

**THE STORY
OF THE
DEMOCRATIC
PARTY**

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Grover Cleveland

"In his campaigns for election and in his administrations of public offices Grover Cleveland, better than any other great American, exemplified common sense and common honesty in politics and in government."

THE STORY
OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

BY
Augustine
HENRY MINOR
A —

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1928

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SET UP BY BROWN BROTHERS LINOTYPERS
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TO MY LOYAL FRIEND AND WIFE,
FRANCES FULTON MINOR,
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED.

FOREWORD

The history of the Democratic Party is well worth the patient study of any American.

Its leaders were potent in framing our government and its principles predominated in the Constitution adopted. It was a major force in Washington's administration, and more powerful as a corrective during the John Adams Presidency than the wrangling Federalist Party was as a positive force. For the following sixty years during which the nation took on size and strength and power it was in control except for four years, and for that short term it held one house of Congress.

The Republican Party with which it has since divided rule was in its inception and during its early years the more truly Democratic of the two. When both these parties came to assume their present positions, the Democratic Party had returned to its original principles.

The history of a party should record its achievements and its failures, merits and faults, what it advocated or opposed, and how and why and under what conditions. To show all these, the main events of each administration must be noticed even at some expense of tediousness.

The history of the great body of the party is told in their votes—what policies and actions they approved, what influenced them, what leaders they chose. To picture these men and times in a story of their party is the function of history.

As a battle-piece must show both contending forces, so must some of Democracy's opponents receive as much attention as some of its champions. Webster, Clay and Calhoun are half the picture of the Jacksonian era. And minor parties require notice as part of the ferment of the voters' minds. Nor should the nearness of events be allowed to dwarf the true perspective.

Times have changed and so have the American people, but not human nature—nor politics essentially. Not the same things, but the same sort of things attract or repel, and analogous causes bring about similar results in 1800 or 1900. Politicians and the voters are constantly doing not the same things but similar

things. There is scarcely a situation which has not its parallel or which is not possible of being paralleled almost any time.

No censure in this book is intended for the rank and file of any party. One is as good as the other. The good sense and honest-mindedness of the average American, even when most misled, are plain to see. Labor striving for its most radical demands, the farmers in their most extravagant claims, the business men in their seeking of tariff and other governmental advantages—the masses of them have been honestly convinced that they were right and that national good would follow on their own welfare.

The most censured judgments of the people have often been vindicated by time, their most applauded verdicts sometimes set aside by their own later decisions with universal approval. As it is the record of the judgments of the American people for much more than half their existence as a nation, the history of the Democratic Party is worth weighty consideration.

HENRY MINOR.

Edgemont,
Macon, Mississippi, 1928.

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THE STORY
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CHAPTER I

EMBRYONIC PARTIES UNDER WASHINGTON

Jefferson and Hamilton—Their Comparative Influence—Dominating Influence of Jefferson—Genesis and Pedigree of Parties—Popular Tendencies—Constitutional Compromises—Times Compromises—Party Lines in Congress—Washington Not a Federalist—His Coalition Cabinet—The Bank Charter—Newspapers—Democratic Societies—Slow Coalescence into Parties—Skeleton Armies—Dread of Revolution—Party Achievements—Our Foreign Policy.

"LIKE two cocks in a pit"—so Jefferson pictures Hamilton and himself in Washington's cabinet. The contest between the political ideas of these two men has been continued ever since. The principles, views, mental trends—everything about them—are of great interest and value to an understanding of American political history, because Americans of their respective ways of thinking, followers of them, have been the brains and bodies of the two major political parties from their day to this.

Both were able, patriotic, high-motived, and, though ambitious, were disinterested so far as material selfish profit was concerned. So jealous of his official honor was Hamilton that he bared the most distressful private scandal to vindicate it, while Jefferson's integrity has never been questioned. Their object was the same, the establishment of a good government, the welfare of the people. But as to the best method to attain that end, as to what was the best government, they differed as widely as the poles.

Jefferson wanted a limited federal government with all powers possible left close to the people in their state governments. Hamilton wanted a strong, centralized, splendid government; he wished to abolish the states. "They are not necessary," he said, "for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue or agriculture." A materialistic view was characteristic of Hamilton's whole theory.

Hamilton did not hate or dislike the people; he had far too great a soul for that; but he distrusted them as a political force and was believed by them to lack respect for their wishes, their opinions and capacities. He looked on a constitution which vested much power in the people as a "frail and worthless fabric," and on our government as an "experiment" which ultimately would fail.

"The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of God: and however generally this maxim has been quoted it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent and changing, they seldom judge or determine right. . . . Take mankind and what are they governed by? Their passions. There may be in every government a few choice spirits who may act from more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than we are."

*Hamilton in speech in
Constitutional Convention.*

"The basis of our government being the opinion of the people our first object should be to keep that right. Were it left to me to decide whether we have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate for a moment to choose the latter.

"I believe in an aristocracy—not an artificial one of birth or wealth, but a natural aristocracy of character and talent. The people are the best judges of who are these natural aristocrats."

Jefferson's Letters.

Hamilton had in fact a better opinion of mankind in general and his compatriots in particular than his rhetoric implied. He was a master publicist; his papers in the *Federalist* are models. Not in them nor in his other public writings, except in his invectives, are to be found appeals to the ignorance, passions, prejudices and selfish interests which he ascribes to the multitude; on the contrary he appeals wholly to their patriotism, good sense and judgment—the very qualities he denies the public.

Jefferson had a keener appreciation of popular follies and prejudices than his generality evinces. Certainly he was always an advocate of a restricted suffrage. But he seemed really to have loved and trusted the great indefinite body politic, and always coupled popular rule with popular education. Besides he had in mind the electorate of his day, the upper half of the citizenry.

Jefferson has been more widely loved, hated and criticized, and is yet. He was a democrat and a Democrat. From his elevation to the Presidency his influence grew, and after his death took on new strength. Until the war between the states hardly one popular appeal, in Congress, on the hustings or by the printed word, was made that he was not invoked or cited in support.

If these things be criteria and this be a government of and by the people no statesman has so much influenced the views of the people of the United States as Jefferson.

To claim, as partisans have claimed and still claim, that Hamilton's influence on our government equals that of Jefferson or Madison is such trifling with the great facts of our history as to be hardly respectful to the intelligence of America. Hamilton's part in framing the Constitution was not important; he himself said in the convention that no man's ideas were more remote from the plan adopted than his were known to be. He repeated this time and time again afterward. His contributions to the *Federalist* and his part in the New York convention were powerful aids to the adoption of the Constitution, but Madison aided much in the former and it was only when Madison had secured adoption by Virginia that New York could be brought into line.

Hamilton's ideas long outlived his influence, and seventy-five years after his death became the main article in the creed of the present Republican party—the paternalistic, materialistic theory of government allying big business, the money power, with government, one contributing governmental favors, the other support of the party. Hamilton's contemporary supporters were of the same mind. Fisher Ames wrote him in 1791, "All the influence of the moneyed men ought to be wrapped up in the Union and in one bank."

Jefferson, whose services as Secretary of State were as vital to the new government as Hamilton's in his department, added to that immediate and practical service under Washington eight years of his own as President, with his party in control of the legislative branch of the government more dominated by him than any of its successors has been dominated by any of his successors. He named his disciple as his immediate successor and this successor's successor, who also was his disciple. He dictated or greatly influenced the policies of our government until his death in 1826.

The party Jefferson founded governed the country from 1801 to 1861 with one four-year intermission, and since then has been the great party in opposition when not in power itself. When the Whig Party was created it claimed to be the true Jeffersonian party and when the modern Republican Party was formed it took his old party name and advocated his doctrines. Jefferson has always been the political prophet either of the great majority or a powerful minority of the American people.

Jefferson's party may be well content with the judgment of

their founder pronounced by a Federalist and Whig, a New Englander representing in his principles and politics that hot-bed of Federalism, the Boston district—Daniel Webster. Harvey, his intimate biographer, says:

“Mr. Webster believed Mr. Jefferson to be a sincere man very true to his convictions. That Jefferson had more deeply impressed his opinions and theories upon the legislation and destinies of the country than any man who had ever lived. . . . Mr. Webster’s comment was that he thought it fortunate that Jefferson’s ideas prevailed. They were, undoubtedly, more in accordance with the spirit of our institutions. Jefferson had stamped his individuality, his peculiarities of character upon the institutions and government of the country more strongly than any other statesman of the Republic’s infancy.”

Just about one hundred years later another New Englander, a Republican, Calvin Coolidge, spoke of Jefferson:

“Next to Washington will come Thomas Jefferson, whose wisdom insured that the Government which Washington had formed should be intrusted to the administration of the people. He emphasized the element of self-government which had been enshrined in American institutions in such a way as to demonstrate that it was practical and would be permanent. In him was likewise embodied the spirit of expansion. Recognizing the destiny of his country, he added to its territory. By removing the possibility of any powerful opposition from a neighboring State he gave new guaranties to the rule of the people.”

*Speech of President Coolidge,
at Black Hills, S. D., April 11, 1927.*

Political parties are not born nor made. They evolve, by a process not dissimilar to the Nebular Hypothesis, out of human conditions—economic, occupational, environmental, educational, sentimental, historical. A brief résumé of the whole state of the nation at the time of the formation of the Democratic Party must precede its history proper. Parties now make or adopt issues; in the beginning of our government the issues developed the parties.

The pre-Revolutionary parties of Whig and Tory were mortally wounded by the Declaration of Independence and expired at Yorktown. Then began to form the Federalist and Anti-Federalist parties. They fought their fight in the Constitutional convention and over the adoption of the Constitution. Then under the same names for awhile, but with different align-

ments and objects, they battled in Congress and out over the character of our government under the Constitution.

When the Fathers met in 1787 to frame a government we had a public debt, a great national domain, the Northwest Territory, and we had tariff and other troubles between states. With a shipping and foreign trade, and European holdings to the north, west and south of us, we had foreign complications at our doors.

The domestic portion of our public debt was now largely in the hands of the moneyed class who had purchased it or taken it in trade from the original holders. Land companies and land speculators had large holdings of our western lands. Much capital was invested in ships and in interstate and foreign commerce. It was quite natural and reasonable that these financial and commercial interests should favor a strong and stable government, able and willing to provide for the payment of the public debt, protect our western lands from the Indians and our ships on the seas, adjust tariffs between states and impose duties on foreign goods.

It was equally natural that other men whose interests and views were more local, who lived and traded at home, should view with jealous eye a government which was to take the place of English rule as the superior of their state government. The misrule of England had made them suspicious. Massachusetts was as far from Virginia as England is now, and further from the Carolinas and Georgia. Wherever the seat of government was placed, to a large portion of the people it would be a foreign government and administered by men unknown to most of them. And the spirit of state loyalty was high.

It was an English constituency the convention was legislating for. The people were mostly English; the English common law ran in all the states; all governmental traditions, ideas and practices were English. This Englishism runs through our whole political history.

It was a wise and capable body of men aided by, for its day and time, an enlightened and sensible public opinion, that constructed our constitution, and the result was a series of compromises between the opposing schools of thought.

The Democratic idea prevailed in the constitution of the House, the method of selection of President and Senators and their tenure of office was a fifty-fifty compromise, but the centralization idea had its way in constituting the Judiciary. The judges were to be appointed, not elected; for good behavior, which practically meant life tenure, not for short terms. And the powers given the

federal courts were such that later on Chief Justice Marshall was to do more to fix the nature of some phases of this government than any other one man except some members of the convention.

Now, one hundred and forty years later, time has worked out its compromises. We have a strong, stable, centralized government with as broad powers as Hamilton could have wished, due in part to a war between the states, but more to railroads and telegraphs and other annihilators of time and distance which have made the United States one great municipality, as it were.

But this centralized government is in the hands of the people to a greater extent than Jefferson ever advocated. Every adult citizen, male and female, regardless of property qualifications or religion, save those debarred by ignorance or crime, is entitled to vote. They elect the Senators direct and, in reality, the President. Gone are the barriers between the people and their government and officers. The ship of state has finally been remodeled to Federalistic plans and specifications, but democracy runs it; and sometimes Democracy is put at the helm.

States rights survive, however, in that the great mass of government still resides in the states. Its most striking features now are that New York with ten million and Nevada with seventy-five thousand inhabitants, and Texas with an area of over two hundred and sixty thousand, and Rhode Island with less than one thousand two hundred and fifty square miles have each two Senators, no more and no less.

And it is possible for a presidential candidate carrying thirteen states—New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Texas, Massachusetts, Missouri, Indiana, Michigan, New Jersey, Kansas, Iowa and Connecticut—by a majority of one in each state, to defeat an opponent carrying thirty-five states by unanimous votes, and having a popular majority of twenty million.

In 1787 the elective franchise in America was on the English basis, a restricted privilege, not a right. Ownership in fee of fifty acres or more or its equivalent in town lots, or the paying of taxes on personal property of equal value was requisite in practically every state. The property basis of the voting privilege was further shown in some jurisdictions by plural voting—one holding the requisite land in more than one election district could vote in each. In all but two states a voter had to be a Protestant. In some New England states there was a theocratic tinge; there was a "democracy in the Fall, but aristocracy in the Redemption"; to vote, one had to be a member in good standing

of the congregation. When the Constitution was adopted more than half of the adult white males of the country were disfranchised.

The battle, after the Constitution carried, was continued, that document serving as a *modus vivendi*. Men of aggressive moral natures, loving order and regulation of human conduct, naturally favored a strong government. Sentiment drew more men into the Republican camp, for state pride, particularly in Virginia and Massachusetts, was strong, and no national feeling had been aroused by the nebulous thing created by the Articles of Confederation.

Environment was a great factor. In New England there were many towns and the farmers for the most part had small holdings and therefore close neighbors. Moreover, the town-meeting system of government had familiarized them to municipal regulations. They had not the repugnance to being interfered with as had many of their Southern brethren who lived on large plantations, each in a small way an independent community where their word was law. The very democracy of New England made it Federalistic while the South was largely Democratic because her leading men were not democrats.

Plato said two thousand years ago that economic factors controlled Greek politics. They were deterministic in America in the 18th Century. The traders, especially those engaged in foreign trade, the capitalists, the manufacturers drifted into the Federalist camp as naturally as water flows down hill, while the agricultural interests quite as inevitably were borne toward the opposite party.

Out of this welter of conflicting ideas and interests grew the two political parties, the Federalist and the Federal-Republican or Republican (Democratic) Party. Much confusion of ideas and history would have been avoided if these parties had been rightly named. John Quincy Adams justly says that after the Constitution was adopted the Federalist should have been called the Nationalist Party, since its theory and object was a national not a federated government. The Republicans, he adds, should have been called Federalists since they really believed in a federal or federated government. Certainly the appellation artfully given them by their opponents—Anti-Federalist—has resulted in the careless or uninformed believing them opposed to our constitution, which is exactly contrary to the fact.

Hamilton and his party sought to interpret the Constitution so as to make it such a document, as they believed (with some

reason) would have been adopted by the convention if it had believed such a constitution could have received the approval of the states. Jefferson and his party fought for the construction, they contended, the states had accepted when they ratified the constitution.

Gulliver describes the trouble besetting the King of Lilliput—his court and people violently divided over the question of the best way to open an egg, into Big-Endian and Little-Endians. Our first President was confronted with an analogous problem. He settled it by placing on his right hand as Secretary of State Jefferson, a Big-Endian who believed the government was based on the broad foundation of the will of the people, and on his left Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury, the Little-Endian who thought the wisdom of selected best minds the basis of a good government.

When the first Congress met in March, 1789, the impression was strong, in and out of Congress, that the Constitution, especially when the agreed-to amendments were added, provided a good government, if only it were interpreted aright. Anti-Federalists who had opposed adoption because they thought the constitution too weak now became Federalists and wished for a rule of construction which would broaden the government's powers. Anti-Federalists whose opposition was based on the opposite theory joined the Republicans and favored a strict construction opposing an extension of federal powers. All these elements were represented in Congress, but neither in nor out of that body were they organized into anything like defined parties. The proceedings of Congress show how slow was the development of parties, and deserve careful consideration.

Neither Jefferson nor Hamilton originated any new school of political economy. Hamilton was the great disciple on this side of the water of what was called the Mercantile school of political science, very popular in England, while Jefferson was the leader of the opposing or Physiocratic school rather predominant in France. Trade and commerce and consequently manufactures were the favored objects of the former school, while the latter regarded agriculture as the basic industry of nations and most deserving of governmental regard and protection. Closely connected and side by side with the contest over the powers of the new federal government these two opposing theories battled for adoption.

The Senate sat behind closed doors. Its votes though show how weak were party lines. The majorities were very often large

and yet Vice-President Adams had to vote to break ties more often, it is said, than all his successors combined. It is to the House proceeding that we must look for congressional political light. The first yea and nay vote, taken May 16, 1789, was on Madison's revenue bill; it carried 41 to 8, and curiously enough the negative votes were cast by Fisher Ames and other high protectionists who thought the law should run, in terms, in perpetuity instead of for only seven years.

The bill establishing the United States bank was supported by men who opposed the administration on nearly every other measure, and the vote on the assumption of state debts was governed by whether the Congressman's state had a large or small debt, *e.g.* Massachusetts and South Carolina for, Georgia and New Hampshire against. The final passage of the assumption measure in exchange for locating the Capital at Washington shows how weak the party lines were.

Some of the administration measures were defeated in this Congress; some carried four to one. There does not appear, from the speeches or votes, that there was any party coherence worth speaking of. There were no concerted party policies, programs or caucuses. Ames and Madison in Congress were bellwethers of changing, shifting flocks.

The administration gained support as the government gained the confidence of the people and public men were finding themselves. Of the 21 principal measures of the First Congress, including the bank bill, assumption of states' debts bill and liquor tax, 41 Congressmen voted with the administration more often than against, 23 against more times than with, and one, Floyd, of New York, tied. Of the 41 administration supporters, only 24 gave twice as many votes for as against the administration. Smith, of South Carolina, Hamilton's mouthpiece in Congress, was the most uncompromising Southern Federalist. Yet he voted often with the Republicans. Geographical lines were stronger than party or factional ones.

In the Second Congress, 1791-93, the leaders at least became more regular. On 27 distinctly administration measures Ames voted 26 times with the administration and was absent on one vote. Smith of South Carolina and Benson of New York made the same record, and several others approximated it. Madison opposed 23 of these measures and supported two. The other fifty or more members followed Ames' lead sometimes, sometimes Madison's. Roughly speaking 32 might be classed as consistent supporters, 23 consistent opponents of the administration, and 14

unattached. Both factions had solidified to some extent but were far from being organized into parties.

The Republicans (Democrats) led by Madison forced the first ten amendments to the Constitution through the first session of Congress. The Federalists hated these restrictions on federal power, especially the tenth, which specifically reserved to the states and the people the powers not granted to the United States. They endeavored to delay and thus defeat the adoption of the amendments, but when Madison after repeated failures to obtain action by Congress calmly announced that unless Congress acted, a convention of the states would be called, the Federalists threw up their hands, fearing lest such a convention would take away much of the power they already claimed for the federal government. This placing of amendments in the Constitution is Democracy's first great achievement.

All leaders of both parties felt in 1792 that the new government was not firmly enough established to risk a contest for party control of it and joined in insisting on Washington standing for reëlection. George Clinton, Republican (Democrat), ran against John Adams for second place, carrying New York, Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia, 50 electoral votes, against 77 for Adams. The conservative idea of letting well enough alone helped Adams, and many just men could see no reason for humiliating an old patriot by turning him out of office.

The Third Congress, 1793-95, shows some consistent voting. There were 103 members of the House now. Sixty of these voted more often with than against the administration on its 33 principal measures, including various revenue laws, non-intercourse with Great Britain, standing army, increase of army and navy, naturalization laws and assumption of states' debts.

The administration's greatest majority was on one detail of the adjustment of state debts, 60 to 27; Ames and Macon of Georgia were together for once, and Madison in the other column. Its most decided defeat was on a proposed stamp duty; here the leaders changed sides, Ames and Smith and other Congressmen representing commercial and shipping districts opposed, while Madison and Macon supported the bill.

The Fourth Congress, 1795-97, covered the last two years of Washington's administrations. Jefferson and Hamilton were out of the cabinet and Pickering and Wolcott in their places, but both leaders were active through their friends and followers in influencing legislation.

By a vote of 52 to 36 the House refused to put the military

appropriation within the President's discretion. The admission of Tennessee brought up the slavery question and the vote was sectional. The yeas and nays, after the two leaders left the cabinet, show a distinct falling off of administration support and apparently more independent voting. Andrew Jackson is found voting with Ames and opposite Madison against a land tax, and with both for a tax on slaves.

The executive branch of the government under Washington was non-partisan or rather bi-partisan. The Federalists with pitiful insistence claim Washington a Federalist, but the facts show otherwise. His first cabinet had in it two Southerners and Republicans (Democrats), Jefferson and Randolph, and two Northerners and Federalists, Hamilton and Knox. He held the balance even, and his was a balanced administration, a coalition government. His bi-partisan attitude was expressed in his letter to Jefferson:

"My answer invariably has been that there were as many instances of my having decided against as in favor of the party alluded to (Hamilton). In short that I was no party man myself, and that the first wish of my heart was, if parties did exist, to reconcile them."

Washington's farewell address was a plea against parties, especially geographical parties. His actions while President did not belie his words. Chief Justice Marshall in his *Life of Washington* says it was Washington's policy, when his cabinet differed on questions he considered open, to allow the Secretary in whose department the matter lay to have his way. The record does not show that he was over-influenced by any member of his cabinet. Nor did he do one official partisan act.

The main reliance of the Federalists to prove Washington's Federalism is his approval of the bank charter. Jefferson and Hamilton at his request each gave written opinions on the constitutionality of the act. Authorities say that Jefferson's paper is one of the best of all expositions of the theory of strict construction of the Constitution while Hamilton's is one of the ablest arguments for the doctrine of implied powers. Washington signed the bill, and this has been taken by Federalist historians as proof that Hamilton won Washington over to Federalism.

Washington had presided over the Constitutional Convention. He knew, and was reminded of the fact, that the convention turned down emphatically a proposition to empower Congress to charter corporations solely because that would permit the

chartering of a bank. He knew, too, that later on the power to charter an inter-state canal company was denied because it was argued that under guise of such authority a bank might be chartered. He knew that framers of the Constitution intended that Congress should not have power to charter a bank. The fact seems to be that he signed the bill, as other Presidents have been constrained to stretch the Constitution, because he was convinced that a national bank was an absolute necessity. Madison, years later, signed the renewal of the bank charter under the same constraint. Washington signed the bill with the greatest reluctance. He held it so long that it was rumored that if it had a veto attached to it, the validity of the veto would be contested as having been exercised too late—after the bill had become a law by not having been vetoed in ten days.

On the bill apportioning representatives in Congress Washington overruled Hamilton and followed Jefferson, as he did in some other matters, especially those affecting our foreign relations. The record bears out the truth of Washington's statement that he favored one man or party no more than another.

Some of the panegyrists of Jefferson and Hamilton, in their enthusiasm for their particular hero have neatly in manner and roughly in effect divided all of Washington's statesmanship and political ability between these two Secretaries of his, leaving him only his military renown and his title of Father of his Country. Then with an abortive sense of justice each seeks to compensate Washington for what they have taken away from his fame by crediting him with all the merit and achievements of their particular hero's rival.

Washington was the strongest man politically and otherwise of the three, and neither could have accomplished anything in opposition to him. It was years before Jefferson's influence extended from New Hampshire to Georgia and Hamilton never was strong throughout the nation, while Washington's power pervaded every state, every community. No man has ever been quite so entirely President of the United States as Washington was. He was the best politician of his day in the broad sense, else he could never have mastered the cabals of his enemies in the Continental Congress and in the army, nor have driven successfully such a double team in his cabinet as Jefferson and Hamilton.

Washington was no Federalist. Monroe was one of the most astute politicians America has ever produced. In discussing with Andrew Jackson, in 1816, the Federal leaders and principles of Washington's time he wrote:

"I thought Washington was opposed to their schemes, and not being able to take him with them, they were forced to work, in regard to him, underhanded, using his name and standing with the nation, as far as circumstances permitted, to serve their purposes."

John Adams said: "Washington appointed a number of Democrats and Jacobins of the deepest dye to office."

Washington's Federalism consisted in doing what every strong President has done, notably Jefferson in purchasing Louisiana, —stretched his authority in imperative cases for national, not partisan, purposes. When what he might have done toward Federalizing the government is contrasted with what he actually did it seems that he was more of a conservative than a radical force in that direction. If toward the last he had a Federalist cabinet, it was because Jefferson declined to reënter it and Madison, wisely knowing his own talents, preferred fighting Federalism in Congress rather than in the cabinet. In the face of these facts to assert that Washington was a Federalist is an imputation on his honor and political integrity not to be borne. Washington tried to return to a balanced administration. Van Buren goes so far as to intimate that Washington, realizing the change in the political sentiment of the nation, intended giving Jefferson or Madison the lead in his cabinet and making his latter administration Republican (Democratic). His support of Adams was support of the government threatened with internal dissension and foreign war; he would have given support to the Republicans (Democrats) had they been in power.

The newspapers of our early days were small and new with neither the dignity nor responsibility that come with age and size. Many were owned and conducted by printers who established them not because they were newspapermen, but because they were printers. The foremen of the composing room were the editors. The papers were often grossly intemperate and vituperative and our political journalism took its cue from its English brother at a most licentious age. In fact Cobbett (Peter Porcupine) and Duane were Englishmen with London newspaper experience and Callender a Scotch pamphleteer.

Jefferson, writing to Washington in 1792, said of two of the leading editors, Fenno, Federalist, and Freneau, Republican:

"They are rivals for public favor. The one courts them by flattery, the other by censure, and I believe that the one has been as servile as the other severe."

"Take away thrones and crowns from among men," Jefferson

read in Fenno's paper about the time he took his place in the cabinet, "and there will soon be an end of all dominion and justice. There must be some adventitious properties infused into the government to give it energy and spirit, or the selfish turbulent passions of men can never be controlled."

John Adams had written, "the elective method wherever tried, has been found to be a failure; the system of hereditary tenure has the sanction of history—the prestige that comes from years of successful operation."

No wonder a man of Jefferson's views wanted an opposition paper and he with Madison and Henry Lee, the last furnishing the financial backing, established Freneau and his *National Gazette*.

An interesting phase of our political life in Washington's second administration was the formation of many clubs—"Democratic Societies" they were termed. Jefferson favored them partly because many were French in their leanings, and because they encouraged public discussion and popular interest in government. Hamilton, on the contrary, hated them and induced Washington to fulminate against them in his 1794 message. The result was to bring many of their members into Jefferson's party.

Here then were the party leaders in the cabinet and in Congress and the party organs of propaganda, and the process of forming parties from the mass of the people were carried on. But it was years ere either party had, to use a military simile, anything more than skeleton armies. They gradually secured officers and skeleton companies and regiments. There were some forty smaller party papers, local journals scattered over the country, most of them in New England, which drummed up recruits. By the time of the Adams-Jefferson 1796 campaign each party had a few battalions of regulars, but the great mass of each army were militia serving at will and frequently changing sides.

In the body politic there were numerous partisans but the great majority were unfixed in opinion and party or factional allegiance. One event would throw them on one side; another draw them to the other. The government was new and untried, the times uncertain and changing. Thinking men were fairly well fixed on some general principles such as the loose or strict construction of the Constitution, but where the question was close, local or sectional considerations controlled. And they differed much on lesser questions.

There were leading men who thought we were veering to a

monarchy, leading men who thought we were on the verge of a revolution as violent as the French Revolution. Even in 1798 Jefferson wrote that "the Alien and Sedition laws were but experiments on the American mind to see if it would bear an open violation of the constitution. If so, then another act making Adams President for life would surely follow; then another fixing the succession in his family, and finally the members of the Senate would hold office for life."

A little later on Fisher Ames, justly rated as one of the ablest and soundest and most representative of New England statesmen, was bitterly prophesying that a democratic government could not live. He foresaw direful consequences if Jefferson defeated Adams. He heard, so he told his hearers, "the clank of chains and whispers of assassins, the barbarous dissonance of mingled rage and triumph in the yell of the infuriated mob," and even "smelled the loathsome steam of human victims offered in sacrifice."

John Bach McMaster says in his history:

"The fact that Jefferson ever wrote such folly is enough to deprive him of every possible claim to statesmanship." He is silent on the equal or greater folly of his admired Ames. Jefferson had the history of every republic in the past except Switzerland to justify his fears; Ames had only the French Revolution to support his.

All good all-Americans are comforted to know that even the culture and wisdom of the Adams and Ames families were divided. While Fisher Ames' "days were heavy with dread" and his "nights restless with horror," his elder brother, Dr. Nat Ames, of the same town, his equal in education and character, if not in fame, was writing in his diary "Jefferson will be Vice-President, which I hope will introduce him finally to be President." And old Samuel Adams, "the Father of the Revolution," staunch Democrat and Republican, was smiling graciously from the windows of his mansion as Governor of Massachusetts at a mob passing by with an effigy of Jay to be carried to the docks and burned as a demonstration against the Federalist treaty with England.

Our foreign policy was a burning issue for years and had great effect in lining up our people into the two parties. There was great sympathy for the French people; they had been our allies and Frenchmen had fought side-by-side with Americans—and against the British. From us, many thought, France had imbibed a love of freedom and these held us morally responsible for the

French Revolution. Early French victories were celebrated from Boston to Charleston. There was a strong demand that we join France against the Allied Powers.

But if the majority of sympathy was with France, the majority of our trade, some say seven-eighths, was with England. There were many influential men of English sympathies. Then the executions of Louis and Marie Antoinette had an effect on American sentiment analogous to that produced by the sinking of the *Lusitania* in 1915. The atheism promulgated by the French revolutionaries alienated many; England was regarded as the defender of religion. Genet's insulting of Washington turned many from France. A counter-revolution set in, to undo, some believed, the accomplishment of ours. Jefferson and his Republican friends fought it off.

England seized our ships and condemned them and their cargoes, she impressed our seamen, and denied us rights of neutral trade. The French seized our ships and either confiscated their cargoes or forced the owners to take pay in worthless assignats. Their minister here insulted Washington; their government in Paris insulted our minister; France treated the crews of seized American ships with injustice and cruelty. These things in a way kept the balance more even in the public mind of that day than did the British detention of our ships and the German sinking of passenger ships a century and more later. A popular demonstration against some British aggression would be followed a week later by a similar outburst against some French outrage. The populace swayed from side to side.

But many men got into the habit of defending France, a sister republic fighting for freedom, and abusing England, the head of a royal alliance putting down a republic. Others became fixed on the opposing side. At first there were no more party lines in American pro-British and pro-French leanings than in our pro-Ally and pro-German sympathies in 1914, though there were more pro-French among the Republicans; and more pro-British among the Federalists.

A few leaders in cabinet and Congress and in the states did not constitute a national party, however organized their joint action was. The unorganized, in fact utterly disorganized condition of parties among the people at large so late in 1794 is exemplified by the Massachusetts state election that year, and public opinion in Massachusetts, by reason of its town-meetings system of government was many times better organized than in any other state. The Federalists nominated for governor

Chief Justice Cushing, who, they said, "was not the head of any party." Later they added old Samuel Adams for Lieutenant-Governor. But Adams' friends had already nominated him for first place. In all eight men were nominated by friends for the two offices. Adams, the hard-boiled Republican, was elected by a large majority in this strong-hold of Federalism. To emphasize the party confusion existing, Berkshire, the most anti-Federalist district in the state, was the only county he did not carry.

Similar evidence of the weakness or absence of party lines in the body politic can be gathered from elections in other states.

Briefly summarized, in 1796 the Federalists could fairly claim as party successes the funding of the debt, the assumption of the debts of the states, the establishment of the Bank of the United States, the Jay treaty, the tariff law so far as its protective feature was concerned, especially the low tariff on raw molasses and the high tariff on manufactured rum, and the excise law.

The Republicans could claim the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the location of the capital at Washington, the maintenance of the binding force of our treaty with France which formed and fixed the genius of our foreign policy.

Next to and hardly second in importance to the additions to the Constitution was the Republican (Democratic) achievement in fixing the fundamental character of our diplomacy. When the royal government was overthrown in France and war between France and England broke out the gravest diplomatic problems were presented to the United States. Washington consulted his cabinet. All agreed on neutrality, but there were sharp differences between the views of Jefferson and Hamilton on other questions involved.

Jefferson insisted that our treaties with France were still binding as agreements between the American and French peoples, either of which could change their own forms of government at will without forfeiting treaty rights. Hamilton, consistently with his characteristic ideas of the relative consequence of governments and peoples, argued that our treaties had been made with the Bourbon government and that government having been overthrown our obligations went with it.

Washington held with Jefferson and thus was first established as a foundation principle of our foreign policy that broad generosity and perfect good faith, that abstraction of American diplomacy from the technicalities, the double dealing, the

Machiavellian character of European diplomacy, which it is our boast has been the cardinal principle and most distinguished characteristic of American diplomacy ever since.

Had Washington been led by Hamilton into the old-world practice of avoidance of treaty obligations on technical grounds, the essential character of our diplomatic tradition would be the reverse of what it is.

CHAPTER II

FEDERALIST DISRUPTION UNDER ADAMS

The First Battle—The Issues—The Campaign—Significance of Electoral Vote—Cabinet Hamiltonian—Monroe—Alien and Sedition Acts—War Intrigue—Miranda Plot—Reaction—Adams Sees a Light—Judicial Partisanry—Congress—Republican Tidal Wave—Jefferson's Party Activities—Political Atmosphere—Virginia-Kentucky Resolutions—Federalist Dissensions—Democratic Activities—Tammany—New York Election—The Second Battle—Democratic Platform—Tie in Electoral College and in House—The Federalist Party.

THE first open battle between two great political parties in the United States began when Washington positively refused to serve another term. His declination referred only to inclination and duty; nothing was said against a third term in general, nor any reference made to reason or principle.

There were no nominations by caucuses, conventions or legislatures and no party platforms. Hamilton and Jay had champions among the Federalists and Hamilton rather favored Patrick Henry as a candidate, but the party soon centered on John Adams. Jefferson was the only Republican (Democrat) thought of. Thomas Pinckney was given second place on the Federalist ticket, and United States Senator Aaron Burr was Jefferson's running mate. Burr, a Republican, had defeated Philip Schuyler, Federalist, for the Senate although the New York Legislature was Federalist, a victory never clearly explained, but it and geographical considerations gave Burr his place on the ticket.

The Federalist Party was earlier and better organized than its opponent. Its strength lay largely in towns and cities, and among business men, already associated in chambers of commerce and used to organized effort. More widely scattered and among men living far apart, not coming into frequent contact with their fellow men and unaccustomed to concerted action was Democracy's strength. The issues really involved between the parties were the fundamental question of constitutional construction and our foreign policy.

Adams was denounced for having represented as attorney the British soldiers concerned in the Boston Massacre; was criti-

cised for his advocacy of monarchical government in some of his writings, his fondness for titles and his advocacy of them and high prerogatives for the Presidential office. It was argued that he had sons to perpetuate an Adams dynasty in office, while Jefferson's children, being all females, could not succeed to office.

A tremendous lot of ridicule was shot at Adams. He was vain and pompous, much given, though not of aristocratic descent, to use of the terms "the well born," "the canaille multitude." In the Senate debate on official titles Senator Grayson suggested "His Superfluous Excellency" for Adams' title as Vice-President.

Jefferson was called a French Jacobin, a tool of France whom that country was seeking to foist on us as President, an inciter of the Whisky Rebellion. He was ridiculed as a wild visionary, such a philosopher as Swift described in *Gulliver's Travels*. His scientific interest in fossil bones discovered in America, his speculations on the biological differences between the negroes and white men, but most of all his invention of the swivel chair, called a "whirligig" or "turn-about" chair, were the targets of Federalist wit.

In regard to religious freedom Jefferson had written—"The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others. It does me no injury for my neighbor to say there are twenty gods or no god; it neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." This expression, like Hancock's "the tariff is a local issue" and Wilson's "Too proud to fight" though defensible technically, was popularly unfortunate and lost Jefferson many a religious man's vote. Why Jefferson's heterodoxy was so fulminated against and that of Adams's hardly mentioned, though, as Parton says, there was not a pin's difference between them, was due to Jefferson's responsibility for religious freedom and church disestablishment in Virginia. The parsons there, dispossessed of glebe lands and denied financial support from the government, were furiously active against Jefferson, and their clerical brethren in New England, however much they abhorred their theology, approved their politics. Adams had said the doctrine of the Trinity was "an awful blasphemy" and a hindrance to true science. But this hurt nobody's leg or pocket-book and passed unnoticed in the campaign.

Both candidates had long and distinguished records of public service. One had moved the Declaration of Independence, the other had written it; both had been ministers abroad and both served in high office at home. The character, ability and record

of each were thoroughly canvassed before the people and the result may safely be taken as reflecting their judgment, not their folly or ignorance. The two men bore themselves toward each other and the public as gentlemen and statesmen. Jefferson had said of Adams: "He is as disinterested as the Being who made him," and Adams had spoken as highly of Jefferson.

The vote in this election showed Washington's warning against geographical parties justified. All the northern states were Federalist, and Pennsylvania and all states south Republican (Democratic). Economic determinism had much to do with this. In 1795, \$1,181,000 was disbursed in interest and capital payments on the public debt. The four original New England states received \$440,800 of this. Massachusetts alone received much more than all states south of the Potomac; Connecticut more than Virginia, North Carolina and Georgia combined.

Adams received 71 electoral votes, Jefferson, 68; Pinckney, 59, and Aaron Burr, 30. Old Samuel Adams was given 15 of Virginia's votes; Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut received 11 Federalist votes but none from his own state.

Rumors of a plot among some Federalists to supplant Adams for first place with Pinckney resulted in the defeat of the latter for second place, probably; for Adams' friends, to foil this, threw some of their votes to Ellsworth. It seems probable, too, that some of Jefferson's friends were suspicious of Burr and gave their votes to Sam Adams and Clinton. One of Virginia's Republican (Democratic) votes went for Washington—surely a gesture against Burr!

It was a very narrow victory—three electoral votes. One of those votes came from Virginia and one from North Carolina, the people of which states were overwhelmingly for Jefferson. Those two votes cast according to the popular will would have given Jefferson 70 and left Adams with only 69. The Electoral college saved the day for the Federalists.

Under the Constitution Jefferson became Vice-President, an incongruity soon cured by the Twelfth Amendment.

Adams began his administration with a strong and radical Federal Senate majority, and a small and moderate majority in the House. Foreign relations largely dominated politics the next four years. The party in power wanted peace and trade with England; it was anti-French and came later, largely induced by political and military ambitions of some of its leaders, to favor a war with France, to be blocked only by their titular leader and President.

Adams had made a great initial political mistake. He kept Washington's cabinet instead of having one of his own. Pickering, Secretary of State, Wolcott, of the Treasury, and McHenry, of War, all owed their positions to Hamilton and were completely under his domination. They looked on him not on Adams as their chief; later, when the rupture between the two became complete, they were Hamilton's spies on Adams.

Monroe, who had been recalled from his mission to France, asked the reasons for his recall; Pickering crisply declined officially to state them; Monroe published a vindication, moderated in tone by Jefferson's advice, and however much criticised he and it were, he became Governor of Virginia, Secretary of State, and finally President. Resulting from the attack of Monroe was the making public of charges against Hamilton which brought forth his confession of the Hamilton-Reynolds scandal. There were no state statutes, ring rules or other regulations governing political fighting of that day.

Taking advantage of the war spirit the Federalists sought to crush all opposition and entrench themselves in power. The emigrants to this country, the majority being Irish, were haters of arbitrary government in general and England in particular. This threw them into the Republican (Democratic) Party. The Federalists increased the requisite residence here before naturalization from five to fourteen years and in other ways made naturalization difficult. It passed the Alien Act which practically gave the President power to deport any alien he thought dangerous or undesirable. Then came the Sedition Act, aimed largely at the press. Adams did not enforce the Alien Act, but it drove many Frenchmen from our shores, among them Volney. Hamilton, himself an exotic, did not urge its enforcement. Under the sedition law many newspapermen were prosecuted and ten of them convicted, all being Republican (Democratic).

Matthew Lyon, Republican (Democrat) member of Congress from Vermont, was fined \$1,000 and imprisoned four months under the sedition law, for language used in canvassing for reëlection. He had charged the President with "unbounded thirst for ridiculous pomp, foolish adulation and selfish avarice." Friends visited Lyon in prison and paid his fine; Vermont sent him back to Congress.

One humble citizen of Newark was fined \$200 and sent to prison for two months, for saying that he wished some of the wadding from the cannon being fired in honor of the President's passing through his village, would hit the honoree "in the broadest

part of his trousers." One wonders what his punishment would have been had he said, as the daughter of one President said of one of her father's successors, that the President looked like he had been weaned on a pickle; or called him a Byzantine Logothete.

This is the only attempt in our history by law to muzzle the press of the country except when we were actually at war. The federal authorities in 1908 attempted to have the New York World prosecuted for what might be called seditious utterances but the case was thrown out of court.

The Federalist leaders engineered a great war scare in 1798. The army was increased and only the faithful Federalists were given commissions. Propaganda that the French Directory, in spite of England's and our own navy, would subdue America as it had European countries was broadcast. It afterwards developed that there was much under the surface in all this. Hamilton and his cabal were deep in the Miranda plot, to join with England in an attack on French and Spanish possessions in this hemisphere. England was to furnish the navy, we the army; England was to have all the West Indies and South America as markets; we to gain the Floridas and all Spanish Louisiana east of the Mississippi. Here was a Federalist policy the very reverse of the Monroe Doctrine later to be enunciated.

Adams was not in the plot, and silently discountenanced the whole scheme. He was cool toward the army and strong for the navy. He told his Secretary of War that there was no more prospect of seeing a French army here than in Heaven; he grumbled at the cost of the military preparations, and wondered why any man of sense should join the army in preference to the navy. But great public feeling had been aroused and the people demonstrated great loyalty. Resolutions from meetings all over the country and offers for service poured in. It was flood tide with the Federalists the spring and summer of 1798. They flew high and the term "High-flying Federalists" applied to Hamilton and his clique became as common as "Old Guard" or "Standpatters" were in 1912. The French cockade disappeared from America and the black cockade of old Revolutionary days reappeared.

The spring state elections reflected the popular feeling. Jay defeated Chancellor Livingston for Governor in New York, but the Republicans (Democrats) secured six out of ten Congressmen, among them Edward Livingston. The Federalists gained

in New England, New Jersey and Delaware. Newspapers hitherto neutral or independent came out strongly for the administration, and the Republican (Democratic) press greatly lost in circulation.

But very soon a gradual reaction set in. Adams' opinion, especially in matters concerning war, carried much less weight than had Washington's, and his quick temper was known. There were many who still differentiated between the French Directory and the French people and thought gratefully of France's aid during the Revolutionary War. The alien and sedition laws were unpopular and numerous petitions against them were sent in. The war taxes were greatly resented, especially that on dwelling houses, and the Treasury reported a falling off of \$1,000,000 in revenue. The soldiers mistreated the people and hatred of standing armies revived; suspicions arose that the army was wanted for domestic objects; the money lenders demanded eight per cent instead of six on the war loans; the War Department was badly handled, the soldiers inadequately clothed, provisioned and equipped; enlistments were slow, it being charged that while before the passage of the War Act there were on file 15,000 applications for commissions, after its passage scarce 3,000 soldiers could be enlisted; many of these deserted and ten dollars reward was advertised for the apprehension of a deserter. Yet they did not dare execute one when recaptured. The idea got out that France would not make war on us unless forced to.

Elbridge Gerry, who had remained in Paris after his colleagues had left, in spite of insults and neglect had managed to impress the Directory to some extent, and a decree was issued restraining depredations to our commerce. Then Dr. Logan, a volunteer emissary from our country to France, returned with peaceful news. France released Americans held as prisoners and gave other friendly assurances.

Adams began to see a light. He had resented being overruled, by the interposition of Washington, in fixing the relative rank of Hamilton and Knox in the new army and also that all control of army appointments and management was taken from him. He became less trustful of, and less managed by his cabinet. He cut from his message the cabinet had prepared the arrogant paragraph dealing with resumption of diplomatic relations with France and inserted a milder one of his own. A caucus of High-flying Federalists was called to override him but the plot did not receive enough support. Then without consulting

his cabinet he in February, 1799, named Murray, our representative at the Hague, minister plenipotentiary to France.

With this assertion of himself in opposition to his cabinet and party leaders a new epoch began in Adams' administration. His cabinet and their associates in the cabal began to look around for a Presidential candidate other than Adams in the next year's campaign. They planned to have Washington run again, but he died before the plan matured.

The partisan attitude and violent and abusive conduct on the bench of some of the federal judges in prosecutions under the sedition act were features of the politics of the day. They copied the manners and bearing of the infamous Jeffries, and were about as popular with the people. But the political effect of their conduct was not felt until the Presidential election. Chase's going his circuit in 1800 was a political campaign, and a disastrous one for his party.

The Senate all during Adams' administration was strongly Federalist, a relief to that party since Jefferson had the casting vote. Still sitting behind closed doors it does not figure so largely as the House in the political picture. Of this Senate Andrew Jackson was a member. Congress passed all the administration bills for defensive measures, but the House held the Senate down on war vessels and army increases. The debates were bitter, and men of the two parties, long intimate friends, crossed streets to avoid meeting.

The first session of the Sixth Congress, the last held in Philadelphia, met in December, 1799. The laws passed by this Congress at its first session, and in its last which was held in Washington, were of little if any political significance. William Henry Harrison took his seat as territorial delegate from the Northwest Territory, and laid part of the foundation for his future Presidency by getting laws passed enabling settlers to buy small tracts of government owned land direct from the government and not through land companies. John Randolph was another new member destined to fame.

The hall of the House of Representatives in Washington was small and the Speaker denied the stenographers reporting the debates permission to sit within the bar. The Republicans (Democrats) took up cudgels in behalf of the press; the Federalists upheld the Speaker, but the vote was a tie, 45 to 45, and Speaker Sedgwick upheld himself, and the reporters were banished to the galleries.

The spring state elections of 1800 was a Democratic tidal

wave. The Federalists lost in New York. Adams suspected treachery among the leaders of his party there as he had for some time suspected it in his cabinet. He asked for and obtained McHenry's resignation. He requested Pickering's and when he demurred, dismissed him. John Marshall was made Secretary of State, and Samuel Dexter given the War Department. Marshall was a Federalist but under the domination of no man; he frankly disapproved of the alien and sedition laws, and this incurred the distrust of the more bitter Federalists. "His character is done for," wrote Ames when Marshall's stand on these laws was made public. Marshall approved of the French mission, and refused to support the Federalist scheme to steal the next election under Senator Ross' bill.

Jefferson as Vice-President occupied a great vantage point. He was placed where he could see and hear everything, but would bear no responsibility for the acts of the strong Federalist Senate. He was in the center of things political and in close touch with the leaders of his own party in the House. The Republican (Democratic) policy was to insist firmly on American neutral rights, steadily stand as friends of the French people and against English aggression. All that a strong and able minority could do they did, but they were ridden over roughshod many times.

The Federalists' chief target was Jefferson, and their choice maneuver was to represent every attack on the administration or their party as an attack on Washington. They met with little success in this. While in Washington's cabinet Jefferson had kept in touch by correspondence with Democrats in every state of the Union. He kept up this practice while Vice-President, and though his old friends Sam Adams and John Hancock had passed away, young men took their places. He cultivated Tammany, which he regarded as an offset to the Cincinnati.

The bitterness of politics was reflected in the social life of Philadelphia. Gentlemen such as Jefferson and Madison were not ostracized, but were plainly shown that their politics was socially unpopular. Their lesser brethren were sneered at and scorned. Men like Logan, whose house had been often visited by Washington, lost social popularity if not caste by becoming Republicans (Democrats). This is amusing now, for the preference for a "Codfish" over a "Plantation" aristocracy is recognized to be a matter of taste rather than of judgment, and the distinction between a combination of merchant princes and a slave-holding oligarchy to be not a social one.

Even the dead were not free from insult, and the statue of Benjamin Franklin was smeared with mud from the gutters because he had been a "filthy Democrat."

Jefferson and his colleagues kept their heads, and held their tongues. But the Boston Chronicle was publishing letters signed "Benedict Arnold," containing offers of services in the war for England and congratulating his countrymen for now shaking off their delusion as he had predicted eighteen years ago they would. And it ran in its columns for days Josiah Quincy's speech of 1774 against standing armies. Tammany's toast was that all the Tories who wanted the United States to engage in a war be placed in the front of the first battle.

Such was the political atmosphere when the Adams administration put through their war measures—hot and humid. It permeated the House debates, the newspapers, society, all public and private meetings. Intolerance prevailed everywhere.

Jefferson was a master politician. Some say he was the first "Easy Boss." Unlike Hamilton he led rather than drove his party associates, nor was he given to belittling his opponents, to others or in his own mind; Hamilton's bust adorned the library at Monticello. He valued the press as Hamilton did, and used it, but did not resent the opposition papers' attacks on himself; he was a philosopher in more ways than one, calm, patient and resourceful, an opportunist politically, but working always toward a great and certain end.

The 1798 elections had some consolation for the Republicans. The Federalists elected eight Congressmen in Virginia, but the legislature and a senatorship were won by the Republicans. They elected a Senator in North Carolina and one in South Carolina, Charles Pinckney. They secured six Congressmen from New York, gained two in New Jersey, and had eight out of Pennsylvania's thirteen. Yet this left the Federalists still in control of both houses of Congress.

His opponents recognized the growing strength of Jefferson, and set out to stop it. The Federalist newspapers were full of abuse of him. The New England clergy and colleges were used; degrees were given prominent Federalists and sermons preached against Jefferson's atheism and his Jacobinism. Timothy Dwight, President of Yale, came to be called the "Pope of Federalism." The lesser fry was not neglected. Fenno's Gazette advocated the discharge of all artisans engaged in manufacture of munitions who were Republicans (Democrats). It was now that the prosecutions under the sedition law

began. Some Democratic writers call this time the "Reign of Terror."

In the summer of 1798 the famous Kentucky Resolutions were framed at Monticello; W. C. Nicholas of Virginia and John Breckenridge of Kentucky were present, and possibly Madison too. Shortly afterwards Madison drew the Virginia Resolutions which closely followed them. Both documents were aimed at the alien and sedition laws. The Kentucky Resolutions were adopted November the 10th, the Virginia Resolutions December 21st.

The Virginia-Kentucky Resolutions are sometimes called the first party platform in American politics. They began with a strong assertion of loyalty to the Constitution, and to the government in all constitutional measures, and declared a warm attachment to the Union. They asserted that the Union was a compact between the states, and that the states had a right, and were in duty bound to maintain their liberties against unconstitutional violations. They declared the alien and sedition acts palpable infractions of the Constitution and expressly violative of the right of freedom of speech, of the press and of conscience. They appealed to other states to join in declaring these acts unconstitutional and in maintaining the rights and liberties of the states and the people, and unite in requesting Congress to repeal the obnoxious acts. Copies were sent to the legislatures of all the other states, accompanied by an argumentative address, urging united action by all the states.

The resolutions were approved or censured according to the political complexions of the legislative houses of the various states. The Democrats laid themselves open to a charge of disloyalty, but the Federalists were forced to endorse the unpopular laws.

It seems that the Resolutions would have been better political propaganda for the Republicans (Democrats) had less been said of the compact theory of government and the whole case rested on the iniquity of the alien and sedition laws. Possibly the drafters thought that the gravity of the situation would be enhanced by showing the fundamental issue involved. At any rate a patriotic handle was afforded the Federalists and they used it.

The day that Adams asserted himself and sent our new envoys to France the Federalist Party became a house openly divided against itself. A division had long been in process between those Federalists who, despairing of perfecting under

the Constitution such a government as they favored, and indeed believed essential, hoped that through a war or some great crisis the government might be altered, and those moderate Federalists who believed a strong enough government could be built upon the Constitution.

The division now came. The Hamiltonian cabinet remained, but with diminished powers, for Adams no longer trusted it, nor gave his Secretaries the free hand he had before allowed them. Washington's death weakened the anti-Adams faction. Young Fenno, successor to his father, gave up the *Gazette of the United States* in disgust, and Cobbett's return to England ended *Porcupine's Gazette*. Marshall, the Federalist leader in Congress, was a moderate. The High-flying Federalists were in desperate case.

Then was hatched a scheme to defraud Jefferson of the Presidency should he win it. Senator Ross fathered a bill which in effect would give Congress power to name the President in case of any contest. This law had the support of many Federalist leaders and passed the Senate 16 to 12. In the House it had hard sledding. Marshall criticized it in the hall and out, and when finally dissuaded from open opposition he offered an amendment; other amendments followed and the bill died between the two Houses. Marshall lost more ground with the Federalist cabal for he was blamed for the defeat. Marshall thus aided Jefferson in reaching the Presidency as Hamilton was to do later.

All during the sessions of Congress Jefferson had met his lieutenants almost nightly at his hotel, the Indian Queen. Now he returned to Monticello, but wrote many letters. Republican (Democratic) artillery was trained on the alien and sedition laws, the direct tax, the cost of the army and navy, the usurious interest charged the government, the violation of the constitutional rights of the states, the standing army and the multiplication of offices. Congress' right to its constitutional share in the government, frugality in government and the payment of the national debt, free commerce with all nations, political connections with none, the liberty of speech and the press were all advocated. The Democrats in Congress in their speeches, and in great numbers of letters sent to their constituents spread these doctrines abroad. Democratic newspapers were fostered and new ones established. An aggressive campaign was in full force.

Pennsylvania as a whole was Democratic, but the Federalists controlled the Senate. The best the Democrats could do was

to get eight of the fifteen electors. This made New York the pivotal state and both parties exerted their utmost efforts there for the electors were to be chosen by the Legislature and a solid block of twelve votes was involved. The Federalists were under direct management of Hamilton, Burr commanding their opponents.

Tammany for the first time loomed large in a national contest; up-state New York was regarded as equally divided, and the city would decide the matter. This contest between Hamilton and Burr was a battle of giants, for no one can question Burr's ability as a politician, especially in a narrow field.

Hamilton wanted Federalist electors, but such men as he could control, with the idea of supplanting Adams with Pinckney. Calling a secret caucus of his intimate followers they framed a slate made up of mediocre controllable men. Burr, by some means, found out immediately their program and ticket.

Using Tammany as his center, Burr threw out flanking forces of young men devoted to him or strong in their faith in Jefferson. He persuaded the Tammany men to postpone their factional fights, put off personal quarrels, ignore local considerations, subordinate everything to carrying the state for Democracy. His candidates were the opposites of Hamilton's. He prevailed on General Horatio Gates, ex-Governor George Clinton, Osgood, ex-Congressman and ex-Postmaster General, and the distinguished Brockholst Livingston, to run for the General Assembly. To induce such men to make such a race required art, finesse, logic and eloquence, but Burr accomplished it, and the Federalists were paralyzed. The other men on the Republican ticket were strong by reason of local reputation or popularity and brought more strength to the ticket.

The two tickets in parallel columns was an unanswerable argument. They presented the most obvious and striking contrast. Who would believe the charges against Jefferson when such men stood for him? Jefferson a visionary, an enemy to the Constitution and government, and such men supporting him? It was to laugh.

To elect these men and their colleagues on the Republican (Democratic) ticket, Burr conducted a most intensive campaign, a card-indexed, individual voter's campaign, as well as having precinct, ward and mass meetings addressed by orators. The result was a sweeping victory. Hamilton's disciples ascribe this defeat to Burr's mastery of political intrigue and trickery, but the clearly apparent facts are that in this particular contest,

both during and after the election, it was Hamilton who intrigued and schemed while Burr played an open game.

Then in Philadelphia there was a secret meeting of the High-flyers, and Hamilton, seeing how Pennsylvania had been kept out of the enemy's column, wrote Governor Jay a letter proposing that he call an extra session of the existing New York Legislature, which was Federalist, and change the law governing the choosing of electors. But Jay, who had been burned in effigy all over the country for his Hamiltonianism, balked at this. At his death the letter was found among his papers annotated in his own handwriting thus—"Proposing a measure for party purposes which I think would not become me to adopt."

There was bad news for the Federalists from other states—Republican (Democratic) gains in New Hampshire and Massachusetts, new papers started and a great activity among the enemy forces from Portsmouth, New Hampshire to Savannah, Georgia.

Accepting the inevitable, the Federalist caucus met in Philadelphia and nominated Adams and Pinckney, but still with the card up the sleeve of substituting Pinckney in the first place if possible. They adopted no platform.

No one was mentioned or thought of for first place on the Republican (Democratic) ticket but Jefferson. A few days after the New York election, at a Democratic caucus in Philadelphia Burr was nominated for Vice-President. It was agreed that to New York was due this place, and after much debate Burr was named, it being decided that to him rather than to Clinton belonged the credit for the New York victory which practically assured success to the party that fall.

The Republican (Democratic) Congressional caucus adopted the first national party platform at the meeting in Philadelphia in 1880. Jefferson is credited with drawing it.

Section 1 declares for an inviolable preservation of the Constitution in the sense it was adopted by the states; 2, opposes monarchizing its features; 3, maintains states rights; 4, favors frugal administration, liquidation of public debt, not its increase or continuance as a public blessing, and opposes multiplication of offices; 5, declares for reliance for internal defense solely on militia until actual invasion, and only a protective naval force; 6, favors free commerce with all nations, political connection with none; 7, neutrality; 8, freedom of religion; 9, freedom of speech and press; 10, liberal naturalization laws; 11, encouragement of science and art.

No one will question Jefferson's responsibility for the last clause.

"Only a protective Navy"—In the 18th century there were American statesmen who asserted that naval competition was bankrupting Europe, attributing the downfall of Spain and the existing poverty of France to excessive naval expenditures. A navy was regarded by some as the most expensive defense, and being removed from contact and control of the people a likely instrument of tyranny, more so than an army. Away from the coast these sentiments were general. Adams signed a bill for sale of some of our vessels and Jefferson acted under it.

Alleged conversations of Adams in which he still advocated a hereditary Chief Executive and Senate, or at least, for life, made many Democratic converts. The failure of the administration to do anything to open the navigation of the Mississippi lost Adams the votes of western men and those interested in western lands. His discharge of Pickering and McHenry had alienated many Federalists; his peace policy others.

Much talk and newspaper comment was there now among the High-flying Federalists of secession if Jefferson were elected, and Ames saw his dreadful visions heretofore described. Many feared and many pretended to fear a replica of the French Revolution if the Democrats won.

The bitterness of the clergy against Jefferson in New England and the North generally has been noted and equally bitter were the answers to them of the Democratic press. Adams' views on the Trinity were heretical; it appeared that Pinckney was a Deist, too, and like his opponent a slave-holder. But the odium theologium was directed only at Jefferson, and the super-devout New England followers of the lowly Nazarene ardently advocated the political principles of the Roman patricians who had hunted His disciples as wild beasts.

The views of Jefferson on slavery, the deeply religious tone of many of his utterances and writings, his private acts of benevolence to churches and clergymen, all were given publicity, with much effect on the public, and the piety of Hamilton, Dayton, Sedgwick and others was extolled with sarcastic mirth in the Democratic press.

Hamilton now made a new move. He wrote Adams asking for verification or denial of a report crediting Adams with saying that there was a British faction with Hamilton at its head. Adams ignored the letter. George Cabot, head of the anti-Adams "Essex Junto" suggested to Hamilton the throwing of

Federalist support to Burr. Hamilton wrote a pamphlet defending himself and his friends and bitterly attacking Adams. A month later he again wrote to Adams and again his letter was ignored. On October 1st he sent a signed pamphlet, as bitter as gall against Adams, to the New York Gazette to be printed, not for general circulation but for distribution among leading Federalists.

Burr had known Hamilton's Assembly slate an hour after it was made; he knew of Hamilton's post-election caucus and letter to Jay the day of the event; somehow he secured a copy of this pamphlet even before Hamilton himself had seen it in print. It is said he obtained it from the delivery-man who was taking the printed copies to Hamilton. He straightway gave it to the world through the Democratic newspapers.

Hamilton's pamphlet rocked the political world and shook the foundations of the already divided Federalist house. Hamilton was lashed by the Democratic papers and the Adams part of the Federalist press. The anti-Adams Federalists became indifferent to party success.

Most of the arguments and charges against Jefferson were "old stuff" but one new one was pulled on him in this campaign. He had taken much interest in the flora and fauna of the trans-Mississippi country and had written about them; "Was a man who called a woodchuck a prairie-dog fit to be President?" it was asked.

A plot, which John Quincy Adams always considered the main object of Hamilton's pamphlet, now developed in the South Carolina Legislature; this was to drop both northern candidates and give the state's electoral votes to Jefferson and Pinckney. Pinckney was too honorable to countenance the scheme. If executed it might have brought about a tie between Jefferson and Pinckney, and the Federalist House of Congress would have elected Pinckney.

Marshall, as has been seen, saved Jefferson by defeating the Ross bill; Pinckney, another Federalist leader, rescued him now, and Hamilton is to work for his election later on.

In no provision of the Constitution did its framers depart so radically from existing and accepted practices, in nothing was its action so novel and original as the method prescribed for the selection of President and Vice-President, and twice in the first hundred years did it bring about a "disputed succession" and threaten to resort to arms by political parties—the Jefferson-Burr contest in 1800, the Hayes-Tilden contest in 1876.

It was not until the middle of December that the exact electoral returns were known, and two months later before the House decided the result. The Federalists carried Vermont, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New Jersey, and had 7 votes from Pennsylvania, 5 from Maryland and 4 from North Carolina; all others were Republican (Democratic). The full vote was Jefferson and Burr 73 each, Adams 65 and Pinckney 64, one Rhode Island vote going to John Jay. The caucus nomination had worked well; every Republican (Democratic) elector voted for Jefferson and Burr. But under the awkward electoral machinery set up by the Constitution, the two men were tied for the Presidency and the election was thrown into the House of Representatives which the Federalists controlled.

Two plans were considered by the Federalists,—to elect Burr, or to have the House ballot without result until March 4th, and then have Congress pass a law and select a President pro tem, who of course would be a Federalist. This latter plan was abandoned; if carried out a new election must soon follow, and armed resistance to it was openly threatened.

Despite Hamilton's active and bitter opposition to the plan some Federalists in Congress were determined to elect Burr. Hamilton was out of office and the defeat he had just suffered in the New York election lessened his political prestige. Despite his assertion that there was no man he had more cause to hate than Jefferson and that he "was well with Burr personally"—(they dined occasionally at each other's homes) his opposition to Burr was attributed to local professional and political rivalry. And these Federalists in Congress had their own fish to fry, their own careers to push.

Some thought to elect Burr would divide and destroy, or at least greatly weaken the Republican (Democratic) Party. Some that Burr would be so antagonized by his own party that he would be forced to lean on "good men" *i.e.* the Federalists, even if he would not bind himself to them in exchange for the election.

Adams in a rage refused to interfere. Jefferson called on him to remonstrate against the proposed temporary government. He quotes Adams as saying—"Sir, the event of the election is in your own power. You have only to say you will do justice to the public creditors, maintain the navy and not disturb those holding offices and the government will instantly be put into your hands." Jefferson replied that he would not come into power by capitula-

tion. Later, so Gouverneur Morris wrote, he made a similar statement to him.

There is not a particle of honest evidence that Jefferson made any terms with the Federalists or with Burr though the charge has been unfairly made and unfairly adopted. So far as negative evidence is conclusive, there exists indubitable proof to the contrary. Much of the correspondence of the Federalist leaders, Pickering, Cabot, Griswold, Otis, King and others between themselves has been published. In this they accuse Jefferson of every political wickedness and crime imaginable (except this one) and they repeatedly condemn his removals from office. Yet not once is he accused of breaking faith, of violating any promise to them or to any one else in this respect. It is unbelievable that any ground whatever for such a charge existed or they would have made the welkin ring with it. The charge that Jefferson made terms with the Federalists was trumped up long after the event.

On February 11, 1801, the Federalist House took up the matter of making an unwilling choice between two Democrats. Nine states were necessary to elect. Jefferson received the votes of 8, Burr of 6. Maryland and Vermont were tied. Jefferson received the votes of 55, Burr of 49 Representatives. It was six days later, on Monday's second ballot that the end of the agonizing suspense came. On the thirty-sixth ballot Bayard voted a blank; the Vermont Federalist, Morris, withdrew and Matthew Lyon cast Vermont's vote for Jefferson; the Maryland Federalists cast blank ballots and that state went into the Democratic column. Jefferson was elected, the Federalist Party's brief rule was over and the Virginia Dynasty began its twenty-four years of government.

The latter days of the Adams administration were not glorious. When Pickering and McHenry were dismissed charges were made that great defalcations existed, supported by publication of accounts obtained from a clerk in the Treasury. Wolcott denied any wrong and promised that the accounts would be shown correct as soon as the office opened in Washington. But early in November every book and paper in the War Department was burned; then in January the office of Dexter, now Secretary of the Treasury, was burned under most suspicious circumstances. Wolcott's private belongings there were saved, but the government papers all burned.

The last day of the administration was spent by the Senate in confirming the twenty-three judiciary appointments, by Adams in signing the commissions, and by Marshall in countersigning and sealing them. At midnight the Secretary of State was still

engaged in his task, and did not have time to complete it. Sunrise saw Adams driving out of Washington, avoiding the inaugural ceremonies of his successor. The law forbade the appointment of members of Congress to offices created during their term of office. Adams transferred existing judges to the new judgeships and appointed members of Congress to the old places—a shifty evasion of the law.

Yet Adams was an able, a great and good man. His temper was his weakness and Heaven knows he lately had had enough to arouse the fury of the most patient man on earth. Treachery in his cabinet, treachery in his party, and gross ingratitude and humiliation from those from whom he had every right to expect honor and appreciation.

Adams and Jefferson had been together in the Continental Congress, in Paris together with Franklin. "Prompt, frank, explicit and decisive—not even Samuel Adams was more so," Adams had written of Jefferson in the Continental Congress. The old friendship came to be renewed in time. "I have always loved Jefferson and always shall," said Adams, and in 1824, when his son John Quincy Adams was elected President, he wrote Jefferson—"I call him our John because when you were at the Cul de Sac at Paris, he appeared to me to be almost as much your boy as mine." His last words were "Jefferson still lives." About the finest thing in American partisan politics is this friendship between these two great and good Americans.

It has been the cult of many writers to exalt the Federalist Party into a brilliant body which established this government, molded its form, fixed its principles and started it on its great career. This encomium needs to be reviewed.

That Hamilton, Ames, Morris and many of their associates were brilliant men of great ability and that they accomplished much that was wise and much that has endured is thoroughly true. But only a part of what was accomplished was their work and even that was greatly affected by their opponents.

The beginning of our national fiscal policy may be set down as a Federalist achievement, but that was modeled much after that of England, and, could Hamilton have had his own way entirely, it would have been still more English. Moreover, one of its main features, the Bank of the United States, was later discarded and the decided rejection of and continued antipathy toward such an institution by the people of the United States has been a distinguishing characteristic of our national finances since 1836.

The three great policies established during Washington's administration were our foreign policy, our territorial policy and our fiscal policy. All were determined while Jefferson and Hamilton were in the cabinet. No fundamental question was solved, no major precedent established by Washington after his two great aides left the cabinet. Jefferson's, not Hamilton's ideas prevailed as to our foreign policy and our public domain.

Our foreign policy established under Washington was as much Jefferson's as was our fiscal policy Hamilton's, and is to be credited to the Republican (Democratic) Party. John Bassett Moore, John Sharp Williams and John H. Latane all agree in the opinion that Jefferson's influence in our foreign policy has been greater than that of any other man. This policy was a more original and purely American one than could be said of our treasury methods, and directly opposed to England's course at the time, and before and after. England came, nearly a century later, to follow it, and glorified it into "Splendid Isolation."

On the one and only Federalist administration, that of John Adams, must that party base its claims and we have seen that with all the brilliance and brains of Hamilton, Ames, Cabot, Pickering, the Pinckneys and others, they had not the political ability to get along with their own President or party, or with the people. They were saved from embroiling us in a war with France only by Adams' independent action contrary to the wishes of the party chiefs. Seated in the saddle with every department of the government under their control and a majority of the states Federalist, they accomplished little lasting good to the country and wrecked their party quickly and completely. Adams rather than his party can claim credit for the good accomplished by his administration. As Van Buren points out in his *Origin and Cause of Political Parties*, the Federalists were in auspicious control of the government and had they accepted the Constitution in the sense in which it was known to have been understood by those who framed it and the people who adopted it, they might have long, if not continually, remained in power instead of for only one brief, inglorious administration.

CHAPTER III

DEMOCRATIC DOMINANCE UNDER JEFFERSON

1801-1805

Jefferson—His Policy—Patronage—No Spoilsman—Cabinet—Economy—Gallatin—Federalist Tricks—Louisiana Purchase—Democratic Successes—New York Election—Seventh Congress—Eighth Congress—Lewis and Clark Expedition—Caucus History—1804 Campaign—Burr—Duel with Hamilton—First Political Landslide—Government Stabilized by Jefferson.

THE third President of the United States had a distinguished record of public service. Well-born and the heir to a good landed estate, educated at William and Mary College and a law student under George Wythe, he was elected to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1769 when twenty-six years old. His first act was to present a bill for the gradual emancipation of slaves. His bill for religious freedom, later to become law, his law abolishing primogeniture and his Statute of Descents, the principles and almost the exact provisions of both of which are now the law in practically every state in the Union, and many other measures, aside from his national record, give him unquestionable rank as one of the greatest law-makers of all history.

Jefferson drew the resolutions organizing the committees of inter-colonial correspondence, whereby the Massachusetts system, covering New England, was extended to all the colonies. He was prominent in all Virginia's pre-Revolutionary and Revolutionary activities, and while remaining a member of her Legislature was sent to the Continental Congress in 1775. There he drew the Declaration of Independence. In 1779 he was elected Governor of Virginia and reëlected in 1780. He resigned in 1781 and was sent back to Congress, reëlected in 1783. In 1784 he was sent as our Envoy to France, succeeding Benjamin Franklin; returning to America in 1789 he became Secretary of State. From this office he resigned in 1793 and declined reappointment in 1794; in 1797 he was elected Vice-President. When he took his seat as President in 1801 he had thirty-two years of public service behind him.

The inauguration of Jefferson was celebrated by his party all

over the country; mass meetings, public dinners, great processions, firing of cannon, erection of triumphal arches were features of the day, and all the bands played "Jefferson's March," the most popular piece of music just then.

The ceremonies at Washington were simple. His inaugural address was moderate in tone and hopeful in spirit, and free from partisan feeling. He spoke of the sacred principle that the will of the majority should prevail, but recognized the rights of the minority. "We are brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists. . . . Error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it. . . . Let us then with courage and confidence pursue our own Federal and Republican principles, our attachment to union and representative government." He outlined his policy "Equal and exact justice to all men; peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliance with none"; States' Rights, but preservation of the General Government in its whole constitutional vigor, supremacy of civil over military authority, economy and the reduction of the debt, encouragement of agriculture and commerce, diffusion of information, freedom of religion, press and person. He paid due tribute to Washington's memory.

The address astonished many Federalists who expected a violent, inflammatory, partisan speech; it made a fine impression on the people at large.

Jefferson showed his political wisdom, not by trying to make peace with the High-flying Federalists leaders, but by winning the people. It was the army not the officers of the opposition he wanted and sought—and obtained. The state of our foreign relations allowed him to devote attention to domestic affairs, it was easy enough for him to demonstrate how foolishly exaggerated were his enemies' denunciations of him, his principles and policies.

The first complete change of administration brought new political problems and patronage immediately came to the front. The President was urged to make a complete sweep and put in men of his own party. This he refused to do, but proceeded, as was his habit, to formulate principles and follow them. Appointments made after it was known he was elected (there were some two hundred of these) he determined should be revoked, and office holders guilty of misconduct, or notoriously unfit, he replaced with capable men of his own party. The great body of men capably doing their duty he left undisturbed. Later he added pernicious partisanship to causes for removal, and it should

be noted that when he came up for reëlection he forbade office-holders being active partisans in his behalf, a strong contrast to his opponents in 1800 who had used the Judiciary as active partisan agents.

An amusing dialogue is recorded by Parton between Jefferson and a young Tammany man arguing for the removal of Federalists and appointment of Democrats. The politician readily agreed that it was wrong to deny a citizen his voting privilege. "Well," said Jefferson, "isn't it just as wrong to punish him for using it as he thinks best?"

The commissions signed by Adams on the last day of his administration but left undelivered on Marshall's table at midnight of March 3rd, Jefferson treated as null. His right to do so was questioned in the case of *Marbury, Justice of the Peace vs. Madison, Secretary of State*, but Marshall, now Chief Justice, while commenting severely on Jefferson's conduct decided the original law under which the appointments were made was unconstitutional, and moreover that the court was without jurisdiction.

As all the federal judges were Federalists, Jefferson removed many Federalist United States Attorneys and Marshals, appointing Republicans in their places to establish a political balance in the courts. He announced generally a doctrine of "due participation in office," and asserted that had the Federalists not established a monopoly in offices but had given the Republicans a due participation therein, he would have made removals only for cause. Of office-holders, he said, "few die and none resign," and it was only by removals that he could bring about a fair distribution. He thus made the federal courts bi-partisan.

The "Midnight Judges" were soon to be gotten rid of by an act of Congress, the constitutionality of which Jefferson at first doubted, but finally accepted. A great Federalist outcry was raised against all this, especially the judiciary act; the "assault upon the judiciary," as they called it, was the acme of infamy, the Constitution was made a dead letter and all was over. Yet the judgment of the people approved and history has justified the law. The Whigs raised a similar storm over Jackson's refusal to accept as a final arbitrament of the question the Supreme Court's decision as to the constitutionality of the United States Bank. Yet they exceeded all bounds in their denunciation of the *Dred Scott* decision.

The expiration of the sedition law, the composition of many controversies arising out of our treaties, the greatly lessened

applications under the bankruptcy law, and the abolition of the excise, all had the effect of decreasing litigation, civil and criminal, in the federal courts. It was nearly seventy years before a material increase in our federal judiciary was needed or made.

Jefferson was no spoilsman. In the first fourteen months he removed only sixteen men. There was no axe-man of his administration. His appointees were good men, and he made bitter enemies because he refused to make some unfit appointments. No President ever did so much proportionately to decrease Presidential patronage by reducing the number of offices. In the repeal of the excise law he abolished nearly half of the offices at his disposal. He discontinued diplomatic posts in Holland, Portugal and Prussia.

Washington had chosen his cabinet with intentional disregard of parties; Adams had taken over the Secretaries of his predecessors. Jefferson established the precedent, followed since by his successors except when varied from from party considerations, of forming a cabinet not only of his own party followers, but of men possessing his personal liking and confidence. But he chose wisely among his friends, and he disregarded geography, only one of his Secretaries being from the South, and three from New England which had given him but one electoral vote. All were college bred men.

Madison was given the State portfolio; Gallatin the Treasury; General Dearborn, War; Robert Smith, Navy; Levi Lincoln, Attorney General; Gideon Granger soon succeeded Habersham, appointed by Washington, as Postmaster General. Dearborn and Lincoln were from Massachusetts, and Granger from Connecticut. Madison, Gallatin, Dearborn and Granger remained in office the eight years of Jefferson's administrations.

Entire harmony always prevailed, so Jefferson wrote long afterwards. Matters submitted at cabinet meetings were discussed until a unanimous opinion agreed on. He allowed no interference between departments; departmental matters were settled between the President and the head of that department, generally by correspondence.

Congress soon welcomed Jefferson's innovation of communicating with it by messages instead of speeches, and also the discarding of formalities in seeing the President, which was extended to other officials, visiting notables and the public generally.

John Adams could never see that he was less democratic than Jefferson. In 1811 he wrote:

"I was a monarchist because I thought a speech more manly, more respectful to Congress and the nation. Jefferson preferred messages. I held levees once a week that all my time might not be wasted by idle visits. Jefferson's whole eight years was a levee. I dined a large company once or twice a week. Jefferson dined a dozen every day."

The democratic accessibility of the President, this homely hospitality of inviting any one to stay and take a meal who happened to be in the White House at or near meal time, whether proceeding from hospitality or policy, gained Jefferson a wonderful popularity all over the country, and with the masses in European countries.

Economy in government was a cardinal principle of his party and himself and Jefferson, ably assisted by Gallatin, proceeded to enforce it. Besides lopping off diplomatic officials and the reduction of internal revenue collectors, he retrenched \$400,000 in the army and \$200,000 in the navy expenditures the first year. Another saving was effected by putting the custom officers on fixed salaries. The government expenses were reduced from \$7,500,000, exclusive of interest, for 1800, to less than \$5,000,000 for 1801, and to around \$4,000,000 for 1802-03 and 1804.

Every Secretary of the Treasury has been, while in office, proclaimed by his friends to be the greatest Secretary, next to Hamilton. Practically all historians, however, rank Gallatin, after Hamilton, as the greatest Secretary of the Treasury in our country's history. He preserved, for the most part, Hamilton's system, but added some safeguards such as having Treasury auditors attached to each department, and specific appropriations expended only for the specified objects. Lacking Hamilton's vision and daring he was more conservative, methodical and economical, qualities as much needed at his time as Hamilton's abilities suited his own.

Conceiving that the agricultural interests were chiefly burdened by the public debt Jefferson and Gallatin worked to reduce that debt, and successfully. In spite of the expense of the Louisiana Purchase and our war against the Algerine Pirates, debt reduction went steadily on. By September, 1804, over \$12,000,000 had been paid off.

Europe was now resting under the Peace of Amiens. Bonaparte was friendly to the United States and so was England. Our navy now, 1800, made a successful demonstration against the Algerine Pirates, the first example of a Christian nation making reprisal on the Barbary Powers instead of resorting to

tribute and ransom. This was carrying out a policy Jefferson had urged when Minister to France, and again as Secretary of State. The result pleased both parties; the Federalists gave the credit to the navy they had established, the Republicans (Democrats) to their President.

A liberal naturalization law was popular and so was an adjustment arrived at of mutual debts and claims under the Jay Treaty, we paying over something like \$2,500,000, and our merchants and shippers eventually being awarded about \$6,000,000.

It was about this time that the Federalists attempted to capture the name "Republican," calling themselves Federalist-Republicans or Republican-Federalists. Conceiving the word "Democrat" to carry a stigma and the word "Jacobin" having become flat, stale and unprofitable, they now termed their opponents Democrats. It was not until Jackson's day, however, that this became the accepted party name. In Boston in 1802 the Federalists headed their Congressional ticket "The Washington and Adams Nominations." The Democrats retorted by heading theirs "The Washington, Hancock and Jefferson" ticket, and won.

The Federalists still claimed that in the handling of foreign affairs they had greatly surpassed their opponents. Scarce had the claim been made when, 1803, the Louisiana Purchase was made, the most notable diplomatic transaction in all our history.

When it became rumored that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France Jefferson became alarmed. In the hands of decadent Spain the territory presented no danger; in the hands of Napoleon the possession of the mouth of the Mississippi was like a pistol at our head. "From the moment France takes possession of New Orleans, we must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation," Jefferson wrote Livingston, our minister to France.

The Spanish Intendant at New Orleans some months before had closed that port as a port of deposit for products of the Mississippi Valley. Jefferson sent the Intendant's proclamation to Congress and Randolph introduced resolutions expressing concern at this breach of treaty and our determination to maintain our rights in the Mississippi. The Federalists endeavored to have much more warlike action taken; Hamilton urged the seizure of New Orleans and negotiations afterward, but Jefferson refused to take any drastic action on the act of a subordinate officer which Spain might fairly disavow. The real situation was disclosed to Congress and Randolph's resolutions passed together with an appropriation of \$2,000,000 to be used by the President. He was also given authority to call out eighty thousand

volunteers, to build gun boats and to send war vessels to New Orleans.

Monroe was sent to aid Livingston in Paris, with the injunction "On the event of this mission depend the destinies of the Republic." The \$2,000,000 was understood to be used in the purchase of New Orleans and the Floridas, and nothing further was looked for. But when Monroe reached Paris he found that Livingston, avoiding through Bonaparte's brother the tortuous and unfriendly diplomacy of Talleyrand, had received from Napoleon an offer of sale of all Louisiana. One hundred million francs were asked and eighty million finally agreed on. Monroe's instructions being more broad than Livingston's, the two using that authority closed the deal, \$15,000,000 for the Louisiana Territory.

There was great rejoicing here. Jefferson doubted much the constitutionality of acquiring new territory. He decided to conclude the transaction and have it confirmed by an amendment to the Constitution, but later was persuaded that an amendment was not needed. The Senate promptly passed the bill enabling the President to take possession of the territory by a vote of 26 to 6, those voting in the negative being Adams and Pickering of Massachusetts, Olcott and Plumer of New Hampshire, and Hillhouse and Tracey of Connecticut, all Federalists. But John Quincy Adams not only voted for but spoke in behalf of a second bill providing for the carrying out of the treaty. The House passed the bill by a vote of 90 to 25, the negatives nearly all coming from Federalist New England.

The first Democratic administration gained favor with the people from the start, which was soon shown in state elections. George Clinton in New York defeated Van Rensselaer; the Federalists majority in Massachusetts was cut down, the Republicans carrying Boston and gaining two Congressmen; Rhode Island came over to the party in power, and New Jersey, Maryland, Georgia and the Carolinas became solidly Republican. Even Hamilton spoke handsomely of the administration in a public speech.

The Vice-Presidency was looked on as the stepping-stone to the Presidency. Jefferson had never fancied Burr and his conduct in the tie contest between them had alienated him and all his friends. So strong in New York were they now that the Clintons and Livingstons combined to oust Burr from political control of their party in the state. They had the aid of the administration and Burr's friends were ignored in both federal

and state patronage. This is the earliest instance of the President, as head of the party, influencing state party action, though Jefferson personally had unsuccessfully sought to bring about harmony between the Republican Governor and Legislature of Pennsylvania. Some Federalist leaders aided Burr, but Hamilton was not one of them. In Washington Burr consorted with Federalists and a toast he gave at a Washington birthday dinner—"To the union of all honest men," was regarded as highly significant.

The Seventh Congress, 1801-03, was safely Republican, the Senate 18 to 15, the House nearly two to one. Jefferson worked excellently well with his party's members there, due largely to Madison and Gallatin, whose long service in the legislative branches and great influence gave them experience and strength. The administration measures passed without the aid of trickery, patronage or corruption. Jefferson had the gift of leadership, in council, in concert with independent bodies and with the people at large. No President has had better control of his government than Jefferson during his first administration.

A judiciary act, a copyright act, the establishment of the Library of Congress, a naturalization act and some post road legislation was the main work of the first session. The bill to authorize the formation of the State of Ohio was opposed by the Federalists in both houses. A more drastic fugitive slave law was rejected.

The second session was short. The House presented articles of impeachment against Judge Pickering, and ordered the sale of the government owned stock in the Bank of the United States.

In the Congressional elections of 1802 much was heard about Virginia domination and bitter were the complaints against the slave-power. Many of the old Federalist leaders were dead and others retired from politics. John Adams was a man without a party. Hamilton politically discouraged, devoted himself to the law; no man was less fitted for America than he, he said. He proposed the formation of a Christian Constitutional Society with branches in every state as an aid to the Federalist Party, but the idea did not take with his associates. He felt the need of Federalist newspapers and in conjunction with John Jay founded the New York Evening Post. Other party papers were established throughout the North and East.

In the Senate, Adams and Pickering represented Massachusetts, the Legislature reversing the decision of the voters of their

Congressional districts who had elected Democrats to the House. The Senate was Democratic about 25 to 9; the House 100 to 39, and some of the Federalists often supported the administration. The increased representation from the West under the new apportionment of representation added to the Republican strength.

The slavery question came up at this session. The House voted a ten dollar tax on each imported slave. The act organizing the new territory forbade the importation of slaves from abroad. Congress refused to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia but on the other hand also refused the petitions of the inhabitants of Indiana Territory to remove the barriers against slavery there. Petitions against slavery were treated with respect and discussions of the question were moderate. The administration was not pro-slavery, though the Federalists bitterly complained of its being dominated by the South. Jefferson opened up negotiations to secure a place to colonize freed slaves in Sierra Leone or elsewhere. He was for emancipation, but not amalgamation.

The Senate removed Judge Pickering, 20 to 6, the negative vote here being the same six voting against the bill enabling the President to take possession of Louisiana. The House exhibited impeachment articles against Justice Chase. He was acquitted and thus was ended the long-drawn-out fight on the sedition act, though the effects of that unpopular law lingered for years. Jefferson's first act as President had been to pardon all convicted under it and discontinue all prosecutions. The Twelfth Amendment was incorporated into the Constitution, thus making impossible a repetition of the Jefferson-Burr tie in the Electoral College.

Jefferson in 1783 had suggested to George Rogers Clark that he explore the country from the Mississippi to the Pacific. Now, twenty years later, he secured an appropriation for the purpose and sent his private secretary Merriwether Lewis and William Clark and a small body of men to explore the great West. Before the expedition started Louisiana became ours. Most of the other territory covered belonged to Spain, but by the discoveries of the Lewis and Clark expedition we established our claim to the Oregon territory, a claim originating in the discovery of the Columbia River by Captain Gray in 1792. The explorations of Zebulon Pike to the southward in 1806-07 were also to have important influence on our acquisition of territory under Democratic administration.

The first mention of caucuses in America is found in an item of John Adams' diary of date February, 1773:

"This day I learned that the caucus club meets at certain times in the garret of Tom Dawes. . . . There they choose a moderator who puts questions to the vote regularly, and selectmen, assessors, collectors, firewardens, and representatives are regularly chosen before they are chosen by the town."

Caucuses or conferences by members of Congress and of state legislatures to make nominations were an early development in parties. These bodies were the only political centers, and sparsely settled as the country was and devoid of means of rapid communication or travel this was the only feasible method of obtaining any unity of choice. Volunteer meetings or conventions occasionally met and passed resolutions of endorsement of men or measures. Congressional caucuses were never popular with the rank and file but it was long before the people actually participated in the selection of candidates. The whole operation of party machinery, outside of cities, seems to have been mostly left to national and state office-holders.

Burr had been nominated for Vice-President in 1800 by a caucus held not at Washington but at Philadelphia and many leaders besides Senators and Congressmen participated. Adams and Pinckney had been selected by a secret Congressional caucus, where it was agreed that the two should be voted for equally. The general public had been left to think Adams was named for first place, but the way left open for the Electoral College to transpose the order.

The Republican (Democratic) caucus of February 25, 1804, consisted of 110 Senators and Representatives and sat in Washington. Jefferson was nominated by acclamation; George Clinton was named for Vice-President. A distinct step forward was made by this caucus in forming a national committee of one man from each state who was charged with the conduct of the campaign in his state. There had been much criticism of the Congressional caucus practice as unwarranted assumption of party control and bossism. The Federalists denounced it as a Republican trick, though they pursued the same method, only more secretly.

It is unfortunate that the names of the committeemen from each state named by the Democratic Congressional caucus were not given so that it might be seen how many were not members of Congress and how much party management was divorced from the Washington delegations. Local action was indicated this year in Prince George County, Maryland, and elsewhere, by calling county conventions to nominate a legislative ticket and name

delegates to a district convention to nominate Jefferson Presidential electors upon whom the Republican (Democratic) voters could unite. The election demonstrated the fact that the Democratic program of local organization was effectually working.

The Federalist Senators and Representatives held their caucus on Washington's birthday a few days after the Democratic caucus. This was a rather informal and secretive body. The nominees were Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King, but it was for sometime in doubt as to who was named for first place. King, a noted Federalist whom Jefferson had left undisturbed as Minister to England, had resigned and on his return home had made a tour of New England and been honored by a great Federalist banquet in Boston where the administration had been caustically condemned, and from which the Adamses were notably absent. Pinckney, too, had recently toured New England and been well received.

The only issue of the campaign was Jefferson's administration. In ten states the electors were chosen by the people and there the battle was most hotly waged. The Federalists found themselves condemning the very exercise of federal powers they four years before had insisted on as right and necessary, and the Republicans (Democrats) defending positions they had formerly bitterly assailed; the latter had found broad powers in the general government most commendable when in proper hands, while the former discovered them most objectionable and dangerous when exercised by the Republicans.

The Republicans showed a prosperous government and country, and every pledge kept, the federal government maintained in its constitutional vigor, economy in government without impairment of efficiency. The Federalists had increased the public debt \$8,000,000 in five years while the Democrats had reduced it \$8,000,000 in three. Peace and honor had been maintained without an army, and the domain of the nation had been doubled.

The Federalists could only impugn Jefferson's motives, prophesy disaster and rail at Democratic violations of the constitution. What good had been accomplished, they asserted, had been achieved by the Republicans Federalizing their party and the government. Men deserted the Federalist Party by thousands, and the High-flying Federalists became desperate. Pickering and Griswold and other New England leaders held secret discussions in Washington looking toward secession and the formation of a new nation, New England the center with adjoining states and part of Canada comprising it. To the abomination

of Virginia domination, and control by the slave-holding power of the South they added the terror of a great trans-Mississippi bloc which would forever exclude them and their section from control. They preferred disunion. Burr was sounded by some of these projectors. He hated the Virginia dynasty as much as they, besides having a personal hate of Jefferson, Clinton, Madison and Monroe, and was in a receptive mood.

Early in 1804 Burr had called on the President, reminded him of a letter written after the electoral vote was known in which Jefferson had intimated that Burr's election with him prevented him from using Burr in some high office in his administration. Burr now plainly hinted for some present appointment, or political endorsement at least. Jefferson gave him no encouragement, and Burr thereupon made his arrangements to run for Governor of New York. The Federalists put up no candidate so the contest was between Chief Justice Lewis, nominee of the regular Republicans, and Burr. The fight was acrimonious, Hamilton active and bitter in opposing Federalist support of Burr. Burr carried the City of New York, but the whole vote was Lewis 35,000, Burr 28,000.

To have made such a race against such odds by no means meant political ruin to a man like Burr. He might reasonably hope, after such a brilliant battle, for a reversal of public opinion in his favor two years later. But an event now took place that eliminated Burr from party politics.

Next to the assassinations of Presidents Lincoln, Garfield and McKinley, the greatest political tragedy in our history was the killing of Hamilton in a duel by Burr. It removed Burr from the political field almost as completely as it closed Hamilton's career. Intense public feeling was aroused and Burr, indicted in New York and New Jersey, became a fugitive for years, and figured no more in political history except as a conspirator against his country.

The result of the 1804 Presidential campaign was a complete rout of the Federalists, the first political landslide in our history. Four years before the Federalists had the whole electoral vote of New England, New Jersey and Delaware, and half of Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina. Now Pinckney and King carried Connecticut and Delaware and received two of Maryland's eleven votes, 14 in all, to 162 for Jefferson and Clinton. Congress reflected the same state of feeling, only a handful of Federalists finding seats. The Democrats were in full control.

The Democrats could point with pride to the reduction of the public debt, and the acquisition of Louisiana. But of more immediate value than anything else accomplished by the first Democratic administration was the stabilization of the government. During Washington's administrations the people had unlimited confidence in the President, but their confidence in the American government was not yet fixed. It was still on trial as an experiment, and judgment was in suspension, so much so in 1792 that by both Federalists and Republicans it was regarded as absolutely necessary to the government's existence that Washington continue President. In 1796 the gloomiest forebodings filled the minds of patriots, some anticipating the absolute failure of the government if Adams were elected, others if Jefferson won the Presidency.

Adams' administration disrupted the Federalist Party and left the condition of things more uncertain, the government more unfixed in men's estimation than before. In 1800 Fisher Ames and other Federalist leaders were wringing their hands, exclaiming "A Democratic government cannot last," and seeing dire visions of wholesale bloodshed, while Jefferson and others of his party were dreading the establishment of a tyranny to which neither the states nor the people would long submit, followed by a revolution destroying the government.

To say the government was stabilized, as Federalist historians claim as their party's achievement, when one-third of the people expected a mob government such as Paris had lately seen and another third expected a monarchy is a braggart partisan claim, not a statement of historical fact. Rural New Englanders hid their Bibles and more material treasures when news came of Jefferson's election, many of them anticipating a catastrophe resembling something between Judgment Day and the Paris Commune.

As for Alexander Hamilton, to whom some of his biographers attribute a preponderant influence in bringing about stability—Hamilton spent the last ten years of his life and went to his untimely grave imagining a great crisis was impending, half dreading and half hoping for a national debacle from which his sword and statesmanship would rescue the nation and establish a different, a strong and lasting government, a government like England's. His final message to his countrymen, written the night preceding the duel in which he met his death, refers to "those crises in our public affairs which seem likely to happen." No one can read the letters of Hamilton and those of his most

confidential friend, Gouverneur Morris, without this appearing as clear as day. In 1802 he referred to our government as a "frail and worthless fabric." If Hamilton established and fixed this government of ours, he died in entire and happy ignorance of an accomplishment he did not endeavor or desire. He wanted to change, and strengthen it as he thought, not establish our government, as it was in his day.

Marshall had not yet rendered that series of great decisions which form part of our system of government. In *Marbury vs. Madison*, decided after Jefferson's inauguration, he had censured but not reversed the action of the President, though setting aside a law of Congress as unconstitutional. That decision asserted no right of the general government against the states or the people, but did establish the power of the court to set aside an unconstitutional law passed by Congress, and define the distribution of the powers of the federal government among the three branches.

Nor can the party of Pickering, Griswold, Hillhouse, Tracey, and other Federalists, nor their successors, claim credit for stabilizing a government which at that moment, 1804, they were actually plotting to circumvent and overthrow, or secede from.

In the Presidential campaign of 1804 so firmly was the government grounded in the affections and the minds of the people that every voter knew he was voting not for what sort of government they were to have, but only for who was to administer it. So firmly did Jefferson cement the government of this Democratic republic of ours that not for sixty-one years, and then only after a great civil war, was the Constitution amended. Between Jefferson's election and the war between the states we went through wars and rumors of wars, through panic and prosperity, doubled the number of states and sextupled our population; administrations were criticized and bitterly complained of as perverting our form of government, yet without one serious danger or fear of its being changed or overthrown. Secession was threatened time and time again, but secession is withdrawing from something too firmly based to be overthrown—an admission of its strength and stability. Only once was the government defied—in 1833 by the Nullifiers of South Carolina—and that defiance melted away before one proclamation by President Andrew Jackson. In 1800 and years following, while thrones and governments were tumbling in Europe, in America under Jefferson the world's greatest republic was becoming as firm as the eternal hills.

CHAPTER IV

DEMOCRATIC NATURE OF OUR GOVERNMENT FIXED UNDER JEFFERSON

1805-1809

The Press—Cat-lived Partisanry—The Intelligencia—Trouble with Spain—With England—With France—The Tiger and the Shark—Non-Inter-course and Embargo—Federalist Disaffection—Keeping Out of War—Burr's Conspiracy—Congress—Randolph of Roanoke—First Anti-Slave Law—Josiah Quincy Moves Impeachment of President—Madison—Monroe Rivalry—Caucus Nominations—Third Term Question—Review—The Nation's Verdict Final.

"DURING the course of Administration"—said Jefferson in his second inaugural address—"and in order to disturb it, the artillery of the press has been levelled against us charged with whatsoever its licentiousness could devise or dare." The experiment had been fully and fairly made, he continued, whether freedom of discussion, unaided by power, was not sufficient for the propagation and protection of truth, and whether a government willing for the whole world to know its every act could be written down by falsehood and defamation.

He pointed triumphantly to the result of the election as the answer of the people and as evidence of their capacity in government.

Recent years, however, had seen the establishment of a conservative press represented by the Washington Intelligencer and the New York Evening Post. These papers were partisan enough but dignified and responsible journals not given to Billingsgate. Smaller papers were as vituperative as ever. As at the time of the Reformation the mind of the Western world was centered on religion, in the early years of our government American mental activity was centered on politics. Literature, science and art were cherished by the few, but for a hundred objects of interest the readers of to-day have their forebears had only politics. And every political writer, every book, paper or pamphlet, was partisan, exalting one man or party and damning their opponents.

Later writers dealing with those days have to a certain extent absorbed much of the coeval folly, prejudice and venom. Others

in treating of politics have been extraordinarily careless or have used no powers of discrimination. For instance, one reputable historian describes the cruelties of the Indian raids on our people instigated by the British who held the Western posts, the burnings, hangings and other atrocities of Cornwallis' Southern campaigns, and the sufferings of our sailors impressed on English ships, and in the succeeding paragraph, turning to politics, he ignores all these whelming reasons for anti-British sentiment, and says, "The Republicans hated England as the source of the aristocratic ideas of the Federalists." Others are equally thoughtless, affording much basis for Henry Ford's dictum on history.

Even now at every Presidential election there are hundreds of thousands of fairly intelligent citizens who are genuinely fearful of disaster to the country if the party to which they do not belong wins. That is the inevitable concomitant of parties in government. Similar feelings were entertained in the early days of our republic. Correspondents, diarists, writers of all sorts recorded what they saw and felt, local conditions and opinions, and current events as they beheld or were told them. These are honest but biased, legitimate but not absolutely reliable sources of history. Failure to fairly weigh the current testimony of the times has resulted in much injustice to many patriots and public servants. While the Democrats were making history, the Federalists were writing it.

The fact is, and any American can and must find it true if he makes an honest investigation, that not only was there enough glory to go around, but that it was fairly well distributed between the parties and partisans of our country's early days. Washington alone deserves practically no censure, Burr alone general condemnation; Pickering is saved from being in the category with Burr solely because while Burr was loyal to nothing, Pickering was fanatically loyal to his section, his idol and his faction, the Essex Junto. Every one of the other leaders merits some just criticism and much well-earned praise.

It was Jefferson's fate, as it would have been the fate of any prophet of Democracy when Democracy was a doubtful proposition, to have incurred the criticism of the major portion of the intellectually active of the country. He antagonized the clergy of Virginia by his disestablishment law, the wealthy and well-born by his anti-primogeniture law. Championing the agriculturist interest as the most important of all industries, he incurred, of course, the opposition of the traders and shippers, the urban

interests generally. In these classes were the most vocal elements of our population. The verdict of the people, not the clamor of partisans, is the truer criterion by which to judge statesmen.

The second administration of Jefferson was confronted with difficulties from the start, a little relieved by an honorable and favorable peace with Tripoli accompanied by the release of Commodore Bainbridge and his sailors.

We had trouble with Spain over the Florida boundaries and incursions on our territory from the Spanish settlements. Jefferson got Congress to appropriate \$2,000,000 to purchase the Floridas but was never able to use it. Far greater was our trouble with England and France. We might easily have been at war with the three European nations at once.

Jefferson sought to keep the United States on an even keel by balancing between the two main antagonists. Both countries needed our trade. But he underestimated the dogged determination of the English and over-estimated the friendliness of the French. He came later to the opinion most reluctantly that we could rely on the friendship neither of the French government nor the French people.

Our large sea trade, obtained in a great measure at the expense of England's sea-carrying industry, was a temptation neither the British nor French could resist. The price demanded by each was war against its enemy, and England became rather indifferent to that. She still impressed our seamen until it was asserted that some six thousand Americans were unwillingly in the English naval service or imprisoned. Monroe was sent to aid Pinckney in patching up a treaty to take the place of the expired Jay Treaty. The best they could do was to obtain a treaty, which contained no stipulation as to impressment, a *sine qua non* by Jefferson's orders, and which was otherwise unacceptable. Jefferson discussed it with some Democratic Senators but would not submit it to the Senate, his position being that it were better to rely on natural right and law than on a contract or treaty which ignored the vital matters in dispute. British merchants were angry at the American capture of their commerce and England drew tighter the rules governing neutral trade, and as there were no neutrals in Europe neutral trade meant American trade.

The Battle of Trafalgar gave England dominion over the seas, while the victory at Austerlitz made Napoleon the master of continental Europe. Between the Tiger and the Shark our

vessels were safe neither on the ocean nor in European ports. England declared a wholesale blockade of Europe by Orders in Council and Napoleon decreed the whole British Isles in blockade. England then prohibited even coastal trade with ports under the control of France. But still harder to bear was the impressment of our sailors, an old and sore grievance against England. British vessels came close to our shores to seize our cargoes and impress our men. Napoleon seized our ships that reached Europe. Both charged that much of our shipping was "rogue" trade—American vessels sailing under other nations' flags, or carrying other nations' goods under America's flag.

The administration's first resort was a non-importation scheme whereby it was forbidden to import certain articles from England. This was not sufficient, so later a more drastic measure was adopted and an embargo laid on all our shipping. No clearance could be given foreign bound vessels except under the direction of the President. Our ships had better rot idle in American waters, it was argued, than to be seized abroad. We followed the policy of Washington in 1794. It was a preventive measure, for Jefferson's passion, as he said, was peace. John Quincy Adams asserts that war would have immediately ensued except for the embargo.

The shipping interest in New England was a dominant industry, and the profits of a successful voyage tremendous. Quincy and other Federalists argued that it would be sufficient for the government to disclaim responsibility and allow American shippers to assume all risk, but Jefferson thought that the nation could not stand the strain of submission to such results as that would lead to. England with her back to the wall on the continent was high-handed on the seas; she had lately seized the whole Danish navy in its home port.

The embargo act bore hard on the country. Merchants were bankrupted and artisans idle. Stay laws and other expedients were resorted to. The cotton, rice and tobacco as well as the lumber, fish and other products of the country were denied export, but the burden on New England was greatest because she had not only the common hardship on her but the stoppage of her greatest industry, the carrying trade. Her sailors and ships were idle, her main business ruined.

Then there arose a noise of protest and accusation which still reverberates through partisan histories. The Republican (Democratic) Party was and still is blamed for all the troubles and disasters befallen the country. That England's or France's

course of action was responsible, that our situation was one unavoidable by us and not avoided by any other nation—these considerations were and are only secondarily mentioned. The embargo imprisoned or impressed none of our seamen, it sank or confiscated no vessel or cargo, it sent no men to battle and death, yet it was cursed by the Federalists with curses louder and deeper than were uttered against our enemies.

It was charged that the embargo was a measure dictated by Napoleon, a mere prelude to war with England. It was evaded both in Eastern and Southern ports, and many American vessels were kept abroad under British registry, and American goods smuggled into Canada. High-flying Federalists kept up a correspondence with the British Minister here and the English cabinet, assuring them that the embargo would not last and that they regarded American interests as interwoven with English.

It was at this stage that John Quincy Adams left the Federalist Party. Massachusetts elected her Senator a year earlier than was the custom and her choice was not Adams. He resigned immediately and his successor was chosen for the short remainder of his term. Pickering boasted of having driven him from public office in Massachusetts, and for a time glutted the hatred he had cherished against his father ever since President Adams had forced Pickering from his cabinet; the Essex Junto was in control of the state. At "Professor Adams' downfall" Rose, former British Minister to Washington, was amused, so he wrote Pickering from London.

Secession or separatism was a popular sentiment among the Federalist leaders in New England and the only reason that such nullification as South Carolina attempted twenty-five years later was not tried seems to be that there were a great many more Democrats in New England in 1804-15 than there were Federalists in the Palmetto State in 1833.

The embargo act was repealed three days before Jefferson left office and its place taken by a non-intercourse act with England and France. Of course Jefferson and his party must bear the full responsibility for the embargo. The Senate had passed the embargo bill 22 to 6, the House 82 to 44, and most of the state legislatures, including that of Massachusetts, had endorsed it. Either it appealed to the judgment of the country or the people accepted it as wise coming from Jefferson. Many statesmen of that time and later believed it would have been successful had the law been strictly obeyed. Some English statesmen said afterward that a year of it would have ruined completely British

commerce. Certainly it seems to have kept us out of war, and war with England at that time held little prospect of honor or advantage to us.

Critics of Jefferson's administration apparently take no account of the justifications of its course or its advantages. England had always impressed our seamen; she treated our ships no worse, if as badly, as those of all other nations. Amends and compensation for such infringements of our rights could await peaceable adjustment. One month, nay one week of actual war easily might have cost us more in blood, money and ships than a year of non-intercourse or embargo, with no assurance of bettering our condition, and possibly worsening it. Hard as our case was it was incomparably better than any other western nation. We were touched only in our pocketbooks; European peoples were fighting desperately for their fortunes, their lives, liberties and happiness as well as national existence.

Jefferson had commented on the fact that France embarked in one war because a foreign diplomat had made a caustic remark concerning Madame Du Barry, one of the king's mistresses, and had been influenced to enter another by the Austrian Empress calling Madame Montespan "Dear Cousin." He thought war the most unwise method of settling international difficulties. He argued, too, that every day the war was postponed the less unequal the contest would be when it did come, if come it must.

In avoiding war he had a varied support. Some of the bravest men in Congress were as stout in their resistance to the war fever as he. The Federalists did not want war with England; Pickering was sure, Quincy thought it probable that New England would refuse to join in such a war. On the other hand to fight France when England was our major aggressor commanded only the support of extreme Federalists, one of whom went so far as to say in Congress that England's Orders in Council only supplied a sanction to what our sense of honor would lead us to do. War with England, Rufus King said, meant alliance with France, and that meant a dissolution of the Union. Union of New England against the National Union became the avowed objects of the Massachusetts and Connecticut Legislatures, says Henry Adams. Pickering, ex-Secretary of State, now Senator, was corresponding with Rose in London, former British Minister in Washington, and naming his nephew in London as a go-between.

While harassed with these external difficulties, Jefferson had also to deal with Burr's conspiracy. Whatever Burr's object, he led some to believe he had the coöperation of the government.

Jefferson had said that Burr was great in small things but small in great things. He had handled the New York City election in 1800 with genius; at the settlements in the new Western country he visited he won men to him most successfully. In the matter of the Presidential tie he had betrayed smallness of mind and character, and when it came to handling the big end of his great plan he proved utterly incapable. It collapsed and he was arrested and tried for treason at Richmond.

If his trial was not a political contest it had many of the aspects of one. Burr was being tried in the courtroom and Jefferson was being condemned and defended on the streets. Among the street orators was Andrew Jackson, who had met Burr in Nashville and had been charmed by him. To him the prosecution was but a political prosecution; he believed that Burr had had no treasonable intent, but only a colonizing scheme, and Jackson hated General Wilkinson who, as was generally thought, had betrayed Burr. Chief Justice Marshall presided and offset any Presidential influence by his whole-hearted hatred of Jefferson, and his naming John Randolph foreman of the jury. Marshall was present at a banquet with Burr before the trial. He regretted this later in life.

Under the instructions given by the Chief Justice, the jury could do no more than bring in a verdict of "not proven." This ended the greatest political court trial in our history.

The Ninth Congress was overwhelmingly Democratic, but composed largely of new men. With the beginning of the Democratic administration Congressional control passed from New England to the South. Macon was again elected Speaker and came to be called the Father of the House, but Northern Republicans voted for Varnum of Massachusetts. Macon was from the South and was thought to be too much under Randolph's thumb, and Randolph was unpopular. Josiah Quincy led the Federalists and in debate was rather more than a match for most Republicans, though Sloan of New Jersey was a heavy hitter by virtue of his strong common sense, despite his being a favorite butt of Randolph's sarcasm.

The President's message, December 3, 1805, dealt chiefly with foreign relations and asked for an increased navy and an organized militia.

Randolph changed from an ardent administration leader to a bitter antagonist. His acid tongue and Josiah Quincy's stinging sarcasm were features of the House proceedings of this Congress. Randolph attacked everything the administration favored and

he defended everything it condemned. He even excused English impressment, since in no other way, he said, could she maintain her navy. But his indiscriminate abuse and insolence, termed by John Quincy Adams "the eloquence of Hogarth's Gin Lane and Beer Alley," together with his absolute inconsistency, gradually reduced his following, called the "Quids," to half a dozen, Jefferson calling them "three or four in number and all tongue."

Randolph came near precipitating a change in House rules in 1806 which did not come until 1911, Sloan moving on the last day the House sat that thereafter all standing committees be chosen by ballot and elect their own chairmen. He accompanied his motion with a review of Randolph's conduct that can be read with pleasure by all who enjoy excoriative literature. The motion was ordered to lie on the table. At the next session Sloan renewed his motion but did not press it, and Randolph being named first on the ways and means committee was allowed to be chairman. At this session was passed our first pension law.

The second session of the Ninth Congress saw less politics and more work accomplished. The first of the powers denied the United States government by Section IX of the Constitution was the prohibition of the migration or importation of slaves prior to the year 1808. On March 2, 1807, Jefferson signed the law prohibiting the importation of slaves into any place within the jurisdiction of the United States after January 1, 1808.

"I congratulate you, fellow-citizens, on the approach of the period at which you may interpose your authority, constitutionally, to withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation in those violations of human rights which have so long continued on the unoffending inhabitants of Africa, and which the morality, the reputation and the best interest of our country have long been eager to proscribe." Thus Jefferson had commended such a measure in his message. Forty years earlier he had introduced his emancipation bill in the Virginia House of Congress; thirty years before he had gotten through the Virginia Legislature a bill prohibiting the importation of slaves, and twenty and more years before he had drawn the Northwest Ordinance prohibiting slavery in that domain. This is Jefferson's record on the slavery question. It is to be compared later with Lincoln's.

Another paragraph in Jefferson's message announced that the public debt had now been reduced more than \$23,000,000, and the President and Gallatin began to draw up plans to use the annual surplus soon to be available for various objects of general wel-

fare, including a national establishment of education, public roads and waterways.

The Tenth Congress at its first session besides passing the embargo act and some defensive measures did nothing of political interest. The same may be said of its second session except for one extraordinary incident.

On the morning of January 25, 1809, Josiah Quincy arose in the House to "perform a great duty, but one imperiously demanded by my station and by the knowledge of facts which I have in possession." This great duty was to move the impeachment of Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States. The facts in his possession, briefly stated, were—that General Benjamin Lincoln, Collector of the Port of Boston, had been retained in his office against his will and conscience in order to hold the place so General Dearborn, Secretary of War, could be appointed in due time. Quincy demanded a committee of inquiry.

Lincoln had been a good soldier much loved by Washington who made him a general. The Continental Congress made him Secretary of War in 1781; Washington appointed him Collector at Boston in 1789 and he served until he actually resigned a day or two before Quincy's motion. He was an open and ardent Federalist; it developed in the debate that Quincy had not obtained his facts from him. The President, Quincy argued, had kept in office at a salary of \$5,000 a year a man who had declared himself unable to fulfil its duties, and the laws had not been executed.

Burwell of Virginia replied. He knew of but one parallel to this in all the history of impeachments and that was the impeachment of Gulliver by the Lilliputians for extinguishing the fire at the king's palace. One reading the proceedings in the Annals of Congress is at first inclined to think, as some of his colleagues thought for a moment, that Quincy was perpetrating a hyperbolic jest—he had often demonstrated a Satanic wit. But it was soon evident that he was engaged in a serious effort to make political capital for his party if not for himself. The vote taken the same day was "yea—Josiah Quincy,"—against 117 nays. Dearborn, however, was soon appointed to the post, to Quincy's rage, and vindication.

The Democratic Party suffered from internal wrangles during its second administration. The Clintons and Livingstons split in New York, and radical and conservative Democrats were fighting each other in Pennsylvania also, the conservatives showing a tendency to consort with the moderate Federalists. Something

of the like sort was going on all over the North, and politics in the South was not all one way. The New England Federalists, the Louisiana creoles, Burr and his satellites, Randolph's vitriolic tongue and the governments of England, France and Spain made Jefferson's second administration not an enjoyable one.

Jefferson in reply to the solicitations of the Legislatures of Massachusetts, Vermont, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, New Jersey and North Carolina that he serve a third term, characteristically enunciated a principle and followed it. To each body he wrote:

"That I should lay down my charge at a proper period is as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some termination to the services of the chief magistrate be not fixed by the constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally for years, will in fact become for life. Believing that a representative government, responsible at short periods of election, is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially impair that principle; and I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolongation beyond the second term of office."

Besides these legislative solicitations to continue in office addresses from churches, from societies, from popular meetings had poured in on Jefferson from every side to the same effect.

Randolph hated Madison earlier and more than he did Jefferson; the one hate caused the other. Their refusing him the mission to England rankled. He was bent on defeating Madison for the Presidency and began his efforts at least as soon as 1806. Being much abroad when Randolph's malignant disposition began to manifest itself prominently, Monroe, therefore, was never one of its objects; Randolph urged upon Monroe and upon others Monroe's deserts and fitness for the Presidency. But Monroe, ambitious as he was, and smarting somewhat under a sense of having been discredited by the Washington administration years before and by the ill success of his last diplomatic mission to England, had yet enough judgment to recognize Jefferson's loyal friendship for him, the fickle temper of Randolph and the adventitious nature of his regard and political backing. The enemies of Madison tried hard to bring Monroe out as a candidate; but with no success, his political sense as well as honorable feelings rejecting the plans of men who had been so

disloyal to their party and their party chief. The party purged of Burr and Randolph was the better for the losses.

Monroe had a frank discussion with Jefferson, who told him that while he might justly have preferred Madison, he in fact had maintained neutrality. He pointed out that a general desire for Madison had been indicated and urged most emphatically that no acrimonious factional party fight over the succession be allowed to endanger success. The Virginia legislative caucus nominated Madison, though Monroe polled a good vote. Mass meetings in many states had endorsed Madison. Monroe and his moderate friends listened, and his name, at his insistence, was not presented to the Democratic caucus. Nor was there a break in the long friendship between the three Virginians. "Madison and Monroe," said Jefferson, "are my two pillars of state."

There were 139 Republican Senators and Representatives, but only about 90 of them were present at the Congressional caucus held in Washington in January, 1808. Parton says John Quincy Adams was present. Some Democratic members were absent from the city, but others held aloof because dissatisfied, among these latter being the friends of George Clinton. Hitherto the order of succession had been from Vice-President to President, and Clinton, though of patriarchal age, had ambitions. There had been discussion of a combination of Clinton and Monroe, but no agreement could be reached as to who was to have first place so nothing developed. Madison was nominated almost unanimously by the caucus, 83 votes to 3 for Clinton, 3 for Monroe, and one for John Quincy Adams.

Clinton was named as his running mate. A great protest was raised, and the caucus asserted to have been irregular in an open letter signed by Randolph and other disgruntled Republicans, but they put out no ticket and the protest fell flat.

Caucuses by legislatures were and continued to be the rule in state politics for years. Locally ring rule largely prevailed and party tickets were put out from sources not definitely appearing, and meetings would be held later at which the ticket would be endorsed. Municipal, state and even national conferences upon political questions were sometimes held, but by volunteer delegates not chosen by the people or by local organizations. Yet the convention idea was growing, the Pennsylvania caucus of 1808 admitting delegates from counties having no Democratic representatives in the Legislature. Caucuses were becoming unpopular. It is to be noted that the first great objection to "King Caucus" came from the Clintonians of New York, the

most thorough-going politicians in the country, unless the New England Federalists be excepted.

Outside of New England and Delaware the Federalist Party was weak and ineffectual. Massachusetts had a Democratic Governor and Legislature but went Federalist in the national election. Connecticut and Delaware were the only states entirely Federalist. Yet so unpopular did the embargo become that in August the Federalists, who earlier in the year had inclined to support of Clinton on an independent ticket, mustered up courage and put out a Presidential ticket, Charles C. Pinckney and Rufus King. Neither party got out a platform.

Pinckney and King carried Delaware, all New England, except Vermont, and picked up 2 of Maryland's 11 and 3 of North Carolina's 11, 47 in all. Madison carried all other states (though 6 of New York's 19 went to Clinton for President), 122 in all. Clinton lost 3 to Ohio's and Vermont's 6 which were cast for John Langdon, receiving 113 for Vice-President.

Though the last year of the first Democratic administration fell on evil times and Jefferson left the Presidency broken in spirit, the eight years between 1801 and 1809 was one of the most brilliant epochs in American history. Next to the establishment of our independence and the preservation of the Union in the 1860's, the greatest single achievement of the nation has been the acquisition of the Louisiana Territory. By purchases from and treaties with the Indians the administration gained title to the whole north bank of the Ohio to its mouth. Indian lands were also purchased in Tennessee and Georgia, adding other millions of acres to our territory as well as consolidating our possessions, a great strategic aid in case of war. And to this must be added the Oregon Territory explored by Lewis and Clark.

It was Jefferson's mastership that stopped that tendency in the national government toward assumption of power that might have led to disunion. Then began that long process by which we have a powerful government not ruling the people but ruled by the people. Never since then has any one doubted that the United States was a democracy. It was this government that Charles James Fox pronounced "the government the wisest men in the world would have formed if they had no old established order of things, no vested rights, to interfere; the English government bettered by a thousand years' experience."

His administrations kept intact that cardinal American principle to keep out of European broils. Jefferson kept us out of

war, and continued the reduction of the debt until some \$35,000,000 had been paid off, and made economy in government a national principle. It announced the germ of the Monroe Doctrine in Jefferson's letter to the Governor of Louisiana in 1808—"We shall be well satisfied to see Cuba and Mexico remain in their present dependence; but very unwilling to see them in that of either France or England, politically or commercially. We consider their interest and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere. We wish to avoid going to war till our revenue shall be entirely liberated from debt."

It maintained in constitutional vigor the national government. Jefferson wrote in 1786 to Madison, then serving in the Constitutional Convention, that "the policies of Europe render it indispensably necessary that with respect to everything external we be one nation only, firmly hooped together." It was federal usurpation of powers reserved to the states that he was jealous of and opposed. The assertion that he abandoned Republican (Democratic) policies and adopted Federalist principles is not maintainable.

Of Jefferson's Northwest Ordinance, Daniel Webster said: "I doubt whether any single law of any lawyer ancient or modern has produced effects of more distinct and lasting character than the Ordinance of 1787." This fixed our policy, until the Spanish War, in governing our territories and building them up into states. As soon as the New Orleans region with its large foreign population had become Americanized, the great Ordinance was applied to the whole territory.

The charge of cowardliness and pusillanimity against the administration could with equal justice be brought against the administrations of Washington and Adams. Washington submitted to England's not only retaining, against the peace treaty, the Western posts, but to British acquiescence in if not instigation of Indian ravages emanating from them which resulted in death and destruction in large portions of our country; also to impressment and refusal to pay for the 30,000 slaves seized during the Revolution. As to that Presidential courage which consists in willingness to commit the nation to war, Washington and Adams evinced as little as Jefferson. Jefferson's personal courage is sufficiently shown by the fact that his boldness in 1774 procured him the honor accorded to but few, that of being named in an act of attainder by Parliament, and likewise is proved by his conduct while Governor of Virginia.

However much criticism he had to endure along with diminished popular favor, Jefferson left his party triumphant and entrenched in power, resigning his seat to his dearest friend and disciple.

The founder of the Democratic Party has been and still is sought to be put upon trial by political writers. His greatness is *res adjudicata*—*stare decisis*. He was tried and judged repeatedly by the people of his county, by the House of Burgesses and later Legislatures of Virginia, by the people of Virginia time and time again, by the Continental Congress, by Washington, and by the people of the United States, the last rendering a favorable opinion in 1800 and reaffirming it in 1804.

To censure or question the decisions of all these representative bodies of citizens, of such men as Washington, Franklin, Lafayette, the Adamses, Madison, Monroe and hosts of others, and the two decisions of the American people, is a reflection on the intelligence and judgment of our forefathers which is not deserved. A Greek court in 1927 may reverse the decision of the Athenian tribunal which condemned Socrates two thousand and more years ago, but there is no reversing the solemn repeated and affirmed judgments of America. Justice, common sense and true Americanism forbid it. Either the severe strictures on former great Americans are silly or the American people of their day were ignorant and silly. There is no way of avoiding one or the other of these conclusions.

CHAPTER V

DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT UNDER MADISON

The President—The Country—Political Grand Divisions—The Executive and Congress—State Elections—Reversal of Positions—The Devil and The Deep Blue Sea—East Florida—Congressional Politics—Eleventh Congress—Louisiana—Quincy Prophecies Secession—Twelfth Congress—War Hawks—Separatism in New England—1812 Caucuses—Clintonian Platform—Electoral Vote—Disaffection—Our Navy.

THEY served long who served well when Madison was President. Jefferson had rounded out forty years of service, and was succeeded by Madison who had thirty-three years of public service behind him when he took over the Presidency.

A graduate of Princeton, Madison was sent to the Virginia House of Burgesses by Orange County in 1776; defeated at the next election he was retained in service by the State by being made a member of the Governor's Council. From 1779 to 1781 he served in the Continental Congress, going thence to the Constitutional Convention after serving in the Annapolis Convention for which he was largely responsible and which called the Constitutional Convention. He was a member of Congress from its institution in 1789 until 1797 when state matters took him to the Virginia Legislature until 1801; then he was hurried to Washington to become Secretary of State which place he filled the full eight years under Jefferson.

If ever a man earned the highest honor in the gift of his people Madison earned his Presidency. In every body in which he served, on almost every question of importance that came up he pulled the laboring oar. The "Father of the Constitution" in the inception and the making of it, he was hardly less so in the adopting of it. It embodied more of his ideas and more of his work than those of any other man, and his securing of its adoption by the Virginia Convention was vital to its success. He carried it through against the almost invincible Patrick Henry who had supporting him such men as George Mason, Benjamin Harrison, John Tyler and others. In addition he aided Hamilton carry it through in New York. All these tremendous labors and their successes are indelibly written in the records.

With a mind as clear as a spring and as capacious as a great river he had an integrity of intellect and an honesty of character that won implicit confidence. Only the perverted minds of Randolph and Pickering and the thwarted ambitions of Burr could find matter for hate and abuse in the conduct and character of Madison.

If Jefferson was the great prophet of Democracy, Madison was his first and chief and well-beloved disciple. In their close association of more than half a century there seems never to have been a discordant thought to mar the perfection of their fellowship.

But Jefferson handed over to Madison a most difficult situation. England commanded the seas, Napoleon the continent of Europe. Responding to the demands of her merchants England was determined that neutral America should not take from them what they regarded as their own particular commerce. Napoleon was equally determined that no ports under his control should fare better than those of France. Between the upper and the nether mill-stone was America ground. It was charged and in some instances proven that our flag was prostituted, in some parts of the ocean covering vessels belonging to one nation, in another those of another, and that our vessels sailed under various flags as circumstances demanded. The seizure of our ships and the hindrance of trade infuriated those interested, but the impressment of our seamen was an outrage hated by all except those Nov-Anglians (Pickering's pun on new Englanders and New-Englanders) who came to favor Great Britain over the United States.

Our population in 1810 had grown to nearly 6,000,000 white and 1,350,000 colored, of which latter 186,000 were free, and most of this white increase was native born, and much of it living in the new states, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. Jefferson's friendly treatment of the Indians and his treaties with them purchasing their lands had tremendously increased immigration westward. Already forward-looking Americans could see only the Pacific as our western boundary. Omitting Russia we already had the largest home domain of any occidental nation, and ours was a homogeneous population.

The constitutions of the new states and the changes in those of the old were already conforming to one American model, and the franchise slowly being broadened. State institutions and ideas were being harmonized into a national whole. Our occupations had grown in size and variety. The cotton gin had made

cotton a great industry but not yet did it figure particularly in politics. Agriculture was still our greatest industry though commerce and shipping were a close second in New England.

The two grand political divisions, North and South, represented by Massachusetts and Virginia, had grown into four. Pennsylvania, long the Keystone State, had become only one of the Middle States, and the West had come into being. The East was preponderantly Federalist, the Middle States divided and debatable ground, the South and West Democratic with a few Federal strongholds. Though one race, our people of the various sections differed as much as a Yorkshireman from a Cornishman, a Kentishman from a Lancashireman. There were wealthy merchants and a poor laboring class in the North, rich planters and poor whites in the South, a powerful Quaker element in Pennsylvania and an influential Dutch and patroon influence in New York. The Westerners were more of a kind and thorough democrats as well as Republicans. They were untrammelled by Eastern or Southern conventions, social or political. "Wild and Woolly" and "Effête" had not become terms of derision bandied between the sections, but for the city-bred aristocrats of the North the Westerners had less affinity than for the country-bred Southern planters who lived out-of-doors and could ride and shoot. The West trained with the South in politics.

There were about 364 newspapers published in 1810, 315 being party organs fairly well divided between the parties. The columns of these latter were filled with argument and vituperation rather than news and information.

Such was the field and the players, the spectators and rooters, in the great game of politics in 1810 and following years.

The accession of Madison marked a change in administration methods commensurate with the change in the nation. Washington conducted his administration without regard to party; Adams governed in spite of his party; Jefferson ran the government and his party; Madison was to govern with and by his party. Congresses had followed or resisted the Presidents; now they were to be taken into partnership.

Madison's long service in parliamentary bodies and his success in them as well as his mental make-up both fitted him for and inclined him to such a method. His eight years in an executive department had given him, by reason of his and Jefferson's invariable coincidence of opinion, little actual experience of independent executive direction and action. He was wont to reason with and convince rather than direct other men. Since his day,

except with very strong Presidents and with them only to limited extents, Congress has been actively a coördinate and independent branch of our government with policies of its own which it has induced the Executive to adopt or forced upon him or over him.

This new relation established between the President and his party in Congress has operated in time to make the President more the chief of his party in party affairs, a party boss and not a mere titular commander, though it was not until Jackson's day that this came about.

Madison consulted politics in the making up of his cabinet and laid up trouble for himself by so doing. The State portfolio was given to Robert Smith, late Secretary of the Navy and brother of Senator Sam Smith of Maryland. Ex-Congressman Eustis of Massachusetts was made Secretary of War, Ex-Governor Paul Hamilton of South Carolina of the Navy. Gallatin of the Treasury, Granger of the Post Office and Rodney, Attorney-General, were retained from Jefferson's cabinet.

Early in the administration the English situation seemed to be clearing up. Erskine interpreted too broadly his instructions and made concessions. He was recalled by Canning who sent Robert Jackson to succeed him. Jackson, encouraged and misled by Pickering and a few other Federalists, refused all concessions and was insulting to Madison and his Secretary, so much so that Madison refused to deal at all with him and reported the matter to Congress which passed resolutions upholding the President and censuring Jackson.

A large and loose majority in Congress bred dissensions in that body, and Madison had cabinet troubles, too. Monroe accepted the premiership in March, 1811, but not until being specifically assured that the foreign policy of the administration was open to change. William Pinkney, succeeding Rodney as Attorney-General, added more strength to the cabinet.

Conditions were almost unbearable yet not quite sufficient to unite the country in war. Our foreign trade dwindled from \$108,000,000 in 1807 to \$7,000,000 in 1814. But Madison himself, and millions of other Americans, regarded Europe engaged in a "maniac's" war into which no sane nation should be drawn if possible to avoid. The disaffected Federalists wanted war, but war against France and on England's side; whatever other war spirit there was was directed against England, but the knowledge of our unpreparedness gave pause to many.

Congress stood by the administration in the Jackson matter but emasculated its measure excluding English and French war

vessels from our ports and restricting importations of those nations' goods, and passed a weaker one, an independent action by Congress not paralleled in the preceding administrations. The refusal to recharter the Bank of the United States and the Senate's refusal to confirm several of Madison's appointments are other instances during this administration of Congressional independence, occasioning Randolph's taunt that Madison was President *de jure* but not *de facto*.

The Federalists were in high feather when it was thought that an amicable arrangement with England had been made. This proved, they said, that England had always been willing to do right but was prevented by Republican (Democratic) mismanagement. They gained strength that spring, but the truth becoming known they lost in the succeeding state elections much more than they gained.

In opposition the Federalists found themselves occupying positions diametrically opposed to all their historical and theoretical principles. From centralizationists they had become disintegrationists. They claimed that the former Union of the "Thirteen good old States" was gone. The new and larger confederation in which their section had lessened power and their party very little at all was not to their liking. In Congress they had no power except when the Democrats were divided.

In power, the Republicans (Democrats) had become converts to a larger degree of nationalism, though not surrendering their principle of states' rights. They lost their fear of the central government when it was controlled by themselves, and Jefferson had convinced them that worked right our government was a most excellent one. That they represented the views of the great mass of the people is proven by that infallible test—the election returns.

Madison, as provided by the Act of May, 1810 (Macon's Bill, No. 2), prohibited all commerce with England after February 1811, thus giving that country three months' warning and in the meanwhile a formal revocation of the Napoleonic decrees was sought. Congress approved the President's action.

Napoleon announced the revocation of the Berlin and Milan decrees, but insisted on the charge that British and American merchants were running English goods into European ports under forged papers making them appear neutral goods from America. It appeared now that if America went to war it need be with only one nation, and the French attitude seemed vastly better than the brutal contempt of our rights exhibited by

England. The impressment of our sailors was still the sorest spot.

Spanish West Florida was in insurrection and asked our aid, and in October, 1810, Madison, instead of favoring either faction, took possession of the east bank of the Mississippi, claiming it under the Louisiana Purchase but leaving the matter open for negotiation with Spain. He directed that no force be used against East Florida, but announced that the United States could not quietly see the Floridas pass into other foreign hands.

An act providing for the erection of Louisiana to a state was passed and a year later when created some of West Florida was incorporated into its borders.

William Henry Harrison won the battle of Tippecanoe in 1811, practically clearing our near western domain of Indian troubles and his own way to the Presidency in 1840.

Political history began now to divide itself into Congressional periods. A new Congress came sometimes to mean a new policy or a new political situation. The first and special session of the Eleventh Congress was harmonious. It was made up of a few Federalists, a few anti-embargo Republicans and a majority of straight-out Republicans. Varnum was elected Speaker, receiving 60 votes against 36 for Macon and 20 for Pitkin, Federalist. This establishes the complexion of the House as 96 Republicans and 20 Federalists. Macon's going off the reservation with Randolph had injured him with his party. Eppes of Virginia, Chairman of Ways and Means, with Macon and Richard M. Johnson led for the majority, while Quincy, aided by Livermore, Key and Gardinier—and Randolph—were pitted against them.

In the Senate the veteran Giles was administration leader, ably aided by Crawford of Georgia and Pope of Kentucky. Clay was Senator but made no great reputation in the upper house at this time.

The administration's actions were approved and its measures adopted at this session, with liberal appropriations for defense of our sea ports and our western lands. The Senate refused to confirm John Quincy Adams' appointment as Minister to Russia as a former Senate had turned down Jefferson's appointment of Short to the same post, but a Minister from Russia arriving in Washington, Adams' name was again presented and he was confirmed.

The second session of the Eleventh Congress, November, 1809-May, 1810, had to deal with worse foreign conditions and was a stormy one. The resolutions condemning Jackson, the British Minister, were carried in the Senate, only the Connecticut and

Massachusetts Senators voting nay. In the House there was a bitter fight made by Quincy, Gardinier and Dana, but it was carried 72 to 41. The dilatory tactics pursued by Quincy and his helpers led the House to consider a rule that the previous question should cut off all debate. The House refused to pass a bill allowing the President to send an offending Foreign Minister out of the country.

The Non-intercourse Act was repealed and Macon's Bill, No. 2 was passed, prohibiting British and French vessels from American waters but authorizing the suspension of the act to either belligerent repealing its own obnoxious decrees or orders. Petitions for a protective tariff were referred to a committee to obtain fuller information and statistics. The arming of our merchant vessels was refused. An appropriation of \$5,000 was made to enable Fulton to carry on experiments with marine torpedoes.

An anti-Gallatin clique in the Senate with ramifications in the cabinet, roused to anger by Gallatin's disclosure of carelessness or irregularity in the navy when Smith, now Secretary of State, was at its head, gave Madison much trouble.

The great political battle of the third session of the Eleventh Congress was over the formation of a state from the Louisiana Territory. This the Federalists opposed with all the law, logic and rancor they were able to muster. It is a fact to be noted that the Federalists as a party treated the slavery question solely in its political aspect, *i.e.* slave representation in Congress, paying little attention to its moral phase. To this "undue" (slave) representation at New England's expense was to be added new states still more decreasing that section's relative power in the government. In the original Union of thirteen states New England possessed about one-third of the power; in the Union enlarged by Kentucky, Ohio and Tennessee she possessed hardly one-fourth. In the creation of new states she saw a steady decrease of her proportionate influence.

The Federalist position as stated by Quincy, and adopted by his party and his party press, was based on—"The fundamental principle that the proportion of political power, subject only to the internal modifications permitted by the Constitution, was an inalienable, essential, intangible right. When it is touched the fabric of the Union is annihilated." To increase the number of states, therefore, was unconstitutional. The Republicans, now rather loose, as the Federalists were rather strict, constructionists, cited the power given Congress by Article IV to "dispose of and make all needful regulations respecting the territory of the

United States," a power without limitations, and the constitutional provisions concerning the making of war and the disposal of captures, the treaty making power and the attributes of sovereignty generally.

It was in this debate that Quincy made that famous utterance—"If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is a virtual dissolution of this Union; that it will free the states from their moral obligation; and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, forcibly if they must."

Here Poindexter of Mississippi interrupted the speaker by raising a point of order "whether it was competent in any member of this House to invite any portion of the people to insurrection and, of course, a dissolution of the Union." Quincy replied that it was "the duty of a member to state the consequences of a measure." Speaker Varnum upheld the point of order but was overruled by the House 56 to 53, Macon and other Democrats voting with the majority, and Quincy continued his speech. He lived long enough to see and rejoice in a great United States. It was Poindexter and other Southerners who now spoke of the "Detestable project of dismembering the Union."

Another political episode was the censure by the Senate on motion of Henry Clay, of Timothy Pickering for reading in public session a confidential document sent the Senate. He made an obstinate, wrongheaded defence. His friends endeavored to soften the rebuke by inserting "unintentional" in the resolution; Clay announced that if the amendment was proposed he would move an amendment to it striking out the "un," so the amendment was not proposed.

The attitude at this time of Clay toward the Federalists is of interest in view of their support of him in after years, as is also his position at this session toward the Bank of the United States.

The Senate debate on a petition to recharter the bank occupies two-thirds of the Senate Proceedings in the Annals of Congress. Clay made the chief argument against the bank, a speech that was to plague him for years afterward. Twenty years later he was to champion the United States Bank, gaining thereby the support of the Federalists and losing, as many think, the Presidency. The report was adopted but only by the casting vote of the Vice-President, George Clinton. The House debate was long and bitter and indefinite postponement was finally carried 65 to 64. Thus Hamilton's cherished institution passed out of existence. The arguments against the bank were its unconstitutionality, the dan-

ger that it would grow or had grown too powerful, the fact that much of its capital stock was held in England. Its defenders asserted that its constitutionality was *stare decisis* and long acquiesced in, pleaded vested rights, the usefulness, and indeed indispensability of the bank to the government finances. But to jealousy of the bank's power was added the influence of state banks, in some of which the states, notably Virginia and Pennsylvania, themselves owned stock.

With the defeat of the bank, the certain prospect of new states and the stoppage again of trade with Great Britain, the Federalists had much to complain of, but as Schouler says, "they were animated not with the Spirit of 1776 but with that of 1796—animosity against France, admiration of Great Britain and hatred of the South's influence in government." But the people were not with them. Gerry again defeated Gore for Governor of Massachusetts, and "Gerrymandered" the state in the interest of his party. There were Democratic victories, too, in New Hampshire, Vermont and New York.

The Twelfth Congress met November, 1811, the Senate Republican (Democratic) 28 to 6, the House by about 95 to 37. Ex-Speaker Varnum (Democrat) had succeeded Pickering in the Senate. Quincy led for the Federalists in the House. Except for Connecticut, Delaware and Rhode Island the Eastern and Northern States had Democratic majorities while the other states were almost solidly so.

Party dissensions and personal feuds in the Senate hampered Madison, and old Giles of Virginia lost the leadership there to William H. Crawford, a sound, able and rising young man from Georgia. The ancient régime lost much influence at this period under the lead of the younger element by Crawford in the Senate and Clay in the House. Clay was elected Speaker by 75 votes against Bibb, the peace candidate, Macon, "the Father of the House," so often Speaker, receiving only 3 votes. Clay, despite three years in the Senate, had little popular reputation, the shut doors of that body having shut in his fame. He and Crawford were both Virginian born and were among those aimed at later by the Clintonian platform against monopoly of offices by one state. Sixty-one members of this Congress, nearly half, were new men, many of them young; Crawford, Clay, Calhoun, R. M. Johnson, Felix Grundy, Cheeves, Troup and Peter Porter Bell, were none over forty years of age.

Madison's message recited the wrongs committed by the English and French; toward England the message took on a sterner

tone. The making of cannon, enlarging the army and navy and other war measures were asked. The violation of our commercial laws by smuggling, and by use of foreign licenses to evade them were mentioned. One clause referred to our duty to take a deep interest in the destinies of the people of our Southern hemisphere, and "not to be unprepared for whatever order of things may be ultimately established."

Randolph of Roanoke resumed his mad-dog tactics of biting at everything in reach. Calhoun, Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, took him in hand on several occasions, and by using methods the reverse of Randolph's succeeded very well. To one speech Calhoun merely answered, "The whole of his argument consists of an enumeration of evils always incident to war." The same complete answer can be made to three-fourths of the criticisms of Madison's administration by subsequent historians. The cold logic of Calhoun was a thorough foil to Randolph's hot stuff.

England disavowed the Chesapeake outrage and promised redress, but would make no change in the Orders in Council. Napoleon was determined that no British goods should reach the continent, and the use of the American flag by British vessels and the granting of English licenses to American vessels carrying British goods made it, he declared, impossible to relax his decrees.

Madison, between France and England, the devil and the deep blue sea, contrasted the conduct of the two belligerents. British abuse of blockage and impressment of our seamen, he concluded, preceded and exceeded the Berlin decree, and France, at least nominally, had desisted from some of the wrongs. Just when Napoleon released our vessels and cargoes in French ports, Great Britain's admiralty courts condemned American vessels and cargoes worth more than \$1,000,000. Napoleon acquiesced in our occupation of Florida, Britain protested. The encounter between our frigate the *President* and the English ship *Little Belt* increased the tension. General Harrison after the battle of Tippecanoe found indisputable evidence that English agents had encouraged the Indians to make war against us and supplied them with arms and ammunition. Knight, an English historian, admits this.

The Twelfth Congress meeting now, November, 1811, brought to Washington a war spirit mostly from the West and South. The War Hawks organized the House by electing their chief, Henry Clay, Speaker. Whether there were other nominations does not appear. The *Annals* only state—"The House proceeded by ballot

to the choice of a Speaker; and upon examining the ballots it appeared that Henry Clay was elected."

The President's message showed a war spirit but warned of unpreparedness. The House acted promptly, reciting English misdeeds, increased the army and navy and authorized the calling of volunteers and the arming of merchant vessels. Felix Grundy of Tennessee, chairman, explained that all who supported the measures pledged themselves to open war. The measures went through the House by such majorities as 117 to 11, 120 to 8, 110 to 22, 113 to 16, the leading Federalists voting generally with the majority. Proportionate majorities were given in the Senate.

Support of the administration was given by every state, and all began to place their militia on a war footing. Resolutions from legislatures, mass meetings and other bodies came pouring in, showing the rising war spirit.

In 1808 and 1809 John Quincy Adams had informed Jefferson and others that there existed between the British government and the party in Massachusetts opposed to Jefferson a channel of communication through the Governor of Nova Scotia. He further stated that it was the design of certain leaders of the Federalist Party to effect a dissolution of the Union and the establishment of a Northern Confederacy, a design formed in the winter of 1803-04 at the time of and as a consequence of the acquisition of Louisiana. Now, in March, 1812, John Henry, an Irish adventurer, claiming to have been the British agent between the Governor of Canada and the disaffected Americans, sold to the United States government a batch of documents which were laid before Congress. They revealed that Governor Craig had sent Henry to Boston in the official belief that some of the Eastern Federalists were to bring about a separation among the American States, to discover how far they would look to England for assistance, or enter into connections with her. Henry's correspondence with the Canadian Governor named no persons and only established the fact that England was intriguing to promote the disunion of a friendly power. The fact also was established that a separatist faction existed in New England. The British cabinet refused to deny the charges although Lord Hallard declared in Parliament that Great Britain stood convicted of a dishonorable and atrocious intrigue.

The last effort of the peace party was to extend the embargo in the hope of averting hostilities, and Madison still had longings for peace so much more suited to his talents and disposition than war. John Adams in somewhat similar circumstances had gone

behind the war spirit of his party and avoided war, but England of 1812 was not France of 1799, and made no motion toward concession.

The war message was sent in June 1, 1812, and with little delay Congress passed a declaration of war against England, the House 79 to 49, the Senate 19 to 13. The sectional character of this vote will be noted later.

The second session of the Twelfth Congress enlarged the navy promptly, but debated long before increasing the army. Randolph, Quincy and Pitney rancorously opposed any increase; Quincy declared the invasion of Canada to be "a wanton and wicked act," and inveighed mightily against the Monticellian Dynasty and its destined line," which he prophesied would make the people of the Northern and Eastern States hewers of wood and drawers of water, yoked with negroes and chained to the cars of Southern masters. Clay answered him; he reminded his hearers of Canadian guilt in Indian warfare against us, and reviewed British treatment of us, particularly impressment. "If Great Britain," he exclaimed, "desires a mark by which she can know her own subjects, let her earmark them. The colors that float from the masthead should be the credentials of our seamen."

Madison was accused by some of being really opposed to the war. These called it a "Congress" war and charged that Madison was brought to recommend it only by threats of being denied a renomination. But Clay and others who were the alleged parties to the threat denied it emphatically, and Madison had expressed the opinion more than once that war was inevitable. The Federalists blamed Madison for bringing on hostilities. They sneered at "Mr. Madison's War."

The Republican (Democratic) Congressional caucus of 1812 was composed of 82 members and nominated Madison unanimously. He had already been named by the Legislatures of Virginia and Pennsylvania and endorsed by others. The second place was offered to and declined by the aged Governor Langdon of New Hampshire, and a later caucus nominated Elbridge Gerry for Vice-President. A national committee was again named. This caucus took pains to state that its members were acting solely in their individual capacities.

Martin Van Buren, just rising into prominence in New York, engineered a legislative caucus there which nominated DeWitt Clinton, Mayor of New York and ex-United States Senator. Whether this movement was of Federalist inspiration or not, that

party supported Clinton, making no nominations of its own. "King Caucus" was the great object of denunciation by the Clintonians, and Congressional caucuses were denounced in the first plank of their platform. Its second and third planks opposed official regencies and perpetuation in office and monopolies in the principal offices on the part of particular states—(a hit at Virginia domination); it criticized long continuation in office—(Gallatin had been the head of the Treasury twelve years) and criticized Madison's lack of efficiency and unpreparedness. It advocated a vigorous prosecution of the war and the conquest of Canada, and asserted that the election of Clinton was the cure for the evils afflicting the country. It can be seen that the platform was half political and half governmental, the political being given first attention.

Despite his bellicose platform, Clinton was supported by the peace element, by the Federalists, and by the dissatisfied generally. Clinton was a good politician himself and joined with him as candidate for Vice-President was Jared Ingersoll, a popular Pennsylvanian. Van Buren met with some leading Federalists and effected a combination between the Clintonians and the Federalists, Rufus King opposing it, Harrison Gray Otis advocating it, and a vigorous campaign was waged.

The Madison supporters denounced the Clintonians as bolters from the regular method of selecting candidates used for years and acquiesced in. The war cry of the Clinton men was "No Virginia Control," "Union, Peace and Commerce." Clinton, by the way, was a professed spoilsman.

All the electors were elected by the people now except in Vermont and New Jersey where the Legislatures still selected them. Madison and Gerry carried Vermont but did not receive another vote until they reached Pennsylvania. They would have carried New Jersey, but six days before the election the Federalist Legislature took the selection from the voters, and assumed it themselves. Clinton carried the rest of New England, New York, New Jersey and Delaware and received 5 of Maryland's 11, 89 to Madison's 128.

In the preceding June in the House on the passage of the Declaration of War every Representative from Connecticut, Rhode Island or Delaware had voted no and a majority of the members from Massachusetts, New York and New Jersey had voted against it, while every member from Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina and Georgia had voted in favor of it along with majorities from Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia and North Caro-

lina. The Presidential vote followed the same lines almost precisely.

The government suffered much from want of support of the country in the war. Pennsylvania and the states south and west were active but in other sections, particularly New England, many leaders were disaffected and many of the general populace consequently lukewarm. That an honest belief in the inadvisability, even the unjustifiability of the war operated on many citizens is conceded by all, but that much disaffection and much downright opposition was purely political is flatly charged, and proven, by many historians.

In Baltimore, on the other hand, a mob took summary vengeance on the editor and the office of a disaffected newspaper. Recruiting went on well in the West and South, but Hull's defeat at Detroit crippled the efforts of Harrison, his successor in command. On the sea we did vastly better, the Constitution—Old Ironsides—the Wasp, the United States, made the reputations of Hull, Jacob Jones, Bainbridge, Decatur and others, and demonstrated to England and the world that man for man and ship for ship England's unquestioned mastery on the sea was gone. It was her first experience of the kind since the days anterior to the Spanish Armada. Even the most apathetic thrilled to our sea victories and Perry's victory on Lake Erie. The Federalists had been wont to claim the navy as theirs, but of the officers of the American navy at this time Virginia with 42 had as many, and Maryland more, than all New England combined, but the states of the farther South had few. The war was decidedly not a Federalist war.

CHAPTER VI

VICTORY AND WORLD RECOGNITION UNDER MADISON 1813-1817

Peace Prospects—Thirteenth Congress—War Financing—Bureaucracy in War Department—Generals Harrison and Jackson—Cabinet Changes—Financial Straits—Disaffection in New England—Peace Negotiations—Battle of New Orleans—Bank of the United States—Campaign for Nomination in 1820—Monroe Named and Elected—New England Federalism and the Hartford Convention—Secession Casuistry—The Federalists and the West—Sixty Years Later—Federalist Cult—Democracy and England—A Hard but Glorious Epoch—The Student President.

MADISON's second inaugural address advocated more vigorous prosecution of the war. Four days after its delivery the Russian Minister on behalf of Czar Alexander made an offer of mediation. Napoleon's disaster in Russia gave his enemies hope and they wanted England unburdened of the war with us. Gallatin and James A. Bayard were sent abroad to reinforce John Quincy Adams. Gallatin's enemies blocked his confirmation, on the ground that he was still a cabinet officer. Madison refused to recognize officially a Senate committee calling on him about this question and would not withdraw Gallatin's name. Later Gallatin, who had departed on his mission before Congress met, was confirmed as one of the peace commissioners.

The Thirteenth Congress met in special session in May, 1813. The apportionment under the 1810 census had given New York the largest delegation in the House. Chosen after the Declaration of War this Congress may be taken to show the war spirit of the country, 114 to 68 in the House, 27 to 9 in the Senate. The Democrats lost their two-thirds majority in the House. Clay was chosen Speaker, 89 to 54 for Pitkin and 5 scattering. Macon and Eppes came back into the Democratic fold from wandering off with Randolph. Randolph and Quincy were out of Congress but Pickering, defeated for the Senate, appeared in the House. A "New School Federalist" sent by New Hampshire to this Congress, Daniel Webster, was put by Clay on Calhoun's Foreign Relations committee. Another brilliant new man was John Forsyth of Georgia. George Campbell of Tennessee, a great friend

of Andrew Jackson's, was the administration's House leader. Rufus King, now a New Yorker, was in the Senate, the last survivor of the old high type of Federalists.

With great regret, but forced by the decreased revenues and increased expenditures of war time, the Republicans had to reimpose those taxes which it had been Jefferson's glory to abolish. Direct taxes, licenses and import duties were all resorted to and still the needs were not fully met.

The war dragged. Our naval victories brought honor and glory, but Winchester's disastrous defeat following Hull's surrender of Detroit were scarcely redeemed by Harrison's successes. In the battle near Sandwich, Canada, Tecumseh, the noted Indian warrior, met his death at the hands of Colonel Richard M. Johnson, who thus won in time the title of "Old Tecumseh," the Vice-Presidency in Van Buren's administration and the honor of often being a Presidential possibility.

While William Henry Harrison in the Northwest was making his way to the Presidency, Andrew Jackson in the Southwest was striding toward the same goal. His first offer of services had received only thanks, but Harrison's success in his section in recruiting led to Jackson being given a chance in the Southwest. Jackson raised 2,000 volunteers and marched to Natchez where he was met with an order from the Secretary of War to disband his men. Armstrong who seems to have been a misfit as War Secretary, wanted regulars, not volunteers, and disbanding these men five hundred miles from home and near General Wilkinson with his regular forces was thought an excellent way to secure them. This Jackson refused to do, but instead marched his men home and forced Armstrong to pay their transportation charges. Harrison suffered from the bureaucratic administration of the War Department, but Jackson rode roughshod over it.

General Winfield Scott, later Whig nominee for the Presidency, was winning his spurs in the North.

A great Indian massacre occurring at Fort Mims, Alabama, Jackson was ordered there. Without waiting arrangements by the War Department he had his Tennessee Volunteers marched there and in a short campaign broke the back of the Creek nation at Horse-Shoe Bend. The war on land seemed to demonstrate the better fighting qualities, in such encounters as were had, of the volunteers over regular army forces, though Harrison's and Jackson's victories may have been due solely to the superior abilities of the commanders. The War and Navy Departments at Washington do not shine in this war. Madison thought once of

making Monroe commander-in-chief of the army. Monroe's friends credited him with military ability.

The President called the attention of Congress at its December, 1813, session to smuggling of British goods into the United States and obtaining from us essential supplies. Congress passed a drastic embargo but for political reasons almost immediately repealed it, the commercial interests of the South as well as North and East being strongly opposed to it.

Napoleon's fall after Leipsic had changed European conditions but Czar Alexander used his influence for peace between England and America. Castlereagh refused interference in what he called a "family quarrel" but suggested a quiet negotiation between the two nations; and Madison accepted and appointed Adams, Bayard, Clay, Russell and Gallatin commissioners and all were confirmed.

Senator George W. Campbell of Tennessee, Jackson's friend, took Gallatin's place in the Treasury. Jones was succeeded in the Navy by Crownshield and Richard Rush, son of Franklin's and Jefferson's old patriot friend, Dr. Rush, was made Attorney-General, vice Pinkney, resigned; Governor Meigs of Ohio took over the Post Office.

Armstrong, always doing the unwise thing, accepted Harrison's resignation in the President's absence, much to Madison's anger, but Brown, his successor, proved a good soldier, and would have done well except for departmental interference. Lundy's Lane was one of Brown's victories, and McDonough's lake fight at Plattsburg paralleled Perry's victory.

The British in 1814 threatened all our coast, came up the Chesapeake, attacked Washington, and just as the American and British peace commissioners were beginning their deliberations burned Washington. This so-called retaliation for the alleged burning of York, Canada, reflects as little credit on Ross and his Peninsular veterans as it does on our forces. The Statesman, a London newspaper of the day, said—"Willingly would we throw a veil of oblivion over the transaction." Monroe gained credit by his courage and decisive actions and took over the War along with the State Department, Armstrong disappearing from the cabinet, and matters rapidly mended under his administration. Baltimore successfully resisted the British and our national anthem, The Star Spangled Banner, perpetuates the event.

Monroe recalled Jackson to activities and gave him the lower Mississippi country to guard, news having been received that

15,000 British had been sent to take New Orleans. Jackson concentrated his troops there and Monroe wrote him—"Great trust is reposed in you."

The financial straits of the government were severe. A lack of specie prevailed and the Bank of the United States was sadly wanted. The banks of New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore had subscribed liberally to war loans, but their resources were well-nigh exhausted. The New England banks loaned comparatively little and hoarded specie in their vaults, some, it was charged, with deliberate intent to hamper the government. Of the \$98,000,000 of war loans New England subscribed less than \$3,000,000, although Massachusetts bank deposits grew from \$1,700,000 in 1811 to \$7,300,000 in 1814. Banks in other sections began to suspend specie payments, and Campbell gave up the Treasury to Alexander Dallas of Pennsylvania, a disciple of Gallatin and an able man, though not so famous as his son, who later held the same office. His first recommendation was a national bank. Known to be conservative, he inspired confidence, and the national loan went better.

The state elections showed support of the administration except in New England where the Federalists rallied. New Hampshire reverted to the Federalists and elected Chittenden, the Legislature electing by joint ballot in default of a popular choice, and his first act was to recall a militia company detailed by his Republican predecessor to garrison Burlington while critical operations were in progress at the front. This action was denounced as treasonable by the legislature of some loyal states. New York was Democratic and loyal, but Massachusetts issued an address condemning public rejoicings over our victories as "not becoming a moral and religious people to express any approbation of military and naval exploits not immediately connected with the defense of our sea coasts and soil." Lawrence was denied such state honors as had been bestowed on Bainbridge, Decatur and Hull.

Congress proposing to have Governor Chittenden prosecuted, Massachusetts resolved to support him with her whole power. The Federalist papers of New England were filled with urgings of a separate peace. "No more taxes from New England until the administration makes peace," was their cry. The Boston Gazette asks:

"Is there a Federalist, a patriot, in America who conceives it his duty to shed his blood for Bonaparte, for Madison and Jefferson and that host of ruffians in Congress who have set their

faces against us for years and spirited up the brutal part of the populace to destroy us? Not one!"

The Blue Light Federalists, as they came to be called, were bold and active. To lend to the Federal Government was pronounced infamous, and solicitations to subscribe to Government loans had to be made furtively in some instances and subscription given only on strict pledges of secrecy.

The Legislatures of New York and Virginia passed resolutions against acceptance of any ignominious terms of peace and voted more troops, while the country in the main rallied to the Government.

The states of Connecticut and Massachusetts having refused to subject their militia to the orders of the Federal Government, Monroe declined to pay their expenses, whereupon a great outcry arose that the national government had abandoned New England. As a matter of well-known fact Congress was maturing a consistent plan of local defense, but Massachusetts appropriated \$1,000,000 to support a state army of her own and then called the Hartford Convention.

Napoleon overthrown and Paris occupied by the Allies, England could no longer make war on American commerce under the guise of war on France; the rights of the case were now confined to the matters at issue between America and England, and the opinions of a liberated Europe had to be considered. England made peace. The American commissioners were abler men than those sitting on the opposite side of the peace table. They forced them from one position to another and a satisfactory peace was arrived at by the Treaty of Ghent. The English doctrines of blockade and impressment were not mentioned, but silently abandoned. Firm and universal peace between the two peoples was the first declaration of the treaty and though there was three thousand miles of boundary line between them, some of it in dispute, that peace has lasted from December 24, 1814, to this day.

The Battle of New Orleans was fought on January 8, 1815, more than two weeks after the signing of the treaty. Jackson with about half as many soldiers, militia most of them, but skilled marksmen, defeated Pakenham and his ten thousand Peninsula veterans. This victory made a deep impression on the European mind, civil and political as well as military. It profoundly impressed our own people, and it made General Jackson a national hero, a President and a dominant force in our national life, a memory powerful to this day.

No sooner was the Ghent Treaty ratified than we declared war on the Algerine pirates and Decatur went after them. Two days after entering the straits he captured their largest frigate, and as soon as our fleet appeared off Algiers the terrified Dey signed a lasting peace on the deck of Decatur's ship.

This war established our ascendancy over the Indians in the reunited country. Jackson and Harrison on the land and Decatur, Hull, Bainbridge, Lawrence, Jones and Perry on the water were the diplomats who fixed our status in the eyes of the world, their work being consummated by Adams, Gallatin, Clay, Bayard and Russell at Ghent.

Taxation and other war measures made up the work of the middle and of the last session of the Thirteenth Congress. A bill was passed at the final session creating a bank of the United States, but Madison vetoed the bill on the grounds that the capital stock was too small and the advantages and aids promised the government were insufficient, especially in time of war.

The message to the Fourteenth Congress congratulated the nation on the accomplishment of peace and assured Congress that a convention on commerce between the two nations was being held with hopes of removing all causes of friction. In this connection Madison advised confining American navigation to American seamen. The national debt was stated as \$120,000,000 (plus some unliquidated claims), made up of \$39,000,000 of old debt, \$64,000,000 funded debt during the war and \$17,000,000 unfunded. The President suggested that Congress reconsider the establishment of a national bank, and urged the establishment of roads and canals, and a tariff which should favor certain branches of manufacture, especially those needed in war. The Federalists in Congress, entirely ignoring Hamiltonian views on these matters, opposed these measures and denounced the protective principle.

The bank bill of this Congress was introduced in the House by Calhoun; he waived discussion of its constitutionality as having been settled and addressed himself to the needs of the country and the value of a bank. Webster was among those who opposed the bill, a national bank not being the proper remedy for our ills in his opinion; give the state banks time and they would serve. Clay in a speech not reported, but a synopsis of which prepared later is given, explains his vote in the Senate against the old bank and advocates this one; times and conditions had changed, he said, though he was not perfectly satisfied of the constitutionality of such an institution. The bill finally passed 80 to 71,

many Republicans voting no. In the Senate the vote was 22 to 12. In both Houses the Federalists opposed the measure. Dallas, to whom much credit was due for this new financeering, resigned on account of ill health and was succeeded by Crawford.

The financial condition of the country imperatively required a national bank, so Dallas convinced Madison, and the new law met Madison's objection to the bill vetoed at the preceding session. Like Washington, Madison yielded positive technical convictions to vital necessity. Striking examples Washington and Madison gave that "Necessity knows no law." The bank with branches in various cities being established, resumption of specie payments was ordered to begin in February, 1817. The national treasury anticipated that date in some of its transactions.

Madison's last two years of service suited well his talents and disposition. The Fourteenth Congress worked in perfect harmony with the executive.

Campaigns for Presidential nomination heretofore had been rather cut and dried, everyone knowing who were going to be the actual nominees. In 1816 there was a small flurry among the Democrats. There had been for years a great jealousy of Virginia's persistent hold on the Presidency, a feeling shared by Democrats and Southerners as well as Federalists and Northerners. "My son will never have a chance until the last Virginian is laid in his grave," exclaimed old John Adams.

New York proposed a candidate, Governor D. D. Tompkins, whose candidacy was managed by the Albany Regency, the anti-Clintonian party in that state, at whose head was Martin Van Buren, already having the reputation of being a most astute politician. But the minority discarded Tompkins and centered on Crawford. Monroe, however, had earned the nomination by his services to the state and his loyalty to the party. He was the last of the Revolutionary soldiers, a disciple of Jefferson but known to be more independent than Madison was thought to be. He had a war record and a long and distinguished civil one. Jackson, the popular hero of the war, though himself mentioned for the place, was openly Monroe's advocate. On his way to Washington from New Orleans his toast at a great banquet in Lynchburg, Virginia, had been a significant one, "James Monroe of Virginia." The Congressional caucus met in Washington; Monroe objected to a caucus and some of his friends declined to attend, but he was nominated by it over Clinton 65 to 54. Tompkins was given second place.

There was a conference of Federalists from eleven states held

in New York, but no nominations were made. King had been endorsed by the Legislature of New York, but there was no campaign worth speaking of. Connecticut, Massachusetts and Delaware cast their 34 electoral votes for Rufus King. The other 183 went to Monroe and Tompkins. The full development of party lines in the Republican (Democratic) forces appears from the fact that every Presidential elector who voted for one voted also for the other nominee.

In vivid contrast to the era of good feeling soon to begin was the New England Separatist movement of 1804-1814. It is still much of a mystery; Daniel Webster in his debate with Hayne professed to know little about it. John Quincy Adams in 1828 brought much evidence to light which may be seen in Henry Adams' "New England Federalism."

Only a comparatively few men are involved. The better Federalists abhorred the idea, John Quincy Adams so much that he abjured the Federalist and joined the Republican Party. The plot began in 1804 when the embargo bore so hardly on New England. It lagged for lack of popular support, but with the restrictive measures preceding and during the War of 1812 it revived and the Hartford Convention was the culmination. New England was also vexed over the loss of relative power in the Union resulting from the creation of new states; the Federalists were sore over their loss of control of the government. A new and small Union was desired which they and New England would control. There was much excuse for New England discontent for of all the country it suffered far the most from the conditions prevailing. And it should be remembered that at that time the right to withdraw from the Union was scarcely questioned.

Many of the disaffected Federalists were learned men, and argued in speech and writing the legality of their disaffection. "State sovereignty excludes the possibility of State rebellion," they said. A State may infract treaties, and our Federal Constitution was but a treaty between sovereign States, but can never rebel; and no citizen obeying State laws can be guilty of treason. In fact so thoroughly did these casuists cover the ground that the Nullificationists and Secessionists later on could adduce no new arguments to support their contentions, but could only show new facts and conditions.

In 1811 Senator Pickering led an attack on the Madison administration which was essentially an assault on the government itself. The Boston press and pulpit joined in. "Come ye apart from them," was a popular text. The "Boston Resolutions of

1811" denied the power of the federal government to change our relations with the belligerent nations and advocated resistance to the federal government. After war was assured Pickering's toast at a Boston dinner was applauded, "The world's last hope, Britain's fast anchored isle." Governor Chittenden recalled the New Hampshire troops, the Massachusetts Legislature condemned as unmoral the celebration of American victories (a resolution expunged in 1825) and refused state honors at the funeral of Captain Lawrence, the Federalist leaders even declining to attend the funeral, and, worst of all, the disloyal men burned blue lights as signals from American shores to the English fleet hemming in Decatur and his ships, and "Blue Light Federalists" came to be a term of reproach as severe as "Copperhead Democrats" during the war between the states. All through the war the nation was hampered by these people through acts of omission and commission, supplying the enemy with essential supplies and failing to support the war loans.

The Hartford Convention met in December, 1815. Massachusetts sent 12 delegates, among them George Cabot, who was made president, and Harrison Gray Otis. Connecticut sent 7 and Rhode Island 4. A few unofficial delegates from other states attended. Oaths of secrecy were taken at each meeting. The formal report recommended state measures to protect the state militia and citizens from acts of Congress, passed or to be passed, enforcing drafts or impressment, and advised the formation of state armies to repel invasion. Seven amendments to the Constitution were recommended—excluding slaves in apportionment of representatives in Congress; requiring a two-thirds vote in Congress for admission of new states; prohibiting any embargo for more than sixty days; requiring a two-thirds vote to interdict commerce or to declare war; no person thereafter naturalized to be eligible to office; limiting the President to one term and prohibiting any state from having the Presidency two terms in succession. It is amusing to note what a complete reversal these Federalists proposed of the old Federalist principles of a strong, unhampered centralized national government.

The curious may see in Volume 17 of the *Annals of Congress*, pages 333 et seq. what John Quincy Adams believed to be the designed constitution for the Northern Confederacy. Senator Plumer, who was at one time in the plot, stated that the method originally intended to be pursued was to secure control of state governments, then refuse to elect Senators and Representatives, and thus get out of the Union peaceably.

The convention kept only mere skeleton minutes of its proceeding and Cabot had all his correspondence and memoranda burned. The recommendations were made only to the states having delegates. The proposed constitutional amendments were sent to all states, but no attempt was ever made to have them adopted. Massachusetts and Connecticut sent delegates to Washington to convey their demands, but meeting there the news of the victory at New Orleans, the delegates hastened home.

The worst feature of the movement was that the Separatists worked in secret and stabbed the nation in the back while it was grappling with a powerful foreign foe. The convention sat while our commissioners were negotiating for peace, and England through Pickering's nephew in London was kept advised. How long peace was delayed, how many Americans dead were added to the lists, how much the peace terms were influenced by this convention can only be conjectured.

The conspirators received scant encouragement except from their own particular cabal, even in those states in which they held political control. The most of the nation condemned them. Jackson said that if the Hartford Convention had been held in his military department he would have court-martialled the leaders, and doubtless he would have.

Two passions of the Separatist leaders were their excessive devotion to England and their extreme enmity toward the West. They were outspoken to each other in hoping for British victory; in blaming the Western settlers for our Indian troubles; in wishing that the peace treaty would create an Indian country—"a wilderness"—between the United States and the Western country so as to block our extension westward; in prophesying and hoping for the capture of New Orleans and the establishment of a British province there, which they asserted, to each other, would be a happy thing for the Westerners and for the United States, for with a British or an independent country on the west and the ocean on the east a small and compact Union would result in which their section would have "due and proportionate power."

These New Englanders little foresaw that their heirs and assigns of the third generation, by sheer political ability, sixty years later, would mold this West to their political desires like clay in the potters' hands. Dominated by Eastern minds the latter day Republican Party, giving the West the Presidency and other high offices took for the East only the legislation it wanted. The happy combination so dear to Democrats and Whigs—"a North-

ern man with Southern principles" or a "Southern man with Northern principles" was developed into perfection in "Western men with Eastern ideas." Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Harrison, McKinley, Taft and Harding, loyal Westerners, but safe and sane. Only twice this rule of partition, the flowers to the West, the fruit to the East, was violated,—when Blaine was nominated in 1884 and Hughes in 1916, and defeats resulted. Roosevelt and Coolidge gained the Presidency through the accident of death, and Roosevelt was, spectacularly, more Western than the Middle Westerner.

The Federalist Party though reduced to a sectional faction was still a force to be reckoned with until absorbed into the Whig Party, a slow process occupying many years. When the Republicans (Democrats) were evenly divided they exercised the balance of power. As to directing the policy of the government their power was almost nil.

Such large claims have been made for the Federalist Party that common fairness requires an examination of these assumptions of superiority. Henry Cabot Lodge is one of its great panegyrists. In his life of George Cabot, referring to Hamilton's death he says:

"But the loss of their great leader was irreparable and no one was left in the smallest degree capable of wisely directing the party and at the same time maintaining a strong ascendancy over its members."

How much political intelligence and statecraft did it possess and how great was that American party which embraced, as they claim, "the major portion of the brains and character of the country" which yet contained only one man capable of leading it?

Lodge further says of the expressions here of sympathy for the French on Genet's arrival:

"The foreign influence so much dreaded by the Federalists, had come from a quarter where they had not looked for it and in a shape they could never have imagined."

The Americans and French had a few years before been allies fighting the British; at the very moment the country was infuriated by the Indian raids against our settlements instigated by the British; Britain was daily impressing our sailors, and daily complaints were being registered by them and their families. Yet the Federalists were surprised at the source and the shape of the foreign influence. How much political intelligence did this

evinced? Did they think English kinship an extenuation rather than an aggravation?

The Federalists excelled in abuse and vituperation on the one hand and mutual praise on the other. "The Beast the Public," "Cowardly Wretches," "Host of Ruffians in Congress," "Insane Jacobians," "Filthy Mob," flavor all their rhetoric.

They spoke of their own partisans as "the Wise and Good," "The Thinking Man," "The Intelligent and Virtuous," "The Defenders of Property, and Law and Order." Their partisan historians have written epithetical, adjective histories. The Federalists "by wise forbearance avoided ruinous wars"; the Republicans "by abject submission maintained a dishonorable peace"; yet when Madison declared war it was "unjustifiable and criminal" and warranted disaffection if not secession. Cut the coloring adjectives and the biased conclusions from these histories and the remainder would be like the play of Hamlet with Hamlet and other principal characters left out and only the grave-digging scene left in.

The Federalists admired the English government and wanted such a government here. It was the England of Pitt, Burke and Fox—and also of Newcastle, where the owner of the rotten borough of Old Sarum with no inhabitants returned two members of Parliament and the hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants of Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham and Liverpool returned none, and where seats in Parliament were bought and votes sold as a matter of course; an England of magnificent landed estates (taxed at the small valuation of two hundred years before); of rich merchants and many well-to-do farmers and artisans. It was a land where law and order and privilege prevailed. It was the England described in the early chapters of Justin McCarthy's *History of Our Own Times*, where women were hanged for stealing loaves of bread to feed their starving children; where men were transported for poaching a hare or a pheasant; where many of the poor died starved or frozen in the fields or beneath the hedges; where forty crimes were punishable by death, and when thirty years later these laws were repealed the conservative Lord Chancellor of England shed actual tears at the revolutionary destruction of these safeguards of Property and Law and Order; where in some of the mining districts women were kept, as mules are confined in America, down in the mines, coming up once a week into the light and air.

Among the two million slaves then in the United States there were hardly a thousand who were not better fed, better clothed,

better cared for, worked more mercifully and living in more safety from death and cruelty than millions of the poor in England.

Jefferson and his disciples saw more than the wealth, the culture, the law and order, the thriving trade of England, and the wisdom and power of her government, and while admiring these they yet determined that not here should the evils of England be bred. Though not yet formulating it into exact phrases, they recognized that every man had a right not only to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, but also to a living wage and a voice in the government. It is to Jefferson and his party that the American laboring man owes the fact that he has been a quarter or a half century ahead of his foreign brother in the obtaining and maintaining of his rights.

The literature and public speeches as well as the letters of the Federalists show that they looked upon the American people precisely as many Americans to-day look upon the Filipinos, so far as capacity for self-government was concerned. In truth the Federalist Party was the narrowest of all our political factions. It was un-American, a political solecism or anachronism; an exotic to our soil as Hamilton said he was.

Mr. Lodge applies the distressful adjectives "mournful and painful" to the history of our country for the first fifteen years of the 19th century, and credits all the existing good as engendered by the twelve years of Washington's and Adams' administrations.

During Washington's, Adams', Jefferson's and Madison's time we had the same impressments of our sailors, the same wrongs on our commerce by England and France, the same tribute to pay Algerine pirates, the same Indian incursions on our frontier, except that Jefferson greatly lessened our troubles with the Indians and the pirates, while the tightening of the European war and the growth of our shipping greatly increased our troubles with our neighbors across the Atlantic.

January 1, 1816, closing the first fifteen years of Republican (Democratic) administration, saw the United States more than doubled in territory since 1800, with Louisiana, West Florida, and Indian lands purchased. We were at peace with the world, including our savage neighbors. On the ocean we had shown ourselves capable of resisting successfully the Empress of the Seas, on the land had defeated Wellington's veterans who had swept Soult from Spain. The Algerine pirates sought peace, not tribute from us. Our ships sailed every sea as safe under the American

flag as if anchored in the Hudson or in Hampton Roads. The world acknowledged us as one of the great nations of the earth. Two years later the English Chancellor of the Exchequer is to say: "England and America are the two great maritime nations of the world."

The American people of 1801-1816 and succeeding years were not fools, fanatics or ignoramuses. They kept in power the party which accomplished these things, in spite of the inevitable hardships of our situation and of war. Painful and mournful period indeed! Supported by the sense and the patriotism of the people, the Democracy of America weathered the new nation through hard and perilous times to peace, prosperity and honor.

The War of 1812 had in it little of the pride, pomp and glorious circumstances of war. Our casualties in killed and wounded were less than 5,000 and the cost only \$80,000,000. Yet in all history it is doubtful if ever so much was won at so little cost in life and money. As most of the glory of war goes to civil rulers and military officers of high rank while the fighting, suffering and paying is done by the people, the criticism of the War of 1812 will appeal more to the militarist than to the average American.

In that remarkable effort begun by Republican essayists in the last quarter of the 19th century to elevate Hamilton and depress Jefferson, Madison and their associates no authorities are quoted except extreme partisans in the heat of intense political controversy. From such judgments the Democrats appeal to the highest authorities among their political opponents. Rufus Choate spoke of

"the calm, capacious intelligence of Mr. Madison—that great man among our greatest, the dead or living."

Webster on his return from visiting Madison at Montpelier told George Ticknor that he was fully confirmed in his opinion that Madison was "the wisest of our Presidents, except Washington." Clay spoke of him thus—"James Madison, the Father of the Constitution—that great man whose services to his country placed him only second to Washington—whose intelligence and wisdom in public councils stands unsurpassed." Pages could be filled with such tributes to Madison. Only the lovers of strenuosity and hullabaloo, or those infected with partisan venom belittle Madison.

James Madison was our "student" President, a scholar in politics. He was the most gentle and courteous of gentlemen, and of spotless character. After Washington no public man of his

time was so universally respected, admired and beloved. He had a fine sense of humor and was quite a raconteur in lighter moments, and strove to relieve the distress of his loved ones by gentle jests with his physician as he lay dying. A man to be loved by all generations of Americans is Madison.

Jefferson's opinion of him must be given.

"From three and thirty years trial I can say conscientiously that I do not know in the world a man of purer integrity, more dispassionate, disinterested and devoted to pure Republicanism; nor could I in the whole scope of America and Europe point out an abler head."

Under Madison the Democrats successfully conducted without scandal or corruption a victorious war with England and with Indians, built up the navy which Jefferson had neglected, handled well the civil affairs of the country, and so intrenched their party in power that the opposing party did not put out a candidate against theirs, and Rufus King and other high-class Federalists supported their regular nominee. The principles of the Democratic Party had been maintained and developed along conservative lines. The party had been kept Jeffersonian. Madison had served his party as he had served his country—exceedingly well.

CHAPTER VII

DEMOCRACY UNIFIES THE NATION UNDER MONROE

1817-1821

A Great President—No Believer in Parties—Era of Good Feeling—Cabinet—General Conditions—Party Conditions—Andrew Jackson—Seminole War—Politics in Congress—Acquisition of Florida—Free and Slave States—Fifteenth Congress—Clay—The Bank—Slavery Question—Missouri Compromise—Monroe Reëlected—Public Lands—Sixteenth Congress—Admission of Missouri.

THE tradition of electing men of long and distinguished service to the Presidency was preserved in the selection of Colonel James Monroe.

He was one of our great Presidents, but he accomplished great things with so much apparent ease, with so little show and outcry and fuss and feathers, that posterity has neglected the greatness his own generation in his own country and abroad so generously appreciated. He, only, accomplished what every great President has aspired to—he united the nation politically. He broke the "Solid East." He destroyed faction and abolished sectionalism for a time. His administration was one of tremendous accomplishment. Both he and it are worth careful study.

Born in 1758 and educated at William and Mary he left that college in 1776 to enter the army as lieutenant. Wounded desperately in a hand-to-hand conflict at Trenton he carried the bullet in his shoulder to the grave. Complimented by Washington for his courage, he was made aide to General Lord Sterling, and later Military Commissioner of Virginia to the Southern army by Governor Jefferson.

In 1782 he was elected to the Virginia Assembly and by that body made a member of the Executive Council, and in 1783 was sent as delegate to the Continental Congress, where he moved for, and was made chairman of, a committee giving Congress power to regulate interstate commerce. It was this that led to the Annapolis Convention. In the Continental Congress and everywhere and at all times, Monroe insisted on our rights in the navigation of the Mississippi River.

In 1787 he was again in the Virginia Assembly and also

member of Virginia's Constitutional Convention. The Federal Constitution he opposed as conferring too much power on the general government. In 1790 he was United States Senator until, in 1794, Washington sent him as Minister Plenipotentiary to France. Recalled in 1796 he served as Governor of Virginia from 1797 to 1802, and then Jefferson sent him to France where he aided in the Louisiana Purchase. While there he was dispatched to London and to Madrid to aid our regular Ministers.

Declining in 1808 to oppose Madison for the Presidency he served again as Legislator in Virginia and in 1811 as Governor until April when he became Secretary of State, acting part of the time as Secretary of War also, until inaugurated President. With a few short intermissions his service covered a period of forty-one years.

Monroe believed free government could exist without parties, that the division into parties in England and in ancient republics was due to defects in those governments rather than in human nature, and that America had happily avoided those defects in her system. His administration for a time seemed to prove him right.

Soon after inauguration he toured the North; DeWitt Clinton, Tammany and Rufus King in New York combined to welcome him; in New England John Adams, Otis, Gore, Quincy and other Federalists including Pickering joined to do him honor. It was in Boston the phrase was coined "Era of Good-feeling."

John Quincy Adams was appointed Secretary of State, Crawford of the Treasury, Gen. Isaac Shelby of War, Wirt Attorney General, and Smith Thompson of the Navy. Shelby soon resigned and Clay, who had first been offered the place, again declined and Calhoun was appointed. This left the West unrepresented in the cabinet.

Adams was technically a Republican but inherently and by training and principle a Federalist, a moderate, broad-minded man far removed from the extreme views of the late leaders of the party whom he hated both on his father's and his own account. Wirt was a Virginian, which partly defines his politics; he might be called a moderate Federalist, somewhere between Patrick Henry and John Marshall, but not so militant as either. His appointment was approved by Jefferson and Madison, but later was bitterly attacked by the Republican press. The other cabinet members were straight Republicans, and all had been loyal during the late war.

Few changes were made among office holders. Of the old

Federalists many were dead, others politically so, only Otis of the Hartford Convention element ever getting back to Washington, and a new set of men headed by Webster now represented New England at the nation's capital.

Monroe's appointment of his rival, Crawford, to his cabinet was not attended with the same results as Madison's appointment of Monroe. Crawford is charged with thinking more of his own elevation than the success of the administration, and hampering it by intrigues. Adams and Calhoun, hoping to be President some day, were loyal to their chief.

America at peace and possessing an army and navy of proven strength commanded the respect of the world, and immigration set thitherward, at the rate at times of one thousand a week. We were looked on as the asylum of the oppressed of all nations. Our relations with Spain were unsettled, her South American colonies in revolt, and Ferdinand, receiving no support from the Allied Kings, was forced to make concessions. Monroe continued Madison's and his own policy of neutrality between Spain and her colonies, but our sympathies were strong and Monroe sent commissioners to the south of us to gather information. Clay wanted immediate intervention—"I would not deliberate, I would act," he exclaimed in Congress. His speech contained phrases strikingly like those of later-day Democrats on the Philippine question. "I shall redeem these people from the calumnious reproaches of ignorance, superstition and unfitness for self-government which are made against them." Adams termed this "Clay's rancorous benevolent stand."

Debt reduction, begun in 1816, by 1818 amounted to \$25,000,000, and the whole country was prosperous. Excise and direct taxes were discontinued. The bank and its branches prospering were proving a great financial convenience to government and people. Foreign commerce, however, had fallen off; no longer could our exporters get war prices, and European tariffs had been set up, which we partially avoided by reciprocal discriminating duties.

Protection hitherto had been only incidental, but the embargo and non-intercourse laws had greatly stimulated manufactures, notably in the Middle States and New England. The American System, championed by Clay, received strong support from the Middle States and was strongly opposed by the South; in New England commerce and shipping, old and established in power, gave only varying support to anything that restricted trade. The tariff was reduced gradually. The first high tariff

association was the American Society for the Encouragement of American Manufactures, organized in New York by the woolen and cotton manufacturers. Vice-President Tompkins was president, and Jefferson, Madison, Monroe and Adams members. But tariff was not yet a partisan political issue, only an economic one under discussion.

The Republican Party, comprising four-fifths of the people, under Monroe took over in modified form some of the best principles of Federalism, yet Jefferson was still the party's prophet and was constantly consulted. Contemporaneous with the death of ultra-Federalism was the birth of a more democratic Republicanism; quiescent under Monroe, it began to assert itself in 1824. Laboring men, congregated in large bodies in large manufacturing plants, began to think more in concert and to question, and to assert rights as citizens; the growing West was assertive, too, and disinclined to be in leading strings to the men of the East, wise or otherwise.

The spirit of Federalism survived in greatest vigor in the North and East among colleges and the learned professions, especially those who wrote history. Old families, rich merchants and manufacturers looking to government for class legislation, the old "governing class" still called themselves the "best citizens," made up the remnant.

In state politics the disappearance of the Federalist Party was succeeded by factions. With the one-party condition existing, legislative caucus nominations amounted to pure bossism, and the convention system came to prevail, Pennsylvania leading in the innovation. New York was divided into Clintonians and Anti-Clintonians, Van Buren with Tammany and the Albany Regency opposing the Clintonians with varying success. In Connecticut Wolcott, a liberal, triumphed over John Cotton Smith and a revolution, breaking down the religious oligarchy there, followed under a new constitution. In nearly every state the liberal men controlled.

Internal improvements became a live issue. Madison had vetoed on constitutional grounds an internal improvement bill. Jefferson wrote in 1817 that the sole tenet dividing the Republicans and the Federalists was that Congress had not unlimited power to provide for the general welfare. He favored internal improvements, provided a constitutional amendment was adopted. John Q. Adams apostrophises the internal improvement policy as one might write an ode to dawn and laments a narrow construction admitting the Louisiana Purchase but deny-

ing the digging of a canal between two states. Monroe's first message suggested an amendment, but Clay was the most active advocate of the movement.

The Seminole War led to the acquisition of the Floridas and greatly increased Jackson's popularity. Criticism and defense of his conduct in that war was to mar and make political fortunes. Monroe smoothed over Jackson's quarrel with the War Department, acknowledging diplomatically his technical errors and testifying to his ability and patriotism. He thought of sending him Minister to Russia, but Jefferson dissuaded him, saying we would have war with Russia in a month. He did offer him the mission to Mexico which was declined.

Jefferson as Vice-President and Jackson as Senator had met in 1797; when they met again at a dinner to Jackson in 1816 Jefferson could with difficulty conceal his wonderment at the courtly polished manners of the erstwhile rough backwoodsman.

Monroe's instructions to Jackson going to Florida had been liberal but forbade seizure of Spanish territory, though allowing entrance in pursuit of a flying enemy, a thing permissible under international law. A letter from Jackson proposing a virtual seizure of the country was handed Monroe when ill in bed, laid aside and not seen again until Pensacola had been occupied. Dewey is said to have purposely cut the cable between Washington and Manila; had there been a telegraph line from Washington to Florida, something would have happened to that line after Jackson had received a few messages from the War Department. Seizing practically all the territory Jackson court-martialed and executed two Englishmen, Ambrister and Arbuthnot, for inciting the Indians to war against us, supplying them with arms and leading them. He became engaged in a quarrel with Georgia, a detachment of state troops having raided a Chehaw village and massacred women and children while the men were absent serving in Jackson's army. The seizure of Spanish territory while we were in negotiation with Spain complicated the diplomatic situation, making it appear that we were making war without a declaration, and the Spanish King broke off negotiations.

In a cabinet discussion over Jackson's conduct Adams defended Jackson, but Crawford and Calhoun thought his actions censurable. Ten years later this is to figure as a bomb-shell in politics. Jackson's seizure was disavowed to Spain and Jackson ordered to turn over Pensacola to any Spanish agent. Familiar with Spain's tortuous diplomacy Adams thought Jackson was

handling the situation in the best way; Monroe altered Adams' dispatch to Spain, saying he was going too far in justifying Jackson. Monroe, however, manfully stood by Jackson while disavowing some of his acts and restoring property unlawfully seized, securing our constitution from any breach and giving Spain no cause for war, at the same time impressing Europe with our honesty and forbearance.

With the matter of the execution of the two Englishmen which might easily have led to war, Adams dealt most skillfully, and made such a strong case that England was appeased. Peace with England was kept more easily than with Jackson, but he was mollified. The political accusation made at the time, that the government knew of Jackson's intention, was laid to enemies of the administration and disproved.

When Congress met, Jackson was the most talked of man in America; Tennessee and the West proclaimed him a hero. Crawford in the cabinet secretly and Clay in the House openly sought to prick this alleged bubble. This cost Clay dearly for it made an unrelenting enemy of Jackson the balance of his life. A Congressional investigation was made and the matter debated for months; the execution of Ambrister and Arbuthnot, which England had allowed to be justifiable, was harshly denounced by some Americans in Congress. The public soon reached the conclusion that though not conducted with all the niceties of modern European war, our war in Florida had been managed as well as the circumstances permitted and Jackson had acted solely for his country's good. The House voted down censure 108 to 62 in the Ambrister and Arbuthnot cases and 100 to 70 on the seizure of Pensacola. Two future Presidents voted in this division: William Henry Harrison approved the execution of Ambrister but disapproved the seizure; John Tyler disapproved both. Clay sought to kill two birds with one stone in one speech. Paying a compliment to Harrison and censuring Jackson, thus bringing both in range at one time, he depicted in eloquent tones the danger of our liberty being overthrown by military chieftains.

While Clay was making war on Jackson, Calhoun was walking arm in arm with him and working for his vindication. Adams was inviting him to dinner and assuring him how happy the Secretary of State was that the House had confirmed his and the President's view, a view directed by a sense of duty and a conviction that the General's conduct had been correct and proper. All this is noteworthy, for Jackson for years to come

was to have a potent hand in the making and unmaking of Presidents. He visited New York and Philadelphia and was enthusiastically received. He toasted DeWitt Clinton at a Tammany dinner, but was forgiven. Whatever he did or his enemies did seemed to give him publicity and gain him favor. Though he now laughed at the idea of so unfit a man as himself being made President, there were Northern and Western Democrats who were looking for just such a popular hero who could crush the Congressional caucus and be the people's candidate and the people's President. Clay, Crawford and other critics had served Jackson well.

For \$5,000,000 Spain sold us the Floridas, and the western Louisiana boundary was fixed at the Sabine, Red and Arkansas Rivers to the 42 degree N and along that line to the Pacific, an unsatisfactory boundary to many since it cut off our settlers west of the Sabine. Monroe did not press this point for two reasons. It was only a question of time, he regarded it, when Spanish dominion over that country would disappear and natural consequences follow; and Eastern and Northern jealousy of enlargement to the South and West could barely swallow Florida right at this juncture, much less a large slice of Western possible slave territory. The slave question made annexation a burning issue.

From his earliest public life Monroe had taken a vigorous interest in the West and had been, in the Virginia Assembly, in the Continental Congress and in the Senate, the chief assertor and defender of the right of navigation of the Mississippi when the West had no representative. The extension of our boundaries to the Pacific in the Northwest gave him as much pleasure as the acquisition of the 60,000,000 acres of the Floridas.

Monroe's first message was one of general felicitation. Crops good, public and private credit good, foreign relations good; local jealousies ended, national income increasing, tax reduction possible, land values rising, army and navy in excellent condition, Indian troubles small, manufacturing growing and to be encouraged, our relations with Spain peaceful despite our kindly interest in her revolted colonies.

His message to the second session was similar, but more moderate in cheerfulness. We had troubles in Florida which General Jackson had settled well though a little irregularly. We would adhere to our kindly neutrality toward Southern Republics. The increase in number of states would increase confidence in our government.

The slavery question in 1819 flared up into a great blaze for the first time. The Constitutional Convention had maintained an evasive silence on the subject and a sort of reserve in the matter had been observed ever since. The first new states had been admitted without the question of slavery or due proportion of power being raised. It happened that a balance of free and slave states had been maintained—Vermont in 1791, Kentucky in 1792; Tennessee in 1796, Ohio in 1803. Louisiana met with opposition led by Quincy in his famous speech, but the admission of that state was governed by our treaty of cession from France. Then came Indiana in 1816, Mississippi in 1817; Illinois in 1818, Alabama in 1819. Now came Missouri with no balancing free state, and, save part of Louisiana, the first proposed state west of the Mississippi, thus involving all that great western domain, whether it should be slave or free.

The first skirmish was in the Fifteenth Congress. The House passed a Missouri bill with an anti-slavery clause, and in March, 1819, the Senate rejected it. But Arkansas was detached from Missouri and made a territory with no restriction on slavery. So the question rested until a new Congress came in.

The army was well reorganized by Calhoun who added a reputation for executive ability to his fame as an orator. The navy was well treated. Congress raised its own pay to \$8 per diem and mileage, and gave all Revolutionary soldiers small pensions.

The first session of the Fifteenth Congress found Macon and Eppes in the Senate with Rufus King, and Otis, sole survivor of the Blue Light Federalists. King, a fine type of Northern man, was friendly to Monroe. The House was an able body, containing Clay, Harrison, Tyler, Johnson and Lowndes. Webster, lately moved to Boston, was absent. Clay was chosen Speaker 143 to 6. He seemed to have played a stellar rôle with little rivalry this session. The law against importation of slaves was strengthened but the Senate struck out the death penalty imposed in the House.

The second session, November, 1818, was devoted to politics—censuring Andrew Jackson.

Eleven hundred and fifty-seven pages of the *Annals of Congress* contain the proceedings of the House and five hundred and thirty-five are devoted to the Seminole War—that is discussion of censure of Jackson. The Missouri question uses less than fifty pages. A bill to repeal the bank charter was defeated 121 to 30, Clay neither voting nor speaking on the bill. The vote against

the bank was not sectional, Easterners, Northerners, Southerners and Westerners voting no, Harrison among them.

Supported though it was by Congress, the bank was becoming unpopular. Much of the flood of paper money issued by state banks during the war was held by the bank and the redemption of it drained the country of specie and broke many small banks. Then the bank declared a rule that notes issued by its branches were redeemable only at the issuing branch. A merchant in New Orleans receiving Boston branch notes would have to pay exchange in New Orleans, or in New York if he paid a New York bill with them. The Boston branch refused to receive the Baltimore branch notes at all, hesitated to redeem the notes of any branch other than its own. A panic occurred in Baltimore and runs commenced on state banks in the Middle, Western and Southern States. Pennsylvania led in attempts to tax the bank out of existence, but Marshall held such laws unconstitutional. 1819-1820 was a period of depression and many men were ruined.

Our foreign relations were indeed in excellent shape. England now began to court our interest and to favor Anglo-Saxon coöperation in world politics and commerce. Richard Rush, our Minister in London, was a capable man suited to the post, and compensation was obtained at last for the slaves seized during the Revolutionary War. Spain delayed in ratifying the Florida Treaty, fearing that we would then recognize her colonies, and Monroe asked for authority to take possession pending ratification. Spain was the subject of the President's message to the Sixteenth Congress, but Congress devoted its attention to the West, to Missouri and the slavery question.

Between the extremes, those who would call the roll of their slaves on Bunker Hill and those who thought the Constitution a covenant with hell, it was generally conceded that the thirteen original states could be free or slave just as they chose. Opinion was divided whether a state admitted under a clause prohibiting slavery was bound by that or had the same sovereign rights of the original states, including the right to be free or slave. The great question was Congress' power to exclude slavery from a territory, whether a slave-holder could take his human property there just as his other possessions, and whether the citizens in forming a state could form a slave state if they chose. There were many finer points involved capable of infinite debate.

With more than half the Southern people reprobating slavery, including such men as Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, and with a large minority of Southern men politically

opposed to it, and the great majority of Northern and Eastern men against it, slavery having been abolished or in process of abolishment in all those states, it seems that the question could have been easily settled.

But the race question was the larger half of the negro problem. Tens of thousands of Southerners, themselves slave-holders, would have voted slavery out if by so doing they could have been rid of the colored inhabitants. This was boldly stated in debate later by Senator Underwood, Whig, of Kentucky, grandfather of O. W. Underwood, the great Democrat of later days. Northern and Western States, some of them, had stringent laws prohibiting the presence of men of color. Years later when John Randolph's executors took his freed slaves to settle them on land in Illinois bought for the purpose, men met them with guns and drove them back. If Illinois would not allow a few free negroes in its borders, who could expect Mississippi to have hundreds of thousands of them free citizens? What just man would impose such an intolerable curse, as it was then regarded, on his Southern brethren? Since the two races must live together slavery was deemed the best condition for the negro. Thus a certain sense of justice in the North preserved the great unjust institution in the South.

Another grave consideration gave thoughtful men pause. Thousands of men living in free states and opposed to slavery saw incalculable danger in unlimited Congressional control of the question. If Congress could prohibit slavery in a territory, it could by the same power impose it. Pinkney's gorgeous statement of this view was made in the Senate in reply to King:

"Slavery a pestilent disease!—Be it so. Yet if you have power to medicine it in the way proposed and in virtue of the diploma which you claim, you have also power in the distribution of your political alexipharmics to present the deadliest drugs to every territory that would become a state and bid it drink or remain a colony forever."

However constitutional it might be, this was too dangerous a power to entrust to a shifting body like Congress. Between the horns of this dilemma the country hung until 1860.

Liberia was established, with government aid by donations, and captured slaves sent there. The American Society for Promoting Abolition of Slavery—Benjamin Franklin had been its first president—convened for the first time in years, and anti-slavery agitations began in the North and East. Old line Federalists like King and young Federalists like Webster took leading parts in the new movement. They drew to them many Republicans

who agreed with them on this issue. Thus began that alignment which later separated from the Republican (Democratic), and formed the Whig Party.

There was a great battle over the admission of Missouri. Since the last session of Congress Massachusetts had agreed to the Maine district being made a separate state provided it was accepted by Congress before March 4, 1820. The admission of both would preserve the balance, and Maine's admittance as a free state was the price of Missouri's admission without restriction, with the famous Missouri Compromise as a rider—Slavery prohibited *forever* in all the rest of the Louisiana Purchase north of the parallel $36^{\circ} 30'$.

Monroe, who had hoped for and foreseen a compromise and had consulted John Adams, Jefferson and Madison, before signing the compromise bill, questioned his cabinet as to its constitutionality. Could Congress prohibit slavery in a territory, and did the word "forever" apply only to a territorial condition or to states when formed? All answered the first question in the affirmative, but on the second there was difference of opinion. Monroe signed the bill. The written opinions of the cabinet members disappeared from the files of the State Department, the envelope only remaining. It is known, however, that Adams stood at one end and Calhoun at the other.

The first session of the Sixteenth Congress, December, 1819, debated long the admission of Missouri, the Senate debate using three hundred and fifty pages of the Annals, the House more than six hundred. Clay was elected Speaker by a vote of 147 to 8 scattering. The anti-slavery element controlled the House, the pro-slavery the Senate. The Senate joined the Maine and Missouri bills with no restriction as to slavery. Rufus King led for the North, in a speech not reported, and Pinkney for the South in a speech heretofore quoted from, before a crowded Senate chamber, galleries and corridors, the most notable debate for many years. The Missouri Compromise was proposed by Senator Thomas of Illinois and provided the way out of the difficulty. The resolution uniting the bills passed 23 to 21, the compromise proviso 34 to 10 and the joint bill admitting the states and carrying the compromise passed 24 to 20, Delaware and Illinois voting with the South.

The House had meanwhile been debating its own Missouri bill. It rejected the Senate bill 93 to 72 and the compromise 159 to 18, passing the Maine bill shorn of attachments. A conference between the two houses resulted, Clay as Speaker appointing

House conferees in favor of peace and compromise. The House passed a bill admitting Missouri and prohibiting slavery 93 to 84. But only a few days remained in which Maine could secure statehood, and eighteen Northern men coöperated with the Southerners to secure it for her. Missouri was admitted without restriction 90 to 87; the compromise proviso passed 134 to 42, 37 of the minority being Southerners who denied Congress power to impose any restrictions on slavery. The Maine bill was then passed March 3rd and was signed. 1820 was a leap year or Maine might have been delayed two years or more.

The compromise had one more peril to meet but was saved by Clay's maneuver. The following morning when the House met Randolph moved a reconsideration. Clay held the motion out of order as the journal of the preceding day had not been read. While it was being read he sent the bill to the Senate and when Randolph renewed his motion the bill was not in the possession of the House.

Clay pressed through the House a higher tariff bill, the Middle and Western States for it, the South against it and New England divided, but the Senate rejected it. Congress cut the pension list about half and passed Crawford's bill which fixed at four years the terms of office of subordinate officials. Monroe signed this bill, but reappointed all good men when their terms expired.

The treaty with Spain being still unratified the Louisiana Legislature proposed that we assert our title to territory extending to the Rio Grande, a boundary once claimed but receded from in the treaty. But the North and East instead of welcoming the proposed extension manifested strong opposition, indeed regretting that any Southern or slave territory, even the Floridas, had been acquired. John Quincy Adams who had unwillingly given up the territory west of the Sabine now thought it fortunate that we had not insisted on that territory, and this too when he had not as yet allied himself to the Northern wing of the party.

In Missouri there was a bitter fight over a constitution and when one was adopted containing a prohibition to its legislature to interfere with slavery and a mandate to it to pass laws forbidding free colored persons to settle within the state, a national protest arose.

In the midst of this contest the Presidential election had taken place and Congress had paused to allow the Senate to count the electoral vote. And the Spanish Treaty had been received last and was accepted.

So strong and widespread was Monroe's popularity in 1820

that even the burning ambitions of Crawford and Clay and the more restrained aspiration of Adams sensed the folly of opposing him. A slenderly attended caucus was held but it decided no nominations were necessary. State dissensions did not affect the national situation. Massachusetts got out a "Washington-Monroe" ticket of moderate Federalists. Of the electoral vote Monroe for President received 231, John Quincy Adams 1; for Vice-President Tompkins 218, Stockton 8.

The pleasing tale that the one vote against Monroe was cast by a friend who said only Washington should have the honor of a unanimous election has been found to be untrue. Ex-Senator, Ex-Governor Plumer of New Hampshire, Adams' corroborating witness against the Blue Light Federalists, wrote his son that he voted against Monroe because he thought he lacked foresight.

Monroe was wanting now to recognize the South American republics, but Congress, even Clay, was cool. All the support possible under strict neutrality was given them.

The business depression grew worse and the national revenue suffered. The exploration of the Yellowstone country was dropped, the elaborate coast defense plan discontinued, the army reduced from 10,000 to 6,000 and the naval appropriation cut down from \$1,000,000 to \$500,000.

There had been wild speculation in western lands, and \$23,000,000 was owing the government by land purchasers. The price was now reduced from \$2.00 to \$1.25 an acre, cash, and tracts as small as eighty acres could be bought. Still further to help the situation land debtors could surrender back part of their purchases and have all preceding payments credited or the purchase price of that part retained.

The second session of the Sixteenth Congress met November, 1820. After such a bitter contest at the last session and Missouri's admission still unsettled one would expect a strict line-up in Congress, yet exactly the opposite is found. Clay, resigning as Speaker, though not from Congress, the House proceeded to elect a successor. Lowndes of South Carolina, Taylor of New York, Smith of Maryland and Sergeant of Pennsylvania were the leading candidates for twenty ballots, the votes for each ranging from almost a majority to around 30 to the lowest candidate. Dropping the lowest eliminated Sergeant, and Taylor was finally chosen by a vote of 76 against 44 for Lowndes and 27 for Smith on the twenty-second ballot.

The Missouri constitution approved by the House committee was rejected 93 to 73. In the Senate, Eaton, Jackson's *fidus*

Achates, moved dissent from the clause against free colored persons. His motion was carried. There the matter rested until Clay returned to Washington and moved to take up the Senate resolution. Sergeant sought to keep Missouri out, and Randolph to admit her, without restrictions. Between the two extremes Clay dragged the measure through. A committee of seven Northerners and six Southerners, doubtless carefully selected, reported unanimously that the Missouri Compromise should be carried out, but that the objectionable clause in the constitution be removed; Randolph and his associates combined with Northern men and defeated the report. A joint committee of twenty-seven Representatives and seven Senators agreed unanimously, and Missouri accepted as a state by a House vote of 86 to 82, and a Senate vote of 28 to 14, but on the expressed condition that the constitutional clause excluding free colored persons be never construed to authorize laws abridging the rights of citizens. After this the slavery question slumbered for years, but the Missouri question had sowed dragon's teeth and when Massachusetts and South Carolina gained direction of the opposing forces war came.

Clay has been called the father of the Missouri Compromise. He did not originate it, but he did play a most conspicuous part in its adoption. This required a renunciation of his former anti-slavery views, and he seems to have been embarrassed by the fact for none of his speeches on the subject appear in the Congressional Debates, though parts of them are quoted by other speakers. He is quoted ridiculing anti-slavery men as afflicted with negrophobia, denying Congress the right to prescribe slavery restrictions on new states, excusing the spread of slavery as likely to cure the evil by diffusing it and improving the condition of the negro. He fought valiantly for Missouri's admission with her unconstitutional constitution, and without his efforts the state would not have been admitted when it was.

CHAPTER VIII

DEMOCRACY LAYS DOWN THE LAW OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

1821-1825

Progress in New England—1825 Politics—The Candidates—Seventeenth Congress—Internal Improvements—Politics in Cabinet—At Large—Holy Alliance—The Monroe Doctrine—Its Authorship—Eighteenth Congress—More Politics—Last Congressional Caucus—Electoral Vote—Election by House—Bargain and Corruption Cry—The Evidence—Roosevelt and Monroe—LaFayette's Visit—Review.

MONROE's second administration witnessed a religio-political change in New England. In Connecticut, New Hampshire and Maine the liberal element had more or less gotten rid of religious domination in politics, but in Massachusetts citizens were still taxed for support of the church. The rise to influence of the Unitarian Church broke the control held by the Congregationalists and brought about religious freedom in all New England and abolition of denominational tests for office. Except in New York where a new constitution extended the suffrage and had other progressive features, there were no constitutional changes among the other states. The New York constitution was a triumph of Van Buren and his Tammany Bucktails of New York City and the Albany Regency.

The 1820 census gave us 10,000,000 inhabitants, four-fifths of whom were white. Virginia had lost first place in population to New York and was losing political leadership in the South to Tennessee and South Carolina. The new Southern States were growing but Virginia standing still, due, her Northern friends asserted, to the incubus of slavery. She was furnishing many settlers to the new states, and good men many of them were.

No sooner was the 1820 election over than speculation became rife as to who would succeed in 1825. Newspapers in 1821 began to push the claims of their friends, Adams, Calhoun, Clay, Crawford and Jackson, three of whom were in the cabinet. Clinton and Lowndes figured also in the calculations. This early political flurry centered in the Capital, where Crawford was accused of constant plotting, and where the others, except Jackson, had very

active friends and were not motionless themselves. Crawford had been a candidate for so long a time that his claims were stale in the eyes of the spectators of the game. Adams and Calhoun, both watching Crawford, remained friends with each other. Adams records his impression of Calhoun's freedom from sectional bias, his broad nationalist ideas. He was young, only forty, and could wait, while Adams was nearing sixty. Calhoun had been educated at Yale and Litchfield and had many Eastern friends; they suggested the good policy of giving the North the Presidency the next time and then he, with Northern aid, obtaining it four or eight years later. He listened and pondered, for he hated Crawford and feared Clay as a rival of his own age. Clay resigned from Congress and ostensibly removed himself from politics for a time, but his friends never let up in their activities.

Adams was a politician of another sort from all the other aspirants. He rested his claims on precedent and service and training, and deserts, though modestly depreciating the last; the Presidency was due the North after twenty-four years in the South. His record was distinguished and clean, but he lacked that attractive personality Clay had in superabundance, Calhoun in abundance and Crawford in moderation.

Jackson did not figure much in the calculations of the other four. By most people with whom they came in contact Jackson was not mentioned. He was now Governor of Florida and having a bully time with lots of trouble with the War Department, with the Spanish Governor Callava at Pensacola, who was awaiting orders from his government. Finally the Spanish flag was lowered and the Stars and Stripes hoisted over our new possessions. The bill establishing Florida as a territory was hurriedly drawn and incomplete, so much so that Monroe had issued Jackson three commissions, one to take possession, one to govern and one to carry out the treaty with Spain. Callava not delivering up some papers Jackson thought he should, he threw him in jail and threatened to give him as company in confinement the territorial judge, Fromentin, who had issued a writ of habeas corpus to release him. All appealing to Monroe, the cabinet was consulted; Adams again supported Jackson. A small newspaper war on Jackson was started, but Monroe blamed the ill-defined powers given Jackson, smoothed his ruffled feelings, and accepted his resignation.

The Seventeenth Congress first met December, 1821, and sat five months. Again there were four strong candidates for Speaker and it took twelve ballots to elect Barbour of Virginia, by a

majority of four, ex-Speaker Taylor receiving 67 to his 88 with 17 scattering. This was considered a Crawford victory, so much was politics influencing Congress more than policies or measures. Politics was thought to dictate the new Speaker's appointments; to two of his opponents he gave good committee assignments, but Taylor, a strong Administration man, and Rodney were passed over; Jonathan Russell, a bitter, known enemy of Secretary of State Adams, was made chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee and congenial men given him on his committee. Political and personal dissension marked the session and Crawford and his friends were blamed for it.

Business conditions improved with the return to sounder financial practices, including the curtailment of paper money. Cheeves, now president of the bank, repaired its losses and built up its reputation and popularity.

The agitation for internal improvements, which had been lost sight of during the Missouri contest and political wrangles, revived and became a growing issue. Monroe had suggested a constitutional amendment, as had Jefferson in his 1806 message, and hinted at a program of improvement when the debt had been paid off; he now made the suggestion again, but Congress took no action except a report on conditions of post roads and canals.

The Cumberland Road from the little Maryland town to the Ohio River was already a historic highway, and for twenty years was to be the center of a fight between Adams and Clay on one side and Jackson and the Democrats on the other.

Clay threw out a feeler in 1821, a small appropriation of \$9,000 for repairs with an authorization to collect tolls. It passed the House 87 to 68, and the Senate approved, but Monroe vetoed it on constitutional grounds and was sustained by an actual majority of 72 to 68.

This veto message is a careful discussion of the constitutional questions involved; copies were sent out by Monroe to many distinguished men including the Justices of the Supreme Court. Many cordially approved his views. Justice Johnson thought the bank decision covered the question; Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "It is a subject on which many divide in opinion, but all will admit your views are profound."

Monroe seems to have reflected public sentiment. Adams sought later, when President, to reverse this policy and failed of reelection. Monroe was not narrow, however, and approved river and harbor improvements as being matters of defense and coming under defense, revenue or commerce clauses of the Constitution.

In a special message in March, 1822, Monroe recommended an appropriation for establishing diplomatic intercourse with Spanish-America. This was recognized as a prelude to recognition and the House supported him 159 to 1, absent members asking to be recorded as voting aye.

The internal improvement veto and the Spanish-American matter were the only things of importance accomplished by the Seventeenth Congress. That body was rotten with politics, its members intriguing for their Presidential candidates. Crawford's friends were warring on his colleagues in the cabinet, and he was accused of using his office to further his candidacy. Investigations and inquisitions were the order of the day, effectuating nothing.

Serene amid or rather above these wranglings, Monroe adhered to his announced course of political neutrality. This honorable course was hard to follow with three candidates among his official family, thwarting one another and doing poor team-work for the administration. He probably weakened in his opinion that parties and partisanship were defects in English and other governments which had been avoided in our system, though he still asserted it in a letter to Madison.

Crawford, strong if not dominant in Congress, blocked Monroe's and Calhoun's plan of coast defense and army reduction, and finally came to open odds with the President in a cabinet meeting. Adams was of the opinion that Crawford was guilty of actual treachery to his chief, an opinion Monroe also reached later, but averse to any breach of his candidatorial neutrality he forbore action and an explanation from Crawford ended in his being asked to remain in the cabinet.

It was these discords that caused Adams to disapprove of the anti-third-term principle:

"They are sown in the practice which the Virginia Presidents have taken so much pains to engraft on the constitution, making it a principle that no President can be more than twice elected. This is not a principle of the constitution, and I am satisfied it ought not to be. Its inevitable consequence is to make every administration a scene of continuous and furious electioneering for the succession to the Presidency."

A by-election in Georgia occurring, indicating loss of control there by Crawford, Calhoun openly broke with him and sought to figure as the South's sole candidate, still, however, keeping his eye on second place at the next election and the reversion later.

Young, enthusiastic and generous Calhoun now was, but the canker of Presidential ambition, which has been likened to the worm that never dies, fastened on his heart, and, together with what he conceived to be great wrongs to his state and section, was to transform him into a cold, bitter and implacable politician and statesman.

Clay was charged to be responsible for an attack now made on Adams by Jonathan Russell. All three had been on the American Peace Commission at Ghent, and Russell there and since had been thought subservient to Clay. Russell charged Adams with being willing to surrender our right to the Mississippi in exchange for Newfoundland fishing rights, but his evidence turned out to be forged and Adams was exonerated. Clay's proposed postponement of this dispute until after the election was called the "question of adjourned veracity" between him and Adams. Russell was politically ruined while Adams' spirited defense produced a favorable impression and brought into notice the high service rendered by him.

While these quarrels were agitating political Washington there were men scattered all over the country from Maine to the Texas line who thought the time ripe to dethrone King Caucus and elect a People's Choice, a plain, blunt man who loved his country and was no politician, and these men believed Andrew Jackson to be just such a man.

Adams was thinking of Jackson as a running mate, the Vice-Presidency being, he opined, an honorable, restful place for a worn old soldier of forty-five who deserved well of his country.

Jackson, however, after resting a few minutes or a few months at the Hermitage, wrathful at criticism of his conduct as Governor of Florida, rumors of which had reached him in his retirement, wrote a defiant letter to the Speaker of the House, and a remonstrance to the President, recalling his resignation. Monroe with reason and good nature and an unaffected regard for the General reconciled him and he remained on his farm. Jackson's friends, notably Major William B. Lewis, a modest gentleman but able and far-seeing politician, bestirred themselves and in 1822 the Nashville Gazette urged Jackson for President. Pennsylvania welcomed the suggestion and the idea spread. The Tennessee Legislature formally nominated him. With Jackson's clanging entrance into the list the hope entertained by some, of the contest narrowing down to one Northern and one Southern man disappeared, and no election by the Electoral College, but a choice by the House was foreseen. Gone, too,

was Washington's and Monroe's ideal of a government without parties.

A sharp political battle over the Albany post office was brought about by the appointment of Van Rensselaer, Representative in Congress, and a Clintonian, as postmaster. Vice-President Tompkins and Senator Van Buren, backed by Tammany, the Albany Regency and Secretary Smith Thompson, just appointed to the Supreme Bench, all opposed the appointment, but Monroe stood by his Postmaster General Meigs. This affair occasioned a strong remonstrance against appointments of members of Congress to office during their terms.

The Holy Alliance, at this time composed of Russia, Austria and Prussia, and supported by France and Spain, after having put down revolutions in various countries of Europe under the Metternichian "Right of Intervention," now directed its attention toward Spain's revolted colonies in America. England, having long ago withdrawn from the alliance, was now remonstrating against its doctrines and practices, but went no further and had not recognized the Spanish-Americas. Canning, English Foreign Secretary, and Rush, our American Minister, were discussing various phases of the matter when in his message of December 2, 1823, the American President announced the Monroe Doctrine.

Shorn of diplomatic verbiage the great Doctrine asserts as fundamental international law, that

The American continents are not subjects for future colonization by European powers; we should consider any attempt on Europe's part to extend their system to this hemisphere as dangerous to us; any interposition by European powers for oppressing or controlling the destiny in any other manner of those whose independence the United States had acknowledged would be regarded as unfriendly.

The authorship of the Monroe Doctrine has been laboriously attributed to others than Monroe. Some credit it to Canning who two years after its promulgation boastfully exclaimed in Parliament that he had brought the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old. Some seek to give John Quincy Adams the honor, he being the Secretary of State when it was proclaimed, and offer as evidence the entry in his diary of July 17, 1823, recording his conversation with the Russian Minister in which he pointedly told him that "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."

The truth is that the Monroe Doctrine was the elaboration and public assertion of an American idea entertained ever since the

United States was old enough to think. Our first treaty with France contains the sentence—"The American continent is no longer subject to colonization." Monroe added an "s" to "continent." We have seen that Jefferson in his letter to the Governor of Louisiana went further in stating the objects of the United States and Mexico was "to exclude all European influence from this hemisphere."

When therefore the time arrived when the United States had occasion to announce it and the strength to enforce it, Monroe laid down to the world the law of the Western hemisphere. He consulted Jefferson and Madison before delivering the message, but it was as much his act as any President's act is his own. England's share in its promulgation is her assurance of non-interference and her diplomatic support of the American position.

John Quincy Adams honorably attributes it to "my distinguished predecessor." One reading his diary through 1823 will gain the impression that he, agreeing with the President, was yet the conservative one and toned down the message.

England had talked of some concert of action and assured us that she would not interfere. Confronted now with this bold independent action she applauded. Monroe's message "was not only the best, but the best timed state paper ever published," English statesmen said. The Holy Alliance acquiesced and Spanish securities rose in the market.

Politics in the cabinet and country dominated the closing years of Monroe's administration. The Eighteenth Congress to whom Monroe's famous message was addressed, was the first under the new apportionment, New York having a delegation in the House of 34, Pennsylvania, 26, Virginia 22, Ohio 14, Massachusetts and Georgia 13 each. Clay came back stronger than ever, and Webster, now from Massachusetts, reappeared after seven years absence, a conservative independent in politics and anti-slavery in a broad way. Randolph and Edward Livingston returned too. Clay defeated Barbour for Speaker 139 to 42, and appointed Webster chairman of the judiciary committee.

Old men were found in the Senate; Macon, John Taylor of Virginia, King, Galliard and Sam Smith. Benton, Hayne and Van Buren were young leaders. Andrew Jackson appeared from Tennessee, forced to be a candidate by his friends for the reason that only he could defeat Williams who had failed to stand by him, Tennessee's son and hero, when he was under fire in the Fifteenth Congress. This brought Jackson into the centre of the political battlefield.

The Senate proceedings, no longer behind closed doors, now fill eight hundred pages instead of the few score of preceding administrations. Congress devoted its time to internal improvements and a protective tariff. As Monroe's successor, whoever he might be, was thought not likely to hold his constitutional views, Clay pushed forward his American System. A protective tariff was gaining favor and catching up with internal improvements in popularity. The Middle States convinced the West that the interests of both would be served by protection, but the South and East held aloof, a moderate tariff passing 107 to 102. The Senate disagreeing, a compromise was reached only by the casting votes of the Speaker and the Vice-President.

Clay and Webster had not yet begun their wonderful teamwork in Congress, that matchless combination of oratory and exhortation with matchless argument and diction. One brought up a Republican and the other a Federalist, they came to agree on many questions, and were to form the cavalry and artillery of the Whig army. But now Webster made, in opposition to Clay, what some consider the ablest anti-tariff argument ever made in Congress. He ridiculed Clay's "American Policy" as one America had never tried, but which foreign nations pursued; what Clay denominated a foreign system was the one America had always followed and foreign nations had not.

The second session of the Eighteenth Congress was devoted to routine measures and private bills, for the first time a very large number of the latter appearing in the record. The choice of a President was the main business engaging the attention of Congress.

The Presidential candidates were all in Washington in the spring of the Presidential year, three in the cabinet, one in the Senate and one in the House. Crawford's state of health really put him out of the race but he refused to see it; he could not sign his name and the duties of his office for a year had been transacted by a clerk. Adams pressed the Adams-Jackson combination. On the anniversary of the Battle of New Orleans, in 1824, he gave a great ball in honor of the General, one of the grandest affairs social Washington had ever experienced. A long poem in the *National Intelligencer* heralded it, the refrain of each verse being

Belles and matrons, maids and madams
All are gone to Mrs. Adams'.

But Jackson had accepted Tennessee's nomination and was an avowed candidate for first place. Calhoun wisely was playing

for the smaller but surer honor of second place. Clay, sore that Virginia still adhered to Crawford though he, too, was Virginian born, persevered hoping that Crawford's condition would eliminate him and give Virginia to himself.

Jackson's race was along different lines. Hickory clubs were being formed all over the country and hickory poles, some of which were seen standing twenty years later, were being put up. City, town and county meetings endorsed him. Some letters he had written Monroe in 1816-17 became public and his advice to his correspondent to appoint some Federalists to office gave Jackson strength in that quarter. His protective tariff position in Congress and some letters he wrote on the subject helped him too. His Pennsylvania friends, denouncing caucuses, broached a plan for a national nominating convention, and held a state convention at Harrisburg which nominated Jackson by acclamation, and Calhoun for Vice-President, young Dallas announcing Calhoun's waiver of first place.

Crawford's friends called these men radical Democrats and denounced their convention as party treason. They held a convention and named Crawford, criticizing Jackson as no Republican and unfit to be President. It was through them that the Jackson-Monroe letters came to light. Before Congress adjourned caucus and anti-caucus notices appeared. At the Congressional caucus only 66 out of 261 Representatives appeared, more than half being Virginians and New Yorkers, and these unanimously nominated Crawford, with Gallatin for second place, a play for Pennsylvania support to offset Jackson's popularity there.

This was the last Congressional caucus. Virginia, New York, Maine and Georgia legislatures had urged standing by the caucus system, but the system was out of date and generally unpopular. With two well-defined parties it was easy for party leaders to meet and name the party's choice, but here were five men with ardent friends in every state and all belonging to one party. "Why," it was asked, "under the cry of concert of action give the choice of President to a small group of politicians?"

Ex-Senator Edwards in articles signed A. B. published in a Washington newspaper, charged Crawford with illegalities and misconduct of impeachable nature, but summoned before a Congressional committee could produce no proof, and Crawford was honorably and completely acquitted.

Calhoun was taken up by Adams' friends for second place so that his strength might not all go to Jackson. Gallatin withdrew from the Crawford ticket and Clay was offered the place but he neither accepted nor declined the honor.

Van Buren and the Albany Regency made a desperate attempt to control New York's vote for Crawford, the Legislature choosing the electors. The Clintonians demanded a new law giving the selection to the people, but the Regency, controlling the Senate, was inflexible. In the midst of this Clinton defeated the Regency candidate for Governor and the Legislature was thrown into a panic with the result that New York gave Adams 26 votes, Crawford 5, Clay 4 and Jackson 1.

The campaign was feverish for it seemed anybody's race, with the foreseen probability that it would be nobody's victory in the Electoral College. It was a period of mass meetings and endorsements, the taking of straw votes on stage coaches, on steam-boats, by grand-juries, wherever two or three were gathered together. Fancy vests adorned with pictures of the candidates were worn.

The electoral vote was Jackson 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, Clay 37; Calhoun for Vice-President 182. The selection of one of the three candidates receiving the highest votes was thus thrown into the House of Representatives.

It was known that Clay's influence in the House was such that he could name either Jackson or Adams, and Clay became a much courted man by the friends of the two, though neither of them appear to have made the slightest attempt to approach him or influence him.

On the 9th of February the House proceeded to elect a President, voting by states. Adams received the votes of thirteen states, Jackson seven, Crawford four. Jackson had received the unanimous electoral vote of eight states and a majority of the electoral votes of three others; Adams had received the unanimous electoral vote of six states and a majority in one other. Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland and North Carolina, four states whose voters had elected Jackson electors, were voted for Adams by their Representatives in Congress, and Kentucky's vote, despite a resolution of its Legislature in Jackson's favor, was given to Adams.

On the day following his selection Adams announced that he would appoint Clay Secretary of State and a great cry of "Bargain and Corruption" was raised.

The people, or at least a very great number of them, resented Adams' selection by the House. The idea was propagated and grew, that Congressmen had thus assumed a guardianship authority over the people, and arrogated to themselves a superior intelligence, violating the American democratic principle.

Monroe was troubled over the affair but his strict neutrality secured him from any responsibility, real or asserted. The last

days of his administration were pleasant. Jefferson, Madison and he met occasionally in a pleasing duty, the three men constituting the Board of Visitors, or trustees, of the University of Virginia. He and his country stood high in its own and the world's estimation. Even Canning, once before and soon again to be our caustic critic, flattered and courted us.

Theodore Roosevelt in his history of the War of 1812 says of Monroe:

"I think he was as much a failure as his predecessors and a harsher criticism could not be passed upon him. Like other statesmen of his school he was mighty in words and weak in action."

This is harsh censure from a high source. It is but fair to both that the two men, the critic and his subject, be contrasted, since their experiences and careers have much in common. Monroe was the first, Roosevelt the last of the "Colonels" elected President. Both were proud of their military service and title, and were commonly called by it both before and after being President. Both were well born, both well educated and men of means. There are other similarities.

Monroe

Fought in Revolutionary War.
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Participated in battles of Brandywine, Germantown, Monmouth and Trenton.

Member of Virginia Assembly.

Member of Continental Congress.

Member of Virginia Constitutional Convention.

Governor of Virginia twice.

Minister to France.

Envoy Extraordinary to London, to Paris, to Madrid.

Member of United States Senate.

Secretary of State six years.

President of United States eight years, population then 10,000,000.

Acquired Florida, 94,000 square miles, for \$5,000,000.

Fixed our western boundary.

Intervened between Spain and South America by recognizing revolted Colonies.

Promulgated the Monroe Doctrine.

Roosevelt

Fought in Spanish-American War.
Lieutenant-Colonel.

Participated in battles of Las Guasimas and Kettle Hill.

Member of New York Assembly.

Civil Service Commissioner.

Police Commissioner.

Governor of New York once.

Vice-President of United States.
Assistant-Secretary of Navy six months.

President of United States seven years, population then 90,000,000.

Acquired Canal Zone, 300 square miles, for \$10,000,000 and a rental.

Fixed Alaska boundary.

Intervened between Russia and Japan by mediating peace.

Promulgated the New Nationalism and Square Deal.

There have been other partisan critics of Monroe; they bring to mind the only humorous anecdote connected with him that has survived. He was on a journey once, attended by Sam, his colored body servant. Wishing to make an early start he wakened Sam, who, as the custom was, slept on a pallet in the room, before day, telling him to look out and see what the weather was. Sam stumbled around in the dark, opened a door and reported—"Marse Jeems, it's a monstrous dark morning and smells powerful of cheese." He had opened a cupboard, not the outer door.

The close of Monroe's happy administration was marked by one of the happiest occasions in our history. When Charles Lindbergh returned from France after his flight across the ocean he was given a welcome here which newspapers declared unequalled in our history. They were in error. In 1824 a withered but hale old man returned from France to America after an absence of nearly fifty years and was given a welcome even more general and enthusiastic than that accorded the stalwart young Columbus of the air.

General, the Count LaFayette, visited the country to which he had given his services, his blood and his fortune, and America took him to its heart as it has taken no other man save Washington. Men and women wept in joy and gratitude, and gave it to him "To read his history in a nation's eyes." As Clay said, he was in the midst of posterity. This republic was not ungrateful. Congress gave him a grant of \$200,000 and a township of land. This latter, LaFayette afterward tried under the guise of a loan to transfer to Monroe when he heard of his financial ruin.

LaFayette visited Jefferson at Monticello, Adams at Brintree, Madison at Montpelier and Monroe at the White House. He remained nearly a year in America and visited every section of the country, and was carried home in our man-of-war Brandywine, named after the battle in which he had been severely wounded.

Monroe was the last of the first generation of Presidents, the Revolutionary patriots. In parting with these gentlemen of the old school and their rivals and associates, it is pleasant and honorable to remember that all were brave men and in their eyes a guinea never glistened. Hamilton died insolvent; Jefferson, Madison and Monroe left the Presidency impoverished.

Even Burr was driven by dreams of power and empire, not sordid motives. Pickering after forty and more years of public service left office with the expectation of having to dig his living out of the ground. Some of these men, notably Monroe,

had, at times of stress, pledged their private fortunes to secure money for the government.

Monroe was described by those who knew him best, as cautious, slow almost to tediousness in reaching conclusions, but prompt in action and tenacious when once decided. He was not slow to resent insult, however; in reply to a peremptory letter from Alexander Hamilton, he ended by saying that if General Hamilton's letter was intended to convey a demand for personal satisfaction, a friend was authorized to make the necessary arrangements. Hamilton denied such intention but stated that if an invitation to the field of honor was intended by Colonel Monroe's letter he should not decline it. Both being assured that no challenge was intended by either the affair ended peaceably.

Monroe is credited with great influence with Madison in bringing about the declaration of war against England. His reputation for courage, military ability and decisive action was believed to have defeated in its inception the plan of those extreme Federalists who, in 1800, were in favor of continuing the deadlock in the House between Jefferson and Burr until March 4th and then have Congress select a President *pro tem*. He was then Governor of Virginia, and was reported to be ready to march with armed forces on Washington to forestall a revolution. He was not reputed to be "weak in action" at that time. Many were of the opinion that had Madison carried out his half-formed intention of putting him at the head of the army during the War of 1812, or had he sooner been put in charge of the War Department, Washington would have been saved. His first report as Secretary of War indicated vigorous action. He advocated the draft as the method to form an army, a plan followed in the War between the States and the World War.

Not the commanding spirit Washington was, not the philosopher Jefferson was, nor the comprehensive statesman Madison was, he surpassed each of these in some high qualities or practical abilities. His administration of the government is second to none in our history in manner and method, in accomplishment and honor.

CHAPTER IX

DEMOCRACY SPLITS UNDER JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

1825-1829

The President—His Party Disjunctions—Distinguished Record—His Political Cast—The Cabinet—Policies—Impolicy—The Clay Appointment—Bargain and Corruption Charge—Nineteenth Congress—Panama Conference—Calhoun—Foreign Affairs—Twentieth Congress—Tariff Law—1828 Campaign—Final Years.

IF ever a man reached high elective office through sheer worth and merit, in spite of faults and even more in spite of virtues, John Quincy Adams accomplished this in his attainment of the Presidency.

Forced out of the Senate in 1804 by Pickering and other Blue Light Federalists for supporting Jefferson's embargo, he had ever since been coöperating and affiliating with the Republicans, the party in power. Technically he was a Republican in Jefferson's administrations, and in Monroe's régime which ignored minor political differences and included all except extreme Federalists or those who, like Webster, held aloof from allegiance though not offering partisan opposition.

Adams, like his predecessors, had a long and distinguished public record. Educated in America, France and Holland and finally graduating at Harvard, he was an accomplished scholar, and a constant contributor to the press, publishing once a partial answer to Paine's "Rights of Man."

In 1794, when twenty-seven years old, Washington appointed him Minister to the Hague, later to Portugal, and insisted on John Adams appointing him to Berlin where he negotiated valuable commercial conventions with Sweden and Prussia. In 1803 he was State Senator and then promoted to the United States Senate. Differing with his party and supporting Jefferson, he resigned and was charged by his Federalist enemies with abandoning a losing and joining a victorious party. This quarrel with the extreme Federalists, the ghost of the old Essex Junto, was kept up until he was President, and resumed during the latter part of his Presidency, when it became especially malignant.

He was the victor in this contest, reaching the highest offices,

while only Harrison Gray Otis of his old enemies ever got back into national prominence and he but briefly.

In 1809 Madison sent him to Prussia and it was owing to his popularity there that Czar Alexander proposed mediation to America and England. Madison named him for Justice on the Supreme Court, but he declined, and was made one of the Peace Commissioners who framed the Treaty of Ghent. In 1815 he was resident Minister to England, and transferred by Monroe to the Department of State. In all the places he filled he distinguished himself. Of the thirty-one years between his first office and his inauguration, about twenty-seven had been in public service.

Nominally a Republican he was really a Nationalist and Independent. He was an Adams, a New Englander with a Puritan cast of mind, and above everything a loyal American. Referring to a free trader he wrote: "He has all the contracted prejudices of that political sect; his whole system of government is comprised in the maxim of leaving money in the pockets of the people." Another quotation shows further his political cast: "It is by the complication of the government alone that the freedom of mankind can be assured. If the people of these United States enjoy a greater share of liberty than any other nation upon earth, it is because, of all the governments upon earth, theirs is the most complicated." In his first message, in an effort to spur Congress into measures not popular with the constituencies of some members, he asked: "Shall we proclaim to the world that we are palsied by the will of our constituents?"

Confident of his own integrity, imagining other men as willing as he to forego all personal and party feeling for the country's welfare, he proposed, Calhoun one rival being in the Vice-President's chair, to bring all the others into the cabinet, Clay, State; Jackson, War; Crawford, Treasury, and, he declining, Gallatin. Then all should embark the nation on a policy of internal improvement, material in roads and canals, rivers and harbors, educational in a national university and astronomical observatory, and a Naval Academy.

A curt declination from Crawford, a sarcastic one from Gallatin and information that Jackson would not receive his offer in the spirit it would be made in, made him abandon his idea of a coalition of all the politics.

Adams, the President, except Washington, most unpolitical-minded, suffered more from politics than any of his fellows. He began his administration under a great political handicap. He

was a minority President, yet his exact mind attached little, if any, importance to the fact that the wishes of probably a considerable majority of the people had been defeated by his selection over Jackson. The Constitution and laws of the country had been honestly followed and to him his title was as impeccable as if conferred by a great majority.

His immediate announcement of his intention to appoint Clay was impolitic. Proceeding from a sense of conscious honesty, it was one of those blunders which in politics is worse than a crime. Politically the appointment was unwise in many ways. If Adams was too little of a politician and Clay too much of one, the sum total of the two did not, as it would in mathematics, produce a good average; instead of a sum in addition a remainder in subtraction resulted.

Friends defended the appointment; there was really no other man in the country fitted for the place. The Jackson men retorted that with his long experience as Minister and Secretary, Adams needed only a good clerk to fill the State Department. Besides, they added, Richard Rush's remarkable success in London pointed him out as the best fitted man in America for the State portfolio. And as for Clay, had he not attacked the conduct of Jackson in Florida which Adams had defended in the cabinet, had justified so successfully with the English and Spanish governments?

There was that unsettled question of "adjourned veracity" between Adams and Clay as to Adams being willing at Ghent to give up the Mississippi for fishing rights in Newfoundland. If the administration needed Clay's support, was he not unquestionably more valuable in Congress than in the cabinet? Had not Kentucky instructed her Representatives to vote for Jackson by an overwhelming majority?

This Clay appointment hung like a millstone around the neck of the administration. Jackson seems to have acquitted Adams, and cordially shook hands with him. But the less just and less informed public were not so fair. Jackson did not acquit Clay; ever afterward he spoke of him as the "Judas of the West." Randolph voiced a widely held sentiment when, borrowing his characters from Fielding's "Tom Jones," he denounced in Congress "The Coalition of Blifil and Black George; the combination unheard of till then of the Puritan and the black-leg."

Clay from Kentucky and a slaveholder supporting a New Englander and an anti-slavery man against his next state neighbor and a pro-slavery man! Clay known to be, as many of his

fellow statesmen were, addicted to gambling on horse races, preferring a Puritan over Andrew Jackson, the owner and racer of Truxton, the greatest race horse ever seen in America! There were many single-minded Americans who could find only one explanation for this—the appointment of Clay by Adams to the position of heirship to the Presidency; and after a Northern man who so natural to succeed as a Westerner?

Casuists may argue the ethics of the Adams-Clay transaction from every angle and on every hypothesis of fact, but few, if any, practical politicians will be found to censure it. Such combinations are frequent enough between friends of candidates in nominating conventions, and arrangements for support after nomination, and it is said, candidates for the highest offices carry out such arrangements when elected.

Adams and Clay were members of the same party, and Adams' views and principles coincided much more with Clay's than did Jackson's. There were many reasons for his supporting Adams; there were many reasons for his opposing Jackson. Clay had long before shown dislike of Jackson, had announced during the canvass that he would never support Jackson. As this appointment is to have influence on many Presidential campaigns, and is the most discussed cabinet appointment in our history, a brief review of the evidence is not out of place.

Though friends of all the candidates were busy and some officious, and overtures were made by Adams' friends to Clay, by Jackson's friends to Clay and by Clay's friends to Adams and Jackson, the available evidence acquits all three of any personal application, trade or deal. The positive denial of the principals, taken with their conduct and character clinches the matter.

Adams' diary, an honest memoranda, records many confidential interviews in those trying days, two with Clay. The kernel of the first interview is thus given: "He wished me as far as I might think proper, to satisfy him with regard to some principles of great public importance, but without any personal considerations for himself. In the question to come before the House between General Jackson, Mr. Crawford and myself he had no hesitation in saying that his preference would be for me." Here the entry closes with no light thrown on what those "principles of great public importance" were which Clay had in mind. The second interview, a two-hour talk, seems to have been just such a friendly discussion as their ordinary relations called for.

It should be remembered that Clay had repeatedly committed himself against Jackson before either interview.

This support of Adams turned out in the long run to be an unwise political move for Clay. He lost many supporters and estranged some of his warmest personal friends, whom he never recovered, notably Amos Kendall and Francis Blair, two Kentucky men who for many succeeding years were to be the engineers running the machinery that turned out Presidents. All the rest of Clay's life the two damning facts—his support of Adams, Adams' appointment of him—were to confront him, so convincing to many who loved fair play, and had no means or opportunity of testing and learning the truth.

A wonderful chapter of imaginary history could be written of what would have happened had Clay supported Jackson, exercised on him that winning personality, helped him with that eloquent tongue and great ability and most certainly succeeded him. Had he only applied "Compromise," his panacea for all other ills, to his trouble with Jackson—

The cabinet as finally made up was: Clay, State; Richard Rush, Treasury; James Barbour, War; Southard, Navy; Wirt, Attorney-General; and McLean, Post Office, the last three being hold-overs from the preceding administration. Fifteen Senators voted against Clay's confirmation, Benton and Van Buren voting aye; Jackson and fourteen other Southerners nay; seven Senators were absent.

DeWitt Clinton was offered the London Mission but declined, censuring Clay's appointment, and Rufus King was sent, who twenty-two years before had held the office. Webster and the younger Federalists received scant recognition. Adams accused the Federalists of always naming good men, but men obnoxious to the people.

Fighting patronage seekers from first to last, Adams refused to remove any office-holder except for just cause and reappointed every one unless cause warranting removal was shown.

With the vote against Clay's confirmation began an alliance between the friends of Jackson and of Crawford, and a rallying of Southern against Northern factions. Calhoun's hand was in this, so Adams records, and he had through a friend given Adams warning. Calhoun wanted Poinsett made Secretary of State, and Cheeves in the Treasury. Poinsett was sent to Mexico. In this new alignment Calhoun had to revise his policies, to face about on internal improvements and all paternalistic ideas.

With the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 a great impetus

was given internal improvements, but the question with many was whether they should be made by the states or the federal government. Adams had a glorious vision of a great national system of roads, canals, navigable rivers and safe harbors, but little was his administration able to accomplish along these lines. New England, which had built its own roads, was indifferent and many states wanted only land grants and aids to their own projects.

The advanced stand taken by Adams would have been a bold move by any President coming after Monroe's constitutional negative on the questions involved. For a minority President its impolicy was accentuated.

Adams' first Congress met and Adams' friend, Taylor, was reëlected Speaker by only two majority. As Taylor had friends of his own, his election was not an administration victory. The opposition controlled the Senate, and administration measures were blocked or so mutilated as to impair their usefulness and popularity. That the Chief Executive was one not chosen by the people was constantly kept before the public eye by committees of inquiry, by numerous proposals to amend the Constitution so as to secure hereafter a popular choice. Benton proposed a general election of President by districts, a second election between the two highest candidates in case of failure of majority in the first. No proposal could get the approval of two-thirds of either house.

In the second session of the Twentieth Congress \$30,000 was voted for repairs to the Cumberland Road and various canals and roads were aided by land grants, and the navigability of the Ohio improved.

The Panama Conference, a forerunner of the Pan-American Congress, was pushed forward by Clay, if not originated by him, who imparted some of his zeal to Adams. But the President's announcement that he had accepted the invitation to send delegates was resented by the captious Senate. Delegates were confirmed, however, but none attended the first meeting which met only to adjourn over, and the adjourned meeting was never held. Poinsett, who was one of our delegates, was instructed by Clay to propose the purchase of Texas. In 1820 in a debate on the Spanish treaty, Clay had sought to force Monroe's hand and bitterly excoriated the treaty because it gave up Texas. In 1844 Clay is to lose the Presidency by his opposition to the annexation of Texas.

The slavery element found fault with this mission in the

possible recognition of the black republic Hayti, and the international suppression of the slave trade which they feared would lead to an international drive against slavery. They disliked and feared, too, a close alliance with these republics, some of whose generals and statesmen were negroes and mulattoes. It was in this debate that Randolph shot his coalition bomb at the President and his Secretary of State.

Amid this wrangling Calhoun is described as presiding in his chair with saturnine eye on the contending men and passions on the Senate floor. Did Randolph, whom he had so capably handled years before in the House and whom he had once despised—did Randolph draw him along, as some think, into that arrayal of the South against the North which his bitterness and harshness did so much to hasten and widen? Calhoun began to slough off his nationalism, reverse his position on internal improvements and the tariff, abandon his former latitudinarian views on constitutional construction, to give to states rights more intellectual force, more powerful reasoning and more individual leadership than any other one individual ever gave it.

Two grave dissensions between the federal government and the State of Georgia under the governorship of the fiery Troup, arose in 1826, one over the treaty with the Creek Indians, the other over the boundary between Georgia and Alabama Territory. Adams with wise forbearance had both matters brought before Congress and settled without serious difficulty. One result was the removal of the Creeks across the Mississippi, and a better system in our dealings with the Indians. Monroe, notably just in his treatment of the Indians, had in his last message suggested as the only solution of the Indian question their removal far from contact with the white man.

Virginia had protested against internal improvements when the President sounded his first note on the subject, and when Congress began on a higher tariff law, Georgia and South Carolina joined her in asserting the unconstitutionality of both tariff and internal improvements. Jefferson and Madison were consulted. Neither approved of Adams' advanced program; Madison counseled patience and reminded his friends of the difference between the exercise of unconstitutional powers and the abuse of constitutional powers. Jefferson's last advice to his countrymen was to suggest again constitutional amendments allowing internal improvements under proper safeguards, and expressly wished Virginia not to take the lead in opposition.

Foreign affairs gave Adams much concern. Our friend Czar

Alexander was dead, the French King would give us no satisfaction in our spoilation claims, and England, under Canning, who after a period of boastful friendship, was once more our sarcastic enemy, shut off our trade with the West Indies.

Gallatin, whose appointment after his curt refusal of the Treasury shows Adams' broadness, was sent to England, but Canning refused even to discuss the question though eventually agreeing to compensation for seized slaves. Nothing more could be effected until Canning's death, when the old conventions were restored.

The Nineteenth Congress at its first session did little more in the way of legislation than provide for the removal of the Creek Indians. The most important measure of its second session was the appropriation of \$500,000 annually for six years for the improvement of the navy. From this bill as it came from the Senate the House struck out Adams' project of a Naval Academy. The proposed Interior Department and other administration measures died, through neglect, on the calendars. Calhoun's casting vote killed a tariff bill much like the one to be adopted by the next Congress.

Edward Everett began his career in this Congress, and Buchanan ended his first four years of service, while James K. Polk was a new member.

The lukewarm friends and even the opponents of the President kept on excellent social terms with the White House, dined there and recommended friends for office. Adams records his opinion of these in his diary: "as bad as Randolph," who was "the image of a great man stamped on base metal."

To the handicap the administration began with, its last two years had the added burden of its first two. Politics far outweighed government with nearly every one except the President. He gave his mind and heart to the nation's business.

State politics were quiet. Van Buren was in complete control of New York and Clinton so badly beaten as to make overtures to Adams which were rejected. The Congressional elections, however, were exciting. There were Adams meetings and Jackson meetings and Adams candidates and Jackson candidates in the field. Party names were not much used. Clay was hopeful and put out another refutation of the "Bargain and Corruption charge." Webster was hopeful, too, but Adams calmly resigned to probable defeat.

Adams records that he wrote his message to the first session of the Twentieth Congress in "agony of mind from causes relat-

ing both to public and private affairs" and notes that only three Senators and thirty-seven Congressmen had called on him, whereas two years before all had called save one Senator and three Representatives.

The antagonism of Congress was soon shown; Taylor was defeated by Andrew Stevenson of Virginia for Speaker, who gave Jackson men control of every committee. The Senate, choosing its own committees now, was as hostile as Calhoun had been. For the first time Congress was organized in opposition to the Executive. It spent its time investigating, calling on the departments for reports, seeking political ammunition. The one important act at its first session, and very portentous in its result, was the high tariff law of 1828, the "Tariff of Abominations," which with its later amendments South Carolina rebelled against. The charge was made at the time that the bill was purposely made odious to injure the administration.

This was not strictly speaking an administration bill. Adams' Southern friends had urged him to omit the tariff in his message and he did so, leaving it to be brought up in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury. The tariff advocates had been active between Congresses and met in convention with delegates from New England and the Middle States, Virginia and Ohio, and memorialized Congress. Local free trade meetings had countered with denunciations of any tariff raise, while South Carolina declared protection unconstitutional. Ships in some New England ports, when the news of its passage came, flew their flags at half mast and from the South came threats of resistance.

The agricultural South wanted free trade; Northern and Eastern towns and cities were growing, while Charleston was not so important a port as it had been in Revolutionary days. The tariff hurt shipping and foreign trade both North and South, and was a burden on the latter with no compensating benefits.

Yet the administration secured for the South the settlement by England for the seized slaves, and the anti-slavery Adams, with constitutional conscientiousness, sought a treaty with England for the return of fugitive slaves from Canada in exchange for the return by us of English deserters from her navy.

New England was now for protection, having greatly increased her manufacturing interests, and Webster, who had been in 1824 the most powerful advocate of free trade, became the strongest champion of high tariff. He defended the change of position adroitly; in 1824 New England thought manufactures should be

built up slowly, but being overruled she had adjusted herself to the new national policy and was conforming to it, and demanded its continuance.

The President bore the adversities suffered by his administration better than his cabinet did. Clay, ill and discouraged, wished to resign; he could not, he said, perform properly the duties of his office. "I must go home and die or get better." The Kentucky Senate was investigating the "Bargain and Corruption" charge. His chief stood staunchly by him, and persuaded him to take a vacation and seek restoration to health, not resign under fire. Barbour, too, wished to retire and Adams gave him the London Mission.

Before leaving for home the South Carolina Congressional delegation had a meeting in Hayne's Washington residence. Treason was the object of the meeting, it was charged; but this was denied though it was admitted that threats were made of separation, unless the tariff law was repealed.

During the Presidential campaign the possibility of separation was discussed; it was New England in 1814 over again in South Carolina now, only much more open and more generally supported by the people of the section involved. Plenty of prominent South Carolinians combated the idea, and other Southern States showed no sign of going further than remonstrance. Madison ridiculed Giles and his faction in Virginia who spoke flamboyantly of states rights.

Calhoun figured as one opposed to such violent views. Corresponding with Monroe he expressed the opinion that the great body of South Carolinians were attached to the Union. Monroe counseled patience; the South, he said, where slaves were so numerous, should never provoke an issue to weaken the Union.

The second session of the Twentieth Congress was less infected with politics, the Presidential election being over. Its proceedings take up only four hundred and fifty pages of record, less than one-fifth as much as some of its predecessors. The House authorized tolls on the Cumberland Road, but the Senate struck this out and appropriated \$100,000 for repairs and extensions. Aid was extended to roads and canals in several states. Many bills died on the calendars, and the late appointments by the President went unconfirmed, and thereby John J. Crittenden did not take a seat on the Supreme bench and was destined to fame in another sphere of action.

Every administration has the burden of one Presidential campaign year; the Adams administration practically had four to

endure. From the day the House elected Adams, the Jackson campaign was on. The Telegraph, Duff Green's paper, was established at Washington, the constant and reckless critic of the administration, the champion of Jackson and Calhoun. It was years before Morse developed the electric telegraph, but the grapevine telegraph had been long in operation.

Governor Tyler was, in 1826, elected as a strict constructionist to succeed Randolph in the Senate. Before he had taken his seat Virginia was astonished by the publication of a letter from him to Clay, written in 1825, in which he praised Clay's support of Adams and stated that the people of Virginia could not have been so dazzled by military renown as to have voted for a mere soldier, acknowledged to be of little value as a citizen. Fifteen years later he is to astonish those who placed him in the Vice-Presidency, when he assumed the Presidency on the death of Harrison. However, in 1826 he said he was not bound to Clay or to the administration and proved it by siding with the opposition in the Senate, and voting against both tariff and internal improvements.

Giles, succeeding Tyler as Governor, in attacking Adams embroiled him with the surviving Hartford Convention Federalists of New England, and the sons of others, which resulted in the correspondence compiled in Henry Adams' "New England Federalism."

State politics were comparatively quiet during Adams' term, but the Congressional elections were exciting.

In October, 1825, the Tennessee legislature nominated Jackson for President by acclamation. Calhoun was a friendly neutral, later an ally, Crawford a foe, but Crawford men were gradually won over by Van Buren, now a Jackson lieutenant and influential as always. He had fought valiantly for Crawford and now Crawford was known by everyone but himself to be out of the running. Reëlected Senator in 1827 Van Buren in the Senate with Eaton managed Jackson's campaign. They toured the South and concert of action followed.

Clay rather than Adams met the Jackson onslaught. Lexington gave him a welcome rivalling that Nashville gave Jackson, but Kentucky was lost, it turned out, along with Ohio and Missouri which had supported Clay in 1824. Clay had lost many of his strongest friends.

Rush could do nothing in Pennsylvania, Barbour nothing in Virginia. There was little hope of a repetition of the New York result in the preceding election, the Albany Regency and Tam-

many, working together harmoniously under Van Buren, being strongly entrenched now and Clinton dead.

A motion in the House to adorn the rotunda of the capital with a picture of the battle of New Orleans was defeated 103 to 98; Sloan of Ohio countered by a resolution to investigate Jackson's execution under court-martial of six militiamen in 1814. A committee appointed exonerated Jackson and the report was adopted 103 to 98. Sloan ruined his own promising career and helped Jackson.

Calhoun, hopeful of the Presidency eventually, found his place on the Jackson ticket in danger from Crawford's persistent hate. The advisability of having a Northern man on the ticket was potent, but Van Buren was willing to wait, and Calhoun's friends persuaded the Jackson managers not to shelve him.

The Adams forces found it hard to secure a suitable running mate. Clay was obviously not the man at this juncture; Monroe was sought but refused; Governor Shulze of Pennsylvania declined and Richard Rush was chosen. Jackson and Calhoun and Adams and Rush were nominated by consent, no national convention nor caucuses being held, and no platforms adopted.

For the first time geography was ignored—Jackson and Calhoun, Southern slaveholders, were opposed to Adams and Rush, Northerners from free states.

A carefully engineered attempt to embroil Jackson and Monroe over the conduct of the War Department while under the latter in 1815 failed. The Adams men in Virginia met and put out an electoral ticket with Madison and Monroe at its head; both refused the use of their names. A great celebration of the anniversary of the battle of New Orleans was a Jacksonian event, his friends from every state in the Union attending.

Along with these more or less legitimate political maneuvers, probably the most scurrilous campaign in our history was waged. Personal charges of a base kind were made against both candidates. Vile and utterly improbable charges were made against Adams, while the Adams forces attacked the character of Mrs. Jackson, a good and particularly devout woman, whose age alone should have protected her.

The real governmental question most at issue in the election—the extreme benevolent paternalism advocated by Adams and Clay—was little mentioned, nor did the extension of suffrage favored by the Democrats figure much in the discussions. With the people the issue was "Bargain and Corruption," "Down with the Senatorial Dynasty," "The People's Choice" on the Jackson

side, and Jackson's unfitness, the danger of electing military chieftains, a mob rule, on the other.

Jackson was charged with numerous murders, in duels, by court-martial and Indian butcheries. A complete offset and more to these charges was produced by an item copied in every Jackson paper in the land:

"COLD AND DELIBERATE MURDER

Andrew Jackson coolly and deliberately put to death upwards of 1500 British troops on the 8th of January, 1815, on the plains below New Orleans for no other offense than they wished to sup in the City that night."

Jackson's military record and his personality won the day, together with the excellent management of his campaign. Under Van Buren's direction the whole Northern Democratic press came out simultaneously for Jackson, a veritable broadside of all the Jacksonian heavy artillery. Every little Democratic country weekly was used. James Gordon Bennett on the New York Courier and Enquirer was active for Jackson. Jackson's personal popularity was marvelous. Twenty-five members of the Tennessee Legislature had voted against him for Senator in 1823; only three were returned at the next election. In some towns citizens were driven from their homes for opposing him for President.

It was during this campaign that the name Democrat came into general use. The Adams wing of the Republican party called themselves National-Republicans; their opponents took the name of Democratic-Republicans or Democrats.

Adams and Rush carried all New England save one Maine vote, and received 6 of Maryland's 11, and 16 of New York's 36, 83 in all. Jackson received all the rest, 178; Calhoun all but Georgia's 7,—Crawford men who would not vote for their chief's hated enemy.

There was a great celebration in Washington on July 4, 1826, of the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, but the two chief invited guests were absent. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson both passed away on that day, and devout Americans saw Divine interposition in allotting these two patriots so significant a day for their translation to a higher sphere.

Though no great achievement foreign or domestic graced Adams' rule, the trade arrangements made with South America were valuable extensions to our commerce. Our country was in a most prosperous condition and the public debt had been reduced

an average of \$7,500,000 a year. Peace reigned except in politics. Adams could leave the Presidency with a conscience as clear as Washington's and this was a great solace to his high mind.

John Quincy Adams' administration, like that of his father, was in a period of transition, and was also something of a tragedy. The fairies bringing political gifts at his birth brought all but one and the lack of that one, in the supreme hours, negated most of the rest. A great and honored name, natural and inherited talents, a fine education and unexampled training, the approval and patronage of Washington, continued by his successors, Adams, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe—five Presidents bore high testimony to his worth and capacity,—and yet when President he failed in much for the lack of a little of that genius for politics which every ward-heeler and every leader of every court-house ring in the country has in abundance.

In 1831 he was elected to the House of Representatives and kept there until 1848 when he died in harness breathing his last under the dome of the Capitol. His father was called "Old Colossus," the appellation Jefferson gave him; the son came to be known as the "Old Man Eloquent." He was the most loved and lovable, and at times the most hated and exasperating man ever sitting in Congress, the House gnashing its teeth at him in rage at times and at other times calling him unanimously to the chair in a crisis, or violating the rules of the House in applauding him.

As Monroe, the non-partisan, or rather pan-partisan, had brought into the Democratic (Republican) Party a large element not properly belonging to it, foreign and even antagonistic to many of its fundamental principles, so Adams took these out of the party and under the sign and name of National Republicans laid the foundation of the Whig Party. Opposing in 1828 the real Democratic party, he did the party, and the nation also, a service. Antagonism within a party is a dread disease; outside of it it breeds health and strength. Jackson and Adams between them brought into the field two vigorous parties instead of one bloated one.

CHAPTER X

TRIUMPHANT DEMOCRACY UNDER JACKSON

1829-1837

Jackson and Wellington—Presidents and Their Times—New America—Andrew Jackson—Cabinet—Messages—Spoils System—Peggy Eaton—Outstanding Features of Jackson's "Reign"—Indian Policy—Internal Improvements—Tariff—Congress—Nullification—Hayne-Webster Debate—Nullification Ordinance and President's Proclamation—Calhoun's Resolutions—Force Bill and Tariff Reduction—Clay's Compromise.

PLUTARCH writing in the 19th century would have paralleled Andrew Jackson with the Duke of Wellington. They were born within two years of each other, both headed armies and then governments, and were staunchly loved and admired, hated and abused.

Both gained their early military training in fighting inferior races and came to have great influence with their defeated enemies, not because they won their love, but their confidence and admiration. Their larger military careers were too dissimilar to make a comparison of any value.

While Jackson was President of the United States fighting for democracy and a government by the people, Wellington as Prime Minister was as boldly and stubbornly resisting Parliamentary reform, standing like a stone wall for class rule, the rotten borough system, the denial of representation to the millions of the common people of England. Jackson won, Wellington lost. Jackson was by far the abler and the more advanced statesman, and greater civil leader. Nor can it be doubted that the success of the democratic idea under Jackson in America profoundly influenced, if it did not actually bring about, the broadening of the franchise in England.

Both men owned and ran race horses and fought duels, Wellington keeping up these practices long after Jackson had sobered down to a well-ordered life. Both were high tempered and at times rough in their manner, Wellington notably and persistently so, while Jackson came to take on the courtly graces of life. These two soldiers and statesmen were typical of their day and countries, much alike and much unlike. America suffers nothing in the comparison.

Every President represents or reflects the predominant aspect of his time—Washington, the stern and patient task of molding a people into a nation as he had formed an army out of raw recruits and militia; John Adams, the wrangling of conflicting ideas, parties and factions; Jefferson, the triumph of Republicanism and the settlement of the government on democratic principles; Madison, a young nation in a warring world when every course was beset with danger and men knew not which way to turn; Monroe, a happy issue out of our troubles, internal and external; John Quincy Adams, factions at war again and the splitting up of party; Jackson, Democracy triumphant, with the President the direct representative of the people and exponent of their united will.

America as a whole was a new country and things grew old and established quickly just as in a new settlement a few years makes an early comer an oldest inhabitant. Jackson broke up what already had become an old order of things. No more were select bodies of men to choose whom the people should vote for, at least theoretically not. The people nominated Jackson in 1828 and elected him. He declared himself the one official representative of the whole people of the United States and constantly appealed to them during his eight years of office. He prevailed over Clay and Webster and the powerful influence of the Bank of the United States, and Calhoun's transference from his to their forces brought them no greater success.

Born in a raw settlement in 1767 to poverty and hardship, receiving almost no education, mistreated in boyhood by British soldiers, emigrating to a still newer country, Andrew Jackson was a typical Southwesterner of America of the early 19th century. In 1788 he was district attorney in that part of North Carolina which now constitutes part of Tennessee, and in 1796 a member of the Tennessee Constitutional Convention, going thence to Washington as that state's first Congressman. His politics were Republican (Democratic) and in 1797 he was elected Senator; resigning in 1798 he was elected to the state supreme court where he served six years. He was appointed General of Militia in 1812, and in 1814 Major-General in the regular army, and given the thanks of Congress. Monroe made him Governor of Florida. In 1823 he was elected to the Senate, not that he wished the place but because he was thought to be the only man who could defeat Williams who, in the Senate, had failed to stand by Tennessee's hero; he resigned in two years.

Jackson's ante-Presidential career was not quite so dis-

tinguished as his predecessors' though having a military element none but Washington's had. But he had gained no little political training in fighting his critics and enemies in cabinet and Congress.

The country he was to govern contained nearly 13,000,000 people, 2,000,000 of whom were slaves. Of the whites the free states contained 6,871,000, the slave states 3,660,000, the territories the remainder. Another division puts 5,400,000 in the North and East, 3,000,000 in the West and 2,000,000 in the South Atlantic States. Thus the South and West with New York or Pennsylvania could and did outvote the rest of the country from 1828 to 1860, except when Harrison in 1840 and Taylor in 1848 broke the combination.

Jackson's first cabinet consisted of Van Buren, State; Ingham, Treasury; Eaton, War; Branch, Navy; Berrien, Attorney-General; McLean was continued in the Post Office and invited to sit in cabinet meetings, but was soon succeeded by William S. Barry of Kentucky. Eaton was the only personal appointment. Ingham represented the strong Pennsylvania Democratic support, as Van Buren the New York Democracy. Branch of South Carolina and Berrien of Georgia, together with Ingham, represented the Calhoun wing of the party, though they were not the men Calhoun would have selected to represent his views. It took a strong head and hand to maintain unity in such a body and Jackson did not preserve it long. Friends told Van Buren that to enter it was to cut his throat, but Van Buren knew what he was doing, always.

Jackson's first message forecasts many of his policies. He recommends, as he does in every succeeding message, Benton's proposed law for Presidential elections, advocates modification of the tariff, suggests distribution of the coming surplus, after the national debt is paid, among the states, advises enlargement of the Attorney-General's office, advocates removal of Indians across the Mississippi, advocates extension of law making four years the term of office in general and reminds Congress that the charter of the Bank of the United States will soon expire.

The message stated that no man had an intrinsic right to office and no individual wrong was done by depriving one of any office; the people alone had a right to complain when a bad officer was substituted for a good one, and the idea of property rights in offices so generally held was wrong.

For a quarter of a century preceding Jackson's inauguration there had been comparatively little change in the personnel of

subordinate office-holders in the United States, save by death and removal for serious cause. Men had grown old in their places and come to feel an ownership in them. The cankers of a calm political world and a long peace infested the service. That many good and faithful public servants were thrown out of place, and many distressful individual domestic tragedies brought about by the numerous removals from office made in Jackson's administration is undoubtedly true. But there was no such massacre of the innocents as has been pictured.

Those ordinary American citizens of to-day who have to transact business with the government departments at Washington may have been struck either with the absence or the prevalence of the insolence of office among the nation's employees. Certainly those whose ability has brought them to high station have been singularly free from this sort of fault, but some of the underlings, in their attitude toward the humble citizen doing business with his government, have exhibited more hauteur than dutifulness. In Jackson's day the state of affairs was far worse than it has ever been since.

There seems to have been a "grandfather clause" in the unwritten law governing appointments to federal office, and the departments were full of descendants of generals, admirals, judges, colonels, governors, and powerful politicians of former days. There were many who thought, with much cause to think so, that office was hereditary in effect and certainly a vested right. In 1829 the government service was suffering as much from an original disregard of that part of civil service reform governing appointment to office as it suffered from the Jackson administration's disregard of that part applying to retention of it. The two should always go together.

The people adversely affected and Jackson's opponents raised a fearful outcry, but it fell on deaf ears so far as the general run of people were concerned. Jackson's desire was to follow Jefferson's principles and make removals only for cause, such as vice in the original appointment, official or personal misconduct, negligence or incapacity and offensive partisanship. There were entire classes of officers which he never troubled—commissioners to adjudicate land titles and the judiciary generally. Of seventeen diplomatic positions only four were changed; of eight thousand post offices only four hundred were changed in the first year. But Jackson's officers carried rotation in office much farther than he intended.

A very violent tempest in a large teapot was the Mrs. Peggy

Eaton episode in the early days of Jackson's Presidency. Major Eaton, an old friend and war comrade of Jackson, and a Senator from Tennessee, was made Secretary of War. He had married the widow of Purser Timberlake of the Navy, who originally had been Miss Peggy O'Neil, daughter of a Washington tavern-keeper. As a cabinet lady her social standing and reception in Washington, especially in official circles, became a question of importance, almost a matter of state. Official society circles, under the lead of the wife of the Vice-President, positively declined to accord her the recognition her husband's cabinet position *ex-officio* was thought to entitle her to. Her mother had been kind to Mrs. Jackson when Jackson was in the Senate and that was a debt Jackson could not overpay. He, who trusted all women and believed her a much injured lady, manfully took up Mrs. Eaton's cause and suffered the most complete and unequivocal defeat in all his career, in spite of the generalship of Van Buren and the aid of the Ministers of England and Russia, both bachelors and therefore free to follow their own social standards. The ladies of the cabinet and indeed of all Washington, however much they had at periods of their lives applauded Cinderella and her Prince and King Cophetua and his Beggar Maid, could see no romance in this Maid of the Inn become the Secretary of War's bride.

Thus began that rift in the cabinet which eventuated in its dissolution, though much graver matters were the direct cause.

The outstanding features of Jackson's eight years in office were the removal of the Indians, the negation of the internal improvements policy, the nullification movement and tariff adjustment, the defeat of the United States Bank with the consequent revolutionary change in our fiscal methods.

Monroe had advocated the removal of the Indians as the most merciful and indeed the only feasible solution of the Indian problem. His successor had made some progress along the same line. The question became acute in Jackson's time. There were three solutions suggested—(to) incorporate the Indians as citizens of the states they lived in; (to) allow them to have their own independent governments within such states; (to) remove them across the Mississippi.

The first was practical only where they had become really civilized and were so few in number as to be no disturbing element in the state. The second plainly was unconstitutional, unless the impossible happened of a state permitting such a thing, since no state could be erected within a state without its consent.

A new element was injected into the problem by the Indians, aided and abetted by the opponents of the administration, asserting the rights of foreign and independent nations making their claims under treaty rights with the United States, and appealing to the courts. The Supreme Court cited the State of Georgia to appear before it and was disobeyed. It has been reported that Jackson said "That is John Marshall's law. Let him enforce it."

The large Quaker element in Pennsylvania and sentimental individuals all over the country sympathized with the Indians and Clay and Webster fought the administration's Indian policy in Congress and before the people. The Supreme Court was brought into the situation again and decided it had no jurisdiction, but Marshall delivered a long extra-judicial opinion, which, with Wirt's argument for the Indians, was immediately published as a political pamphlet.

The removal bill finally passed the Senate by the necessary two-thirds vote without a vote to spare. This Indian policy was regarded as Jackson's own, and not his party's policy.

The internal improvements policy as part of his American system had been steadily persisted in by Clay, notwithstanding Madison's and Monroe's vetoes on constitutional grounds. Jackson in Congress had voted for some such bills. As President he stood firm on the old Republican (Democratic) theory, vetoing such laws as unconstitutional, though he was much in favor of the states making such improvements and the nation aiding them. He was cursed for his vetoes by Clay and his followers, and applauded by those of his own opinion. He arrayed the Democratic Party against special legislation of this and every other kind, a position it has held theoretically ever since.

Jackson in some letters and by some votes had favored a moderate tariff. When Clay was told that Jackson said he was for a judicious tariff, he exclaimed: "Then, by God, I am for an injudicious tariff." Jackson was responsible for much profanity by Clay; Webster bore him with more philosophy and Calhoun cursed him only inwardly.

The Twenty-first Congress met in December, 1829, and the House on first ballot elected the administration candidate, Stevenson of Virginia, Speaker by a vote of 152 against 49 scattering, but Jackson's supporters were estimated to constitute a majority of only 65. Yet even these did not support him on all occasions, notably on subsidiary questions involving the bank. Before the end of the last session the bank was carrying the House against him. Moreover, he vetoed many of the bills it passed.

In the Senate Calhoun presided, with Clay and Webster leading a majority of six or eight over the administration forces. The Senate was perfectly open in its antagonism and rejected many of Jackson's appointments.

The Twenty-second Congress, December, 1831, Democratic in both branches, was a notable body. Calhoun still presided in the Senate where besides the other two of the great triumvirate were Isaac Hill, Ashe Robbins, Horatio Seymour, William Marcy, Mahlon Dickerson, Frelinghuysen, Dallas, Clayton, Tyler, Mangum, Hayne, Forsyth, Grundy, White, Ewing, Poindexter, King and Benton.

There were big men in the House too, John Quincy Adams, late, and James K. Polk, future President, Rufus Choate and Edward Everett of Massachusetts, Cambreleng and Verplanck of New York, Archer, Mason and Stevenson of Virginia, McDuffie of South Carolina, R. M. Johnson, John Bell of Tennessee, Thomas Corwin of Ohio and many others.

Clay, though defeating R. M. Johnson for the Senate by a very narrow majority, led the Senate, Webster assenting to his leadership. Party caucuses were held and party lines drawn. The Presidential campaign was due the following year and the bank issue and the nullification issue, as well as other important matters were pending. The opposition was more solidified and more under command than the administration forces in both houses.

The Twenty-third Congress, December, 1833, even more distinguished than its predecessor, contains Calhoun and Preston, both anti-Jackson Senators from South Carolina, Silas Wright and Tallmadge from New York, Southard from New Jersey and William C. Rives of Virginia.

In the House Franklin Pierce is a new member, Millard Fillmore, Horace Binney of Pennsylvania, John H. Fulton and Henry A. Wise of Virginia, also.

The tariff of abominations of 1828 was modified some but not much by the Twenty-first Congress. The tariff bore almost as hard on the cotton growers of the South as the embargo and non-intercourse laws had borne against the shipping of New England, and South Carolina began to pursue a course very similar to that of Massachusetts and Connecticut in 1814. Nullification began to be talked and the Virginia-Kentucky resolutions of 1798 appealed to as justifying it, and the Separatists' argument of 1812 repeated. Madison, as one of the authors of the resolutions, denied their approving nullification or secession. Several of the

Southern States declared by their legislatures that the tariff was unconstitutional, but disclaimed disunion sentiments. South Carolina's extreme position strengthened the high protectionists in a way; it was easier to combat disunion in argument than to defend some of the tariff provisions.

In 1829 the Legislature of South Carolina sent to the Senate its famous Exposition and Protest against the new law; Virginia, Georgia, North Carolina and Alabama supported her, and a small reduction was made, but not enough to quiet or allay dissatisfaction. South Carolina had hoped for more aid from Jackson, and nullification became more and more of a threat. The arrangement for the Jefferson birthday dinner of 1830 fell into the hands of Calhoun men and the program toasts smacked strongly of states' rights; by the time they had been responded to the atmosphere had become highly charged and tense. The first volunteer toast called for was from the President. Jackson amid a deathly stillness proposed—"Our Federal Union; it must be preserved." Originally he had written it out "Our Union; it must and shall be preserved," but friends who wished to keep peace in the party had induced him to modify it. Calhoun responded with his argumentative toast—"The Union, next to our Liberty the most dear; may we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the states and distributing equally its benefits and burdens." Van Buren also gave a toast, a characteristic one—"Mutual forbearance and reciprocal concessions."

Out of the loose language of some of the clauses of the Virginia-Kentucky resolutions Calhoun constructed a whole elaborate system of political philosophy. From expostulation and denunciation it is a long step to nullification and another from nullification to secession, but that course Calhoun and his followers pursued. Benton, from one of Calhoun's speeches, judged that the primal source of nullification Calhoun took from the veto power of the people's tribune in the patrician government of Rome. Calhoun's friends claim that he was no secessionist; that he believed that nullification, if established, would be an effectual bar against any action which would bring about disunion; that state sovereignty was the best bond of union.

The Hayne-Webster debate, although it arose in a discussion of a land bill, was really a part of the nullification debate. It attracted nation-wide attention and its political effect lasted until the Civil War. Hayne was a man of no mean ability, ranking in company with Buchanan and Benton close to the great

trio. Webster's in the House, his in the Senate were the two ablest attacks on protection in 1824. He seized, in 1830, an opportunity, in answering a speech by Webster, to seek to reunite the South and West. It is the general impression that Webster completely demolished Hayne. That is only partly true. Hayne's speech made Webster's friends very uneasy and their anxiety continued until he came to the latter part of his speech.

Hayne taunted Webster with his change of position on the question before the Senate, the sale of Western lands; in 1825 Webster had argued that these lands should be disposed of to settlers, not hoarded as a national treasure and held for high prices, as he now advocated. He also taxed Webster with his absolute reversal of position on the tariff, in 1816 making the ablest of all arguments against protection, in 1820 enthraling an anti-tariff meeting in Boston, again opposing protection in Congress in 1824, and now the strongest advocate of high tariff in the Senate. Webster's former opposition to internal improvements was contrasted with his present one, and all his changes charged to an effort to purchase the support of the West for the benefit of the East.

The old antagonism of New England toward the West, her opposition to new states there, Quincy's secession speech, the desired creation of a wilderness between the United States and the country to the West, were reviewed. But since that famous or infamous coalition of 1825 was consummated which gave the Presidency to New England, the portfolio of State and the supposed succession to the West, carrying with it the reciprocal distribution of governmental favors, the tariff to the East, internal improvements to the West, a change had come, said the South Carolinian.

Hayne contrasted the condition of the slaves in the South with the miserable state which was the fate of freed negroes in some sections of the North where they were the most despised outcasts or hunted like wild beasts.

He compared the course South Carolina was proposing in time of peace with the course pursued by New England in 1812-14 while the country was at war, when, Hamilton dead and John Adams overthrown, Pickering, Cabot, Otis and their faction controlled the Federalist Party in Massachusetts, and asserted that South Carolina's present course was far more constitutional, far more patriotic than Massachusetts' then. He quoted from newspapers, sermons, speeches in Boston, Quincy's in the House, Tracey's and Hillhouse's in the Senate, and the journal of the

Hartford Convention lately made public. He cited the Massachusetts legislative resolutions condemning rejoicings over American victories. The sale of provisions to the British army in Canada, the blue light signals to the enemy's fleet, the attitude of the leaders toward government loans, were not neglected. But he gave full honor to those New Englanders who neither approved of nor participated in these things, and to New England's patriotism.

Then he launched into a defense of nullification. Who, he asked, were the true patriots, those who wished to confine the government to the limits prescribed by the constitution, or those who would make it a consolidated government by stealing the powers belonging to the states and giving them to the federal government? The tariff and internal improvements were likened—he borrowed this from John Randolph—to bits of meat held out to Towser or Sweetlips, Tray, Blanche or Sweetheart, and the whole pack of hounds would follow.

He likened South Carolina's resistance to the tariff dues to Hampden's and Pym's resistance to Ship Money and our forefathers' resistance to the Stamp Act and the duty on tea.

Webster replied next day. As Hayne had long been prepared for the attack, Webster had long been ready to meet it. As he entered the Senate next morning Senator Clayton anxiously asked him if he was well prepared—"Are you charged?" "Seven fingers," replied Webster; four fingers was the charge for deer hunting, seven meant he was loaded for bear. Edward Everett had also shown signs of trepidation for his friend.

Webster ridiculed the old coalition story as baseless, something that never existed but like Banquo's ghost was always being called up. He denied any attack on slavery or on the South, and any disposition on the part of the free states to interfere with the South's peculiar institution. He, himself, condemning slavery, thought the federal government had nothing to do with it. He made no reply to Hayne's allusion to the treatment of free negroes in the North.

Webster adroitly defended his change of position on the tariff as an adaptation to an entirely new condition imposed on his section, and denied any change of position on the land question; he had always favored, he said, and favored now the sale of public lands as fast as they could be settled on.

The Hartford Convention he passed over as a mere episode, something he never had anything to do with, the journal of which he had never read. So far as its proceedings could be

shown to be disloyal or tending to disunion he was as ready as any to condemn it.

The Senator from South Carolina, he said, had stretched a drag-net and pulled in a lot of perished pamphlets, indiscreet sermons, frothy paragraphs and fuming popular addresses which the press, pulpits and parties had thrown off in times of excitement; he had raked over the rubbish of bygone times. A like process now in South Carolina would probably find much just as wicked, though, he added humorously, not so many sermons would be discovered.

So far Webster had entered one denial, one plea of confession and avoidance, one explanatory denial, and an evasion coupled with a rather weak "you're another." Had he stopped here the honors would have been with Hayne. But he launched into his magnificent tribute to the glorious history of New England and Massachusetts in colonial times, in Revolutionary times and since, and then, taking up the constitutional question of nullification, tore Hayne's gossamer argument into shreds.

That was the question at issue; all the rest had been mere sparring for points, and there he was completely the victor, and his victory comes down to posterity in histories and books of American oratory as it deserves to. Some allusion had been made to the "Five-striped banner," the proposed flag of the Northern Confederacy of 1814; it was to this that Webster was replying in the sentence—"Let their last feeble and lingering glance, rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original luster not a stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured."

Harvey in his intimate Reminiscences of Webster tells of an old neighbor, friend and idolator of Webster's, who when he read Hayne's speech took to his bed in despair, vowing never to get up again. To assurance that Webster would triumphantly answer, he would mournfully reply, "Dan'l can't do it. It can't be answered." When the reply was published and it was taken up to him, he turned his face to the wall, refusing to read it, though assured that the reply was complete—"Dan'l can't answer it. It can't be answered," he said. The paper was left on his bed and in about an hour he was heard shouting, "Bring me my boots. I'm going to get up."

In July, 1832, a new tariff bill was passed. The South Carolina Congressional delegation thereupon issued a manifesto that all hope of redress from Congress was gone, and the duty devolved

upon the sovereign power of the state whether or not to tamely surrender its precious heritage of rights. South Carolina called a convention to meet November 19th. It met a few days after Jackson's reelection and passed the nullification ordinance to take effect in February, 1833. Calhoun resigned the Vice-Presidency and was sent to the Senate, Hayne becoming Governor. Jackson in his December message recommended tariff reduction, but touched lightly on nullification. Later he issued his proclamation against nullification. This message and proclamation should be compared with Lincoln's first message to Congress.

No state supported South Carolina, and in her own borders civil war was threatened. The Stars and Stripes were hoisted at Greenville and a convention of protest held in Columbus. Governor Hayne issued a counter-proclamation, and Jackson prepared to enforce the federal authority, but acted with a patience and forbearance, unusual with him, toward his native state to whose loyalty to the Union he had strongly appealed in his proclamation.

While Congress was considering the tariff, Jackson sent in a special message asking for more power in the collection of the revenue, and what was known as the force bill was introduced and passed along with the tariff measure.

Calhoun on his journey to Washington had met cold glances from old friends, and discovered how little public sentiment favored the course his state was taking. He arrived in Washington in a less assured state of mind. The report had been spread that Jackson had said that in the event treason was committed Calhoun would be the first man hung, and Calhoun took the oath of office as Senator under curious eyes. No one questions Calhoun's courage but he was a statesman, not a soldier, a logician, not a duelist. Cooler counsels prevailed as other Southern states held coldly off, while Northern and Western states, and Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina and Tennessee denounced nullification. Virginia assuming the office of arbitrator advised moderation to South Carolina and to the President.

Calhoun introduced his Senate resolutions on the powers of government. Webster's attitude was rather averse to concession; he thought the time as good as any to try the issue. He fought Calhoun's resolutions, Calhoun appealing to Roman, he to English law, in their abstract reasoning. From Calhoun's and Webster's speeches at this time many of the arguments for and against secession were later gathered.

For a time the stars of Jackson and Webster were in conjunction. Webster was never again so potentially near the Presidency except when Thurlow Weed insisted that he take the Vice-Presidential nomination on the Harrison ticket and again on the Taylor ticket. Fighting with Jackson against Clay and Calhoun there was possible promotion for him. But the attorney of the bank, the counsellor of the New England business interests could not be the ally of Jackson for long.

The force bill was an administration measure but it was carried through the Senate only by the united exertions of Jackson and his Northern and Eastern enemies. John Tyler alone voted against it, but Clay and fourteen other Senators were absent. To some Southerners the question was regarded as loaded with dynamite. In the House it passed 149 to 48.

Clay now won his title as the great pacificator. To block what he called the "vengeful passions" of Jackson and to join the North and South, he abandoned his high-tariff program and brought in a bill gradually scaling down duties, thus giving the anti-tariff states relief and the protectionists a respite at least. This suited no one at first, neither Jackson nor Calhoun, South Carolina nor New England, but working on the good feelings of all he invoked successfully "the spirit of mutual compromise." Calhoun was put on the committee with him and the bill reported favorably. Objected to in the Senate as a revenue measure which must originate in the House, it was substituted for the Verplank tariff bill there under consideration and passed 119 to 85, and then by the Senate 29 to 16. Calhoun afterward claimed he had forced this measure on Clay, which Clay indignantly denied.

Nullification though defeated was regarded as having effected a great object in securing tariff reduction, and it thus prepared the way for secession being considered as a method of securing results otherwise despaired of.

The South Carolina convention reassembled and repealed the nullification ordinance but as a parting shot annulled the force bill. Like most compromises Clay's tariff settlement contained the seed of future trouble.

CHAPTER XI

JACKSON SLAYS THE BANK OCTOPUS

1829-1837

The Great Bank Battle—First Move—The Haughty Biddle—Congress Considers—The Recharter and its Veto—Investigations—Jackson's Second Term—Course of the Bank—Cabinet Upheaval—Removal of Deposits—The Senate Censures the President—His Protest—More Investigations—Bank Defeated in the House—Polk's Leadership—Expunging Resolution.

JACKSON's battle with the Bank of the United States is the greatest single contest in our political annals. The conflict over slavery was longer and of greater importance, but that was a series of wars with intervening truces; our tariff struggles have been separate periodic conflicts strung along a thousand-mile front. The bank battle was a drive on Verdun—and its destruction.

Against Jackson and his lieutenants were arrayed Clay, Webster and Calhoun and the bank itself, the most powerful institution in America save the government, and, supporting it, most of the money power and the large business interests of the country—the organized wealth of that day.

Even before the framers of the Constitution sat in council there had been among our people a dread of monopolies, especially of bank monopoly with accompanying paper money. "This is a hard money country and we are a hard money people," had been a current phrase since the evils of the Continental currency had been felt. The expression of utter worthlessness was coined into the phrase—"Not worth a Continental." It has been seen how unwillingly and only when driven to it by sheer necessity Washington and Madison had signed the bills establishing banks. As soon as the necessity lessened, the opposition to the bank revived.

When Jackson was inaugurated the second Bank of the United States owned assets of over \$100,000,000; its deposits were over \$13,500,000, its discounts more than \$40,000,000, and its notes, circulating at par all over the United States, amounted to over \$27,000,000. It was giving the country a fairly stable and

uniform currency. It had twenty-five branches in various states and its stock was 125 in the market. Nicholas Biddle, its president, was a gentleman of high standing in every way and was accounted a great financier.

Jackson's first message reminded Congress that the bank's charter would soon expire and stated that both the constitutionality and the expediency of the law creating it were well questioned by a large portion of the people, and that it had failed to establish a uniform and sound currency. His criticism was of the bank *per se*, not its present management, which at another place he complimented. He renewed the attack in his second message and suggested a government bank as a branch of the Treasury Department. In his third message he contented himself with again bringing the matter to the attention of Congress and the people.

The refusal of the New Orleans branch and the curtness of the refusal to honor his draft on the government in 1821 when on his way with his army to Florida, may have prejudiced Jackson, but his fight on the bank was due to deep antagonistic principles he was imbued with. There were plenty of complaints of the bank and its branches for its favoritism, oppression, interference and other faults. One of the chief complainants was Senator Woodbury of New Hampshire.

President Biddle had some literary talent and quite a flair for controversy; when he took pen in hand he strutted on paper. He was a proud man, at the head of a proud institution. He wrote in a grand way to the Secretary of the Treasury that the political conduct, as well as opinions, of the bank's directors was beyond the government's remonstrance. As one of the chief objections always held against the bank and especially argued against it right now was its political influence and its power to make or break a government, this was not a diplomatic stand to take. With the government owning \$7,000,000 of stock and having millions on deposit and appointing five of the directors of the bank, this declaration of independence sounded rather high to the average citizen.

The Bank of England had lately been under fire in Parliament and some of its methods and the high and mighty language used by that institution, even to Pitt, when his government was in straits, had attracted attention here as well as in England. That Jackson would lie down under language like the bank's no one who knew him could believe.

Of course there were charges that Jackson had wanted to use

the bank politically and Biddle had refused; equally of course there were charges that Biddle and the bank were guilty of pernicious partisan activities. There is little or no convincing evidence of either charge being true at the beginning, but naturally enough the bank and its president became active in politics when its existence was at stake.

In April, 1830, the House ways and means committee elaborately reported that the bank was constitutional, expedient, supplying an ample and stable currency and ought to be rechartered. The use of local banks as depositories would, it said, bring about great financial, political and moral evils, and the suggested treasury bank would be even worse. Biddle himself could not have prepared a more favorable report. Indeed he was charged with having a hand in its composition.

Before a Senate committee Biddle had denied ever oppressing any state bank and claimed to have saved many of them by timely aid, taking great credit for this course, since, he added, that there were few state banks his bank could not ruin if it exerted its power. This tremendous power of the bank shown in the committee report and emphasized in Biddle's testimony was to many minds the strongest reason for its discontinuance. There was exhibited a power they were unwilling to trust to the government itself, much less to a bank.

The message of 1830 said nothing had occurred to lessen the danger which many citizens apprehended from the bank, and Jackson again suggested a government bank without power to make loans or purchase property, but to handle government funds and leave to state banks the general banking functions. It should be noticed that Jackson made the fight against the bank the people's fight—"its constitutionality was questioned by a large portion of the people"; "many citizens apprehend danger."

Benton's resolution that the bank should not be rechartered was voted down on Webster's motion summarily without reply, but Benton's speech in introducing it was a strong one, showing the monopolistic character of the bank and quoting much of the discussion in Parliament of the English bank. It was widely published and had great effect.

Jackson's third message, December, 1831, said that the matter had been brought to the attention of Congress and the people and he would leave the question there for the present. This left it with the bank to precipitate the battle or postpone it until after the election of a President and a new Congress. But Clay wanted the issue, wanted it for the bank and his own candidacy

for the Presidency. He thought it was the winning issue and that it would be folly to waive it. However much the wish may have been father to the thought, the opinion was honest and enthusiastic.

Against the advice of the conservative friends of the bank he assumed the aggressive, got the bill for a recharter through Congress and forced Jackson to veto it in the middle of the Presidential campaign. Clay thus made the bank question the paramount issue in the 1832 campaign between Jackson and himself for the Presidency.

The bank had won over many of Jackson's friends in Congress, turned a majority of sixty-five into a minority; would not the same issue, Clay asked, win with the people? In Washington, in most of the circles Clay moved in, Jackson had lost popularity by reason of his antagonism to the bank; had he not lost ground equally with the people? The bank was powerful in Pennsylvania, a Jackson stronghold; win Pennsylvania's pivotal vote and the Presidency!

A flank attack on Jackson, in which Clay was heartily joined by Webster and Calhoun, was the rejection of Van Buren's appointment as Minister to England.

The memorial for a new charter was presented in January, 1832. Jackson and Clay had been nominated and the Presidential campaign in full swing for months. There was much jockeying with the issue in both houses of Congress during the campaign. A demand for an investigation by Clayton in the House, supported by recitation of seven specific violations of its charter and fifteen abuses of power, was after long delay grudgingly granted, but confined to charter violations.

Three reports were made, a majority report, a minority report and a John Quincy Adams report. The majority was adverse. It charged that the bank had subsidized the press, making large loans to editors on poor security on days that good bankable business paper was rejected because of alleged lack of funds. It showed evidence of the bank's speculating in stocks and exporting gold. It expressed doubt of the bank's solvency.

But the thing which stuck in the public throat was the proof that the United States navy needing \$10,000 to pay off the fleet in South American waters, the government was charged a profit to the bank under the claim that the Spanish silver dollars furnished were mere bullion, although Spanish dollars were by our law made legal tender and were current coin in this country. The minority and the Adams report were favorable.

The rechartering bill passed the Senate 28 to 20, the House 106 to 84, was presented to Jackson July 4th and vetoed July 10, 1832. The veto message, like the three committee reports, had a strong political flavor. It recited the evils of monopolies; if the people were to grant a monopoly they should get a fair return. A new bank would give much more than the present one offered for a charter. The constitutionality of a bank was argued at length—bitter medicine for Clay, as most of Jackson's argument was a plain rehash of Clay's great speech against a bank in 1811. Lincoln later justified his attitude toward the Dred Scott decision by Jackson's position on the decision of the Supreme Court affirming the constitutionality of the bank's charter.

One expression in the veto message came in for virulent criticism. Alluding to the Supreme Court decision as to the constitutionality of the bank charter, Jackson said:

"If the opinion covered the whole ground of this act, it should not control the coördinate authorities of this government. The Congress, the Executive and the Court must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, not as it is understood by others."

This, which distinctly applied only to Congress, to the President and to the Court, was tortured into an assertion that any deputy marshal or any custom-house officer could interpret the constitution according to his individual ideas. Of course this was pure distortion; Jackson did not mean to allow to subordinate officials an authority he was just then denying to the sovereign State of South Carolina.

A nicer question is whether a President is justified in vetoing a bill as unconstitutional which is palpably so to his mind yet where the Supreme Court has declared the principle involved constitutional. Shall his conscience or the court decision guide him? The court later may reverse its decision. Jackson and Presidents of like character would veto such a bill and let Congress and Court act according to their convictions. This is only preserving the independence of the three departments.

In the particular matter before him Jackson, who had been a lawyer and a judge, treated the constitutionality of the existing charter of the bank as *res adjudicata* between the government and the corporation, but as to a new charter he refused to be

bound, as the court might be, by the rule of *stare decisis*, when his convictions were absolute the other way.

All officers are bound to the constitutionality of a law so declared by the courts; but a bill coming up to a President for approval is not a law until he approves it. In signing or vetoing it he is functioning, not as an executive obeying a law, but as part of the legislative branch of the government, considering a proposed law.

No effort was made to pass the bill over the veto but much campaign material was made in Congress. The bank advocates drew fearful pictures of the distress that would ensue. It was a hobgoblin campaign—the bank monster that would fatten on the people, the anti-bank dragon that would destroy all business and prosperity. As the nation had prospered with the bank in existence for sixteen years, and the bank had four years more to run and two years in addition to wind up its affairs, a process its predecessor had gone through without ruining the country, the people refused to be unduly alarmed at either scarecrow.

Clay attacked the veto power as irreconcilable with representative government, borrowed from the English government in its tyrannical days; Louis XVI of France, he pointed out, had used it so often as to be called in derision *Monsieur Veto*. Webster said that the veto denied first principles, contradicted truth, appealed to every prejudice and every passion, arrayed the poor against the rich. If its principles were accepted the government would not long survive.

Senator Hugh L. White replied that of all Andrew Jackson's services to his country this veto was the greatest, the most courageous and unselfish.

With this the issue went to the country—Andrew Jackson *vs.* The Bank of the United States. The verdict was a large popular majority and an electoral vote of more than four to one for the prosecution. This ended the first phase of the battle.

So long as the nullification issue was unsettled Calhoun, presiding over the Senate, kept hands off. His political principles made him anti-bank, but he was even more anti-Jackson, and he could with much consistency oppose any executive usurpation of power.

Jackson was sixty-six years old and in ill health when he began his second term. He looked on his reelection as the people's approval of what he had done and proposed to do, and as the death sentence of the bank in due and legal form.

The four great figures in the arena were Jackson, the Preserver of the Union; Webster, the Defender of the Constitution; Clay, the Great Pacificator, and Calhoun. Benton, the administration leader in the Senate, was of little less prominence, and a most doughty champion, no swordsman but a mighty wielder of the battle-axe, and there were many able men of lesser note in both branches of Congress.

Jackson toured the East in the spring and was given great ovations. Some criticized these tumultuous welcomes as too noisy and democratic, and clergymen, professional men and prominent citizens complained that they could with difficulty reach the President. Some newspaper correspondents, notably Jack Downing, a forerunner of Artemas Ward and Will Rogers, gave a humorous cast to their daily despatches. But the conqueror of Indians, British, Spaniards and the Bank of the United States, was thunderously received by the masses and was mightily pleased therewith.

In his message of December, 1832, Jackson renewed his attack on the bank by recommending the sale of its stock held by the government and an investigation into the bank's solvency, but Congress promptly voted down both propositions. Jackson was not alone in his belief of the bank's insolvency although a great many people thought the idea preposterous. Never has it been ascertained who was right for when at length its affairs were wound up in 1842 no one felt curious enough to explore the disastrous wreck. Its ruin was generally attributed to the expenses occurred in fighting for its life, and bad management after becoming a private institution.

In 1831 the bank had advised the Secretary of the Treasury not to pay off some millions of the public debt held abroad as the money was needed by the country's business. Many thought no such need existed, and that this was an artifice to keep the money on deposit with the bank.

A second time this debt payment was postponed at the bank's request, the bank agreeing to pay the interest, thus keeping possession of the funds instead of paying off the national debt, a consummation devoutly desired by the people. This increased the doubt of the bank's solvency, and, though having all the evidence in its hands, it not only did not prove its solvency but resisted and hampered every investigation.

Congress taking no action except a hasty investigation by the House ways and means committee, which recommended that the deposits might be left with safety in the bank, Polk dis-

senting, which report was adopted by a vote 109 to 46, Jackson began his final drive on the bank. This move, referred to as the "Removal of Deposits," was really drawing out funds on deposit regularly as needed for expenses of the government, but making no new deposits of government receipts. The receipts were deposited in certain state banks which had agreed to act as government depositories. Many banks were so in dread of the power of the great bank that they declined this profitable business, but enough were secured.

Jackson was informed by Blair that his constitutional and his unconstitutional advisers were opposed to the removal, especially without an act of Congress, but Jackson waved all objections aside. Hundreds of letters every day, resolutions of chambers of commerce, of various and sundry bodies of citizens, of mass meetings, and tremendous delegations sent to remonstrate with him had no effect. "Biddle shan't have the people's money to frustrate the people's will," was in effect his answer to everything and everybody.

The bank instead of contracting its loans began feverishly to extend them. The bank lobby about Congress increased in size and importunity.

In September, 1833, Jackson read to the cabinet his reasons for the removal of deposits and assumed sole responsibility. The paper was published in the newspapers of next day. The board of directors of the bank met and adopted resolutions concerning "a certain paper purporting to be signed by 'one Andrew Jackson' and read to 'what is called a cabinet.'" Later, in the Senate, Clay put a resolution through requesting that the President lay a copy of such paper before the Senate; this Jackson declined, on constitutional grounds, to do.

McLane, transferred from the Treasury to the State Department, was strenuously opposed to removal; Livingston advised against it, Cass and Woodbury were doubtful; Taney, Attorney-General, and Barry of the Post Office alone of the cabinet were with the President. Duane, the new Treasury head, prominent as a Pennsylvania opponent of the bank, wavered, and as he alone could act in the premise, his coöperation was vital. He promised to carry out the President's wishes or resign, then refused to do either and was dismissed, Taney taking his post.

The ceasing to deposit in the Bank of the United States was ordered to begin October 1st. McLane and Cass thought of resigning but reconsidered, and Taney carried out the President's policy. When the new Secretary took over the Treasury the

United States had on deposit with the bank nearly \$10,000,000, all payable on demand. The bank was at the mercy of the administration, but the withdrawals were made only in the ordinary course of business. As late as March, 1834, there was still on deposit over \$2,000,000. The bank weathered the storm, its other depositors and the business public not crediting the charge of insolvency, and many believing in its final triumph and recharter. The mass of the people read Blair's *Globe* and the Democratic press and applauded Jackson.

The methods of Jackson in this matter have been much praised and very much censured. That so large an institution so intimately connected with the business of the country should be tenderly handled is very true, but it was not contemplated to remove the government funds from the channels of trade, only to put them in many state banks instead of one national bank.

Besides, the bank precipitated the summary action taken by the administration, and its conduct and policy rendered tender treatment impossible. Contemptuous, abusive, and reckless, it was flooding the country with propaganda, much of it in defiance of the government. What was worse, the five government directors were excluded from all participation in the transactions of the bank and even denied information, although the charter expressly provided to the contrary. The charter provision of a board of seven to pass on loans was disobeyed and a committee of five appointed by the president, from which the government directors were rigidly excluded, passed on all loans. The president was authorized to spend unlimited sums in his sole discretion, to operate on public opinion. High-handed proceedings marked the conduct of both parties to the conflict, but the administration's conduct and utterances were dignified and courteous compared to the course and fulminations of the bank.

When Congress met, the President's message announced the removal of deposits and Taney's report gave full facts and reasons. Jackson sent in the names of five annual government directors of the bank, four of whom were incumbents. The nominations were acted upon separately. The four were rejected 24 to 20, Calhoun voting with the bank.

These directors were prominent men who had been approved by the Senate the year before. The only objection to their reappointment was their having reported to Jackson their treatment by the bank. He sent their names back with the statement that he would appoint only men who would report to the government, and that the question seemed to be whether the President

and the Senate should appoint the government directors, or the bank and the Senate name them. John Tyler was the chairman of the committee to which this message was referred, and it reported adversely to the nominations as "impolitic." Tyler was on principle opposed to the recharter of the bank, but Virginia had instructed her representatives to oppose removal of deposits.

Clay had thought that he could win Congress over; the preceding Congress had begun with a large administration majority and yet passed the bank's measures; the administration men in the new Congress were considerably fewer.

Clay would brook no interference with his absolute leadership. Webster, hamstrung by the universal impression that he was the hired attorney of the bank in private capacity and deeply indebted to it too, was forced to submit to some mortifying trials; and his eloquence and logic had no more moral weight than if they had proceeded from the bank itself. He was allowed, however, to report the resolutions condemning Jackson's actions. As the charter of the bank provided that government funds should be deposited in the bank "unless the Secretary of the Treasury should otherwise order or direct," to charge Jackson and Taney with a breach of the bank's charter rights seems without foundation.

The bank now began a vigorous curtailment of its loans, causing much financial distress, asserting that the action of the government compelled it to such a course. The government replied that as it had previously recklessly increased its loans for political effect, it was now recklessly curtailing them with the same object. The bank advocates in Congress drew lurid pictures of the situation with prophecies of worse to follow.

Webster proposed to fight for a six-year extension of the charter, but Clay would not consent. Wright of New York, who on his side was the ablest speaker on financial matters as Webster was on the other, made a speech which William Jennings Bryan must have sometime read:

"The glorious American Revolution was but a resistance by our forefathers to moneyed power. . . . Have we, their immediate descendants, so soon lost their noble spirit? Are we to fold our arms and obey the dictates of a moneyed power?"

It was late in March, 1828, that the famous resolutions of condemnation of the President after long debate and much amendment were adopted, 26 to 20—"That the President, in the late executive proceedings in relation to the public revenue, has

assumed upon himself authority and power not conferred by the constitution and laws, but in derogation of both."

It will be noted that no specific acts are named or described and no particular clause of the constitution or law cited. The main though unmentioned charge was Jackson's summary dismissal of Duane for refusing to remove the deposits. In spite of the recent experience of Senatorial condemnation elevating Van Buren to the Vice-Presidency and Isaac Hill to the Senate, Jackson's enemies were elated at this censure of him and confident of great effect from it. It had the opposite effect; the people resented it and it weakened the Senate in public estimation.

The President sent in a protest:—Here was impeachment of the President by the Senate when the Constitution imposed upon the House of Representatives the sole power of impeachment. Here was a conviction without evidence or opportunity of defense, amounting to the mere fulmination of a mass-meeting. Jackson pointed out that the four Senators from Maine and New Jersey and one from Ohio had voted for the resolution whilst the legislatures of those states had solemnly approved the proceedings it condemned. He requested that the protest be recorded on the Senate journal.

Instead, it was vituperatively assailed as a breach of privilege; Frelinghuysen said the legislature misrepresented his state and Ewing accused the President of bad taste in flinging Ohio's instructions in his face. Memorials for and against the President flowed in from every part of the country. Senator Brown of North Carolina said that if his Satanic majesty had at any time left Kentucky and taken refuge in Buncombe County, he had not remained there, for one could see his hand in a memorial just read which praised at one time for the same thing Messrs. Clay, Webster, Calhoun, McDuffie and Binney; to this Clay replied that nothing but a deep and solemn sense of the danger which was impending over the country could have brought together men who entertained such a diversity of views. Webster made a labored constitutional defense of the Senate and an elaborate attack on Jackson's position. Clay and Calhoun each made characteristic speeches, Clay's declamatory, Calhoun's syllogistic, but both were funeral orations over the death of the Constitution or Jacksonism, only one of which could survive.

The word Whig came to be much used by the opponents of Jackson, they claiming to be Whigs and calling their opponents Tories. "It is a glorious old name," said Forsyth, "they will

be sure to disgrace it. Which are the true Whigs?" he sarcastically asked—"the nullifiers of last year or the descendants of the Hartford conventionists of the last generation?" This was a shot at the coalition of the Federalist element and the South Carolinians lately at each others' throats. Nearly every Senator spoke on one side or the other. Benton closed the debate in a long defense, and by a vote of 27 to 16 the protest was declared a breach of privilege not to be entered on the journal and the right of the President to send a protest to the Senate against any of its proceedings emphatically denied. On the last day of the session Benton introduced his expunging resolutions, which were opposed by the great triumvirate and negatived 20 to 11. These resolutions were "to expunge from the Senate journal" the censure passed on Jackson in March.

In the House the debate on the Senate resolution directing the deposits to be restored was led by Adams, Choate and McDuffie for the affirmative, opposed by Polk, Cambreling and Clement C. Clay. In its stead the House adopted a resolution that the bank ought not to be rechartered by a vote of 132 to 82, another that the deposits ought not to be restored, 113 to 103, and passed a bill regulating deposits in local banks 112 to 90. These votes show many opponents of recharter voting against the policy of removal of deposits. Polk's nomination for the Presidency in 1844 was largely the result of his activities at this session. He led the fight for the administration.

After withholding Taney's nomination to the Treasury until June, Jackson sent it in with that of B. F. Butler of New York as Attorney-General; the former was immediately rejected 28 to 18, the latter confirmed. Taney resigned and a clerk remained acting Secretary of the Treasury until Woodbury was transferred, Dickerson taking the Navy portfolio.

The House deposit bill ended all hope of rechartering the bank, but Whigs kept up agitation for effect in the 1834 elections, and the panic machinery was in full operation all over the country, sending in petitions, remonstrances, memorials to Congress and the President.

To the House committee investigating its affairs, Biddle sent a resolution of the board "*requiring*" the committee to state specifically what was wanted and for what purpose—this when the government had created the bank, owned \$7,000,000 of its stock, kept millions on deposit, and had reserved in the charter the right to committees of either branch of Congress to inspect the books and examine into its proceedings. The bank rendered

any real examination impossible and so Polk, the chairman of the committee, reported. He recommended that Biddle and his supporting directors be arrested for contempt of the House, but nothing was done.

John Tyler, at the opening of the next session, presented the report of a friendly Senate committee, called the "white-washing" committee, the first appearance of this, now standard term, in Congressional literature. Its title describes its report.

The bank began a more conservative course, and the state banks being, with government deposits, better able to meet demands, the financial needs of the country were met. In fact money became too easy and inflation set in which produced a great panic in Van Buren's administration.

Benton's triumph came at last in January, 1837. His expunging motion made at the time the resolution of censure was passed and dramatically renewed each session was called up when he was sure of its passage. The Alabama, North Carolina and Virginia legislatures had instructed their Senators to vote for the expunging resolution. Mangum of North Carolina and Leigh of Virginia refused to obey; John Tyler resigned rather than obey. The floor and galleries were filled.

It was proposed only to draw a line around the obnoxious resolution as it stood recorded on the journal of the Senate and write "Expunged by order of the Senate," with the date. It was intended to censure the Senate of 1834, to rebuke it precisely as severely as it had censured Jackson. The identical resolution then passed was to be stigmatized, stamped "Expunged." Only a clerical act was to be performed by a clerk, yet each side acted as if the heart of the constitution was involved.

Calhoun was tragic. "They tell us that the record is not to be expunged but only to be endorsed 'Expunged.' I do not know how to argue against such contemptible sophistry. The occasion is too solemn for such argument. Night is suitable to the dark deed we meditate. It is an act which will tell on the political history of this country forever. An act like this could never have been consummated by a Roman Senate until the times of Caligula and Nero."

Clay was dramatic. "The matter of expunction is contrary to truth, reproachful for base subserviency, derogatory from the just powers of the Senate, and repugnant to the constitution. The deed is to be done—that foul deed which, like the blood-stained hands of the guilty Macbeth, all ocean's waters will never wash out."

Webster closed the discussion with a solemn "*PROTEST*."—"This record the constitution solemnly declares shall be *kept*, but the resolution before the Senate declares this record shall be *expunged*. A record which is *expunged* is not a record which is *kept*, any more than a record which is *destroyed* can be a record which is *preserved*!"

Calhoun, rated the most accomplished sophist ever in any Anglo-Saxon legislative body, revolted at the "contemptible sophistry" of the expungers. Clay, the great adjuster of differences, could see no possible compromise with the deep damnation of this Macbethan crime. Webster, the profound expounder of the Constitution, based his whole case on a shallow, technical definition of one word—"Kept." Verily politics cause great men to strain at gnats as well as swallow camels.

The expunging resolutions passed 24 to 19, and the clerk solemnly wrote on the Senate Journal of March 28, 1834—"Expunged by order of the Senate."

A few weeks later on the east front of the Capitol Jackson saw Van Buren, his Minister whom the Senate had rejected, sworn in as President, by Taney, his Secretary of the Treasury, who had been rejected by the same Senate, who was now Chief Justice of the United States.

There was no consolation for Jackson's enemies in the Congressional elections of 1836, and soon the President was authorized to sell the stock in the bank held by the government. Upon the expiration of its national charter the bank secured one from the State of Pennsylvania, but a few years later failed disastrously, plundered by its own officers, mismanaged, ruined by jobbery and favoritism, its entire capital stock dissipated; tons of its records were sold to junkmen as waste paper, and New York supplanted Philadelphia as the financial capital of the United States.

CHAPTER XII

JACKSON THE PROGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT

1829-1837

Jackson's Statecraft—A Student of Government—Jackson's Critics—The Kitchen Cabinet—Democracy's Basic Idea—Break with Calhoun—Cabinet Dissolution—First Democratic National Convention—The Two-thirds Rule—The 1832 Campaign—The Anti-Masons—Congress—Six Presidencies in the Making—Jackson and the Great Trio—Jacksonianism.

JACKSON's lack of scholarship has been exaggerated. He had no early schooling, but when he became a lawyer and judge he studied law, when he became a soldier he studied military science and when he was raised to high civil office he studied political science. His statecraft shows study as well as bold and original thinking.

There is strongly persuasive evidence that Jackson was a "Benthamite," a student of Jeremy Bentham, the most advanced juridical philosopher of the age, who was anathema to the old-school politician and statesman, but a prophet to the Progressives of his time. No extrinsic evidence of this is known to exist, but the intrinsic evidence is convincing. The "single executive" as opposed to the distribution of executive responsibility among a cabinet or council, was an innovation advocated by Bentham and fixed into the United States government by Jackson. Bentham's discussion of banks seems to have influenced Jackson.

Jackson named his estate "The Hermitage," a most incongruous name for the home of a man who was everything a hermit would not be, and for a place filled with nephews and nieces, the scene of the wild pranks of the half-civilized adopted Indian boy, and an open house for friends and pilgrims from every part of the Union. But if the name was chosen because Bentham's English home was called "The Hermitage," Jackson's choice of a name was fit and appropriate, and explainable.

If he was not in fact a student of Bentham, Jackson's ideas coincided with Bentham's in many respects, which is equal evi-

dence of his knowledge of government. In 1830 Bentham wrote Jackson a letter ecstatic in its approval of his views.

"Judge Sir," he writes, "of the consolation, of the more than consolation I experienced when upon reading your Presidential Message I found that upon the whole your sentiments were so fully in accordance with mine," etc. . . . "Intense is the admiration it (the message) has excited in me."

Jackson was in some respects a most advanced statesman. It is possible, even probable, that he was along some lines one of the most advanced political students of his day.

Jackson exhibits his educational deficiencies at times but never ignorance or that sort of folly which proceeds from unformed or half-formed minds. He was not a man of half-baked ideas. The insinuations that his opinions were formed and his actions directed by others, by Van Buren, Livingston, Kendall, or any one else, have no foundation. He suffered from over-confidence, not under-confidence, of his convictions. And no matter who was around him, every conception, every theory, every policy and every action was thoroughly Jacksonian. His mind and character earmarked and branded everything he said or did.

He did not hesitate to go contrary to the advice of his closest advisers. He told Blair to find out what his friends thought of the removal of deposits and later when Blair began telling him that all opposed it, he interrupted him—"Oh, my mind is made up. Biddle shan't have the people's money to fight the people's will."

Jackson's strenuous eight years defy chronological narration. The tariff trouble leading to nullification preceded his inauguration, and he initiated the fight on the bank in his first message. This bank contest affected every other issue, more or less, broke up personal and political friendships and alignments and made and ruined political careers. Nullification was confined to a single state, but the bank had friends and enemies in every county, every community. Nullification was settled in 1833; the bank fight lasted as long as Jackson's "reign."

Jacksonian Democracy was a logical development of Jefferson's principles and performed the functions in its day that Jefferson's politics performed in his. Jefferson had pointed the way to the people, who pursuing it found Jackson their natural leader. The power of the people, especially in the new states, and their will to power had grown vastly between 1800 and 1828. Practically all the new states had manhood suffrage and

Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts and New York had abolished property qualifications for voters.

Jackson, far removed in some ways from a conventional aristocrat, was, as a typical product of his environment, one of those natural aristocrats born to lead and rule, whom Jefferson had referred to. He won his leadership by talents and services and was awarded it by the judgment of the people.

Although the United States was many years older in Jackson's day than in Jefferson's, it was a younger and newer country in a way, just as an old settled town by rapid growth may develop into a new and crude city; Jefferson belonged to an older régime than Jackson. Many men like Jefferson and Adams could have been found in England in 1770-1800, but nowhere except in the America of 1810-1840 could the like of Jackson and Clay be found in commanding positions.

Many of the books written about Jackson are excellent, indeed admirable; some are execrable. One of the latter sort says he was no great hero because his famous victory was chiefly due to the blunders of his opponent, as if about half of every soldier's genius does not consist in utilizing the blunders of his opponent. Pakenham was trained under Wellington, who guaranteed his ability, and he commanded English veterans.

His chivalric, even Quixotic, championship, in his old age, of Mrs. Eaton is sneered at as "malodorous." Lancelot and Galahad rode the list for ladies whose reputations were as tarnished, and the Duke of Wellington was famous for certain friendships. Jackson's life in this particular was singularly pure.

The Kitchen Cabinet is called a "low personal element." They were men of exalted character. Colonel Lewis was a gentleman of spotless reputation who sacrificed his own pleasure to serve his chief and country. Amos Kendall and Blair were two newspapermen, seeking neither high office nor graft. Kendall in the Jackson and Van Buren administrations made one of the most efficient Postmaster Generals in our history. In his later years he founded and endowed Kendall Green, the first incorporated school in America for the deaf-mute and blind children.

Francis P. Blair was one of the founders of the modern Republican Party, presiding over the meeting at which it was organized in 1856; in 1860 he was a powerful factor in Lincoln's election, and in 1864, more than any other one man, he defeated the attempt to deny Lincoln a renomination. In 1865 he was the recipient of as signal a mark of honor as was ever given any

man in history, the trusted agent of Abraham Lincoln and Jefferson Davis in an effort to find a basis of peace between the North and South.

Not only of high character, but of great ability were these men. A letter written by Lewis or Blair and inserted, with a head and tail, in the *New York Courier*, was more effectual than \$10,000 worth of the hired publicity of Biddle. Ability coupled with character made these men powers in American life for thirty years and more.

Jackson's patient forbearance with the South Carolinians about nullification, his giving the loyal people of that state time and chance to remedy conditions is spoken of as an "alarming indication of weakening." And in the biography which these criticisms introduce, Jackson is convicted of the murder of Arbuthnot. Monroe and Adams acquitted Jackson; the American Congress acquitted him. Arbuthnot's execution was under fire in Parliament, but the English government, under that most imperious of English statesmen, Castlereagh, acquitted Jackson. But his American biographer of 1898 condemns him.

Andrew Jackson was the most American man of his time. He was a plain American. He raced horses and fought duels as did many other American and English gentlemen and statesmen of the day. He lived the fullest life of his countrymen and neighbors, as country gentleman, planter and merchant, soldier, politician and statesman, friend and fellow-citizen. In private life and public conduct he was manful and masterful. There was that about him which in his lifetime and even to this day arouses, somehow, the pale animosity of celestial minds and the admiration of the average American.

Another outstanding quality of Jackson's was his intense loyalty to his friends. History has much to say of the extraordinary devotion the followers of Clay and the followers of Blaine manifested toward those leaders, but little, if anything, of their loyalty to those supporters. But Jackson's loyalty to his associates attracts as much attention as theirs to him. It was a main characteristic.

It is the sort of men who underrate the average American that disparage Jackson. If there could be gotten together at random a hundred, or a thousand, of what they call the "better class," the "thinking men," the "leading citizens," and at the same time a hundred, or a thousand, average Americans, there would be found in the first assemblage more learning, more modern ideas, more expert knowledge, but not more good sense or sound native

judgment (if as much), not more practical intelligence, and certainly not as much disinterested patriotism. The academic folly of one crowd would balance the lack of academic learning in the other. There would be as many in the first gathering who were there by the luck of inheritance as there would be others in the second because fate had denied them education and opportunity.

Jackson and Jefferson were exponents of this idea, and it was this that made them great, powerful in life and mighty living forces after death. America is great not because of the talents and virtues of what is called the upper classes, but by reason of the worth and sense of the plain American citizen.

This is the basic idea on which the Democratic Party is built, and is what makes it imperishable and indestructible.

"Old Hickory," "The Old Hero," "The Old Man," as he was called, was such a popular idol as only Washington has been in our history. In the South the "Old Horse-racer" as John Quincy Adams dubs him, was regarded with a peculiar devotion. "Bless the Lord and General Jackson!" "Thank God and General Jackson!" were uttered by thousands with no idea of anything disrespectful to the Deity in thus associating the two in grateful ejaculations.

Jackson neither bullied nor flattered Congress, but he reminded it that he had the mass of the people supporting him. Jackson's influence exerted through the people defeated the bank's influence exerted on Congress. He held that in vetoing laws he was blocking opposition to, or carrying out, the will of the people as their agent, a doctrine later emphasized by Polk. "Speak out," Jackson said to Blair, "and tell the people Congress is engaged in President-making instead of supporting me and my measures."

There is no telling how gravely the history of this country has been affected by Jackson's breach with Calhoun. Believing him a staunch friend, Jackson's toast once had been—"John Calhoun. An honest man's the noblest work of God." Learning, accidentally in 1830, that Calhoun had been one of his severest critics when he was under Congressional fire, Jackson broke with him and cleaned his cabinet of Calhoun men. This, together with nullification, which soon after developed, put Calhoun out of the party and practically out of the Union politically. He became more of an ambassador from South Carolina than a Senator of the United States.

The cabinet dissolution was effected most diplomatically. His

intimates, Van Buren and Eaton, resigned and Jackson wrote to the other members intimating that their remaining would create an unjust impression. Their and his letters are courteous, but with touches of satire. Jackson gave each a testimonial, worded identically, for integrity, zeal and ability in office. This was the first cabinet dissolution in the middle of a term and created a sensation. The break up, which Clay termed "a cleaning of the Augean stable," inspired the opposition with great hopes. But there was no dissolution of the Kitchen Cabinet.

The new cabinet was composed of Livingston, State; McLane, Treasury; Woodbury, Navy; Lewis Cass, War; Taney, Attorney-General. Jackson wanted Hugh L. White to take the War portfolio so Eaton could return to the Senate, but despite the urgings of Polk, Grundy and other Tennesseans, White would not accept. Isaac Hill, whose appointment as Comptroller the Senate had rejected, was sent by New Hampshire to succeed Woodbury among his rejectors.

The movement to reëlect Jackson began in 1830 with an announcement in the New York Courier, and the legislatures of New York and Pennsylvania immediately endorsed his candidacy.

The Republicans of the New Hampshire legislature, about 169 in number, in 1831 issued an address approving the Jackson administration, the Maysville road veto, condemning nullification and Clay's American System, approving a reduction of duties and disapproving the bank, and suggested a convention of Republicans friendly to Jackson to meet in Baltimore in May, 1832, to nominate a candidate for Vice-President and take other measures to reëlect Jackson, the delegates to equal the number of electors in each state.

Major Lewis, Amos Kendall, Blair and Isaac Hill were the instigators of this call, though Van Buren may have been the father of the idea.

The Baltimore convention met as scheduled May 21, with 344 delegates representing 23 states, with only 283 votes, however, according to the plan of representation. New Jersey with 8 votes had 53 delegates present; in allowing all these to cast the state's votes was the germ of the unit rule.

General Romulus Saunders, chairman of the committee on rules, reported the two-thirds rule as follows:—"That two-thirds of the whole number of votes given be required for a nomination and all questions connected therewith." It has been reported that Mr. Sumner, a delegate from New Hampshire, proposed the

rule in committee, and that it was a part of the original plan agreed on by the originators of the convention when Calhoun was still a formidable contender for second place, and was adhered to after the danger was past. This is consistent with the farsightedness attributed to Lewis, Blair and Kendall. The main reason assigned in the convention for the rule was that such a nomination would carry more moral weight. Another argument was that the rule would curb the strength in convention of non-Democratic states.

Van Buren was nominated on the first ballot, 208 against 49 for Phillip Barbour of Virginia, and R. M. Johnson 26. A committee of one from each state was named to draft an address, but seems never to have functioned. A general committee on correspondence, of one from each state was provided. The platform was contained in the only resolution adopted.

"The convention reposes the highest confidence in the purity, patriotism and talents of Andrew Jackson, and most cordially concurs in the repeated nominations which he has received in various parts of the Union as a candidate for reelection to the office he now fills with so much honor to himself and usefulness to his country."

Henry Clay had been unanimously nominated, with John Sergeant as his running mate, in December, 1831, at a convention of the National Republicans held in Baltimore, and an address was issued eulogizing the bank and denouncing Jackson's attack on it. This address or platform said, "If the President be reelected it may be considered certain that the bank will be abolished." Sergeant's nomination was a bid for the vote of Pennsylvania, always a Jackson stronghold. At a ratification meeting held by National Republicans in Washington in May, 1832, protection was declared indispensable, internal improvements highly endorsed, and the spoils system denounced.

The party line-up in the campaign was the Jacksonian Democracy, reënforced by some converted Federalists and anti-bank men, against the Clay Whigs (to use a term not yet in use), the Webster Federalists, the disgruntled Southerners, the Calhoun Democracy and the bank men. Duff Green wanted Calhoun to run in the hope of his carrying enough Southern states to throw the election into the House.

Every policy, every measure and every act of the administration was attacked, more especially the veto of the bank bill. The bank's destruction would ruin all business, the tariff reduction

ruin all the manufacturers and the rejection of internal improvements ruin the West—so said the National Republicans.

Jackson ran on his record, including his military record. The nullification question was hanging in mid-air. The bargain and corruption cry was again raised against Clay; his changes on various questions, his compromises, were contrasted to the inflexible course of Jackson. But the bank was easily the paramount issue.

The situation was complicated by the Anti-Masonic Party whose candidates were William Wirt and Amos Ellmaker of Pennsylvania. John Quincy Adams and Richard Rush, the National Republican candidates in 1828, were supporters of this party. Adams was under consideration as its candidate and was believed to be willing; he had said that the dissolution of Masonry was more important than the election of Jackson or Clay. In 1828 the Anti-Masons had polled 33,000 votes in the New York governor's race, 70,000 in 1829 and 128,000 a year later. William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, and others were members and active in the party, which fought the Albany Regency. The party was strong also in Pennsylvania, where Thaddeus Stevens was one of its leaders, and in Massachusetts and Vermont. The Anti-Masons hurt Clay much more than they did Jackson, though their opposition to Jackson was far more pronounced. Jackson pronounced Masonry an institution calculated to benefit mankind; Clay insisted that it was not a political question at all. The Calhoun party supported Wirt in preference to either of the two main candidates.

In this campaign the administration of the government by parties was established as an American doctrine, and the electors pledged to support their tickets.

In New York, Tammany and the Regency fought for Jackson, aided by other friends of the administration. Tammany debtors of the bank were dragooned into opposing their brethren, but this was offset by the influence of local banks for Jackson. But Van Buren won New York and Jackson's popularity carried Pennsylvania. Clay's flirting with the East hurt him in the West, while his "American" policy killed him in the South.

The Democrats won 219 electoral votes against 49 for Clay, South Carolina's 11 for Floyd, and Vermont's 7 for Wirt. Clay carried Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware and Kentucky and received 5 of Maryland's 10. Van Buren fell behind Jackson by losing Pennsylvania's 30 votes. All electors

were chosen by the people except in South Carolina where the selection still lay with the legislature.

The popular vote was Jackson, 707,217; Clay, 328,561; Wirt, 254,720. Alabama gave Jackson a unanimous vote, there being only one ticket in the field there. The fusion of the National Republicans and Anti-Masons in New York failed to defeat Marcy for Governor. The Anti-Masons figured no more as a national party. William H. Seward thought its main effect was to drive many National Republicans in dread and disgust into the Democratic ranks.

The result of the elections was known about the middle of November and on the 19th of that month the South Carolina Nullification Convention met.

The Congresses of Jackson's time, the Twenty-first, Twenty-second, Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth, were notable bodies of men. Half of their members were distinguished enough to have their names handed down in our histories. Calhoun, Clay and Webster overshadowed their colleagues in parliamentary renown, but others reached the highest place, which they did not. It took courage to wield the big stick over such men.

Van Buren presiding over the Senate, suave and impartial, making no enemies, increasing no enmities, each day strengthened his position as Jackson's heir and successor.

In the same chamber John Tyler, strict construction, anti-tariff, states rights Democrat, but anti-Jackson, acting under Virginia's instructions was opposing with alacritous pleasure Jackson's removal of deposits, resigning rather than obey or disregard later instruction to support the expunging resolutions, and somehow winning the nomination for Vice-President on the losing, bolting Democratic ticket in 1836, and the same position on the winning Whig ticket of 1840, thereby attaining the Presidency.

James Buchanan, presenting petitions against slavery in the District of Columbia, at the same time assuring the South that he did not endorse their request, and declaring that Congress had no power to legislate on slavery, supporting Jackson's measures, advocating the admission of Arkansas, and defending the preëmption privileges of settlers, was sowing seed which made him the "Harmony" candidate in 1856.

In the House, James K. Polk, straight Jacksonian Democrat, was bold and active against the Adams administration, and very efficient. He was Speaker of the House in 1835 and 1837. His

party services in Congress and his strong pro-slavery stand were to gain him the Presidency eight years later.

Franklin Pierce, opposing internal improvements and high tariffs and all anti-slavery measures, was making himself that darling of the political gods of the second quarter of the 19th century, a "Northern man of Southern principles," to be crowned as Chief Executive in 1852.

Millard Fillmore, first an anti-Jackson Republican, later a strict Whig, was manfully advocating internal improvements and a high tariff. He built up a strong and solid reputation which in 1848 placed him on the Whig ticket with Zachary Taylor, a "Southern man of Northern principles," he supplying all the Whiggism of the combination, and by Taylor's death becoming the only Whig President, except Harrison's thirty days, our country has had.

Jackson was not far wrong when he accused Congress of President-making; here were six Presidents in the making.

There were nineteen cabinet changes under Jackson. Of all his advisers Van Buren, Livingston, Taney and Cass only became large national figures. Jackson was wont, not disrespectfully, to refer to cabinet members as his secretaries; he was criticized by his Senatorial enemies for speaking of "my cabinet." He looked upon himself as being responsible for the administration and as absolute commander-in-chief; he believed in the "single executive" theory. As for the Kitchen Cabinet, Jackson decided, Kendall and Blair elaborated and published, and all team-worked effectively.

The chronic folly of Jackson's chief opponents was that they could not oppose Jackson, or discuss anything emanating from him, calmly and reasonably, but grew extravagant, even hysterical. Everything he proposed or did was criminally wrong and unconstitutional. The result soon came to be that their accusations were taken by the people as mere politics and nothing more.

Adams, bitter as they, was more just. He saw his cherished policies for making his country great and prosperous "undisguisedly abandoned by Clay, ingloriously deserted by Calhoun and silently given up by Webster." He was an antithesis of Jackson, yet often supported and defended him. First on the roll-call of the House, for fifteen years his vote was ever an example of honesty and courage—and sometimes prejudice.

Jackson had but little Latin but he knew how to apply what he possessed. In the midst of the nullification trouble he was given an honorary degree by a university. Part of the ceremony

was a Latin oration by a graduate student. When Jackson was acknowledging the honor conferred some rude Democrat in the audience shouted—"Give them some Latin, General!" Instantly came the response—"E Pluribus Unum, sine qua non."

The Missouri Compromise was in full force and Jackson's policy on the slavery question was against agitation. The admission of Arkansas, slave, and Michigan a free state, kept the balance even. Jackson recommended laws to prevent incendiary anti-slavery propaganda being sent through the mails.

Congress appropriated \$500,000 and the administration purchased Indian Territory, now the State of Oklahoma; this 17,000,000 acres were traded to the Indians for 3,000,000 acres east of the Mississippi.

Vetoing by pocket veto a bill distributing among the states the surplus in the Treasury, Jackson later signed the bill making a similar distribution under guise of a loan to the states. This is said to be the only official act Jackson ever openly regretted.

During his last years, it is told, he once mentioned to his pastor that he still cherished one great regret in life. The minister, thinking he meant the killing of Dickinson in their duel or some similar deed, asked what it was.—"That I did not hang Calhoun."

The annexation of Texas appeared dimly over the horizon during the latter part of Jackson's administration. He advised his old friend Sam Houston to immigrate there, doubtless with an eye to future developments. Texas, rapidly filling up with Americans, declared her independence and established a provisional government. Congress refused to recognize Texas' independence, but resolved that her independence should be recognized as soon as a stable government was established. The North opposed, the South advocated recognition, which was known to be a preliminary to annexation, both sections having politically legitimate, but selfish reasons. In the closing hours of Congress an appropriation for a diplomatic representative to Texas was inserted in the civil list, and before the Senate could adjourn Jackson named a Minister and the Senate confirmed him.

In 1835 on the portico of the capitol an attempt to assassinate Jackson was made. The pistol missed fire, the old soldier stepped forward with uplifted cane as the assailant's weapon missed fire again. The would-be assassin was a demented foreigner out of money and work, inflamed by the abuse his enemies had heaped upon the President.

About the very last official act of Jackson was his pocket veto of the act rescinding his Specie Circular. The wild speculation

of the preceding two years, especially in the purchase of public lands, had induced Jackson, in order to protect the government, to issue orders that only specie be received in payment for lands purchased. A howl of protest arose so strong that Congress heeded it, but the bill was passed less than ten days before adjournment and Jackson pocketed it.

Jackson hated compromise, while Clay was the master compromiser of all our statesmen; Webster, the strongest constitutionalist the country has produced, fought Jackson on constitutional matters; Calhoun ranks at the head of American political logicians and Jackson was called illiterate. Yet Jackson's policies still survive while Clay's adjustments have all disappeared, none of Jackson's main measures have been declared unconstitutional, but it took a civil war to establish some of Webster's fundamentals; Calhoun is now a mere tradition while Jackson is a living force.

Jackson led the people of the United States to direct popular control of their government. He awakened them to their power, appealed to their will to power, and showed them that the machinery of politics was theirs if they would operate it. The lesson has never been lost, though sometimes neglected.

Another Jacksonian exaggeration is the tradition of his uncouth costume and manners. When he came first to Congress in Washington's time he was unpolished. Doubtless, like more than one fairly recent representative from the West when the West was raw and new who at first scorned dress suits and other effete things, Jackson prided himself in adhering to local dress, customs and manners. Doubtless, too, his political publicity men long afterward presented him in an aspect calculated to catch the new country vote, the farmer vote, just as Coolidge was pictured in 1924 in overalls loading hay. But in this as in all other respects, Jackson grew, developed and improved.

In 1824 John Quincy Adams wanted Jackson for Vice-President with him because he "would restore dignity to that office." Adams himself was trained in foreign courts, used to refined manners and customs all his days; Clay's manners were notably gallant and attractive; Crawford was magnificent in appearance and demeanor. Yet Webster and Mrs. Webster too, in 1824, thought Jackson's "grave, mild and reserved manners more Presidential than those of any of the other candidates." Cultivated travelers from other countries were impressed by his dignity and courtesy. It was the half-baked parvenus, ignorant of the virtue of simplicity, who called him a boor.

He set a great precedent, which all his successors have endeavored to live up to, when he said to Congress:

"The President is the direct representative of the American people; he possesses original executive powers, and absorbs in himself all executive functions and responsibilities; and it is his especial duty to protect the liberties and rights of the people and the integrity of the Constitution against the Senate, or the House of Representatives, or both together."

Jackson's dominant personality ruled his party during his administration and until his death. His principles and policies were as pronounced as his personality. He gave form, substance and direction, and a name, to an epoch. Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln alone, of our long dead Presidents, are as alive to-day in men's minds as Jackson. He had heroic qualities of mind and heart, and fighting ability. Lewis, Blair, Kendall and Van Buren may have been his trainers, but his own head, hands and heart won his battles. They may have given him method and technique, taught him some art and science in politics, but he was no product of other men's minds, nor the instrument of other men's hands.

Jackson brought Jefferson's party a long stride forward, modernized it, adapted it to new conditions. Jefferson's government was of and for the people by—not the select few of the Federalist, but the qualified many—a restricted electorate; Jackson's government, so far as he could make it, was of, for and by the whole people. Jefferson was willing to trust the people in the long run; Jackson was willing to trust them forthwith and immediately. Like Jefferson he believed newspapers powerful instruments in politics and governments. No President has used them more.

Jefferson believed in a due participation in office by the two parties; Jackson believed in a due participation in office by all the citizens. When he came into the Presidency the government in its smaller administrative, office-holding, salary-drawing features was one of, for and by a bureaucracy. He ended that, and has been abused as a spoilsman ever since.

It will be said that Jackson's coercion of South Carolina was diametrically opposed to Jefferson's theories of our federal government. So was Jefferson's acquisition of Louisiana. It was a different Union in 1832 from that of 1800. Time had changed fundamental conditions, demonstrated the wisdom and safety of a strong Union. The words of the Constitution and their

legalistic meaning were the same, but every day that the Union had existed had made it a greater folly, a greater wrong, a greater crime to breach it. The states had lost or lessened some original rights by non-user for forty years. The excessive states rights position of the Calhoun Democrats brought about a revulsion and a new aspect of the question. Yet Jackson stood unqualified for the rights of states within their province and for a limited but powerful federal government within its proper province.

Jackson in complete control of his party named his successor. He turned over to him a thoroughly organized, loyal and enthusiastic party strong in numbers and in faith.

CHAPTER XIII

VAN BUREN, STATESMAN AND POLITICAL STRATEGIST

1837-1841

Compared to Jackson—Career—Rejection as Minister to England—Second Democratic National Convention—Nomination and Election—Cabinet—Panic of 1837—Manly Message to Congress—Independent Treasury—Congress—Great Triumvirate Dissolves—Texas—Slavery—Character of the President—Noncommittalism—Politician and Statesman.

MARTIN VAN BUREN was in many respects the antithesis of his predecessor and sponsor. His views and general principles, his political tenets and policies closely approximated Jackson's. But whereas Jackson was gaunt he was rounded; Jackson rugged, he smooth; Jackson vehement, he diplomatic; Jackson raw, he done to a turn. Jackson had no more the courage of his convictions, but Van Buren had a keener appreciation of opposing opinions, and a disposition to outflank rather than run over, to convince rather than demolish, his opponents. Jackson's natural qualities were toned down and held in restraint; Van Buren's natural talents were carefully built up and added to, and trained. The two acting together on sound principles were invincible; Jackson made Van Buren President; Van Buren helped to make Jackson a great President—and Jackson never failed to feel the obligation.

Born at Kinderhook, New York, in December, 1782, the son of a small farmer, an innkeeper some say, little is known of Martin Van Buren's early days. The curse of politics still pursues him in that practically all writings about him begin with, and are restricted to, his political career. He must have had some good schooling for he knew a little Latin and all his letters, speeches and papers betoken more than average culture, though his campaign biographer in 1835 rather stresses his humble beginnings. He studied law under W. P. Van Ness, a leading attorney in New York, and was himself a lawyer of unusual ability and success.

Delegate to a Republican (Democratic) convention at eighteen, in 1808 he was Surrogate of Columbia County, and in 1812 State Senator. From 1815 to 1819 he filled the office of Attorney General of the state, being State Senator part of the time, and

was a founder and ruling spirit of the Albany Regency, which controlled New York politics most of the time from 1818 to 1838.

United States Senator in 1821, and reëlected in 1827, he served in the meantime in the constitutional convention of his state, where he battled for extended but not universal suffrage. Elected Governor in 1828, he resigned from the Senate. While Governor he put through the first guarantee of bank deposits law, called Safety Fund, each bank contributing to a state fund to guarantee deposits in all banks. After nearly a hundred years of desuetude, this plan was revived by Oklahoma and now is a feature of state bank legislation in many states.

In March, 1829, he gave up the governorship to become Jackson's Secretary of State; was Minister to England, 1831-32, Vice-President from 1833 to 1837, and had rounded out thirty-two years of official life when he left the Presidency in 1841. His career represents, in a way, the triumph of politics as a fine art.

When Calhoun and he quarreled Jackson forthwith adopted Van Buren as his political heir. He appointed him Minister to England, but Clay, Webster and Calhoun induced the Senate to reject him. Astuter politicians would have aided in keeping him out of the United States. It was pure politics, though the objections to his confirmation were stated to be proscription of office-holders, causing the breach between the President and Vice-President, and as Secretary of State censuring the Adams administration in some instructions to our Minister to England.

If Van Buren's political death was accomplished not only would he be out of the way, but a sizable political estate would be left open to acquisition. Calhoun, the supplanted, had against Van Buren a personal grievance no politician would blame him for avenging; had he been allowed to sit calmly in the Vice-Presidential chair and impartially preside over their friend's condemnation by others, few Van Buren men would hold Calhoun's part in the proceedings against him. Clay and Webster had no idea of allowing their co-conspirator any such advantage. Twice tie votes were arranged and on two vital questions, one the rejection itself, victory was attained only by the casting vote of Calhoun.

There was great quiet jubilation among the enemy over this victory. "It will kill him! It will kill him dead," said Calhoun, and so thought Webster and Clay.

But when the vote was announced Benton wisely remarked to Moore of Alabama: "You have broken a Minister and made a

Vice-President." Churchill Cambreling, his brilliant New York friend, wrote Van Buren that night: "I congratulate you on your rejection by the Senate. . . . This is a providential interposition in your favor. . . . Poor Hayne has laid himself on the grave of Calhoun, and Webster and Clay die in each other's arms."

In England when the news came, King William IV assured Van Buren that he and his people well understood the excesses of party spirit, and had him as a guest at Windsor for several days. Lord Auckland, President of the Council, later Governor-General of India, congratulated him, and seeing his questioning look said, "It is a great good fortune to a man to be made the victim of a political outrage." Palmerston went out of his way to honor him; and Talleyrand in his excitement, no interpreter being present, divulged a secret he had kept sixty years—that he could speak English.

Jackson was furious at the rejection of his appointee and the injustice to his friend. He began an active campaign in Van Buren's behalf. Forsyth and Butler were brought into the cabinet, and Van Buren taken along on the Presidential tour of the North. This dictation to his party as to his successor aroused much resentment in some quarters, so much that Jackson's old friend, Hugh L. White, of Tennessee, would not submit. He, with John Tyler for second place, ran in 1836 on a bolting Democratic ticket, the "No-Party" Party it was called. They carried Georgia, and Tennessee, and Tyler received also the votes of Maryland and South Carolina. This party served a purpose similar to the Palmer and Buckner Gold Democratic Party in 1896 and provided an asylum for anti-Van Buren Democrats, and dissatisfied members of that party in general. Polk refused to leave the Democratic Party even to support an old friend and fellow Tennessean. His regularity was rewarded in 1844 when Van Buren, whom he had defeated for the nomination, loyally supported Polk.

The Second Democratic National Convention met in Baltimore May 20, 1835, a year and a half before the election. Twenty-three states, South Carolina, Alabama and Illinois omitted, were represented by over 500 delegates, and they met in the Fourth Presbyterian Church where prayers were offered during the meetings in "a fervent, feeling, manner." Andrew Stevenson presided and stated the object of the meeting in such a way as very clearly to indicate Van Buren the nominee. The two-thirds rule for nominations was vigorously opposed, and carried only by a small majority; the unit rule was observed, except the Massachu-

setts delegation split. No platform was adopted. It is curious that nominating speeches were barred, to "avoid unnecessary or angry discussion." This convention recommended state conventions to nominate electors.

Van Buren was nominated unanimously, but when R. M. Johnson was named for second place by a bare two-thirds majority of delegates the Virginia delegation, which had fought for the nomination of William C. Rives, announced that Virginia would not support him, a prophecy which was fulfilled. An announcement that 7 of Ohio's 21 delegates were opposed to Johnson caused a stir as without that 7 he would lack the requisite two-thirds, but it was ruled that the majority could cast the whole vote of the state, a definite application of the unit rule.

The Whigs at a "Democratic Whig Convention" nominated William Henry Harrison and gave him Francis Granger, the anti-Mason, as an associate. The addition of the word "Democratic" to the party name is explained by Seward as designed to attract the foreign vote, new citizens being familiar with and partial to "Democrat" and attaching no meaning to "Whig" or "Vhig." At the time of this nomination the party had little hope of success. The Massachusetts Legislature had named Webster, but he withdrew in Harrison's favor and he and Clay supported the ticket. The Whig ticket was designed to appeal to the West and the North, with the No-Party Party detaching Southern strength from their opponents. The Democratic ticket was a Northern man of Southern principles and a Westerner.

The Democratic candidate was so identified with Jackson as to need no express declaration of principles. Yet in a letter published in August Van Buren came out explicitly against the power of Congress to raise money for distribution among the states, and against similar distribution of the proceeds of land sales. He was flat-footed against a national bank.

The Whig Resolutions of New York were taken as the Whig platform. Nothing better shows the condition of that party than this document. Not one principle, not one policy, is even mentioned. It was meant to be void of all offense to all men except the Van Burenites. The first section invites the support of all men opposed to Van Buren; the second accuses Van Buren of intriguing for the Presidency; the third endorses Harrison not solely on account of military services, but as a patriot, a man of the Washington school; the fourth and last commends the talents and patriotism of Granger.

Jackson from the Hermitage gave Van Buren strong support. Harrison, a fine man with a good record, developed little of that strength with the public which four years later bore him triumphantly into the White House.

There were things alleged against Van Buren which hurt him in the South, but the full effect of these was not felt until 1840. In the New York legislature he had voted for giving colored citizens the right to vote; he had opposed admitting Missouri as a slave state, and assisted in sending Rufus King, Federalist and anti-slavery man, to the United States Senate. He was called a politician of the deepest dye, the guiding spirit of the Albany Regency, the Little Magician, the Red Fox.

But he was a Jacksonian Democrat, he had the endorsement of Jackson, he would oppose the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, and he was a man who knew how to elect a President even when he was himself the candidate.

John Quincy Adams did not admire greatly any of the candidates. He wrote in his diary, "Clay and Calhoun are left upon the field for dead; and men of straw, Hugh L. White, William H. Harrison and Daniel Webster, are thrust forward in their places. Neither has a principle to lean upon; Van Buren's principle is the talisman of democracy."

The name Whig was now definitely taken by Clay's and Webster's party, dropping entirely the National-Republican and Democratic-Whig titles. There was no particular application to the party in the name. In colonial days the patriots were called Whigs. The term had long lost political significance and become merely an honorable appellation, applied to old and distinguished citizens, synonymous with "Old Patriot," "Patriot Father" and the like. Jackson in 1800 had proclaimed himself a Whig, and swore by "Whig principles."

Seward describes the make-up of the Whig Party in New York at this time as being Anti-Mason, Anti-Jackson, Anti-Mortgage (referring to a pending state measure) and Anti-Regency. The hybrid nature of the opposition was shown by the result. White carried Tennessee and Georgia, 26; Webster, Massachusetts, 14; South Carolina, still playing only in her own back yard, cast her 11 votes for Mangum. Harrison carried Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio and Vermont, 73 electoral votes, and Van Buren all the rest, 170. Four New England States voted for Van Buren, Maine, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Rhode Island. In the popular vote, especially in the South, Van Buren fell far behind Jackson's vote in 1836; several states

overwhelmingly for Jackson, he carried only by the narrowest of margins; New York City, which had given Jackson 6,000 majority, gave him less than 2,000. Yet he ran stronger than Jackson had in some of the New England states. His popular vote was 762,678 against 735,650 for the others. Jackson's popular vote had been 707,217 out of a total of 1,300,000. Van Buren was the first Democratic candidate to win a majority of both the popular and electoral vote of New England. Pierce in 1852 received its electoral vote, but by a minority popular vote, and since then no Democrat has won either.

No Vice-Presidential candidate was elected and the Senate chose the leading one, Richard M. Johnson, who had lacked one vote of a majority.

People commented on the cool and perfectly decorous manner in which Van Buren was inaugurated as contrasted with the wild enthusiasm that had welcomed Jackson. Not only were the Presidents different but so were conditions. The inflation wind had been sowed and the whirlwind was being reaped. It was an almost impossible situation that Van Buren had inherited, and all his cool political sense and administrative ability were needed to avert disaster.

His cabinet was a sound one, and geographically diffused—Forsyth of Georgia, State; Woodbury of New Hampshire, Treasury; Dickerson of New Jersey, Navy; Kendall of Kentucky, Postmaster General; Butler of New York, Attorney General. Poinsett of South Carolina, a strong Union man in nullification days, was made Secretary of War.

The inaugural address was optimistic and carefully calculated to allay strife and animosities. It was the first address of the kind to specifically mention slavery. Hardly had Van Buren settled himself in the White House before the panic came on, accentuated by the late revolutionary change in the handling of the government funds. The government deposits were made on state lines and not based on the financial needs of the different sections. The opening of the banking field during the preceding administration by the destruction of the great bank had given rise to numerous small banks. The country had taken on a great boom in every way. Our trade was invading the Orient and South America as well as increasing in Europe; manufacturing was absorbing enormous capital; everybody was buying land, the cheapest way to get rich, many thought. Public lands sales had increased from 2,500,000 in 1832 to 25,000,000 in 1836. Mobile's assessed land values rose from \$1,300,000 to \$27,000,000

in six years. Railroads were being built; in 1830 there were 23 miles in operation, and in 1837, 1,500; cotton rose from 6 and 8 cents per pound to 14 and 20; flour doubled in price. Lots in boom towns in Maine and Florida brought New York City prices.

The financial minded of the country had met the extraordinary demand; banks increased in number from 330 in 1830 to 634 in 1837 and their combined capital rose from \$61,000,000 to \$525,000,000 in the same space of time, while their note circulation grew from \$61,000,000 with \$22,000,000 specie behind it to \$149,000,000 backed by only \$48,000,000 in specie. Of course easy money had made speculation rampant. Jackson's Specie Circular to protect the government had hastened, not caused, the crash, nor did the distribution of the \$37,000,000 surplus stay it. The end had been reached and the bubble burst. England was suffering financial trouble at the same time due to speculation in American and other enterprises and, instead of relief, additional pressure on America came from that country.

Specie disappeared from circulation, banks suspended or broke, business houses failed and a wholesale panic was on in full blast. But, as Edward M. Shepard points out, the American people of that day were well clothed and fed and pursued the even tenor of their way despite the great business depression and the ruin of banks, capitalists, speculators, traders and manufacturers. It was a financial panic, the bursting of a boom, a readjustment to real values. It bore hard on certain classes of poor people in cities and bread riots occurred.

Naturally enough all the blame was sought to be laid on the government, ascribed to the destruction of the bank, to the specie circular, and Van Buren was called on to restore with a wave of his hand the good old times, to recharter the bank, suspend government suits against importers and distribute the land revenue among the states.

Van Buren confronted the situation with calmness and courage, with patient determination. He declared that the specie circular should stand. He refused to be stampeded or bluffed, driven or cajoled. His message to Congress is classed by many authorities as one of the greatest American state papers. The government, he said, could not help the people make a living but it could refuse to deceive them into thinking that paper was gold. Debts could not be paid by legislation, nor gotten rid of by change of form. This "mere politician" at a time of crisis wrote one of the least political papers ever coming from the White House.

He reviewed the enormous extension of business in recent years, the large borrowings of our people from abroad, the purchase of millions of acres of government land on speculation, which no settlers were ready to make productive, the money wasted in improvident public improvements, and the fact that this, the first country in the world agriculturally, had actually imported \$2,000,000 worth of grain in 1837. To the demand for a bank he answered that just the opposite was the wise course. The Bank of the United States had not prevented former similar troubles and the Bank of England right then had failed to prevent them in England.

The United States was not, he said in effect, in the banking business nor any other business other than governing the country. The revenues ought to be kept down to government expenses, and not taken from the people, and the collection, care and custody, transfer and disbursement of the government funds should be by public officers. This was the announcement of the independent treasury, the sub-treasury.

The message closed with what theoretically at least is perfectly sound Democratic doctrine:

"Those who look to the action of this government for specific aid to the citizens to relieve embarrassments arising from losses by revulsions in commerce and credit, lose sight of the ends for which it was created, and the powers with which it is clothed. It was established to give security to us all, in our lawful and honorable pursuits, under the lasting safeguard of republican institutions. It was not intended to confer special favors on individuals, or on any classes of them; to create systems of agriculture, manufacturers or trades. . . . The less government interferes with private pursuits, the better for the general prosperity. It is not its legitimate object to make men rich, or to repair by direct grants of money or legislation in favor of particular pursuits, losses not incurred in the public service."

Van Buren pressed hard for an independent treasury and the bill passed the Senate 26 to 20; in the House it was defeated 120 to 106 although Polk, the administration candidate, had defeated Bell for Speaker 116 to 103. Blair's *Globe*, a hard-money anti-bank paper, lost the government printing. An element, antagonistic to Van Buren, called the Conservative Democrats, was forming.

The last instalment of the distribution of the surplus to the states was postponed, and \$10,000,000 in treasury notes, not legal tender, but interest bearing and receivable for public dues, was

issued. Clay's proposal for a national bank was negated in the Senate 31 to 14, in the House 123 to 91. A significant incident was Calhoun's rejoining the Democratic Party. He claimed that Van Buren had come over to his position, just as he had claimed that Clay had capitulated to him in the tariff bill of 1832.

The state elections of 1838 showed marked Democratic losses; New York, which gave Van Buren 30,000 plurality, went next year overwhelmingly for the Whigs, and the President's friends there were derisively called *Loco-focos*. The name arose from their using loco-foco matches to light up Tammany Hall when in a convention held there their opponents had turned out the lights on them. The *Loco-focos*, or equal rights men, were strongly opposed to monopolies, especially banks, and against all class legislation and special privilege. They were considered very radical in their day, and their disaffection was enough to throw the city administration into Whig hands. The antagonism of the bank to Van Buren brought them into sympathy with him and he soon brought them and the Tammany regulars together on a moderate declaration for equal rights.

Clay, Webster, the Whigs, the Conservative Democrats led by Rives of Virginia and Tallmadge of New York, thundered against the administration's course, which, they orated in mixed metaphor, curdled one's blood and ground the people to the very dust. But the Twenty-sixth Congress in 1840 passed the Independent Treasury bill, 24 to 18 in the Senate, 124 to 107 in the House. Set aside by the Whigs in 1841, it was restored by the Democrats in 1846 and remained part of our fiscal system until the Federal Reserve Act of 1913. Business gradually grew better, the premium on gold sank to three per cent and specie payments were resumed by practically all banks in or before the fall of 1828.

The most dramatic feature in the Congressional history of Van Buren's term was the final dissolution into three parts of the great triumvirate, Calhoun attaching himself to the Democrats while Clay and Webster were rivals in the Whig Party. Many were the stinging taunts hurled at each other by the two Southerners, but Webster abstained from personalities.

Instead of legislating, the House wrangled over anti-slavery petitions in the bitterest humor. Southern Democrats, such as Bell, Wise and Seargeant S. Prentiss, hurled anathemas at the administration. Silas Wright in the Senate was the administration's closest friend; administration support in the House was

scattered; Polk had retired to private life and no one taken his place as administration leader.

The Texas question agitated all of Van Buren's administration. Independence having been recognized, annexation was urged and opposed. Opposition to the acquisition of such a splendid territory was based almost if not entirely on its increasing of slave territory, the pro-slave element of our country being as much responsible for the acute turn the issue took as the abolitionists and the free-state sentiment people. Many of the most intelligent Northerners advocated the annexation of Texas on the ground that bringing it into the Union and under our control would be far better than to leave it an independent nation free to import slaves from Africa or elsewhere, and thus render easy their being smuggled into the United States.

The abolition societies had grown from scores to many thousands, and petitions were constantly poured in on Congress. John Quincy Adams presented his daily dozen to the House in spite of the most extreme opposition. Refusing the moderate demand that they be allowed to be presented and laid on the table without action, the extreme pro-slavery members of both branches insisted that they should not even be received. This was a grave error, for it denied the constitutionally guaranteed right of petition. Denying or ignoring a petition was one thing; denying the right to petition quite a different one. The logic of the situation gradually turned many conservative and just northern men from the South's side and from the Democratic Party.

The defalcation for large sums of Swartwout, whom against Van Buren's advice Jackson had appointed Collector at the Port of New York, the final removal of the Indians across the Mississippi, the dragging on of the long-continued Seminole War among the Everglades of Florida, and the dispute over the Maine boundary with England narrowly missing real trouble, were some main incidents of the years 1837-1841.

In 1839 Ohio, Massachusetts, Georgia, New Jersey and Mississippi gave administration majorities, but next year "Maine went Hell bent for Governor Kent," in rebuke of Van Buren's handling of the boundary matter.

The aftermath of the panic was experienced; in 1840 cotton fell from 16 to as low as 5 cents, the customs duties from \$23,000,000 in 1839 to \$13,000,000, while land sales fell from \$7,000,000 to \$3,000,000. The former Bank of the United States broke with a crash on pressure from English creditors, the

Philadelphia Gazette ascribing the failure to "the revulsion of the opium trade with the Chinese." Banks all over the country failed, but nearly all in New York and New England stood firm.

When Congress met in December, 1839, the President had to report that some of the \$10,000,000 treasury notes were outstanding, but that expenditures in 1838 had been less than in 1837, and in 1839 \$6,000,000 less than in 1838, and would be \$5,000,000 still less in 1840. He again opposed a national bank. The House was so evenly divided that its control was secured only by rejecting five New Jersey Whigs in favor of contesting Democrats. The Calhoun men refused to support the administration candidate or a Conservative Democrat, or the regular Whig candidate, but effected an alliance with the Whigs and elected R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia, a states rights Democrat, Speaker. Hunter later figured prominently in Civil War times.

The following session heard Van Buren's last message—During four years of great business and financial distress with a decreasing revenue, the administration had punctually met every obligation without a bank and without creating a permanent debt and without incurring any liability which the ordinary resources of the government could not speedily pay. He recited his efforts to suppress the slave trade, and asked Congress to prohibit that American trade which sold supplies to the slave factories on the African coast.

This session was idly spent in happy jubilation and anticipation by the lately successful Whigs soon to inaugurate a President and thirty days afterward eat the Dead Sea fruit of Tyler's individual Democracy. Legislation was postponed until the new administration came in.

The imputation of noncommittalism, so insistently charged against Van Buren, is contradicted by a great many of his acts and words. In his inaugural address he minced no words on slavery, then a dangerous topic to aspirants for public favor.

"I must go into the Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every attempt on the part of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia against the wishes of the slave-holding states; and also a determination equally decided to resist the slightest interference with it in the states where it exists. . . . No bill conflicting with these views can ever receive my official sanction."

When the bill prohibiting delivery by postmasters of "incendiary" publications was before the Senate when he was Vice-President his enemies arranged that a tie should result so as to

force him to offend either the slave or the anti-slave element. He easily could have evaded the issue, but he met it squarely. To inquiries addressed both to him and to Harrison in the 1840 campaign he gave answers as frank as his opponent's, and fuller. His messages are full of explicit positions taken boldly and never wavered from.

It was his easy manner, his tactful avoidance of matters disagreed over but not at issue, his courteous ignoring of antagonisms, which may account for much of his seeming lack of positiveness. The suavest and most diplomatic of our Presidents knew that

"The statues of our stately fortunes
Are sculptured with the chisel, not the axe."

Van Buren is really pathetic in his manner of resenting the characterization given him by his enemies of being a politician and intriguer, and the charge of noncommittalism. In his autobiography he asserts that, save the State Senatorship, every office he ever held came to him "without interference, direct or indirect," on his part.

Yet in a most naïve way he records incidents illustrating his political sagacity and adroitness, such as in 1828 putting up an administration man for Governor against Clinton, with the result that Adams support of him angered Clinton, and Jackson won 24 of New York's votes against 1 in 1824. He relates that he attended a meeting in New York called to censure him for failing to support a tariff measure and made a speech which so pleased his hearers that a disposition was manifested to give him a vote of thanks instead of the intended censure. He then records, in a half proud way, a conversation between two dealers in wool, one of whom had been a prime mover in calling the meeting.

"That was a very able speech, Mr. Knower, that Senator Van Buren made." "Yes, very able indeed, Mr. Wood. One of the ablest I ever heard." "Mr. Knower, on what side of the tariff was it?" "The very point I was thinking about, Mr. Wood."

The Albany Regency, founded and controlled by Van Buren, was but the logical development of the old New York council of appointments, abolished by law yet continued in practice. Van Buren seems to have kept perfect peace between the up-state Democracy to which he belonged and Tammany. Only honesty, fairness and political skill could have maintained that condition as long as he succeeded in doing, and no one has done it since

for any such length of time, unless Alfred E. Smith has accomplished it.

He was thoroughly democratic, yet conservative in extending the suffrage; he believed in universal suffrage as soon as the people were trained up to it. He was Democratic in believing in a strict construction of the Constitution and confining the federal government to its own sphere. It was this which led him to oppose Adams' Pan-American mission, a beneficent and splendid policy, maybe, but full of warlike possibilities and with no warrant in our organic law. He was modest; he said that his name was first associated with the Presidency more through the ill-will of opponents than the partiality of friends.

Jackson wrote Judge Overton in 1829, of Van Buren:

"I have found him everything that I could desire him to be, and believe him not only deserving my confidence, but the confidence of the nation. Instead of being selfish and intriguing, as has been represented by some of his opponents, I have ever found him frank, open, candid and manly."

It cannot be said fairly that he was any more of a politician than Calhoun, Clay or Webster, but he was certainly a better one than any of the three, especially Webster, who was one of the poorest politicians in the world. Given a friend such as Major Lewis, William C. Whitney or Mark Hanna and Webster would have reached the Presidency as surely as Jackson, Cleveland or McKinley. As it was, he never came near it.

Van Buren played politics no more than did the great three, and other, aspirants; he only played a better game and more carefully observed the rules. He always returned his partner's lead, and knew when to finesse; he knew when to bluff and when to lay down a hand. He knew what English to put on a ball, and when to walk a batter, when to make a sacrifice hit, when to use an iron or a wooden club. Every misplay of his opponents was noted and utilized.

It is not certain but that the errors of his enemies profited him almost as much as the efforts of his friends. His political ability was accompanied by a high statesmanship which history is tardily acknowledging.

The creed of the Democratic Party was not changed in the least by Van Buren. He followed, in his way, the straight course laid out by Jackson. His defeat was not due to political fault of his own or his party's, but to a great back-wash to another man and another party. Hard times, business depression, financial

panics made the people bent on a change. Van Buren's administration left the Democrats strong, compact and well organized in spite of a split-off coupled with an overwhelming defeat, and prepared to put up a winning fight four years later. It was Jackson's party still.

CHAPTER XIV

ONE MONTH OF WHIGGISM, FORTY-SEVEN OF DEMOCRACY

1841-1845

Hybrid Administration—Remarkable Tactics Deprive Clay of Whig Nomination—Curious Clay-Tyler Misalliance—Campaign Starts in December—Democratic Convention in May—Platform—Van Buren's Campaign—Liberty Party—Landslide for Whigs—John Tyler—No Whig—Parts Company with Party—Bank Bills Vetoed—Congress—Texas Question.

THE Harrison-Tyler administration belongs nominally to Whig history, but actually to Democratic annals. Harrison was an old Jeffersonian with Whig leanings and Tyler an anti-Jackson Democrat. Harrison's campaign and election much resembled Jackson's of 1828, and his few weeks in office carried the resemblance further, for hordes of office-seekers of the common or farm variety flocked to Washington and besieged the old General, many of them sleeping in the corridors of the White House, so as to be able to reach the President in the early hours before the crowd had gathered. "The latch string on the outside" had been a campaign slogan, and Harrison lived up to it thirty days. He fastened on the country as a national system what before had been only a party practice—the spoils system.

There were three references to the principles of Jefferson in the inaugural address; slavery agitation was deprecated, and paper money advocated which was taken to mean the President favored a national bank. Clay declined any place in the cabinet; Webster was given the State Department; Ewing, the Treasury; John Bell, War; Badger, Navy; Granger, the Anti-Mason, Postmaster General, and Crittenden, Attorney General.

Clay and Webster immediately clashed on appointments and Harrison bluntly charged with attempt at dictation; shortly afterward he requested Clay to make his recommendations to him in writing. An extra session of Congress was called for May 31st.

Old and in shattered health, the exposure of a long inaugural ceremony in inclement weather, the cares of office and the harassment of office-seekers brought Harrison to his death in exactly thirty days.

The nomination and election of the Whig ticket in 1840 and the causes behind them had a portentous aspect not noticed at the time. To win success the party had discarded its real leader for a winner, and associated with him another vote-getter of a different faith; then death opened Pandora's box on its head.

Clay had been campaigning, in a high sort of way, for the nomination ever since the last election, but instructed his friends as the convention drew near to withdraw his name if harmony or party success demanded. It was when cautioned that his course in the Senate was imperiling his chances that he exclaimed "I would rather be right than be President."

Webster desired the nomination but formally withdrew in 1839, and neither he nor his friends supported Clay. Many other Whigs opposed Clay, too, for personal and political reasons. A notable device was used to injure him, called the "triangular correspondence." Three Whig leaders in separate districts in New York each wrote the others—"Do all you can for Clay in your district for I am sorry to say he has no strength here." Thus was Clay's chances slaughtered by his reputed friends, for the letters were effectually used to show the uselessness of sending Clay delegates to the convention. General Winfield Scott, thought by some to be a leading candidate, was mostly only a stalking horse to detach delegates from Clay.

The Whig convention met at Harrisburg in December, 1839, 400 delegates from 22 states. Here another curious and elaborate device, originated by Thurlow Weed and joined in by Horace Greeley, was used to encompass the defeat of Clay, who was the favorite of the majority of the delegates. No general vote was taken, but, on motion of Sprague of Massachusetts, probably a Webster Whig, each state delegation chose a committee of three who took the sense of the delegation and reported to a general committee composed of all the members of these committees of three; a delegate named Penrose (from Pennsylvania?) moved an amendment embodying the unit rule, and the amended plan was adopted. For three days these committees labored and finally a majority was obtained and Harrison nominated. The first report showed Clay 102, Harrison 91, Scott 57. The main, if not sole objection urged against Clay was his unpopularity with the Anti-Masons, and his unavailability generally.

Clay, who was in the city, was indignant when he learned the result. Henry A. Wise, who bore the intelligence to him, describes him as in a towering rage. His friends, he said, were

not worth the powder and shot it would take to kill them; he was always put forward when defeat was certain and betrayed when victory was sure; if there were two Henry Clays, one would make the other President. "No," said Wise, "there would not be room for both on this continent; they would mutually destroy each other."

A bolt was threatened, but Clay was loyal. His friends were entitled to second place, it was admitted, and John Tyler was chosen, in compliance, it was said, with a promise given him months before by Clay, but the great strength it was believed he would bring to the ticket was duly considered, in fact was alleged to be the controlling factor in the choice. This Clay-Tyler misalliance is one of the most curious episodes in American political history.

The Whigs adopted no platform and issued no address to the people, an omission caustically commented on by their opponents. Harrison, a retired old soldier, had never been active enough in politics, except as Whig candidate in 1836, to stand for any leading principle or policy in the public mind. When territorial delegate from Indiana he had sought permission to establish slavery there. As a Whig he was a very moderate one, a staunch admirer and professed follower of Jefferson, which constituted part of his popularity. He was a fine old American patriot with a good record in Congress and as territorial Governor, and famed for his honesty. He was so guarded in his utterances during the campaign that the Democratic caricaturists pictured him with a padlock on his mouth.

The 1840 campaign was that of 1828 over again except that now the Whigs had the old Hero and backwoodsman, the Democrats the city man. Harrison tall, gaunt, clean-shaven with long gray locks, just like Jackson; Van Buren low and stout with bald head and mutton chop whiskers, with city manners and habits, just like John Quincy Adams. Log cabins, with a cider barrel at the door, took the place of hickory poles. Harrison's manner, his frank honesty when he did speak, and other qualities attracted the very same sort of people that swelled Jackson's great majorities—people who knew and cared little about politics, but voted for their favorite, the common people, the hurrah boys, the wool-hat crowd, by whatever name they are called. Even Jackson's endorsement could not hold that element to Van Buren. The Hero of New Orleans could not defeat, with a third person, the Hero of Tippecanoe.

A Democratic paper suggested that letting Harrison stay at

home and giving him plenty of hard cider would suit him much better than putting him in the White House. The Whigs used this sneer at an old patriot and hence the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign."

A newspaper called the Log Cabin appeared; in a few weeks it had attained a circulation of 60,000; its editor was one Horace Greeley, picked up two years before by Thurlow Weed, who had been attracted by some of his writings, and used in Seward's campaign for Governor. Thus was begun that famous political firm, Seward, Weed and Greeley, so dramatically dissolved by Greeley in 1854.

Clay's speeches were taken as indicating the Whig policies—no abuse of the veto power, a single term for the President, restriction of the power of removal from office, exclusive control of the Treasury by Congress and no power in the President to dismiss the Secretary of the Treasury, a stable and uniform currency either by a national, or carefully selected state banks, preferably the former, protection, internal improvements by states with federal aid, economy in government and slavery left as the Constitution placed it.

The Third National Democratic Convention met, six months later than the Whig meeting, at Baltimore, May 5, 1840, 21 states represented by 250 delegates. Van Buren was unanimously nominated but no Vice-President named, the conflicting claims of Polk and Forsyth being too evenly balanced. Both of these withdrew later in favor of R. M. Johnson of Kentucky, "Old Tecumseh," with a war record to offset Harrison's.

The Democratic platform of 1840, every section of which was separately and unanimously adopted, calls for careful study. It is the declaration of Jacksonian principles, and for sixteen years was the political constitution of the party. Readopted in its entirety in 1844, it constitutes the major part of the party platforms of 1848, 1852 and 1856.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1840

1. Federal government one of limited powers.
2. Internal improvements unconstitutional.
3. Assumption of state debts incurred for internal improvements unconstitutional.
4. Opposes fostering one branch of industry or one section of country to injury of another.
5. Rigid economy and no more revenue than necessary to run the government.

6. A bank unconstitutional and dangerous to institutions and liberties.

7. Congress no power to interfere with domestic institutions of the several states; condemns Abolitionists.

8. Separation of moneys of government from banking institutions indispensable to safety.

9. Reaffirms principles of Jefferson and favors liberal naturalization policy.

The declaration in favor of liberal naturalization laws was in opposition to a movement, in New York City mainly, against new and foreign-born citizens, which had developed into the Native American Party in 1835 and which elected a Mayor, Harper, in 1846. Later this society spread over the country, and grew into the Know-Nothing Party, electing Governors and legislatures in several states, and finally became the American Party which with Millard Fillmore as its candidate for President polled 875,000 votes in 1856.

In response to published letters addressed to the candidates Harrison stated that he believed in banks, a credit system and paper currency, and detested executive usurpation and the spoils system. The geography of the two tickets is worthy of notice. The Whigs, strongest in the East, ran a Westerner and a Southerner; the Democrats, strongest in the South, a New Yorker and a half-Westerner. Lincoln was on the Illinois electoral ticket.

Van Buren's conduct in the campaign was bold and honest, with no noncommittalism in it; he answered letters from friend and foe; he said that with Congress' treatment of abolition petitions the President had no official concern, but that he believed Congress was justified in adopting the "gag" rule.

Harrison had promptly repudiated abolitionism too. Webster gave Macedonian aid to the Whig cause in splendid speeches not always logical or entirely consistent with the courses the two parties had pursued on the questions involved, and he kept silent on slavery, except to assure the South that "Harrison would not lay ruthless hands on the institutions under which he was born and educated"—Washington and Hancock, Virginia and Massachusetts were invoked; "How many bones of Northern men," he eloquently asked, "lie at Yorktown?" Preston of South Carolina added to the play for Southern support of Harrison, "a Southern man of Southern principles," against Van Buren, the supporter of that rank Federalist Rufus King who had fought Missouri's admission and favored free negro suffrage.

Some authorities say the campaign of 1840 was one of much enthusiasm and little thought. Certainly there was much of the former and more songs and illustrated campaign literature issued, comparatively, than in any campaign before or since. "Little Van," "Mattie," the Red Fox caught in a log cabin trap, "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too," "Liberty in Log Cabins rather than Slavery in Palaces," "Harrison with Two Dollars and Roast Beef," were Whig ammunition. The Democrats laughed at the Whigs, whom they called "Coons," because of coonskin caps of the frontiersmen, and "Cider Suckers," and at "Goody" or "Granny" Harrison. But the Whigs laughed loudest and longest and last; they fairly ridiculed Van Buren into defeat. The "bank bullies" in towns and the "coon hunters" in the country outroared the Loco-focos and the Van Burenites generally. Tammany, now beginning to be "ruled from the bottom up instead of from the top down," weakened in its support of its old ally and gave him less than 1,000 plurality in the city. Van Buren's wonderful political ability, invincible when used in behalf of others, was vulnerable now that he himself was the candidate. Early in the campaign he had said that the race was a farce or a tornado; it proved an avalanche.

Advertisements appeared in many papers that \$6.00 per barrel would be paid for flour if Harrison was elected, \$3.00 if Van Buren; \$5.00 per hundred for pork against \$2.50.

The Liberty Party, falsely suspected at the moment to be a ruse of Van Buren's to detach Abolition support from the Whig candidate, sprang into national prominence in 1840. At a convention held at Albany in April James G. Birney, a former Kentucky slave-holder who had for conscience's sake freed his slaves, was nominated for President, with Thomas Earle for second place. Its platform proclaimed respect for the Constitution and all laws, and declared against slavery in the District of Columbia and all territories. The name Liberty Party was formally adopted.

This party cast only 7,000 votes this year; it was not sufficiently strong in New York to make up to Seward the defection of the "dough-face" or pro-slavery Whigs, so he was elected Governor with only half of Harrison's New York majority. Four years later it was a tremendous factor in the Presidential race.

Ohio and Pennsylvania were the first to vote on Presidential candidates and both went to Harrison; it was the beginning of a landslide. The Democrats carried New Hampshire, Virginia, Alabama, South Carolina, Illinois, Missouri and Arkansas, 60

electoral votes against 234 for the Whigs. Harrison and Tyler carried eight slave states, with a popular majority in all the slave states of 55,000 in a total of 695,000 and had a majority of 90,000 of a total vote of 1,700,000 in the free states. This indicated the Whig ticket proportionately stronger in the South than in the North. Was this attributable to "Tippecanoe" or to "Tyler Too"? Three years and eleven months of United States history was greatly affected by that question.

The total vote of 2,400,000 as against 1,500,000 four years before was the occasion of a cry of fraud, but it was soon decided that the increased vote was due to the usual stay-at-home vote going to the polls. Van Buren took his defeat manfully and with his characteristic dignity. He wrote his last message to Congress while he could hear from the White House the song "Van, Van, He's a Used-up Man," but that did not mar its fine Democratic statesmanship.

Tyler was the first Vice-President to succeed to the Presidency by the death of his chief, and his first act was to repel Clay's assumption that his administration was to be "in the nature of a regency." It began the battle between the President and the party which had elected him, which lasted his entire term.

The new Chief Executive was of distinguished birth and well educated, with quite a distinguished career behind him, and he was conscious of all these facts. Opinionated and stubborn he seems to have been, but honorable, scrupulous and anxious to do the right thing by the Whig Party so far as possible with his ideas of duty and the Constitution. He described himself as a true Whig or pure Jeffersonian Republican, a states rights Democrat. He called the Clay Whigs Nationalist Whigs, the Webster Whigs Federalist Whigs. He had at one time been a strong Jacksonian, but parted with him on his coercive position toward South Carolina, being the only Senator voting against the Force bill in 1833.

Born in 1790, he was the youngest man to attain the Presidency. Educated at William and Mary, he had repeatedly been elected to the Virginia legislature; twice Governor of Virginia, as his father had been, he had defeated ex-Speaker Andrew Stevenson for Congress, and John Randolph for Senator in 1827 and been reelected in 1833. Resigning from the Senate in 1836 rather than vote for the Expunging Resolution, he had been candidate for Vice-President in the No-Party ticket of that year.

"Tylerism" as synonymous with treachery was the claim of

the Whigs in 1841-1845 and the same imputation against him survives in some histories. A careful inquiry, however, indicates that Tyler never intentionally deceived any one, but many men deceived themselves about him. It will be recalled how astonished Virginia was just after electing him Senator in 1827, to learn of his letter approving Clay's support of Adams. Had the least suspicion been entertained that such was his attitude he would not have been elected. Yet he asserted, and proved by consistent opposition to the Adams-Clay administration, that he was not of their party or politics.

His record in both houses of Congress was known to Clay, who acknowledged twenty years intimacy with him, during thirteen of which, he bitterly said, they had never once voted together on principle. It was known to all the Whig Congressional leaders. To accuse Tyler of treachery and bad faith for adhering to views and principles he had publicly advocated for twenty years is not just.

His views on the national bank question were known; in 1819 he had brought in a report to the House declaring that the bank had forfeited its charter and in a speech had argued a bank unconstitutional and urged a *scire-facias* to forfeit its charter. In 1828 in the Senate he voted against a recharter. During the 1840 campaign in answer to published letters he had twice referred to this speech and vote and announced that his views were unchanged, and that a bank was unconstitutional. In a letter written during the campaign and submitted to the Whig leaders, who suppressed it as impolitic, he had plainly declared that a Bank of the United States was unconstitutional. Opposed to this long and open opposition to a bank was only his conduct in opposing Jackson's removal of deposits, in which he was following the instructions of the Virginia legislature. In reply to a thrust by Benton at that time, he stated in the Senate, where Clay and Webster sat, that he was and had always been opposed to a bank as unconstitutional.

On the tariff and internal improvements his record was equally anti-Whig, the first he opposed on principle, the latter as unconstitutional. No man in high public life except Calhoun was a stronger states rights advocate; in his speech against the Force bill he said:

"The pernicious doctrine that this is a national and not a federal government—This government was created by the States, is amendable by the States, is preserved by the States and may be destroyed by the States."

That such a man with such a record was put by Clay on the Whig ticket is susceptible of only one explanation, and that a most reasonable one. It was to fulfil a pledge and to bring outside strength to the Whigs; and it brought it. Clay's direct responsibility rests mainly on the authority of Henry A. Wise, who records it in his "Seven Decades of the Union."

In 1838 Tyler and Rives were contesting for the Virginia Senatorship and Tyler's friends found Clay's influence being exerted in Rives' favor. Clay justified this as necessary to Whig national success in 1840, and promised that if Rives was given the Senatorship he would have Tyler given second place on the national Whig ticket next year. Clay then was sure that he himself would have first place. This agreement, so Wise says, was carried out then in the Virginia legislature and later in the Whig convention.

A man of strong convictions, as much of a Democrat and as little of a Whig as he was, Tyler seems for a while to have made a genuine effort to govern in conjunction with the Whig Party. He retained Harrison's cabinet and endeavored to have concocted a bank or fiscal bill which he could constitutionally approve. But the imperious Clay, who with much reason deemed himself the personification of the party in power, sought to rule as mayor of the palace. Tyler would not for a moment submit to that. He told Clay to return to his end of the Avenue and do his duty there. "As for me I will stay at this end and, so help me God, will try to do my duty here."

The two men had been born and raised in the same district in Virginia; one the Mill Boy of the Slashes, son of a poor Baptist preacher, the other rich, the son of a Governor of Virginia. One was President of the United States now, the other a Senator. Who should give, who take orders of the other?

The result was that Tyler was publicly repudiated by the Whigs—with execrations. The English language did not afford a sufficient vent for the rage of his erstwhile supporters. He neither sought nor was granted entrance into the opposition. First treated by the Democrats as an outlaw and enemy, his attitude on the annexation of Texas and the developments of the 1844 campaign made him their ally, so that his administration properly belongs to Democratic history. Tyler strove first to govern with the Whigs, then without a party, and finally tried to form a party of his own. He failed in all attempts.

That he was elected by the Whigs he granted, but that the victory was due in part to him he did not doubt. He was put on

the ticket to bring strength from the South, to court Northern Democrats, and anti-bank, anti-tariff and anti-internal improvement votes everywhere. In 1836 he had carried against both Van Buren and Harrison, 47 electoral votes, 21 more than his chief, Judge White. Who, he could logically ask, brought Tennessee and Georgia, states which had not troubled to send delegates to the Whig convention, and North Carolina, Louisiana and Mississippi, all strong for states rights, into the Whig column with their 50 votes? Who had won over the 30 votes of that Democratic stronghold ever since Jefferson's day, Pennsylvania—Tyler the Democrat or Harrison the Whig? And that Democratic, that old and cultured State, New York—had the scholarly Virginian or the backwoodsman won it over? The ticket and slogan had been "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too"; in some sections "Tippecanoe and TYLER Too." Tyler thought it a joint victory and governed himself accordingly.

Two Virginian cliques wanted to be the Kitchen Cabinet, one headed by John Minor Botts, Whig, the other by Henry A. Wise, and the latter won, his associates being Gilmer, Upshur and Beverly Tucker, all "Republicans of the old school."

The Twenty-seventh Congress met in May, 1841, with a Whig majority of about 50 in the House and of 7 in the Senate. The Independent Treasury was promptly abolished. Tyler promptly vetoed Clay's bank bill because he "could not conscientiously sign such a bill."

The very recent failure of the old bank strengthened the anti-bank sentiment. The Senate tied, 25 to 25, in an effort to pass the bill over the veto. The House prepared a new bill of its own, Webster and Ewing taking part in its framing, the word "bank" not being used, but "fiscal agent," "fiscal institute" being considered and finally "fiscal corporation" adopted. Benton believed that corporations being allowed to purchase stock was provided as part of a plan for the old bank to gain complete control of the new. The bill passed was vetoed by the President and could not be passed over the veto. Charges of bad faith, of deceit and prevarication in and about these bills were added to accusations of party treachery and perfidy.

Twenty-four acts and six joint resolutions were passed and approved, but none except the sub-treasury repeal were party measures. The session was a bitter dose to the Whigs. It was an unhappy time, too, for Tyler. He asserted then and ever afterward that he went as far as he could to meet the Whig view.

He was dissuaded by his cabinet from inserting in his second veto message a pledge not to be a candidate for reëlection.

It was a curious scheme Clay hatched to drive Tyler to resign, and it exhibits Clay's lack of political common-sense. The whole cabinet, except Webster, resigned suddenly and without previous warning one Saturday afternoon. Congress was to adjourn at noon Monday and it was believed that Tyler would be unable in the interim to form a cabinet. The vacancies, occurring while Congress was in session, could not be filled in vacation; the President without a cabinet could not carry on the government and would be forced to resign. Then the staunch Whig Southard, president pro tem of the Senate, would be President. Webster declined to join in the scheme for two reasons; he would not submit to Clay's domination and he desired to carry to completion the negotiations culminating in the Webster-Ashburton treaty with England. With Webster's aid Tyler had no trouble in forming a cabinet, which the Senate confirmed forthwith.

A conversation at this juncture between Tyler and Webster is interesting. "Where am I to go, Mr. President?" "You must decide for yourself, Mr. Secretary," was replied. "If you leave it to me, I will stay where I am," said Webster. Whereupon the President, extending his hand, said, "Give me your hand on that, and now I will say to you that Henry Clay is a doomed man from this hour." Webster was once more close to the throne, but an alliance with Tyler was even more impossible than one with Jackson.

The President, with a government now organized against parties, wielded the axe and new appointments were used to build up a party of his own, but as Clay expressed it, he could only muster a "Swiss Guard" at the White House.

The President vetoed a provisional and a regular tariff bill, and impeachment was threatened, but petered out into a censure of the use of the veto. The House refused to receive his protest. Adams and others wished to adjourn and leave the government without any revenue, but Fillmore brought in a tariff bill omitting Clay's favorite feature, the distribution among the states of the proceeds of land sales, and it became a law.

Indiana, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi and Pennsylvania had loaned their credit extensively to railroads, canals and other improvements, partly relying on the distribution of land funds to help them out. The plan was now proposed that the federal government assume these debts as it

had assumed the states' debts in Hamilton's days. The Democrats declared against it.

Clay, already nominated by various state organizations for President in 1844, left the Senate in 1842, to rest—and to keep out of trouble. His farewell was an affecting scene, many Senators, among them his old foe Benton, wept, and Calhoun, with whom he had not been on speaking terms for five years, embraced him. Calhoun himself soon followed Clay into temporary retirement, and Fillmore left the House to return later to Washington in a higher place.

A main feature of Congressional life during Tyler's administration was the continued slavery agitation, bringing out Adams' startling statement that in case of war emancipation of the slaves would be a lawful war measure. Joshua Giddings backed the Old Man Eloquent; was censured by the House for violence; he resigned, was reëlected and continued his fierce assaults on slavery.

Pairing was first introduced into Congress in 1840. A threat was made in 1841 by Clay to introduce cloture into the Senate rules either by limiting speeches on the bank bill to one hour, as had been done in the House, or the adoption of the previous question, parliamentary rule, into Senate procedure. The strongest Whig Senators refused to support him and the move was abandoned.

Tyler, following Harrison's example, had advocated a single term for the President as "that greatest of all reforms without which the effort of reform is hopeless." Yet now he and his friends began to argue that it did not apply to him; his three years and eleven months was not a "term." The reason of the rule—the removal of the temptation to use the office for reëlection, applied with full force, but the ordinary rules of logic do not seem to apply always to Presidents or the Presidential office. Jefferson approved of the two-term theory because it afforded in the middle of a President's service an opportunity to take the sense of the country. But now both parties adopted the one-term theory as a corollary to rotation in office.

The Clay campaign for the Whig nomination was in full swing two years before the campaign year and so universal seemed the Whig demand for him that General Scott retired in his favor when named by a Whig meeting in Pennsylvania. Yet some dire omens appeared; Webster and Spencer were thought to be unfriendly and were keeping away from Whig gatherings; New York state elections were lost in spite of Seward, Weed

and Greeley, and Massachusetts and Virginia showed Whig losses.

Webster was likened to Achilles sulking in his tent; he had been unable to attract New England Whiggery to Tyler's support, and the Texas matter sent him back to them. Tyler wished to give him the English mission but Everett held on. Webster made his second Bunker Hill speech and reinstated himself with his people. But he had lost New England support for the Whig nomination in 1844, by adhering to the administration.

Tyler found the Whigs united, the Democrats undivided while he had one staunch friend in the Senate and only six in the House. He was abused by Whigs and Democrats. "The light reflected from burning effigies of myself," he wrote, "has only rendered the path of duty more plain." Yet he formed great plans. The annexation of Texas might split both old parties and out of the wreck he hoped to form a new party with the best features of each. He moved swiftly; the active interest England and France were manifesting toward Mexico, Texas and particularly California gave strength to his efforts. Old Sam Houston, President of Texas, was always an American at heart—was such until his death, and cursed the day Texas seceded in 1860—and was not difficult to persuade that Texas' best interest lay in the Union; Jackson, his old friend and counselor, advised it, and an annexation treaty was prepared. A treaty of annexation was signed in April, 1844, and American troops stationed near the border. "British designs forced the step upon us" was the assigned reason.

The Democrats and Whigs were thoroughly agreed that Tyler should not have the honors and rewards of the achievement. The conventions would soon be in session and Democratic candidates were plentiful. Two days after the conventions were over the Senate rejected the treaty two to one. Before Congress met again Polk had been nominated on an annexation platform and the people had spoken in his favor. A bill inviting Texas to join the Union was passed. Tyler sent his nephew post haste to take to Texas the proposal.

The explosion of a gun on the war vessel Princeton in February, 1844, had resulted in the death of two cabinet members, Upshur and Gilmer. Calhoun succeeded the former and John Y. Mason the other. Bibb took Spencer's place in the Treasury and not a Whig was left in the cabinet and only one Northern man, Wilkins.

Some famous men made their appearance in the Twenty-eighth

Congress, Howell Cobb and Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia, Stephen A. Douglass of Illinois; Webster came back to the Senate, succeeding Rufus Choate, and Lewis Cass of Michigan entered that body. The House repealed its "gag" rule, for which Adams fervently thanked God; a great fundamental principle had been vindicated, but the only practical effect was that anti-slavery petitions were laid on the table instead of thrown out of doors.

The admission of Florida and Iowa to the Union, hand in hand in a single bill, an extradition treaty with France and an advantageous commercial treaty with China, were achieved during Tyler's administration. He had administered the government economically, had made up the deficit, and treasury notes were at par value.

Whether through vanity, as his enemies alleged, or by reason of his courage and conviction that he was right, as his friends loyally asserted, he fought his way doughtily and fairly successfully through four years of unmitigated political warfare. If not a victor he assuredly was not vanquished. Webster's friends claim for their hero the Ashburton treaty, Calhoun's for theirs the annexation of Texas. Tyler, rejected, disowned, disinherited, a political orphan, has had no party to defend his administration and spread and preserve his fame. Both have been left to the censure of his enemies and the cold charity of apathetic historians. His critics have not succeeded in convicting him in the public mind of political felony, but have dimmed his fame. His administration speaks for itself, and for him.

Virginia honored him later, politically, by electing him, unanimously, to the Provisional Confederate Congress, and later to the Confederate Congress. He was president of the peace commissioners Virginia sent to confer with Lincoln before secession.

Tyler's direct influence on the Democratic Party was small. His course disorganized the Whigs and thus greatly strengthened their opponents. Whether his advocacy of Democratic principles rendered them more popular is doubtful. Certainly the Democrats asked nothing from him, claimed nothing of his, and assumed no blame or credit for his course. To the party he was technically an enemy until he went out of office. The party's platform in 1844 reaffirmed in toto and without change the platform of 1840, on which it had suffered defeat by Harrison and Tyler, adding three new planks dealing with new subjects.

CHAPTER XV

DEMOCRATIC EFFICIENCY UNDER POLK

1845-1849

The President—Clay-Van Buren Arrangement—The Nominating Conventions—Two-Thirds Rule—First Dark Horse Candidate—Party Platforms—The Campaign—Cabinet and Policies—Oregon—Tariff—The Twenty-ninth Congress—Mexican War—Wilmot Proviso—The Thirtieth Congress—Abraham Lincoln—Jefferson Davis—Peace and the Slavery Question—National Prosperity—Polk as President and Party Head.

WHO is James K. Polk? This question was asked all over the United States in May, 1844, sneeringly by the Whigs, but in honest inquiry by many Americans who did not keep up with the times. Their own nominee being the best-known American citizen, save the superannuated Jackson, it was Whig politics to belittle his opponent. Polk had friends who thought him a second Andrew Jackson, and higher praise they could not give. And many of Polk's successors have not had at the time of their nominations half so long and distinguished a record as he had when he was nominated by the Democrats.

Fourteen active years in the lower house of Congress, a leader of the opposition during Adams' administration, the administration leader during Jackson's eight years when he defeated time and time again the cohorts of the United States Bank, thrice a candidate for the speakership and twice elected—this would seem to constitute a record, aside from his having been Governor of Tennessee when that state was dominant in Democratic politics. As a Congressional leader and gladiator he ranks with Thad Stevens and McKinley, John Sharp Williams and Oscar Underwood; but Calhoun, Clay and Webster kept the Senate in the public eye while Polk's arena was the House.

Born in North Carolina, where his forefathers had prominently participated in the adoption of the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence, he had, when a boy, moved with his parents to middle Tennessee. He was a graduate of the University of North Carolina. In 1823, at the age of twenty-eight, he was elected to the Tennessee legislature; two years later he was sent to Congress, was conspicuous in opposition until Jackson was

inaugurated, when he led the administration forces in the fight against the bank and in other contests; defeated for Speaker in 1834 by Bell, who was supported by a coalition of Whigs and malcontent Democrats, he was elected in 1835 and reëlected in 1837; he was elected Governor in 1839, but defeated for reëlection.

In 1836 Polk refused to support his friend and fellow-Tennessean, Judge Hugh L. White, for President. He proclaimed the greatest respect and regard for White, and declared he would support him with the greatest pleasure were he running on the Democratic ticket; as it was, he would stand by his party. This regularity was a great recommendation of Polk to the Democratic convention in 1844.

Since Harrison's death, if not even earlier, Clay and Van Buren had been regarded as destined to oppose each other in 1844. Each was recognized as the leader and the logical candidate of his party. No one, least of all, it seems, the two men most concerned, looked for another candidate, unless indeed the improbable happened and Tyler succeeded in forming a party. Twenty-four state conventions had pronounced for Van Buren, and before the Democratic convention met more than three-fourths of the states had instructed their delegations to support him. Webster's connection with the hated Tyler administration left the Whig field absolutely to Clay.

Van Buren on a tour of the South in 1842 had visited Clay at his home, Ashland; it was popularly believed that the two statesmen, old friends although political enemies, discussed many matters, and agreed that the Texas question, on which they held the same opinion, then only on the horizon, should not be an issue in the coming contest. This belief was confirmed when, on the morning of April 27, 1844, a week before the Whig convention, a month before the Democrats were to meet, there appeared in the morning *National Intelligencer* a letter from Clay, and in the afternoon *Globe* a letter from Van Buren, both opposing the annexation of Texas. Clay's letter was long and argumentative, giving many reasons for opposing annexation but hinting that if Congress acquired the territory he would not refuse executive sanction.

Van Buren's letter also was a diplomatic document; he was frankly opposed to annexation, but would yield to the public will. This letter cost Van Buren the nomination. Immediately some delegates, instructed for him, resigned; others declared his position absolutely contrary to the known wishes of their states

and stated that they would oppose his nomination; mass meetings were held in various states which resolved that instructions for Van Buren were cancelled by his act.

The Whig convention met in Baltimore May 1st and with wild enthusiasm nominated Clay by acclamation. On the third ballot Senator Frelinghuysen of New Jersey was named for second place. A great ratification meeting was held next day when Webster, Clayton, Reverdy Johnson, Berrien and other Whig leaders spoke. The Whig campaign started off with a whoop; they seemed thoroughly united and were sanguine, their opponents in serious discord and discouraged.

The Fourth Democratic National Convention met in Baltimore, "the Convention City," May 27, with 266 delegates representing every state but South Carolina. Calhoun, flirting with the Tyler party while Secretary of State, had said the Whigs were the old Federalists turned demagogues, the Democrats old Republicans turned spoilsmen, and withdrew himself and his state from both. Romulus Saunders of North Carolina, who had reported the two-thirds rule in the 1835 convention, now moved that the rules of 1832 and 1835 be adopted. Saunders was said to have been a Calhoun agent in evening up matters between Calhoun and Van Buren; if so, Calhoun obtained his revenge.

The two-thirds rule, opposed as violative of the great Democratic principle of majority rule, was advocated as a necessary protection against control by non-Democratic states. Precedent was invoked and the argument stressed that the two-thirds rule insured a Democratic majority, which a mere majority did not. Saunders, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi and Hopkins of Virginia supported the rule; Clifford of Maine, Dickinson of New York and Morton of Massachusetts opposed it, South against North. There was no satisfactory answer to the argument that Van Buren be subjected to the tests his friends had imposed on candidates opposing him and the North gave way. The rule was adopted 148 to 118. Two-thirds of the Northern delegates voted against it, while six-sevenths of the Southerners supported it.

On the first ballot Van Buren received 146 votes, a majority of 13. A motion that Martin Van Buren, having received the votes of a majority of the convention, be declared the nominee was ruled out of order, and an appeal from the ruling was abandoned. Van Buren's majority was made up of 134 of the 151 Northern delegates and 12 of the 105 from the South. The other votes were for Cass, the Northwesterner, Buchanan, and R. M. John-

son. Calhoun had requested that his name not be presented to the convention, yet Van Buren's friends attributed his defeat largely to Calhoun's influence. Seven ballots were taken, Van Buren losing on each; on the fifth Cass received 107 to Van Buren's 103; on the eighth the vote was Cass 114, Van Buren 104, Polk 44, the first vote for the last named. The roll call of states was in geographical order, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont—New Hampshire started the stampede for Polk on the ninth ballot; when New York was reached the chairman of the delegation, ex-Attorney General Butler, long Van Buren's close friend, asked permission to retire for consultation. There was a tense moment when they returned. Butler produced a letter from his candidate authorizing the withdrawal of his name if conducive to harmony; he withdrew Van Buren and cast New York's vote for Polk, and delegation after delegation, amid wild confusion, changed its vote and Polk was nominated unanimously, the first dark horse and the first beneficiary of a stampede to the band wagon in our political history. Polk's regularity and his loyalty to Van Buren eight years before were rewarded, but his fitness, his deserts, his availability were potent influences in bringing about his selection. There seems no evidence that his nomination, as was alleged at the time, had been carefully prearranged, nor is there the least basis for likening his nomination to Harding's in 1920. It was good sense and fitness, not manipulation, that brought about Polk's nomination. There turned up, however, immediately several "original Polk men"—"the first man who" etc., among them George Bancroft, Gideon Pillow and Cave Johnson.

Jackson had urged Van Buren's nomination, but an old letter from him advocating the annexation of Texas offset his present and personal endorsement. Besides it was known that Polk was the friend and disciple of, and much liked by, the Old Hero.

Silas Wright, the New York veteran leader and Van Buren's friend, was offered the nomination for second place and on his declination George M. Dallas was named. This made a strong ticket, geographically and in other ways.

On the same day, in the same city a "Tyler and Texas" nominating convention was held. It was thought that overtures from the Democrats were expected and that place and time had been arranged so that acceptance could be prompt and easy. None were made and Tyler was nominated unanimously on a platform of immediate annexation of Texas. In accepting the nomination the nominee stated that had Van Buren and Clay

coöperated for annexation he would have withdrawn from any attempt to succeed himself. Later he withdrew in favor of Polk.

THE DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM OF 1844

Began with a sarcastic reference to the Whig campaign tactics of 1840—

Reaffirmed, verbatim, planks 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the 1840 platform (see ante page 194).

10. Proceeds of public lands to be applied to national objects, not distributed among the states.

11. Opposed taking from President the veto power which thrice had saved the people from the Bank of the United States.

12. Claimed the whole of Oregon and advocated its "reoccupation" and the "reannexation" of Texas.

THE WHIG PLATFORM OF 1844

Declared that the names of Clay and Frelinghuysen gave assurance that the great Whig principles would be maintained, and summed up those principles as:

"A well regulated national currency; a tariff for revenue, discriminating for protection of the domestic labor of the country; the distribution of the proceeds from the sales of the public lands; a reform of executive usurpations; economy in government."

The Liberty Party, a year and a half before the election, had nominated Birney and Morris, and adopted a long platform against slavery and all its attributes, including the fugitive slave law, as unconstitutional, and void by the overruling moral law. Birney on the stump advocated the election of Polk, preferring between two slave-holders, he said, the less powerful one. Even John Quincy Adams was not sufficiently anti-slavery to suit these folk. Before the campaign was over Birney was advocating dissolution of the Union.

Adams, Giddings and other anti-slavery leaders supported Clay. Although the annexation of Texas involved the extension of slave territory, yet it appealed to many voters of anti-slavery views. Clay sought to hedge on the proposition and wrote six "Texas letters," some for Northern, some for Southern consumption. The result was that many anti-slavery-extension Democrats went to Polk, while Clay gained few Southern votes, and the Liberty ticket gained many disgusted voters. One of Clay's Northern friends exclaimed in disgust that he wished for a candidate who could neither read nor write. Many Whigs now regretted that Webster had not been chosen as their candidate. That, had he been, the result would have been different is very possible.

Polk stood squarely on his platform, especially the "reannexation" the "restoration" of Texas to the United States. He knew what he wanted and those who supported him knew what they

were voting for. Clay's platform was silent on, he was considered as straddling the main issue, Texas.

Polk had announced in his letter of acceptance that he would enter the office with "the settled purpose of not being a candidate for reëlection." His long and prominent opposition in Congress to Clay's "American System" made the issue between the two candidates clear-cut and well defined on all economic questions. The Democratic slogans were "Fifty-four, forty or fight" and "Polk, Dallas and Texas," while "Texas and Southern Rights" was used in the South, and "Polk, Dallas and the Tariff of 1842" in Pennsylvania.

It was foreseen that the contest would be close and Pennsylvania's election of a Democratic Governor pointed out New York as the pivotal state. Such it was. The Van Buren men repaid Polk for his loyalty four years before, and the candidacy for Governor of Silas Wright aided the Democratic national ticket, yet Polk carried the state only by a plurality of 5,106, of which Tammany furnished one-fourth. The Liberty ticket polled 15,812 votes; had one-third of these gone to the Whigs, Clay would have been President. The third party, the bitterest against slavery, elected the strong pro-slavery ticket, a contrarious result, as is usually accomplished by third parties.

The Democrats won Maine and New Hampshire, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania of the free states; the Whigs carried Tennessee, Polk's own state, and Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and North Carolina of the slave states. Polk and Dallas received 170 of the 275 electoral votes. The popular vote was, Polk, 1,337,243; Clay, 1,299,062; Birney, 62,300. Polk lost Tennessee by 113 votes. Polk was a "minority" President by some 25,000 votes; but it must be remembered that the 9 electoral votes of South Carolina implied possibly 50,000 votes in his favor.

Clay's heart was broken. He knew this was his Waterloo; gone was the magnificent vision he had cherished for long years to lead a great party to victory and as President "to scatter plenty over a smiling land," his own country. Aside from his personal disappointment, he thought dire evil impended over the nation.

Polk's inaugural address was Jeffersonian in tone and spirit. It coupled the "support of state governments in all their rights" with the "preservation of the general government in its whole constitutional vigor." It condemned attempted exercise by states of powers not reserved to them equally with usurpation of

federal power. "Not in the ruins of the Union," the President said, "would our people find happiness." On slavery, the tariff, and other issues, including Oregon and Texas, he showed he stood squarely on the Democratic platform.

His training and experience as well as great natural executive ability were all needed by the new President. He had no pre-nomination or pre-election pledges to redeem, was not a candidate to succeed himself and had no favorite to whom he wished to transfer the succession. He chose his cabinet solely for utilitarian reasons; Buchanan was given the State Department; Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, the Treasury; Marcy, of New York, War; George Bancroft, the historian, Navy; John Y. Mason, an old college friend, was retained as Attorney General, where Tyler had placed him, and Cave Johnson, of Tennessee, was made Postmaster General.

To keep the peace with Calhoun and with the Tylerites, and to reconcile the Van Burenites to annexation were difficult tasks. The last named were pleased with the offer of the Treasury to Silas Wright and on his refusal, the bestowal of the War portfolio on Marcy. The Tylerites were soon merged back into the parties they came from. As to Calhoun he could hardly do otherwise than support an administration favoring the annexation of Texas. These settlements allowed Polk to do something for the Bentonites who held the balance of power in the Senate. Jackson helped his protégé in all this, and in the delicate matter of establishing a new paper, the *Daily Union* in Washington, with Ritchie, the noted editor of the *Richmond Enquirer*, at its head, as the organ of the administration in place of Blair and Rives' old paper, the *Globe*. The *Globe's* head on a charger was the price agreed on for Tyler and Calhoun support during the Presidential campaign.

In June, 1845, at the Hermitage, died Andrew Jackson.

Bancroft says Polk told his cabinet that the four principal measures of his administration were to be the settlement of the Northwestern boundary, the acquisition of California, a constitutional treasury and a tariff for revenue.

The Oregon question was first settled. Polk suspected Great Britain of designs on California and a plan to shut us off entirely from the Pacific. The Monroe Doctrine was cited and the battle cry of "Fifty-four, forty or fight" was asserted in diplomatic negotiations. In 1814, 1824 and in 1826 we had offered to compromise on the 49th parallel, Great Britain each time refusing. Now that America assumed so aggressive an

attitude England made the offer and it was accepted, the Senate ratifying the treaty 41 to 14.

The lowering of the tariff advocated in Polk's first message was accomplished and the law still referred to as the "Walker Tariff of 1846" was passed, in the House 114 to 95, in the Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-President. It lowered protective duties and made all assessments *ad valorem*. Some Pennsylvanians hung Dallas in effigy for bringing about a "British tariff," but the country prospered and while we bought more British goods we sold England vastly more agricultural products. The customs warehouse system was established by this tariff law, and the sub-treasury reëstablished at the same first session.

The Twenty-ninth Congress showed a great majority, sixty or more, for the administration in the House, a close one in the Senate on many questions. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee and Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, both Democrats, were members of the House. The latter in debate praised the conduct in Mexico of the West Point graduates, and referring to some exceptional work performed by them, asked if an untrained man, a blacksmith or a tailor could have rendered such service. The former resented this as reflecting on himself and the mechanic class generally, and was assured that so far from anything personal being intended no slur on the mechanic class was meant, but only the value of trained officers in war stressed.

Texas was admitted to the Union. Sam Houston was one of her first Senators. The annexation, however, was not to be the "bloodless achievement" Polk thought it to be. Mexico protested and Slidell was sent as peace commissioner authorized to purchase California—and peace. George Bancroft, Acting-Secretary of War, ordered General Zachary Taylor to the Rio Grande, soon the American and Mexican troops clashed, blood was shed and war was on.

The political features of the Mexican War were that the two leading generals, Scott and Taylor, were both Whigs, that Franklin Pierce was a Brigadier General under Scott, and Ulysses S. Grant and Jefferson Davis were officers; further, that in the free states and to some extent with the Whigs of other sections the war was unpopular and greatly criticized. To a great many Americans it seemed wicked in a great powerful nation as was the United States to seize Mexican territory and then wage war upon her.

The Abolitionists saw no other, and the anti-slave men saw no greater result than the increase of slave states to be carved out of the territory to be acquired. They did not vision the real

future of that territory. "Manifest destiny" was a high-sounding phrase to cover wrongful aggression, to many Americans in 1846 as it was to many in 1898. State elections of 1846 in the North showed the antagonism to the administration, especially in the defeat for Governor of Silas Wright in New York.

Congress was in a critical temper when it reassembled, but the war was liberally supported. The mere hint of British intervention operated strongly. Polk was accused of favoring Taylor at Scott's expense, but as both were Whigs the charge had no political force; besides, Scott was sent to Vera Cruz to march on the Mexican capital from that point.

The Wilmot Proviso, its author a Pennsylvania Democrat, was tacked on an appropriation bill for adjusting boundaries with Mexico. It provided that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude should exist in any territory purchased with the money appropriated in the bill. Texas already in the Union was not affected. The proviso was the first of a series of questions which made slavery becoming a burning party issue. The proviso never got through Congress, but it became a tenet of political faith and split parties, churches and the people, although the country was engaged in a foreign war. The Methodist Church separated into two bodies in 1845 and the Baptists followed suit, while the Presbyterians were deeply agitating a separation. Many people came to think that an antagonism of opinion stronger than church attachments rendered a continuance of the Union impossible. This feeling existed both in the North and in the South.

To the South the Wilmot Proviso seemed the acme of injustice. That section, it was argued, was furnishing three-fourths of the volunteer soldiers who were winning the war; should they and their belongings be barred from the land won by their valor and blood? Granted that slavery was an evil; was it not an evil inherited from the framers of the Constitution and guaranteed by that compact? The Missouri Compromise had almost the sanctity of the Constitution; should it not be continued on westward? Was not that a reasonable, a small demand when slavery was constitutionally legal in all territorial domain? It was folly, the South asserted, to call Mexican territory free soil; was it not perfectly well known that ninety-nine per cent of the negro slaves of the South were better cared for, better treated, really not less free from the peons of Mexico held in cruel villainage and an economic bondage with no corresponding duty to care for and protect?

The North, on the other hand, was determined that that cursed thing, slavery, should not be extended, that not one drop of American blood should be shed to increase its spread. The fact that the evil was old and could not be gotten rid of in slave states was all the greater reason for excluding it from new territory. Louisiana was slave territory when acquired and the effect of the Missouri Compromise was to make part of it free; to apply the compromise to lands acquired from Mexico would be to make that slave territory which under Mexican law was free soil. A citizen could carry his "property" into a territory, but he could not carry his state law with him any more than a banker could take his incorporated bank along with his money into a territory.

Meanwhile Northern and Southern men spilled their blood and gave up their lives, among them a son of Webster and a son of Clay, on the fields of Palo Alto, Monterey, Buena Vista, Cerro Gordo, Cherubisco, Molino del Rey, Chapultepec, and ended the war by the capture, September 14, 1847, of the Mexican capital.

Polk was a man of a certain self-contained taciturnity not dissimilar to that possessed by the present (1928) occupant of the White House. Neither to the public nor to his party, some say not even to his cabinet, did he deny or explain or attempt to justify himself in his course of action. He toured the North and East in the summer of 1847, but he did not unbosom himself to the people.

Just before the Thirtieth Congress met in December, 1847, Clay delivered his famous Lexington speech which was received by many as laying out the course the Whigs were to pursue. The Mexican War was described as wicked and unnatural, and brought on by deceit and unrighteousness; Congress should declare the objects of it and control the prosecution of it, and wholesale annexation should be opposed; the acquisition of any new territory for the purpose of propagating slavery or introducing slaves from the United States should be barred.

Webster, Winthrop, Corwin and other Whigs went even further and opposed any annexation of territory at all. This was farther on one side of the Wilmot Proviso than the more moderate of their fellow partisans were on the other.

To the divided counsels of the Whigs the Democrats opposed a far from united front. Van Buren and the Barn-burners of New York and other Northern and Western anti-slavery Democrats were dead against any extension of slavery. State elec-

tions showed the effect of Democratic dissension, the New York Whigs electing Fillmore and Hamilton Fish Governor and Lieutenant-Governor by 40,000 majority, carrying Tennessee and gaining in other states. The far South was solid for acquisition of territory and the extension of slavery into it, certainly below the 36° 40' of the Missouri Compromise, but Calhoun and Tyler criticized the war as unnecessarily brought on.

Congress met with Clay's Lexington speech ringing in its ears, but with the newer sound of the cheers greeting the news that the American army was quartered in the palace of the Montezumas. The President's message was a defensive review of the conduct of the war and an argument for the acquisition of territory, especially since Mexico would be able to pay no indemnity in money. Paying Mexico for part of the domain to be acquired was recommended. Prosecution of the war, by economic pressure as well as force of arms, to a just peace, was urged. To Mexico was extended the sword in one hand, peace and purchase money in the other.

The Whigs, having a majority of eight, organized the House by electing Winthrop, Massachusetts, Whig, Speaker by a bare majority, 110 votes, on the third ballot. More than 128 of the 228 men constituting the House were new members. The war, when the people had been voting, had been unpopular and the voters had taken revenge on the Democrats and on old members of Congress.

Abraham Lincoln was a new member, the sole Whig from Illinois. He made a reputation during this, his one term in Congress, as a quaint character, a rough diamond, a wit, a powerful and logical debator of the homespun variety. He declined to run again and a Democrat succeeded him.

Jefferson Davis was a new Senator from Mississippi. He had resigned from the House to take command of Mississippi troops in Mexico, and was now in the Senate by appointment to a vacancy. How extreme his states rights views were is shown by the fact that he declined an appointment by the President as Brigadier-General of Volunteers on the ground that only a state had the right to make such an appointment.

Webster, Calhoun, Benton, Clayton, Berrien, Mangum and Crittenden were the veterans in the Senate; newer men were Cameron, Cass, Dix, Reverdy Johnson, Bell, Douglass, Hunter and Hale, the latter classed as an Independent.

The President vetoed the River and Harbor bill of the last session as unconstitutional. "To call the mouth of a creek a

harbor," he said, "does not confer authority to expend public money on its improvement; many of our ports of entry exist only on the statute books, and never saw a vessel enter from or clear for a foreign port." To thus waste money when the country was at war was an additional reason given for the veto. The House promptly adopted a resolution that river and harbor improvements were wise and constitutional.

Criticism, much of it opprobrious, marked the session. Santa Anna, by American aid, had been gotten back into Mexico from his Cuban banishment, with the idea that his restoration would bring about peace; Polk refused to furnish the House with the correspondence between Santa Anna and the United States government, or the correspondence between Generals Scott and Taylor with the War Department. Politics dominated Congress and little legislation was accomplished. The Twenty-ninth Congress had resolved that Mexico had begun the war; the House of the Thirtieth Congress resolved that the war had been "unnecessarily and unconstitutionally begun by the President." A loan bill, to supply much needed funds, was passed only after news came that Mexico was ready to sign a treaty of peace.

The air was full of the rumors of peace when John Quincy Adams was stricken at his desk in the House of Representatives.

The treaty of peace submitted by the President was debated for more than two weeks by the Senate. Slight changes were made but none in the boundaries agreed on or the amount to be paid Mexico, \$15,000,000. Mexico ratified the treaty May 30, 1848. Polk proclaimed it July 4th, and our national domain, under Polk, took the Pacific as our western boundary from the northern line of Oregon to the southern line of California. The treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo added 334,443,520 acres to the United States, out of which have been carved all of California and Nevada and parts of Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and New Mexico. Six weeks later the news of the discovery of gold in California reached the East. Polk and manifest destiny had brought immeasurable wealth to the United States.

Polk in a special message in July invoked the spirit of Washington in deprecating partisan and sectional feeling in Congress in dealing with the new territory; no geographical dissension, he said, should mar our glorious Union.

The Missouri Compromise suited neither of the contending factions now. The anti-slavery element demanded the Wilmot Proviso, the pro-slavery element demanded the removal of the

restrictions against slavery contained in the Missouri Compromise. Cotton, now a most profitable crop, and, the growing of it the greatest industry of the South, was king and it and slavery called insistently for wider fields.

Whether the Constitution followed our flag to the Philippines was a great question in 1900; in 1848 the great question was whether the Constitution covered the continental territories of the Union. Did slavery follow the Constitution? Was the newly acquired soil part of the United States or merely owned by the Union? Calhoun held the former, Webster the latter view. Did American law apply or, according to international law, did Mexican law continue until Congress acted?

Oregon imperatively demanded admission as a state. The Whig House by a vote of 129 to 71 tacked the Wilmot Proviso to the bill in a clause extending the Ordinance of 1787 to the whole territory; the Senate amended the bill by adding Cass's amendment which emphasized the fact that Oregon lay above the Missouri Compromise line; the House refused to recede and the Senate accepted the House bill. Polk in approving the measure recorded as a reason that the territory lay north of 36° 40', and recommended the extension of the Missouri Compromise to all the territory acquired from Mexico.

Clayton's compromise that the disputed matters be referred to the Supreme Court passed the Senate, but the House would have none of it. Wisconsin was admitted as a free state, and Congress adjourned long after the nominations for President had been made and the quadrennial contest begun.

Polk was the head of a defeated party when Congress met in December, 1848. His message was a defense of his administration and of Democratic principles, and a plea for domestic peace by the application of the Missouri Compromise to the newly gained territory. He restated Jackson's position—"The President represents in the executive department the whole people of the United States, as each member of the Legislative department represents portions of them." Many of Polk's own party dissented from his position on the slavery question, the extreme proslavery men wishing to go far beyond it. If only Pierce in 1854 had been as wise as Polk in 1848—

The House organized California as a territory with the Wilmot Proviso attached; the Senate voted the proviso out and all that could be effected was to extend the revenue laws of the country to California. The only law of importance passed this session was that creating the Interior Department, the author of the bill

being Walker of Mississippi, still Secretary of the Treasury, and author also of the Tariff bill of 1846.

The country prospered greatly under Polk's administration, agriculturally, industrially, commercially and financially. Money was easy and every loan made by the government had been negotiated above par. Our relations with foreign nations were particularly pleasant and England, where Bancroft had been Minister since 1846, was notably friendly. It was while Bancroft was Secretary of the Navy and largely due to his efforts that our Naval Academy was established, and Matthew Fontaine Maury began his work as oceanographer, second only to the invention of the mariner's compass in influence on navigation.

A treaty negotiated by Polk with New Granada guaranteed by the United States the neutrality of the Isthmus of Panama so that a canal or railroad might connect the two oceans, "open to all nations on the same terms."

Polk was an able and efficient President; Buchanan and Bancroft say he was a model President, keeping the reins of government strictly in his own hands yet working well with his counselors, over whom he maintained a great influence. He refused to surround himself with rival chieftains of his party and exacted from each member of his cabinet a promise that if he became a candidate for the Presidency he would tender his resignation.

He knew his own limitations—it is reported that when told of his nomination he said, "I knew they would nominate a nobody"—and was cautious and careful, but at the same time brave, confident and decisive in action. John Quincy Adams marked these qualities in him, and that he "worked like a galley slave."

He was a little narrow, perhaps not too fastidious, not too thoughtful of other nations, peoples and races than his own, nor of other parties than his own in matters political. To be a partisan was forced on him by the conditions of his day; all were partisans—abolitionists and extreme pro-slavery men, Webster, Benton, Lincoln (he introduced a bill to abolish slavery in the District), the older and the younger statesmen, church members, and everybody. Yet Polk did not go near so far as many, possibly a majority of his party, wished.

It is no small proof of his real greatness that at a time of such partisanry, he, as Woodrow Wilson did years later, refused to inject politics into the army, and made no efforts to put men of his party in command.

He was a practical politician and a practical statesman. He

knew what he wanted and he accomplished what he set out to do. Despite his ill health he held the helm of State firmly always. He was grave, unostentatious and amiable and William H. Seward, calling at the White House in 1846, missed "the dignity and grace of our reception by General Jackson" in 1835. Polk's private life was pure and upright, and he was a devout Christian.

History has not dealt fairly with Polk. It has been the fashion to call him one of the weakest, one of the "smallest" of our Presidents, and to slur over his administration. This has been done by general and indefinite disparagement rather than any criticism supported by fact or argument. Roosevelt belittles him along with Presidents who could not win a renomination. Even so astute a political historian as Frank Kent invidiously compares the short tenure of Polk's power and influence with the long terms of power Jefferson and Jackson enjoyed. Both ignore the facts that Polk had solemnly announced that he would not again be a candidate, was an ill man all during the latter part of his Presidency, that his health absolutely forbade his being a candidate again, and that he died a few months after leaving office.

The settlement of the Oregon boundary, the annexation of Texas, the establishment of the sub-treasury which existed until a comparatively recent day, the passing of a tariff law which prevailed until the War between the States, the successful conduct of the War with Mexico and the acquisition of enormous territory, his handling of the slavery issue—these alone make Polk's administration one of the most notable in our records. With no brag or bluster, no demagogic appeals to popular prejudice or favor, Polk followed the instructions of the people as expressed at the polls by his election. No President more thoroughly carried out the policies announced at his inauguration than did Polk, and his administration was one of most distinguished achievement.

The Whig view of the wickedness of the Mexican War has been perpetuated by partisan or careless historians, but Professor Justin H. Smith of Dartmouth College, in a lately published history, came, to his own surprise, to the conclusion that it was a just and necessary war on the part of the United States, an opinion always maintained by Democrats.

The historian proves his case. Of course a great many Americans were avid for expansion, and Mexican outrages, particularly the Alamo tragedy, had excited the American mind. And the fear of European dominance in Mexico was real and widespread. But Polk's instructions to our envoys and to our

army, while seeking the acquisition of California, repeatedly and distinctly directed that the matter should not be pressed if it prevented friendly relations with Mexico. Polk made every rational effort to pacify and keep the peace with our neighbor.

American and Mexican troops were both in the disputed territory as each, under international law, had a right to be, in joint occupation. The first clash was the Mexican attack on Colonel Thornton's reconnoitering party. Senator Otero admitted in the Mexican Congress that the American army did not advance to the Rio Grande until war was inevitable, and then only as an army of observation. It was Mexico that had broken off diplomatic relations and later refused to receive our commissioner. Mexico made every preparation for war, and notified her representatives abroad that war existed or was certain, while we were still striving for peace. The Mexican people demanded war and the Herrera administration was forced to yield to popular fury.

In strong contrast to Polk's pacific policy and utterances was Mexico's conduct. "I had the pleasure," said President Herrera in 1847, "of being the first to begin the war." "It is indispensable," he ordered General Arista before any clash had occurred, "that hostilities begin, yourself taking the initiative." In the light of evidence now accessible, America must be acquitted of having forced on the war, and the Democrats acknowledged to have pursued the traditional American policy of patient forbearance toward our Southern neighbor.

As he turned over the government to his successor with the country in most excellent condition, enlarged by a tremendous accession of territory acquired at a comparatively small cost in blood and money, so Polk delivered over to his successor the Democratic Party in excellent condition. Only a wonderfully popular military hero could defeat it, and not he, but for the Van Buren bolt in the next campaign.

Polk was the last of the Tennessee leaders, indeed the last of the Southern Presidents until Woodrow Wilson was elected sixty-four years later, though Bell of Tennessee and Breckenridge of Kentucky were candidates in 1860. With Polk the scepter departed from the South, and passed to "Northern men with Southern principles."

Polk adhered strictly to the principles of his party and fastened them on it by successfully applying them during four years of a most difficult period. He proved their wisdom and practicability, and enduring strength.

CHAPTER XVI

THE LONE WHIG ADMINISTRATION

1849-1851

Fifth Democratic National Convention—New York Contest—Cass Nominated—Whig Contestants—Webster—Whig Convention—Taylor Nominated—Free Soil Convention—Van Buren Nominated—Platforms—Campaign and Election—Taylor's Administration—Omnibus Bill—Webster's Seventh of March Speech—Death of Taylor—Fillmore's Administration—Compromises Win—Thirty-first and Thirty-second Congresses—Deaths of Calhoun, Clay and Webster—Crisis of 1850—Disunion Not Partisan Nor Sectional—Unionism in Mississippi—Fillmore and Arthur.

The Fifth Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore May 22, 1848. New York had two contesting delegations, the Old Hunkers, Marcy and Dickinson men, and the Barnburners, Van Buren men now led by John A. Dix, Samuel J. Tilden and John Van Buren. The latter called themselves Progressive Democrats and were pledged to support the Wilmot Proviso; they refused to give a pledge to support the nominee but distinctly asserted that they would not support Cass. Each delegation demanded its own admission and the exclusion of the other. The convention admitted both, whereupon the Barnburners withdrew. The Hunkers were so called for their alleged "hunkering" after office; the Barnburners were likened to the Dutch farmer who burned his barn to get rid of the rats. These Barnburners were the successors of the Equal Rights Democrats and the forerunners of the Free Soil Democrats. This New York split lost the Democrats the election.

Every state was represented, though South Carolina's sole delegate had not been regularly selected. The first act of the convention was to fix the representation in future conventions as the same as in the Electoral College. A central committee of one from each state was established which should have charge of his party's interest—the first regular national committee. The two-thirds rule was adopted after long debate, 175 to 78.

Cass led on first ballot, 125 to 55 for Buchanan and 53 for Levi Woodbury; on the fourth ballot Cass was nominated. Polk

adhered strictly to his announcement and would not allow his name to be voted on. The three candidates were all Northern men of Southern principles and all known to be opposed to the Wilmot Proviso. Northern votes had put Cass over, but the nomination was made unanimous with great enthusiasm.

General William O. Butler of Kentucky was chosen for second place over three other Southerners, Quitman of Mississippi, Mason of Virginia, and King of Alabama.

Lewis Cass, born in New Hampshire, but moving soon to Ohio, began his public life in the Ohio legislature in 1806; he was Colonel in the War of 1812, brevetted Brigadier for ability and gallant conduct, and made territorial Governor of Michigan, in which office, with the added duties of superintendent of Indian affairs, he served eighteen years and by twenty-two treaties he negotiated vast tracts of land were purchased by the government from the Indians. Jackson made Cass Secretary of War in 1831 and in 1836 Van Buren sent him Minister to France. His open opposition to the "Quintuple" treaty between England, France, Austria, Russia and Prussia, involving the right of search of vessels suspected of being in the slave trade, gave him some popularity in the South, though, as has been seen, Northern delegates nominated him. In 1845 he was elected Senator from Michigan; resigning on his nomination for the Presidency, he was reelected the following year.

Clay, Webster and Scott were chronic contenders for the Whig nomination. Webster had long and with just claims aspired to his party nomination for the Presidency. He and his friends felt his services had earned it. The supposed superior claims of Clay had denied it to him twice, the superior availability of Harrison superseded him twice. Now or never was his chance. But Webster had bitter enemies within and without his party. His relations with the bank in 1832, and other financial transactions embarrassed his candidacy. His remaining in Tyler's cabinet had antagonized many Whigs. That about money matters Webster was anything more than careless no one now believes. It should be remembered, too, that no man of his day, indeed no American statesman, relatively has made greater business sacrifices to serve his country, than Webster. Had he devoted himself to his profession his income would have been enormous. However, his enemies could lay hold of enough facts or inferences to do him great damage.

Webster had the most devoted friends, North and South. Senator Preston, an ardent South Carolina Whig, on a convivial

occasion toasted "Daniel Webster, a Northern man of Southern principles." Webster's reply was rather caustic:

"Born in New Hampshire and living in Massachusetts I am certainly a Northern man. As to my Southern principles—Do I ever leave any whisky in my glass? Don't I love to play cards? Do I ever pay my debts? Am I not fond of challenging men who won't fight?"

Webster's campaign received a setback when, to head off Clay, some of his friends started a boom for Taylor. It never recovered from this. New England and the North failing to champion his cause, his Southern friends could do nothing.

General Winfield Scott had been flirting with the Whig nomination ever since 1840 when he had been used as a stalking horse to defeat Clay. He and General Taylor were really the two leading candidates for the nomination despite the greatness of the two civilians.

General Zachary Taylor laughed in Texas in 1846, just as General Andrew Jackson had laughed in Florida in 1816, at the idea of being a candidate for President. Taylor had written Clay endorsing his candidacy. But when state legislatures and many mass meetings and local conventions nominated him Taylor became a passive and then an active candidate. On Clay's announcement that his hat was in the ring, Taylor, to Clay's astonishment, informed him that his was, too, and to stay. The General had been greatly encouraged by various Whig leaders who wanted a winner. They knew he had no politics in particular, had never voted, but had admired Clay, refused to wear any but American made clothing, and preferred American-made goods generally.

They took him in hand, stopped him from accepting nominations from local Democratic meetings and from writing letters. It is said that the Democrats and Free Soilers also had Taylor in view as a candidate. But Thurlow Weed, through the General's brother, got hold of him first. It is reported that General Taylor when first approached had said, "Well, I'm a Whig, but I am no damn fool Whig." This was euphemized into a declaration that he was a Whig but "not ultra in his views and no partisan." His former letters were superseded by a "Rough and Ready" letter, the authorship of which is credited to Thurlow Weed or Alexander H. Stephens, which made the old soldier a "good enough Whig."

Taylor and Scott were, and are credited with having been

good soldiers and men; there the resemblance ended. Scott invariably wore full regimentals, looking as 'twas said "like Mars going into battle," while Taylor always dressed like a private. Only once, and then, under protest, to meet a Mexican envoy, did he don dress uniform during the whole war. Scott's army nickname was Old Fuss and Feathers, Taylor's Old Rough and Ready. Scott was liked and respected by his officers and soldiers, but only Washington in the Continental army and Robert E. Lee in the Confederate forces were loved by their men as devotedly as Taylor was.

The Whig convention, named the "Slaughter-house" convention by Horace Greeley because of its alleged slaughter of Whig principles, met at Philadelphia June 7th, all states being represented except South Carolina and Texas. The first ballot showed Taylor 111, Clay 97, Scott 43, and Webster 22. Taylor was nominated on the fourth ballot. Abbott Lawrence of Boston was the favorite for Vice-President, but as Taylor was a Southern slave-holder and he a large cotton mill owner, the Conscience Whigs protested that King Cotton should not have both ends of the ticket, and Millard Fillmore was named. The Conscience Whigs laid greater stress on anti-slavery extension, while the Cotton Whigs gave greater attention to business connections with the South. No platform or address was adopted, and this noncommittalism was severely censured by Democrats and Free Soilers, the latter condemning it in their platform.

The failure of the Whig Party to come out for the Wilmot Proviso or take some ground opposed to slavery is by many thought responsible for its decay and death and the rise of the coming Republican Party.

The nominations were ratified at a great Whig mass meeting next day, when it was resolved that Taylor's nomination showed sympathy with a great popular sentiment, and that his every action and word strengthened the view that he would follow in the footsteps of the founders of the government; and it was further resolved that "General Taylor, in saying that he would have voted the Whig ticket in 1844 had he voted, gives ample assurance that his heart is with us," etc.

The Barnburners held a convention in Utica on June 22nd, with delegates from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Ohio and Wisconsin participating. Martin Van Buren was nominated for President; Dodge of Wisconsin was named for second place, but declined the honor, announcing he would support Cass. Later another convention was held at Buffalo at which seventeen states were

represented by 300 delegates, Free Soil Democrats such as Samuel J. Tilden and David Dudley Field, Conscience Whigs such as Charles Francis Adams, and Liberty men. Van Buren was nominated by a vote of 159 against 129 for John P. Hale, and Charles Francis Adams named for Vice-President. Joshua Giddings George W. Julian and Salmon P. Chase were prominent at this convention, as were Frederick Douglass and a colored preacher, Mr. Ward, who opened it with prayer. Joshua Leavitt, known as one of the "blackest Massachusetts Abolitionists" proposed Van Buren's name to the meeting.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1848

Reaffirmed Platform of 1840 and 1844 (see ante pp. 194 and 209), adding advocacy of payment of public debt.

Declared Mexico provoked the war.

Urged vigorous prosecution till peace.

Paid tribute to officers and soldiers.

Congratulated Republic of France.

Condemned monopolies and legislation for benefit of the few.

Advocated adherence to those principles and compromises of the Constitution which are broad and strong enough to uphold the Union as it was, as it is and as it shall be.

Pointed with pride to Polk's administration which was reviewed.

William L. Yancey's plank for non-interference with slavery in territories defeated, 216 to 36.

FREE SOIL PLATFORM, 1848

Party of union of free men for free soil and free men against slave aggression.

Condemned Democratic and Whig Parties, whose candidates self-respecting opponents of slavery could not support.

Freedom versus Slavery.

Non-interference in old slave states.

Approved Jefferson's proviso of 1784 against slavery, and Northwest Ordinance.

Condemned pending fugitive slave law.

Favored admission of free Oregon.

Proclaimed name and banner: "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor and Free Men."

How uncomfortable Van Buren felt standing on such a platform is not known, but he accepted the nomination with his accustomed suavity. Jefferson was appealed to in the platform, and Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson and Van Buren himself had signed bills imposing freedom as a condition to the creation of territories and of states. Besides, Cass was responsible for Van Buren's defeat in the 1844 convention. And Andrew Jackson's bones were moldering in the grave at the Hermitage. It was recalled now that Van Buren's first venture into national politics had been when, in 1812, he managed the campaign of DeWitt Clinton, the bolting Republican candidate. Webster

thought it a great joke that the former leader of the "Free Spoils Party" was now leading the Free Soil Party.

The Democratic candidates were from the extreme Northwest and the Middle South; the Whig from the extreme South and the North; the Free Soil from the North and East.

Another convention held in 1848 was the "Woman's Rights" convention at Seneca Falls, New York, in the autumn, under the energetic efforts of Mrs. Lucretia Mott and Mrs. Elizabeth Stanton, the husband of the former presiding over the meeting. Suffrage for women, reform in laws relating to employment and wages of the sexes and property rights of married women were demanded, and strong anti-slavery sentiments proclaimed.

The Whig campaign was vigorous and the popularity of Taylor everywhere evident. This and the Van Buren defection disheartened the Democrats, but they waged an active fight. It was a people's campaign and a people's election. The Whig leaders, after sulking a little, all came to the support of the ticket. Seward and Lincoln spoke together at a great Whig meeting in Boston; the papers reported Seward's speech in full, but Lincoln's received a four-line notice—"Mr. Lincoln of Illinois, next came forward and was received with great pleasure. He spoke about an hour and made a powerful and convincing speech which was cheered to the echo."

It was a close race. Taylor carried Delaware by 500 only, and Cass Mississippi by only 600, and Alabama and Iowa by less than 1,000 each. In no state was there a landslide. Leaving out New York's 36, the electoral vote was 127 each for Taylor and for Cass. Therefore the Barnburner Democrats of New York were the decisive factors in the defeat of the Democratic ticket, and the Free Soil element in the combination was responsible for the election of a Southern slave-holder to the Presidency. Thus do third party movements work contraries.

The popular vote was, Taylor 1,360,099; Cass 1,220,544; Van Buren 291,263, of which two-thirds were reckoned Democrats. Tammany being divided, Taylor carried New York City by 10,000. The New York State vote was, Taylor 218,603; Cass 114,318; Van Buren 120,510. Van Buren received a larger vote in Massachusetts than Cass, but in Delaware only 80, in Maryland only 128 and in Virginia 9, while in eleven states he received none.

Taylor was another "minority" President by 52,000 votes, to which must be added the unknown majority against him in South Carolina, which still chose her electors by the legislature.

It was a difficult task to beat Old Rough and Ready in the South with a Michigan man; Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina and Tennessee, of the slave states, gave Taylor their votes.

It was contended that Cass' "Nicholson" letter, issued during the campaign, in which he opposed the Wilmot Proviso, cost him dear. It may have lost him some Northern votes, but it probably gained him thousands of Southern votes and very probably many electoral votes. In that letter the principle of popular or squatter sovereignty is first distinctly broached.

There was much gloom in some high Whig quarters in spite of the victory. On the other hand, Southern Democrats did not greatly lament Taylor's victory. He knew Southern conditions, Southern feelings, was honest, just, generous, not sectional, and brave and strong enough to withstand any pressure against what he believed right and just. He was father-in-law to Jefferson Davis and withal a Southern gentleman. Their cause, they thought, was just, they only wanted what was right. What reason had they to fear such a man as Taylor?

General Taylor was the first President who had not long or at least considerable Congressional experience. His sole public service had been in the army. It was said that he had never voted even once. Washington had not served in Congress, but his presiding over the Constitutional Convention was an equivalent.

Taylor soon became a great believer in rotation in office, due probably to the influence of Seward, who was a very practical politician with all his idealism. "Rotation in office," said the President, "provided good men are appointed, is sound Republican doctrine. I do not think it wise or just to kick away the ladder by which I ascended to the Presidency. Colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, sergeants and corporals are as necessary in politics as in the army." This policy of Taylor's did one great service to literature; it resulted in Nathaniel Hawthorne's being ousted from his place in the Salem custom house and driven into writing for a living.

There was great dissention in the Whig Party. The North generally demanded the Wilmot Proviso; Southern Whigs under Stephens and Toombs were bitter the other way, prophesying destruction of Whiggism in the South and disunion. Northerners said the South was bluffing and adduced as proof that government bonds stood firm in the market.

Clay, once more the "Great Pacificator," brought forward his

"Omnibus" bill. It was defeated but one by one its separate provisions later became laws. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis led the Southern opposition to these measures, Seward the Northern, and on exactly opposite grounds. Clay led for the bills and Webster came to his support in his famous Seventh of March speech, as Democratic an utterance as his early anti-tariff speeches.

Whether that speech was the greatest or worst act of Webster's political life is still debated. A storm of protest swept over New England and he was compared to Lucifer, to Benedict Arnold, selling his soul for Southern support for the Presidency. Whittier wrote his "Ichabod," as severe a political invective as literature contains.

A speech "for the Union and the Constitution," Webster himself called it, and such it undoubtedly was. He declared that he spoke not as a Massachusetts man, but as an American having no locality but America. The Wilmot Proviso "would be to give needless offense merely to reaffirm an ordinance of nature and reënaet a law of God," for climatic and other natural conditions made slavery impossible in the territory involved. What most shocked the anti-slavery element was his position toward the proposed fugitive slave law; for Daniel Webster to argue for it seemed treason.

Webster undoubtedly turned his back squarely on several of his former positions, but as Rhodes says, he changed his front, not his ground, to meet an enemy from a new direction. He had condemned slavery and fought its extension during all his public life. He had opposed the Missouri Compromise, favored the Wilmot Proviso, opposed the annexation of Texas and any and all increase of slave territory from first to last—until this day. Certainly there seemed a complete reversal of position, enough in a time of such intolerance as 1850 to arouse men to fury. It was not so absolute a reversal as New England had applauded when Webster changed on the tariff question; it resembled more his change on the public land issue.

A juster view and one more in line with Webster's character and feeling as proven during his whole public career is that, faced with a great and painful duty, he performed it. Nullification in Massachusetts and other Northern states of the fugitive slave law on high moral grounds was suddenly seen by Webster to be as unconstitutional and disloyal and as dangerous as nullification in South Carolina of a tariff law on economic grounds, one as sure as the other to lead to disunion. The one great passion

of Webster's heart was his love of the Union. In that he had never wavered, faltered or retreated. No legal retainer had ever warped his views on that subject. Not fear or ambition, but love of the Union inspired Webster's Seventh of March speech, which was an argument for obedience to the Constitution, the observance of the reciprocal duties therein imposed.

Tremendous was the effect of the speech in and out of Congress and it was credited largely with carrying the compromises through, and many think now as many believed then that Webster saved the Union from dissolution at the time. The conservatives applauded him, and one enthusiastic Union man who held his note for many thousand dollars marked it paid and sent it to him as a gift.

Another notable speech was Seward's; in it he introduced the "higher law" into the slavery problem. It was the practical politician, not the sentimentalists Mann and Giddings, who was the author of this dogma; it was their followers, however, who broadened Seward's higher law into a warrant for violation of the laws of the United States to conform them to God's laws, as they asserted.

In the very midst of the legislative battle General Taylor died, July 10, 1850. The death of the slave-owner Taylor and the accession of the New Yorker Fillmore was regarded by many as a great blow to the anti-slavery cause. But neither Clay nor Webster, praising the dead President as both did, seemed to regard it so. With Taylor's death, General Scott rose into greater prominence in Whig politics.

Fillmore was a genuine Whig, with a splendid party and public record, wise, upright, courageous, but conservative. He was a strong partisan of Clay's American System. Leaving Congress and serving as Comptroller of New York he advocated a banking system very like the national banking system later adopted by the United States.

The Taylor cabinet resigned on the death of its chief, and Fillmore chose Webster for his premier and a cabinet regarded as dictated by Clay and Webster; the change of advisers indicated the change in policy to follow. Taylor had opposed the compromises, Fillmore unwillingly accepted them. The votes by which they passed show how much stronger convictions were than party regularity.

California was admitted, the Senate vote being 15 Northern Democrats, 11 Northern Whigs, 4 Southern Whigs, and 4 Independents, 34 ayes, against 12 Southern Democrats and 3 Southern

Whigs, 15 nays. In the House the vote was 150 to 56, the nays being from the slave states, some of them Whigs.

The New Mexico bill, the Wilmot Proviso out, passed the Senate 27 to 10, all nays being from the North; the House passed it 108 to 97, South Carolina and Mississippi members voting against it because it did not recognize the Missouri Compromise, Northern Free Soilers opposing it because it did not contain the Wilmot Proviso.

The fugitive slave law passed the House 109 to 76, 31 Northern men, including 3 Whigs, supporting it, but 33 Northern men did not vote. In the Senate the act passed 27 to 12, the nays being 8 Northern Whigs, 3 Northern Democrats and Chase, but 15 Northern Senators did not vote.

Squatter sovereignty was recognized in the New Mexico-Utah bill in the provision that they should be admitted as states, when prepared for statehood, with or without slavery, as their constitutions might prescribe.

With a minority in both Houses of Congress Fillmore was able to carry out no Whig policies nor to effect much legislation.

The Thirty-second Congress, December, 1851, had a Senate composed of 33 Democrats and 24 Whigs and 3 Free Soilers, Hale, Chase, and Webster's successor, Charles Sumner. Sumner's election was the result of a bargain between the Free Soil Democrats and the Conscience Whigs of Massachusetts, the former taking the state offices, electing George S. Boutwell Governor, the latter taking the Senatorship. The House contained 140 Democrats, 88 Whigs and 5 Free Soilers. The Democrats had lost two seats to the Whigs in the South; in the North they had gained twenty-six members.

The first session lasted through the following August. In it was begun the donation of public lands in aid of railroad construction, and liberal appropriations were made for rivers and harbors. These were the only Whiggish measures adopted, though Fillmore tried hard for some tariff legislation. The slave question dominated everything, excluded everything else. Pierce had been elected and the Whig Party recognized as defunct when the last session was held. Nothing was done at it.

Between the first and final session, Henry Clay, in June, and Daniel Webster, in October, 1852, both had passed away. The 1849-1853 term was filled with tragedies, the deaths of Taylor, Calhoun, Clay and Webster,—and of the Whig Party.

The great triumvirate which for forty years and more had been the most brilliant constellation in our political firmament,

the like of which has never been seen since, suffered final eclipse. Of all the members of Congress, from first to last, there probably has never been another who could so control and lead that body as Clay, never another who could so ably handle facts, eloquence and law as Webster, or another who could so appeal to pure reason as Calhoun. Miss Martineau had recently commented on the "utter intellectual solitude" of Calhoun. He had long abandoned the English for the Roman ideals of government, and favored a dual executive for this country, one President from the free, one from the slave states.

In 1850 at every fireside, in the columns of every newspaper, wherever two or three citizens were gathered together, as well as at public meetings and in the halls of Congress, the dissolution of the Union was discussed. There is an impression in the minds of many Americans, a perfectly natural consequence of the developments of 1860, that practically all the disunion sentiment was at the South and in the Democratic Party. This was far from the actual facts.

The right of secession had always been regarded by practically all American statesmen as one which could be used as a last resort. Andrew Jackson of the Southern, Daniel Webster of the Northern leaders almost alone absolutely denied the right. Disunion is treason, said Jackson; secession is revolution, said Webster, and peaceable secession impossible. Love for the Union and strong loyalty to it existed everywhere.

The rankest and most avowed disunionists were the rabid Abolitionists of the North, centering in Massachusetts; next to them were the avowed non-Union men of the South, centering in South Carolina. Between these two extremes was the great body of the nation loving the Union and believing it a great blessing. It was not all pure idealistic patriotism. There were Northern men keenly alive to the business advantages secured by the Union, many with valuable business connections in the South; there were Southern slave-holders with profitable Northern connections, and having a full sense of the value of the Union. Moreover, many had taken to heart Clay's warning: "In the Union you may lose some of your slaves who escape to the North. Out of it you will lose all of them."

Mississippi was a typical slave state, devoted almost entirely to growing cotton, and having more slaves than free men in its population. Yet when a convention to consider federal aggression was called in 1851 a majority of 7,500 votes were cast for the Unionist candidates. The convention when met resolved that

secession was not sanctioned by the Constitution, and that "the people of Mississippi will abide by the Union as it is, and by the constitution of the United States without amendment."

A year later in the gubernatorial contest, Senator Henry S. Foote being the Unionist candidate, the radical Governor Quitman was withdrawn by the Democrats and Jefferson Davis, at that time strong states rights man but more moderate, was substituted. Davis was popular, had a fine war record, was known to be personally loved by Henry Clay, while Foote had made many enemies by his erratic conduct and brought down much ridicule upon himself by his eccentricities. Yet on the squarely defined issue of the Union against states rights Foote won.

In 1856 Fillmore, running on the American Party ticket, the first plank of its platform being an appeal to the Supreme Being, the second "The perpetuation of the federal Union," received 24,000 votes in Mississippi to 35,000 given Buchanan, the Democrat. In the same election Georgia gave Fillmore 42,000 to 56,000 for Buchanan, and Louisiana 20,000 to 22,000 for the Democrat. As South Carolina selected her Presidential electors by the legislature her popular feeling was not recorded.

The fact seems to be that disunion was not peculiar to, nor popular with any great political party or any section of the country in 1850 or 1856. There was a great struggle between the anti- and the pro-slave elements and whichever won was strong for the Union and whichever lost was dissatisfied with it. Whigs like John Quincy Adams said the admission of Texas with slavery meant the dissolution of the Union; Whigs like Stephens and Toombs declared barring slavery from Utah and New Mexico meant disunion.

Webster, Clay, Fillmore, Stephens, Toombs, Cass, Douglass and many others, including Rufus Choate, Richard Rush and John Sergeant, correctly diagnosed the situation in 1850 and preserved the Union for ten years—it might have been forever, if that had been possible. The adoption of the compromise was a great concession made to slavery for the sake of the Union. The gravity of the situation was recognized and both the major parties in their 1852 platforms approved the settlement. The people in the election that followed approved it by a vote of 3,000,000 for, to 150,000 against. Fillmore in his message of December, 1851, urged the country to accept the compromise as a final settlement of the controversy, and a House resolution to so accept it was adopted by a good majority, the Democrats

and Southern Whigs supporting it almost unanimously, the Northern Whigs dividing.

Fillmore had inherited the Presidency at a most difficult juncture. He was a fair, sane man and left the Presidency with the esteem of the country and the good will of his party, which endorsed his policy in convention though denying him the nomination. "Fillmore has been tried and found true, faithful, honest and scrupulous," said Henry Clay.

Fillmore and his career are remindful of his remote successor, Chester A. Arthur. Both were civilians succeeding by death men of high military renown; both New Yorkers, large, handsome men, dignified, careful of dress and social conventions. In character, disposition and views, allowing for differences in times and conditions, the two men were very similar, cool, conservative and good politicians. Another point of similarity is that many Whigs believed in 1852 that had Fillmore been nominated their party would have been victorious, and many Republicans thought in 1884 that had Arthur been the nominee instead of Blaine their party would have won.

The effect of the Whig victory and executive control for four years had been to sober and consolidate the Democratic Party. With the measures enacted the majority of the Democrats agreed. The intense fight brought many Southern Whigs to believe that only in the Democratic Party was to be found safety to their own property and rights and safety to the Union. Losses in the North from defection of men aroused over slavery extension were more than counterbalanced by these Southern gains.

When the conventions met in 1852 the Whigs were divided; united and hopeful were the Democrats.

CHAPTER XVII

THE DEMOCRATIC LEGALISM OF PIERCE

1851-1855

Sixth Democratic National Convention—Whig Convention—Platforms—Free Soil Democrats—Campaign and Election—The New President—Cabinet—Cuba—Diplomatic Appointments—A Fatal Day—Kansas—Nebraska Bill—Its Far-reaching Results—Squatter or Popular Sovereignty—Know-Nothing Party—Changing Political Affiliations—Birth of Republican Party—Bleeding Kansas—Thirty-third and Thirty-fourth Congresses—Pierce and His Administration.

THE Sixth Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore June 1, 1852, with 297 delegates. John W. Davis of Indiana presided. The convention was called to order by Benjamin Mallet of Massachusetts, chairman of the National Committee, who read the call issued by his committee. The two-thirds rule and the unit rule were adopted with little debate, and later a motion to reconsider the former was rejected 269 to 13. During the balloting for Presidential nominee, Governor Floyd of Virginia, endeavored to avoid the unit rule, claiming that the Democrats of the district choosing him wanted Douglass, and not Buchanan, who was getting Virginia's entire vote. The question seems to have been decided according to the admitted usage of Virginia which was to cast a solid vote according to the wishes of the majority of the state delegation.

A motion to adopt a platform before nomination of candidates was defeated 115 to 111. The number of delegates for subsequent conventions was doubled, fixed at twice the number of Senators and Representatives in Congress.

The Democrats had an embarrassment of riches in the way of candidates, Buchanan, Cass, Douglass and Marcy, all considered of Presidential size and prestige. The first ballot was, Cass 116, Buchanan 93, Marcy 27, Douglass 20, scattering 25; twenty-nine ballots were taken with a very gradual shift of strength from Cass to Douglass, showing Cass 27, Buchanan 93, Douglass 91, and no other candidate with over 25 votes. At

this point Cass' friends staged a comeback and the thirty-fifth ballot gave Cass 131; but on that ballot Virginia changed from Buchanan to Pierce, and on succeeding ballots this dark horse gained or held firm. The forty-eighth ballot was Cass 73, Buchanan 28, Douglass 33, Marcy 90, Pierce 55. On the next ballot came the stampede led by North Carolina, Pierce 282, all others 8. It has been asserted that Pierce's nomination long had been planned and carefully arranged for, but there seems little evidence of this.

Ten men from ten different states were voted for on the first ballot for Vice-President, William R. King of Alabama leading with 126 votes; on the second ballot he was unanimously chosen. The platform was adopted with little dissent, and the plank dealing with the Compromise was read and reread amid great enthusiasm and long continued applause.

The Whig convention assembled in Baltimore June 16th, with all states represented. The Southern delegates held a caucus and drew up a declaration of principles which, it is said, the friends of all candidates finally agreed to stand for; this story is most credible as a reading of the platform adopted will show. Fillmore, a "Silver Grey" or moderate Whig, had most of the Southern support, many of those delegates having been instructed for him. Between Fillmore and Webster, a "Cotton" Whig, the Southerners were indifferent or individually preferred the latter. The story is that when it seemed that Fillmore could not make the grade the Southern leaders agreed to break instructions and go for Webster, provided that would insure his nomination. This required at least 41 Northern votes and that number could never be obtained. The Conscience Whigs, Dawes and Lee of Massachusetts and others, would not vote, not even on just one ballot, for Webster. It seemed to be recognized as impossible to transfer Webster's strength to Fillmore. The first ballot was Fillmore 133, Scott 131, Webster 29; on the fifty-third Scott, the favorite of the "Conscience" Whigs, was named and William Graham of North Carolina given second place on the second ballot.

The platform was adopted, but not without a struggle; that Scott's friends had agreed to the main points demanded by the South seems certain. Especially was the concluding plank resisted; it has been called the death sentence of the Whig Party.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1852

Reaffirmed platform of 1848.

Pledged adherence to Compromises.

Opposed agitation of slavery question.

Endorsed Kentucky-Virginia Resolutions and Madison's Report as main foundation of Party's creed.

Declared Mexican War just and necessary.

Rejoiced over peace with Mexico.

Declared Party's mission to be maintenance of States' Rights and Union, constitutional rights, resistance of monopolies and legislation for few at expense of the many, and adherence to those principles and compromises of the Constitution which are broad and strong enough to uphold the Union as it is and as it should be.

WHIG PLATFORM, 1852

Reaffirmed old Whig principles.

Declared government of United States one of limited powers expressly granted or necessary thereto, the other powers being reserved to the States and to the people.

Rights of States and of General Government should both be held secure.

No entangling foreign alliances.

Obedience to all laws.

Economy in government and a protective tariff.

River and Harbor improvements.

The late Compromises, including the fugitive slave law, acquiesced in as settling in principle and substance the matters involved, and further agitation deprecated.

The Free Soil Democrats held a convention at Pittsburgh, August 11th, Henry Wilson, General Grant's running mate of 1872, presiding. John P. Hale and George W. Julian were nominated, and a long platform of twenty-two planks adopted, in which the Declaration of Independence was quoted, and the extension of slavery, the creation of slave territory or slave states and national legislation for the extradition of slaves were all denounced as sins against God and crimes against man. The Compromises were condemned, especially the fugitive slave law, and it was declared that no settlement of the question was possible until slavery was recognized to be sectional and freedom national. The party was organized, it was proclaimed, not to aid either the Democratic or Whig Party, but to obtain control of the government, and its banner was Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor and Free Men. The Free Soilers had little effect on the election this year; they cut Whig majorities in some states, Democratic majorities in others, but carried no state nor changed the result in any way.

Three other conventions held during the summer put tickets in the field. An Abolition convention named Birney for President; he received 72 votes in the election. The Native Americans named Jacob Brown on a Know-Nothing platform. A Georgia convention nominated old ex-Governor George M. Troup as a

"Southern States' Rights" candidate; he received 100 votes in Georgia and 2,000 in Alabama in November.

The Northeast and far South were represented on the Democratic ticket; Scott was a Virginian but had been so long in the army as to be regarded as from the country at large, and his running mate represented the Southern Whigs; Hale was from Maine, Julian from Indiana.

The campaign was a dull one, and mean and scurrilous in a small way; Scott was ridiculed and an old court-martial verdict against him revived; Pierce was accused of cowardice, intemperance, opposition to religious freedom, and in the South of being an Abolitionist. Pierce placed himself squarely on the party platform and remained at home.

Scott made a short excursion into the West, with unfavorable effect. Thurlow Weed, the wisest and most accomplished politician of his day, met him and found him needing no advice, information, instruction or encouragement, being all-sufficient, sure of himself and of success. As a matter of fact he was tremendously handicapped; those of his party who liked him disliked the platform; those who liked the platform did not care for him. "We accept the candidate but spit on the platform," said Northern Whigs, while Stephens and Toombs and other Southern Whigs and Whig newspapers flatly refused to support him; "The voice of Jacob, but the hand of Esau," said they.

The business element of New York were lukewarm or opposed to Scott because they believed him under Seward's influence. The Webster men in New England were disaffected, to say the least. Webster, not paying enough attention to several local conventions nominating him to accept or decline their compliments, would take no part in the campaign and announced to close friends that he would vote for Pierce. Their fathers had been war comrades under Washington, and Pierce, though of the opposite political faith, had always been a keen admirer of Webster, and their families were intimate.

Pierce, so soon as his party had digested his nomination, became very popular. Van Buren came back into the Democratic fold and with him Samuel J. Tilden and David Dudley Field. Pierce's record, private, public, military and political, was excellent, and he inspired liking and confidence. He stood for what his party wanted. Yet many Northern Democrats disliked the platform so far as it was pro-slavery as much as anti-slavery Whigs disliked the Whig platform.

On the great issue the platforms of the two leading parties were practically the same and the people, being tired of the agitation, voted for the ticket they thought most likely to secure peace and quiet. This, added to normal Democratic strength, brought about a sweeping victory. A like state of public weariness brought about a similar result in the Harding election in 1920.

Pierce carried 27 states with an electoral vote of 254, while Scott carried 4 states, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Tennessee and Vermont, with 42 electors. The popular vote was Democratic 1,601,474; Whig 1,386,580; Free Soil 156,667. A Webster vote of 5,324 in Georgia and 1,670 in Massachusetts was polled, though most of those voting for him must have known of Webster's death ten days before election day.

Uncle Tom's Cabin was published in book form in March, 1852, and obtained wide circulation immediately, but seems to have had little influence on the election. It was not until 1860 that its tremendous political influence was fully felt.

Susan B. Anthony, Lucy Stone and other distinguished Woman's Rights advocates held their annual convention in 1852, but did not tie up their cause with the fate of any one party. The Temperance people, flushed with their success in establishing prohibition in Maine the year previous, worked on state legislatures and in state politics and held aloof from national parties, but complicated matters in many districts for regular party candidates of the main parties.

General Franklin Pierce, son of Benjamin Pierce, a General in the Continental army and afterward Governor of New Hampshire, was fifty-two years old when inaugurated, the youngest man so far assuming the office. He began his public career in the New Hampshire legislature in 1829 and was twice Speaker. Elected to Congress in 1833 he was active in opposition to internal improvements and all anti-slavery measures. Here as always he was a strong Jackson Democrat. Promoted to the Senate in 1837 he was consistently Democratic there, but his personal relations with his neighbor, Daniel Webster, were cordial.

Resigning in 1842 to resume the practice of law, he declined in 1846 Polk's tender of the Attorney Generalship, and refused the Democratic nomination for Governor. He ardently advocated the annexation of Texas and as soon as war was declared enlisted as a private in a volunteer company at Concord, New Hampshire, his home. Commissioned Colonel and later Brigadier General, he served with distinction under Scott, who gave

him honorable mention in his dispatches, and made him one of the commissioners to arrange the truce. Hostilities ended, he returned home to practice law until elected President.

To escape the waiting hordes of office-seekers Pierce rode from Baltimore to Washington in the baggage coach of his train, thus evading the reception committee and the crowd of office-seekers in waiting. His escape was only temporary for Washington was jammed with deserving Democrats, some of whom, for lack of other quarters, slept in the rotunda of the capitol, congregating early in the morning in Lafayette Square, where they looked with loyal admiration at the equestrian statue of General Jackson, newly put up, and hoped his present successor would follow in his footsteps in the distribution of offices.

The inaugural address boldly announced that the country's position rendered certain acquisition of territory important if not essential, and the administration would not be controlled by timid forbodings of evil from expansion. This indicated a determination to annex Cuba. The policy of appointment to office of men of the administration party was frankly announced, but the President declared himself free from all personal obligations. The observance of the boundaries of federal and state powers was stressed, the Compromises approved as constitutional, and unhesitating enforcement of the law promised. A hope was expressed that the questions lately so dangerously exciting the people would be left at rest.

The cabinet, which remained entirely unchanged throughout the administration, was Marcy, State; Guthrie of Kentucky, Treasury; Jefferson Davis, War; Dobbins of North Carolina, Navy; McClelland of Michigan, Interior; Campbell of Pennsylvania, Postmaster General, and Caleb Cushing, Attorney General. Every section was represented. Marcy and Guthrie, the latter a successful bank and railroad magnate, were considered the conservative influence in the cabinet; Davis and Cushing are credited by the critics of the administration with being the moving forces of it. Cushing had eagerly sought a place; Davis had at first declined and reluctantly yielded to Pierce's personal solicitations after reaching Washington. The cabinet was charged with having too strong a Southern bias, Cushing being held to be at odds with Massachusetts and New England since leaving the Whig Party.

Southern statesmen, including the Whigs, had long been desirous of annexing Cuba, and the present interest England and France were manifesting in that island excited them. The ex-

pansion sentiment expressed in the inaugural address was regarded as indicating Southern influence, and some diplomatic appointments pointed further to Cuban designs, Pierre Soule of Louisiana was sent to Spain, John Y. Mason of Virginia to France, Solon Borland of Arkansas to Central America and James Gadsen of South Carolina to Mexico. Buchanan, who was sent to England, was known, too, to favor annexation; while Secretary of State under Polk he had offered Spain \$100,000,000 for Cuba.

A diplomatic appointment possessing another sort of interest was Nathaniel Hawthorne's as Consul at Liverpool.

Peace and calm reigned in the Democratic Party and the country, except in extreme Abolition circles, when the Thirty-third Congress met in December, 1853. The election result and all other indications went to show the nation weary of wrangling and willing for the sake of peace to fully accept the Compromises. The Senate contained 37 Democrats, 21 Whigs and 2 Free Soilers; the House 159 Democrats, 71 Whigs and 4 Free Soilers. In the state elections held that year every state going for Pierce the year before went Democratic except New York, where a quarrel between the Hards (the regular Democrats) and the Softs, led by Samuel J. Tilden and John Van Buren, resulted in the defeat for Governor of Horatio Seymour. The Softs had supported Pierce, but were anti-slavery. Tennessee, a Whig state generally and voting for Scott in 1852, elected a Democratic Governor in 1853; his name was Andrew Johnson. So it was that the Democrats controlled the Presidency, both Houses of Congress and the Governors and legislatures of nearly every state in the Union.

The message urged a reduction of duties, there being a surplus of revenue over expenditures, and aid to the construction of a continental railroad to the Pacific. A law cheapening lands to actual settlers was passed, and an internal improvement bill which Pierce vetoed on Jacksonian grounds. By the Gadsen Purchase we acquired from Mexico 20,000,000 acres of land, which was added to New Mexico. These were, with one exception, the accomplishments of one of the most momentous of all sessions of our Congress.

Sunday, January 22, 1854, was one of the most fateful days in American history. That morning Senator Stephen A. Douglass, chairman of the committee on territories, accompanied by some other Democratic members of the committee, called on President Pierce and submitted to him the Kansas-Nebraska bill which Chairman Douglass proposed to introduce in the

Senate on the following morning. This bill codified into law the doctrine, first advanced by Cass and now championed by Douglass, of squatter or popular sovereignty—the right of the people of a territory, free from Congressional control, to adopt or prohibit slavery, whether such territory lay north or south of 36° 30', and the Missouri Compromise was expressly repealed.

Had President Pierce admitted the constitutionality of Douglass' bill, but reminded him that it was in direct violation of the Compromises, which within the last two years had been made laws by the joint effort of both major parties, endorsed in the platforms of those parties and approved by ninety-eight per cent of the voters of the country, our nation's history might have been very different.

Pierce also could have reminded Douglass that he had been elected President on a platform pledging "adherence to those compromises," and was in honor bound to oppose the bill even to the extent of vetoing it, if passed. He could have further reminded him that when the last of the compromises passed the Senate he, Douglass, accepting their finality, had exclaimed—"I never expect to mention slavery again in a speech."

He could have pointed out that the Senator's proposed law would upset a "settlement in principle and substance," as the Whig platform expressed it, of a controversy which had seriously threatened the very existence of the Union.

But keeping political faith with the people by observing his party's platform, obeying the wishes of the vast majority of the American people who wanted the Compromises to stand, avoiding the renewal of a controversy pregnant with national calamity—these things seem not to have given Pierce pause. Had he but been as Jacksonian in principle and action as he was in theory . . . had he but been more of the General and less of the juriconsult. . . .

But the legalistic mind of Pierce saw only the legal and constitutional questions involved. "I consider the bill based upon a sound principle which the compromise of 1820 (the Missouri Compromise) infringed upon, and to which we have now returned," was his comment.

However constitutional Douglass thought his measures and however ardently he felt the injunctions of the "proper sense of patriotic duty" which he proclaimed, the general opinion then and now is that political ambition was back of his action. The next nominee of the Democratic Party would be the next President, and, to use a favorite figure of cartoonists, Miss Southern

Democracy was to be wooed, the successful suitor winning her and the Presidency; Buchanan, Cass and Pierce, all Northern men of Southern principles, were also in the field; Douglass laid not all the world, but all the territories at her feet. The Kansas-Nebraska bill, according to Douglass' own repeated statements, and by the best evidence, was Douglass' very own, in inspiration, conception and delivery, although he took counsel of Dixon and others. The bill was reported favorably and the debate opened January 30th and lasted into May.

"Slavery takes the field," said the anti-slavery press and the battle began, in the papers, the pulpits, mass meetings, state legislatures; Congress was deluged with petitions, remonstrances and resolutions. Chase, Seward and Sumner were the more radical opposers in the Senate, old Sam Houston, Bell of Tennessee and Everett the more conservative. Jere Clemens of Alabama, almost alone of those from the slave centers, opposed the measure, not only as a breach of faith but as certain, eventually, to shut out slavery more effectually than the Wilmot Proviso; he claimed that Pierce agreed with him in this latter view. The South's attitude was mostly one of quiet acquiescence, only a few resolutions endorsing the measure being sent in. The Senate passed the bill March 3rd, 37 to 14; 14 Northern and 14 Southern Democrats and 9 Southern Whigs voted aye; 4 Northern and 1 Southern Democrat, Houston, voted nay.

The House vote was 44 Northern and 57 Southern Democrats with 12 Southern Whigs supporting the bill; 42 Northern Democrats and 7 Southern Whigs opposed it. And Pierce signed the bill.

This was a measure proposed by a Democratic leader, passed by a Democratic Congress and signed by a Democratic President, and the Democratic Party has not yet recovered from its effects. Southern members had left it to Northern Democrats to make the fight. James Ford Rhodes likens the proceeding to Northerners catching, bridling and saddling the horse, bringing it around and holding the stirrup for the South to mount. Northern, Eastern and Western Democratic papers and legislatures opposed the measure, reflecting the real public opinion of those sections. However constitutional the law may have been, the inexorable logic of events, the logic of circumstances and common sense were against it.

Massachusetts had just given signal assurance of faithfully living up to the Compromises by sending back to slavery Anthony Burns, although it had taken the courts, the police, twenty-two

companies of Massachusetts troops and some United States soldiers to accomplish it against public sentiment. Stronger evidence of carrying out the Compromises could not be demanded.

The political effect of the bill's passage was immediate. On January 1, 1854, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and Iowa were Democratic, all their Senators and 24 out of 29 Representatives being Democrats; all were soon lost except Indiana, though Douglass held Illinois in line for a while. Another far-reaching effect was that it brought Abraham Lincoln back into politics. He wrote a friend, "I was losing interest in politics when the repeal of the Missouri Compromise aroused me again."

The involvement of England and France in the Crimean War seemed to the Cuban annexationists to afford an opportunity to acquire the island, but the great opposition at the North to any increase of slave territory restrained the President, although the Spanish authorities in Cuba gave excuse for drastic action by their confiscation of the cargo of the "Black Warrior" just at this time. The antagonism stirred up by the Kansas-Nebraska bill, however, forbade any increase of slave territory at the moment. Douglass probably cost this country Cuba.

The support given the Kansas-Nebraska bill by Southern Whigs tended to drive Northern Whigs into the Free Soil Party, already the refuge of Northern Democrats such as Hale and Chase. In heavy type the Northern papers published the names of those of that section who supported the bill. The unrestrained abuse of the South by the Abolitionists was paralleled by the extremists of that section. Insult and abuse were answered by abuse and insult. Cotton prices were high and the price of slaves rose proportionately; the reopening of the African slave trade was advocated by a few. Even among the moderates of both factions acrimony developed; inevitably censure of slavery involved censure of slave holders. The strongest of party ties could not long hold together men of such antagonistic feelings.

"Anti-Nebraska" conventions were held in many Northern states in which all former party affiliations were ignored. On July 6, 1854, at a convention held in Michigan the new party was christened "Republican" and the name was adopted by other conventions. The Democrats resented this assumption of the name of Jefferson's old party and to distinguish it from their parent party, they called it the "Black" Republican Party.

The Know-Nothing Party, a development of the Native-American, grew powerful at this juncture. Anti-foreign and anti-

Catholic in its origin around 1834 in New York City as an opponent of Tammany, in 1854 it spread into many cities from Boston to New Orleans, Philadelphia to San Francisco, and elected governors in Massachusetts and Delaware. On the slavery question it took no position, but was strongly Union. By combining with the Whigs in some states, by affording a sort of half-way house to disaffected Democrats, it influenced elections in many states, mainly to the detriment of Democrats.

Wherever there was prejudice against the foreign element or the Catholic Church the organization flourished. The name originated from the answer given by its members to every question—"I don't know." The answer became a password—and a byword. The test word or shibboleth was "Have you seen Sam?" and applicants for membership were "taken to see Sam." All this flubdubbery and secrecy were entirely dropped along with the Know-Nothing name in 1856, and it became really a national political party.

The firm stand of the administration against Great Britain and France, who wished to abolish privateering in time of war, and the securing, for the time being at least, of the doctrine that "free ships make free goods," together with reciprocal commercial and fishing treaties with England were popular and added prestige to Buchanan who negotiated them.

In October, 1854, Buchanan, Soule and Mason met at Ostend, Belgium, and issued the famous Ostend Manifesto, setting forth the advantage to Spain of a sale to us of Cuba, the danger of Cuba becoming Africanized like Santo Domingo, and asserting that self-preservation justified its seizure by the United States, of which it was territorially a part. But Spain kept out of involvement in the Crimean War and haughtily refused to sell.

New Hampshire, the President's home state, deserted Democracy in 1855, electing a Know-Nothing Governor, as did Connecticut and Rhode Island also. In Massachusetts the Know-Nothings were influential enough to have Catholic institutions investigated by a legislative committee. The Free Soilers in that state passed a law over the Governor's veto forbidding the use of any state agency in enforcing the fugitive slave law, providing counsel for seized negroes and prescribing penalties against unsuccessful slave reclaimers as kidnappers. Even these measures did not satisfy the Abolitionists, and, Cato-like, Garrison ended every speech, "The Union must be dissolved."

The fight for the possession of Kansas between the pro-slave and anti-slave settlers was fierce. From each section they poured

in. In the first territorial election the pro-slavery element was successful on the face of the returns and adopted a constitution modeled on that of Missouri. The Free Soil men claimed the election fraudulent and held a convention and adopted a constitution prohibiting slavery. Border warfare, mobs, murder and various outrages were the order of the day in Bleeding Kansas.

The 1855 elections, outside the South, ran strongly against the Democrats, the most notable defeat being Chase's election over Medill, Democrat, as Governor of Ohio, Chase running on the "Republican" ticket. The Pierce administration faced for the rest of its existence, in the Thirty-fourth Congress, a hostile majority in the House made up of anti-Nebraska Democrats, Whigs and Southern Know-Nothings. The Senate remained Democratic. Losing in the North and West the party held its own in the South.

The President recognized the Kansas pro-slave government. It is easy to see how he did this since its credentials were regular. Governor Reeder had issued due and legal certificates of election. "Which shall we believe," said Pierce to Reeder later, "your official certificates under seal or your subsequent declarations to us in private conversations?"

The House passed a bill admitting Kansas under its free constitution, which the Senate rejected 33 to 12. The House attached a rider to the army appropriation bill that no regular troops should be used to enforce laws passed by the territorial legislature of Kansas, and rigidly adhering to this, a deadlock ensued until the session ended. A special session was called immediately and in a ten day session the House receded, the Know-Nothings, it is said, weakening at the last moment.

Pierce's message to the second session, deploring sectionalism and geographical parties and condemning evasions of the fugitive slave law, fell on deaf ears. The House laid the message on the table without a reading. A protective tariff bill was passed by the House, one reducing duties by the Senate, and a compromise resulted in which each gained something. Lobbyists infested the capitol, representatives of manufacturing interests, seekers of land grants to railroads and internal improvement schemes. Three Congressmen were found guilty of corruption by a committee. Five river and harbor improvement bills were passed over the President's veto.

The Thirty-third Congress, Linn Boyd, Speaker, saw Benton in the House after thirty consecutive years in the Senate, his opposition to slavery extension defeating the doughty old Democrat

for the Senate by a combination of pro-slavery Whigs and Democrats. He supported the administration at first but broke with it on the Kansas-Nebraska bill; yet in 1856 his Democracy was strong enough to make him support Buchanan against Frémont, his own son-in-law.

Douglass and Chase were the heavyweights in the Kansas-Nebraska debates. Years afterward Douglass said "Seward's and Sumner's speeches were mere essays against slavery; Chase was the leader." Toombs, Jere Clemens and Judah P. Benjamin were Southern leaders.

Of Sumner's first great oration Jere Clemens said it was "the ravings of a maniac"; Horace Mann said of it—"The Seventh of March is atoned for." When charged with violation of his oath to support the constitution Sumner said, "I swore to support the constitution as I understood it, not as it is understood by some one else" and was applauded to the echo by the same party which had roared with rage at Andrew Jackson's assertion of the same doctrine years before. The Democrats, however, were equally inconsistent.

The Thirty-fourth Congress, divided into irreconcilable factions, accomplished little. Its complexion is given as 75 Democrats, 40 Know-Nothings, 108 Anti-Nebraskans, a majority of whom were Democrats on other issues. Convening December 3, 1855, it was not until February 2, 1856, that it elected a Speaker on the one hundred and thirty-third ballot, when N. B. Banks, once a Democrat, now a Republican, was elected by a plurality vote, Banks 103, Aiken, Democrat of South Carolina, 100, scattering 11. Exciting as it was, however, the whole long fight had been conducted with moderation and good humor.

Pierce had at various times resigned from the Senate and refused the United States Attorney Generalship and the Governorship of his state all because he preferred to practice law. Perhaps therein lies the secret of his administration. He was a thorough lawyer and saw chiefly the legal and constitutional aspect of governmental questions. He looked only, it seems, at the constitutionality of Douglass' measure; his recognition of the Kansas pro-slavery government was based on *prima facie* legal grounds which a less technical mind might have questioned.

Ita lex scripta—and moral law, expediency, the consciences and sentiment of millions of citizens, if in conflict therewith, had no weight with him officially. The letter of the law rather than the spiritual substance impressed him. He was the victim of his own exact mind. Years later in the midst of the War between the

States he was most impressed with the constitutional questions involved.

He was a man of great private virtues and attracted the most loyal devotion of friends; Daniel Webster and Nathaniel Hawthorne were but two of a very great many. John Sherman came to regard him as honest, able and firm.

His administration hurried on that division of his country and his party into geographical alignments he so much deplored. He and other men were to blame, but so also were civilization, the course of events, climate, conscience, humanity and human nature, all which had brought slavery and its problems upon the country.

The Democratic Party, however, was in prosperous condition in 1856; weaker in the North, West and East it had shed itself of some party disaffection and was stronger in the South. But Pierce had allowed it to be committed to an extreme policy from which even the diplomatic Buchanan could not rescue it, and which meant catastrophe.

The death of the Whig Party, which was a recognized political fact, was much deplored by the wisest Democrats. It was a national party with strong Southern elements; it divided the North politically. Its passing away and being succeeded by a party likely to be solely Northern and having no Southern influence in its councils presented the gravest problems to the politician and the statesman; this spelt sectionalism and ultimate Democratic disaster.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE IMPENDING CRISIS UNDER BUCHANAN

Seventh Democratic National Convention—American Convention—Republican Preliminary and Main Conventions—Whig Convention—The Platforms—The Campaign—Pennsylvania State Election—The Election—Fillmore's Southern Vote—Buchanan—Inaugural Address—Cabinet—Dred Scott Decision—First Message—Kansas Politics—Thirty-fifth Congress—Douglass and Democratic Dissension—Lincoln-Douglass Debates—Disunion Talk—Thirty-sixth Congress—The 1860 Situation—Southern Fears—Tariff Effects—Impending Crisis.

THE Seventh Democratic National Convention met at Cincinnati, June 2, 1856. Called to order by Robert McLane, chairman of the National Committee, it chose John E. Ward of Georgia president. The rules of the preceding convention were unanimously adopted, which included the two-thirds and unit rules. The practice, usually since followed, of adopting a platform before nominating candidates, was inaugurated at this convention at the insistence of the Mississippi delegation. The New York, Ohio and Kentucky delegations split over candidates and it was held that where a state had not issued instructions individual delegates could vote their preferences. Later this became a settled rule of the party.

The opinion seemed to prevail that the two-thirds rule had become fundamental party law, and it was praised by some, condemned by others. The National Intelligencer argued that it effectually blocked the nomination of the most distinguished members of the party. Its advocates held that it insured unity and harmony and real Democratic choice.

Contesting delegations of New York Hards and Softs appeared and both were admitted, each delegate with half a vote. The nominating speeches were confined to two hundred words or less, not by express rule, but tacitly according to custom.

Pierce, Buchanan and Douglass were the leading candidates with no prospects of a dark horse entry. Pierce and Douglass had ardent supporters from the South, but their recognized weakness in the North alarmed many who were more anxious for victory in November than success in the convention. Sober-

mindful Southerners believed conservatism, moderation and diplomacy, all of which Buchanan was credited with, would be of more value to their section in the long run than aggressiveness and partiality. Buchanan's long and distinguished record had in it nothing objectionable to the South. And there were those 27 Pennsylvania electoral votes. There were heated objections all over the West, North and East to the courses pursued by Pierce and Douglass, while Buchanan in London had won general public favor here.

The first ballot was Buchanan 135, Pierce 122, Douglass 33; the Southern vote went for Buchanan 29, for Pierce 72, for Douglass 14, while the North gave Buchanan 106, Pierce 50, Douglass 19. Succeeding ballots saw Pierce's strength dwindling until his name was withdrawn. On the tenth ballot Buchanan reached a majority; on the sixteenth the vote stood Buchanan 168, Douglass 121, Cass 6. A statement from Douglass that Buchanan having received a majority ought to be nominated being read to the convention, on the next ballot Buchanan was unanimously nominated. John C. Breckenridge on the second ballot was unanimously chosen for the second place.

Political wisdom had guided the convention. Buchanan was well known all over the country and no American of any party dreaded the election of such a venerable high-type gentleman and statesman of the old school, with an honorable and useful, if not brilliant, record. Buchanan had much the same sort of strength Fillmore, already nominated by the American Party, had and was without Fillmore's weakness; that is he had no faction of his old party hating him, no accusations of political disloyalty against him, no party enemies in his own state. The nomination immediately became popular with all Democrats of every section. Breckenridge brought strength to the ticket especially in Kentucky. The Democrats had nominated men from Democratic, but doubtful states, one Northern, one Southern.

The American Party had held its convention at Philadelphia on Washington's birthday, twenty-seven states being represented by 227 delegates; Maine, South Carolina, Vermont and Georgia were unrepresented, though Georgia gave the nominee 43,000 votes in November. A motion to proceed to nominations having been carried 151 to 51, all the New England and Ohio delegates and some from Pennsylvania, Illinois and Iowa bolted, and in a convention of their own nominated John C. Frémont and ex-Governor Johnston of Pennsylvania.

The main convention nominated Fillmore and Andrew Jackson Donelson of Tennessee, a North and South, a Whig-Democratic ticket with a Jacksonian flavor.

A gathering approximating in significance the first meeting of the Continental Congress was the organizing convention held at Pittsburgh, Pa., February 22, 1856, at which the modern Republican Party was nationally launched. The convention was much the work of, and largely managed by four newspaper men, Francis P. Blair of the old *Globe*, Andrew Jackson's friend and Kitchen Cabinet advisor, Henry J. Raymond of the *New York Times*, Horace Greeley of the *New York Tribune* and Thurlow Weed of the *Albany Journal*. The Jeffersonian and Jacksonian inspiration of this party should be noticed.

The meeting had been called by the Republican state committeemen of the nine states having such committees and twenty-three states were represented. Blair was elected president and Raymond wrote the address, adopted unanimously, which voiced absolute opposition to slavery in the territories and the immediate admission of Kansas as a free state. It called a convention to meet on Bunker Hill day.

The Republican National Convention met pursuant to this call at Pittsburgh on June 17. All the free states were represented and Delaware, Maryland, Virginia and Kentucky of the slave states. Seward, believed best to represent the aims and principles of the new party, was passed over on account of his unpopularity with the bolting Know-Nothings and other elements of the new party, while Chase, another logical candidate, was barred because the odor of Democracy still clung to his garments. Justice McLean was the only one of the older statesmen receiving serious attention. On an informal ballot he received 196 votes against 359 for Frémont and the latter was then unanimously nominated.

On the first ballot for Vice-President, William L. Dayton of New Jersey received 259 votes, Abraham Lincoln, 110, N. P. Banks, 4; and twelve other candidates were voted for. On second ballot Dayton was unanimously chosen. Frémont was a Free Soil Democrat, Dayton an old line Whig. Frémont was a member of the Catholic Church. The ticket represented the extreme West and the central East.

The Whig convention at Baltimore, with little ado, nominated Fillmore and Donelson. The Abolitionists nominated Gerritt Smith and Frederick Douglass.

The Cincinnati platform, as the Democratic declaration of principles of 1856 came to be called, was the reaffirmation of the

platform of 1852, except that the Mexican planks were omitted. The new matter in the platform was a declaration for free seas and progressive free trade throughout the world, the enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine, the right of control of the Atlantic-Pacific highway (the Isthmian route), our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico with an expression of sympathy for the people of Central America, and popular sovereignty. The other and more vital new matter in the Democratic platform is given further on in parallel columns with opposing planks of other parties.

It should be noted that free trade was advocated as a world wide program, not merely a domestic policy of this country.

The American Party's platform may be summarized as (1) Appeal to Supreme Being; (2) Perpetuation of the Union; (3 and 4) America for Americans; (5) Anti-Catholic (given in full later); (16) States Rights and non-intervention by any state in the affairs of other states; (7) People of territories to regulate their own domestic affairs; (8) Only citizens to vote or hold office; (9) Stricter naturalization laws; (10) No union of church and state; (11) Maintenance and enforcement of all laws; (12) Condemnation of Pierce's administration, especially the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

The Republican platform began with an invitation to unite all opposed to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise and the extension of slavery, and all in favor of admission of Kansas as a free state and the restoration of the government to the principles of Washington and Jefferson. It was a Jeffersonian document. Its second plank urged the maintenance of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, and the third asserted the self-evident truths of that declaration, and that those truths denied any power anywhere to give local existence to slavery in the territories (see this more exactly set out further on). It indicted the administration for its actions in the Kansas matter, demanded admission of Kansas as a free state, denounced the Ostend Manifesto, declared for immediate aid to the railroad to the Pacific, and for river and harbor improvements.

The Whigs reaffirmed, without setting them out, the old Whig principles, proclaimed reverence for the Constitution and the Union, deplored the disordered condition of national affairs, geographical parties and sectional dissensions, and charged the Democratic and Republican parties with being sectional and threatening the continuance of the Union. It asserted that all subordinate questions were submerged in the peril to the Union. The lines of cleavage follow:

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

Since an adverse political and religious test has been secretly organized by a party claiming to be exclusively Americans, it is proper that the American Democracy should clearly define its relations thereto; and declare its determined opposition to all secret political societies by whatever name they may be called—

Resolved, that the foundation of the Union of States having been laid in, and its prosperity, expansion and preëminent example in free government built upon, entire freedom of matters of religious concernment, and no respect of persons in regard to rank or place of birth, no party can justly be deemed national, constitutional, or in accordance with American principles, which bases its exclusive organization upon religious opinions and accidental birthplace. And hence a political crusade in the nineteenth century, and in the United States of America, against Catholics and foreign born, is neither justified by the past history or future prospects of the country, nor in unison with the spirit of toleration and enlightened freedom which peculiarly distinguished the American system of government.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

The American Democracy recognize and adopt the principles contained in the organic laws establishing the territories of Nebraska and Kansas as embodying the only sound and safe solution of the slavery question, upon which the great national idea of the people of this whole country can repose in its determined conservation of the Union, and non-interference of Congress with slavery in the territories or in the District of Columbia.

AMERICAN PLATFORM

Americans must rule America; and to this end native born citizens should be selected for all state, federal and municipal offices of government employment, in preference to all others.

No person should be selected for political station (whether of native or foreign birth) who recognizes any allegiance or obligation of any description to any foreign prince, potentate or power, or who refuses to recognize the federal and state constitutions (each within its sphere) as paramount to all other laws, as rules of political action.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

That we deny the authority of Congress, of a territorial legislature, of any individual or association of individuals to give legal existence to slavery in any territory of the United States, while the present Constitution shall be maintained.

That the Constitution confers upon Congress sovereign power over the territories of the United States for their government, and that in the exercise of this power it is both the right and the imperative duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism—polygamy and slavery.

Whigs in the South in numbers affiliated with the Democrats, in other sections many going to the Republicans, while the moderate, middle-of-the-road Whigs everywhere went with the American Party.

The Know-Nothings, purged of their secret-society features and other follies, and renamed, for one year became a great national party having a ticket receiving votes in every state, while the Republican ticket received no votes in eight states. In eleven states Fillmore received in 1856 more votes than Scott received in 1852, though falling short of Scott's total vote by half a million; but there were only two great parties contending in 1852 while three were in the field in 1856.

The campaign in the South where the contest lay solely between Buchanan's letter, asserting that the Democratic Party was the Jackson campaign of 1828 and the Harrison race of 1840. Buchanan's letter asserting that the Democratic Party was the national party, its mission to overthrow sectional parties while the Republican Party would outlaw fifteen states of the Union, was a powerful campaign document. Fillmore also charged the Republicans with sectionalism. To many the idea came that the success of a party having existence in only part of the country would mean disunion. Rufus Choate wrote the Maine Whigs -- "The first duty of Maine Whigs is to unite with some organization to defeat the new geographical party calling itself Republican. The triumph of such a party puts the Union in danger. Practically the contest in my judgment is between Mr. Buchanan and Colonel Frémont. I shall vote for Mr. Buchanan."

Yet the Times, Tribune, Herald and Post, of New York and many other such papers and men like their editors were actively supporting Frémont. The women, sympathizing with the slave and with Bleeding Kansas, used their influence for the "Party of freedom." Tons of literature were sent out by the Republicans, while the Democrats were notably lax in this particular.

On Pennsylvania's vote the result hung and the contest there was, in effect, determined in a minor state election, although the candidates for state offices received little real attention. Excessive expenditure of money was charged against both Democrats and Republicans, and \$500,000 was said to have been spent by each in Pennsylvania; the denials went rather to the lawful use of the funds expended than to the amounts. The Buchanan ticket won by a majority of less than 3,000 of a total of 423,000, and a month later Buchanan carried the state by a majority of 1,025, a plurality of over 80,000, of a total vote of 460,000.

The popular vote in the nation was Buchanan, 1,838,169; Fré-

mont, 1,341,264; Fillmore, 874,534. The electoral vote was Buchanan, 174; Frémont, 114; Fillmore, Maryland's, 8. Outside of New England Frémont carried Iowa, Michigan and Wisconsin by majorities, New York and Ohio by pluralities. He was a poor third in his own state. Though several states were carried by pluralities in no state was the result very close.

The Fillmore vote in the slave states where there was no Republican ticket deserves careful notice as registering opposition there to the disunion sentiment which too many Democrats were too openly evincing. As fear of disunion in the North drove Choate and many of his like to support a Democrat, dislike of disunion drove many men in the South to support Fillmore. In the slave states Fillmore's vote was 363,000 to 455,000 for Buchanan. Fillmore polled 44 per cent of the entire Southern vote and but 13 per cent of the Northern. In his own state he ran third.

Buchanan lacked 375,000 of an actual popular majority and was therefore a minority President, though South Carolina's support may be taken as virtually adding 50,000 to his popular support.

Current opinion of the wisest was that the Americans had lost the election and their party existence; that the Republicans had lost the election, but gained the future, while the Democrats had won the victory at the cost of their supremacy; that thereafter the Democratic Party could expect nothing from the East, North or West.

The new President had started in politics as a Federalist but when war was declared in 1812 he enlisted as a volunteer and participated in the defense of Baltimore. Elected to the legislature in 1814 he was promoted to Congress in 1821, where he was a pronounced low-tariff man. In 1828 he was an ardent Jacksonian and one of the leaders of the administration forces in the House, where he was chairman of the judiciary committee. Jackson made him Minister to Russia and our first commercial treaty with that country was negotiated by him. He was elected to the Senate in 1833 where with Benton he staunchly defended Jackson, his acts, policies and measures; he continued a Democratic leader in the Senate all during Van Buren's term. Not the equal in eloquence and fame of Clay, Calhoun and Webster, he was a foeman of no mean ability and so respected. Though never unhorsing any of the great three, he always maintained his own seat in the saddle.

When Tyler became President, though neither his foe nor ally,

Buchanan was the main support in the Senate of the administration's independent treasury measure and defender of Tyler's vetoes.

As Polk's Secretary of State Buchanan had settled the long-vexed question of the Oregon boundary line, and during the Mexican War handled the foreign affairs of the country, keeping English and French hands off, excellently well. Retiring in 1848 to private life, he was recalled to service by Pierce, who sent him, as Minister to England, a post he held with distinction until just before his nomination.

Without being brilliant, Buchanan's whole career had been one of eminent usefulness, hard work and solid accomplishment, distinguished rather than famous, efficient rather than striking. He was sixty-six years of age when inaugurated.

Washington and Madison not excepted, Buchanan faced a more trying task than any of his predecessors. Happy results were hoped for from his ripe wisdom, his calm and diplomatic temper, his national, non-sectional and conservative views and feelings. His administration was in a period of national doubt, the fatal question growing more and more acute.

In the inaugural address the election was interpreted as a demand for the maintenance of the Constitution and the Union, and its calm acceptance after a most exciting contest a striking example of obedience to the will of the majority. Apply that principle, the President urged, to our territories; let the majority of the people of a territory admit or exclude slavery at their will.

The cabinet gave fair representation to every section: Cass of Michigan, State; Howell Cobb of Georgia, Treasury; Floyd of Virginia, War; Touchey of Connecticut, Navy; Thompson of Mississippi, Interior; Brown of Tennessee, Postmaster General, and Jeremiah Black of Pennsylvania, Attorney General.

The Dred Scott decision, handed down by the Supreme Court two days after the inauguration, declared that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional and that a slave was property and Congress could no more exclude that sort of property from a territory than any other sort. No decision of the court has ever been deemed so political in its nature and none certainly has ever had so immediate and so great a political effect.

Buchanan had been elected on a platform emphatically declaring the right of the people of a territory to settle the slavery and other local matters for themselves; then had come the Dred Scott decision denying the federal government the power to exclude slaves from a territory. To obey the Constitu-

tion, observe his party platform and execute the will of the people as just expressed at the polls did not at this juncture appear an insuperable task.

Buchanan's first message indicates that he was hopeful. Reviewing the Kansas situation he urged admission into the Union so soon as an election could be held there, plaintively remarking that the peace and quiet of the whole country were of more importance than the mere temporary triumph of either of the political parties in that state. Once a state Kansas could settle state questions without embroiling the Union.

Now that old passions have died out and facts are correctly known, and it is seen that politics in Kansas in the Fifties had the elements of an ancient Hebrew attack on a Hittite camp, a Donnybrook fair, Sheridan's march through the Shenandoah valley and an encounter between Racketeers in Chicago in 1928, it seems that no administration in Washington could have settled the Kansas question except by putting the whole territory under strict martial law, which would have required a larger army than the United States possessed. And that would only have postponed the question until the Kansas people settled it.

A financial panic in 1857 for a time diverted the public mind from Bleeding Kansas. Overtrading and speculation, coupled with an inelastic currency, brought about a period of disaster. Banks, insurance companies, railroads and many large business houses failed, and much idleness and suffering among laboring people ensued. A year, however, restored normal conditions.

The state elections of 1857 were mainly significant in showing the disintegration of the Know-Nothing or American Party, most of its members in the free states going over to the Democratic or Republican parties, as their individual views led them. Strange to say, they held together to a considerable extent in the South and voted for the Bell and Everett Union ticket in 1860.

The Thirty-fifth Congress, with a Senate of 37 Democrats, 20 Republicans and 5 Americans, and a House of 128 Democrats, 92 Republicans and 14 Americans, gave the administration technical control. Orr, Democratic of South Carolina, defeated Galusha Grow, Republican of Pennsylvania, for Speaker 128 to 84, Grow being so radical as to be unable to poll the full strength of his own party.

Douglass opposed Buchanan's support of the *de facto* government of Kansas. Some temper had been shown in a conference between the two. When Douglass told Buchanan that he would oppose his view in the Senate, the President said: "Mr. Douglass,

I desire you to remember that no Democrat ever yet differed from an administration of his party without being crushed. Beware the fate of Tallmadge and Rives." "Mr. President, I wish you to remember that General Jackson is dead," retorted the Senator.

Douglass now reversed his political strategy of a few years before. Then he had courted the South, now he courted the Northern Democrats. His own reelection as Senator was being contested by Lincoln, his very political existence in the balance. Douglass was a man of personal and political honor, but no Don Quixote; he advocated the views of the constituency he represented in the Senate, which were doubtless his own. The anger of the South was aroused against him never to be appeased.

Right or wrong, selfish or patriotic, Douglass, by his breach of the Compromise of 1850 with his Kansas-Nebraska bill and now by leading the breach in his party in his fight on the admission of Kansas, was tearing the party of Jefferson and Jackson into irreconcilable parts. In the fall of 1857 the Republican Party seemed destined to suffer the fate of the Federalist and Whig parties, without their successes, but when Douglass made his speech on the admission of Kansas the Republicans began discussing candidates for 1860.

Seward has been accused of playing for a new combination, perhaps a new party made up of moderate Republicans, Free Soil Democrats and Whigs, taking in Douglass himself. The New York Times thought something of the sort not improbable and approved of cordial relations between Seward and Douglass. It was about this time that Greeley dissolved the firm of Seward, Weed and Greeley, though his letter was not then made public. He was believed to favor this new alignment as heading off Seward from the Presidency. The South began to accuse Douglass of flirting with the Republicans.

The Lincoln-Douglass debates were exciting not only to Illinois but to the whole country, and properly so since they cost one participant the Presidency and gained it for the other. Many Whigs and even some Republicans wished Douglass to have no opposition. In fact the forming of a new party composed of Republicans, Douglass Democrats, Know-Nothings, Whigs and what-alls was seriously agitated, and terms suggested such as allowing the Republicans to name the Presidential, the others the Vice-Presidential candidate.

The slavery question in all its aspects was practically the sole subject of these famous debates. Sets of questions pro-

pounded to each by the other were features of the discussions. One particular interrogation of Lincoln's to Douglass was—"Can the people of a territory, in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits, prior to the formation of a state constitution?" This put Douglass between his "popular sovereignty" doctrine and the Dred Scott decision, and also between the conflicting views of Northern and Southern Democrats. A tradition recorded by Nicolay and Hay has it that some Republican friends urged Lincoln not to put that question—"If you do, you can never be Senator," they said. "Gentlemen," Lincoln replied, "I am killing larger game; if Douglass answers, he can never be President, and the battle of 1860 is worth a hundred of this."

Douglass answered by arguing that territorial legislatures by "unfriendly legislation" could effectually exclude slavery, despite Supreme Court decisions on "abstract questions." This new position of Douglass became known as the "unfriendly legislation" or "Freeport" doctrine. It did exactly what Lincoln had prophesied. It put Douglass outside the pale of Democracy so far as the South was concerned. Judah P. Benjamin said in the Senate that Douglass had ignobly purchased election as Senator by sacrificing the Presidency. Gone, too, was Douglass' chance of any Republican alliance.

Congress accomplished little. It could agree on no tariff bill. Minnesota and Oregon were admitted as states, the latter's constitution excluding negroes from the state; these admissions destroyed further the old balance between free and slave states, there being now eighteen of the former to fifteen of the latter.

The Democratic caucus removed Douglass from his chairmanship of the committee on territories. The debate in the Senate between Douglass and Jefferson Davis in February, 1859, was immediately recognized as presaging the formation of an independent Democratic Party in the North unless the next Democratic National Convention could heal the breach.

An interesting and important phase of the politics of the 1850's was the changing attitude of the South toward the West, the effect of which is still existent. It has been seen how in earlier times New England opposed Western development because the growth of the West decreased the due proportionate political power of the East. Then the South fought the battles of the West. Now the South opposed Western growth into free states unless corresponding slave states were allowed, and the North

and East fought for Western development as it added to anti-slavery strength.

The state elections of 1859 showed Republican gains. Signs of approaching disaster to the party and country were not lost on some Democrats. Cass said, "I have witnessed the beginning of this government and sometimes think I shall witness its end." Old Sam Houston left the Senate for the Governor's chair of Texas to endeavor to keep that state in the Union. Alexander H. Stephens, retiring from the Senate, said he was afraid he would never see Washington again unless as a prisoner of war. All disunion talk now, except from Abolitionists, was at the South. Political issues from now on, so far as the South was concerned, were all submerged into a fight in defense of slavery extension, and John Brown's raid on Harper's Ferry added fuel to the flames.

The Thirty-sixth Congress met a few days after this raid, the first to occupy the two new wings of the capitol. The Senate was still Democratic, 38 Democrats, and 2 Americans from the South, and 26 Republicans. The House has been classified as 113 Republicans, 93 administration Democrats, 23 Southern Americans, 8 anti-administration Democrats. Half of the House members were new men.

It took forty-four ballots to elect a Speaker, John Sherman withdrawing on the thirty-ninth and throwing his strength to Pennington who was chosen. Kansas and John Brown, slavery and secession, mixed with a vast amount of abuse and epithets, occupied the attention of the session.

Kansas was admitted by the House but rejected by the Senate. A homestead bill, practically the only act of any importance passed at the session, was vetoed. The Pacific Railroad bill was postponed. The Morrill tariff bill increasing some duties passed the House but was not acted on by the Senate. Before the session ended the national party conventions had all been held and four tickets were in the field.

Underlying and largely responsible for the Southern determination to maintain and extend slavery, and operating, too, on the Republican determination to prevent its extension, was slave representation in Congress and in the Electoral College, which sometimes meant, and at any time might mean, control of the government, and many times had meant control and organization of the lower House of Congress. The Federalists had claimed that to it was due Jefferson's defeat of Adams in 1800. Some

claimed that thirty-five Representatives in Congress and thirty-five Presidential electors were based on slave population. A fairer estimate would have been twenty-one, but smaller majorities had carried or defeated some of the most important measures in Congress. The election of a President easily might hinge on a smaller number of electors. That advantage the South meant to keep, and to maintain it, slave states must increase to keep pace in number with free states. The Republicans were equally determined that this "rank injustice" should be confined to as small limits as possible.

Southern economists argued, with statistics to support their arguments, that any tariff bore heavily on the South without corresponding benefits. The South was a purely agricultural country, practically without manufactories, shipping trade or commerce to profit by tariffs, and the result was that the annual drain from the pockets of the South to the coffers of the North was estimated at \$100,000,000 to \$200,000,000, and had been for many years. Selling his cotton and tobacco in an open world market the Southern planter was forced to buy in a protected one. The stamp tax, the duty on tea, which his forefathers fought England rather than pay, was a mere bagatelle compared to the tariff—so the South Carolinian felt.

The effect was to make control of the government seem vital to the South and every restriction of slavery a restriction and diminishing of the South's political power. In 1860 Republican success meant to Southern minds not only high tariffs and denial of property rights in the territories, but also a continuing diminution of Southern power in the government and consequent economic enthrallment to the North. It was another instance of economic determination controlling the politics of a people. It was not all arrogance and ambition in the South, not all moral sentiment and pure patriotism in the North. King Cotton and King Tariff played great parts in 1860, and King Politics, too.

The South does not seem to have considered that with a settlement of the slavery question in a way satisfactory to the view and conscience of the agricultural West and Northwest, those sections would have combined with the South and kept in power a party favoring low tariffs and other economic theories of the Democrats. Such a political alliance would seem most natural and much to be expected, and very possibly would have been brought about.

Reading the Northern and Southern newspapers of that day, giving to them, as reflectors of public opinion and feeling, con-

sideration equal to that given contemporary political speeches, and viewing the situation in the cold light of seventy years after, it seems that a deep-seated fear of economic ruin amounting almost to a panic fear pervaded the South and operated more widely than any other one thing to bring about the political condition existing there in 1860.

Another great operating factor was the dreaded effect on the negro of anti-slavery agitation, which while growing less incendiary was increasing in volume and weight. Uncle Tom's Cabin was the most widely read book of the day though practically excluded from the South. It was dispossessed of its place as the best seller for a while in 1860 by Helper's *Impending Crisis*, a book which played a part and had a vogue in the campaign of that year comparable to Coin's *Financial School* in 1896. Like Harvey's book it was filled with facts and figures, some inaccurate and misleading, but written with great sincerity and very convincingly. This book was more hated and dreaded than Uncle Tom's Cabin or any other literature. It was a deadly drive on the morale of the body politic of the South, for seven out of ten Southerners owned no slaves, and the slave-holding oligarchy was the object of bitter attack. John Sherman had thoughtlessly endorsed the book; it was sufficient to defeat him for Speaker as not a man from the slave states could be induced to vote for him.

There is one thing which will unite the most antagonistic elements of a body of people and that is harsh and persistent abuse for the same thing by the same critics. Thus the anti-slavery propaganda, much of which was vituperative, and directed indiscriminately against any and all who practiced or sanctioned slavery, cemented together the people of the slave states of all political opinions. Great numbers were driven to support the Democratic Party not because they were Democrats, but because they were Southerners, and both Whigs and Democrats of the slave states resented the linking of slavery with polygamy in the Republican platform as "twin relics of barbarism."

On the other hand the moral sense of the people of the free states had been thoroughly aroused over slavery. It was a wrong, an injustice, a barbarous, uncivilized, inhuman thing, an evil as much a shame on the people who allowed it, who suffered it to exist in the nation, as on those who practiced it. However constitutional and historical, even Scriptural, were the defenses of it, the inherent whelming injustice of the thing itself dwarfed these justifications into nothingness. Solidification of sentiment

was going on in the North, and Southern arrogance and abuse helped it along.

With the South smarting under a sense of existing wrongs and filled with forebodings of greater and permanent future ones; with the Northern Democrats feeling sure of defeat for the party and political ruin to themselves if further concessions to Southern views were made; with the Republicans, a young party made up largely of young men, eager for the fray, hopeful of success, sure of being right and determined to stop the spread of slavery; with many sober-minded Americans, most of them old men, fearful of disunion and its incalculable consequence, the Presidential year had begun.

CHAPTER XIX

DEMOCRACY'S GREAT DEBACLE

1857-1861

The Charleston Convention—The Two Platforms—Disruption—Two Conventions—Constitutional Democrats and Regulars—Adjourned Convention at Baltimore—Another Bolt—Douglass Nominated by Regulars—Douglass' Letter Offering to Withdraw—Breckenridge Nominated by Bolting Convention—Constitutional Democrats Endorse Him—Constitutional Union Convention Names Bell—Republican Convention Nominates Lincoln—The Platforms—The Campaign—The Tariff—Efforts to Fuse—The Returns—Buchanan's Task and Performance—Scott's View—Undecidedness of Country—Buchanan's Policy and Lincoln's—Buchanan—The Party.

THE Eighth Democratic National Convention assembled at Charleston April 23, 1860, with full delegations from every state. From contemporaneous accounts it seems that if those Democrats who witnessed the 1924 Democratic Convention in New York would divide its size by five and multiply by the same figure the intensity, the heat, passion and dissension manifested there, they could form a fair conception of the Charleston gathering. Whom the gods would destroy they first make mad was often and aptly quoted at Charleston in 1860.

The conditions preceding the convention resembled much the Democratic conditions of 1927-8. For a year and more the Northern wing of the party had proclaimed a candidate to whom the Southern wing was strongly opposed. The question was constantly agitated whether or not the South would support Douglass if he were nominated. Some said that he would not carry a single Gulf state; others that the South would stand by the ticket, but very reluctantly; while others maintained that there were a great many Douglass men in the South who for various reasons were unwilling to avow their sentiments. On the way to the convention a Mississippi delegate bet an Indiana Douglass delegate \$1,000 that Douglass, if nominated, would not carry Mississippi, but other delegates protested and the wager was withdrawn.

There was a great seeking in the months preceding the convention by the Douglass men for a popular Southerner to take

second place on the ticket. Long before the state conventions met the whole situation centered about the Little Giant and the proceedings of the national convention revolved around his candidacy. His Freeport speech was in the hands of every delegate, more discussed in conversation than the Constitution, the Cincinnati platform or any other one thing.

Through Judge Smalley of Vermont, chairman of the executive committee, the Douglass element controlled the preliminaries and admitted the New York "Soft" delegation, Douglass men, over the "Hards" led by Mayor Fernando Wood; they also admitted the Douglass delegation from Illinois. This gave Douglass a majority of the delegates, but the anti-Douglass element, California and Oregon acting with them, held seventeen states, fifteen of them Southern, against their sixteen.

Caleb Cushing of Massachusetts, originally a Whig, then Tyler Democrat and lastly a regular Democrat and Pierce's Attorney General, was elected president, and presided with great, some say "artistic," ability.

The two-thirds rule was adopted, and the unit rule modified by a proviso that when a state had not provided or directed how its delegation should vote each delegate could vote individually. The change was objected to, but carried. Two questions arose under the new rule; Georgia had "requested" its delegation to vote as a unit and Cushing held the delegation under the rule; New Jersey's convention had "recommended" its delegation to vote as a unit, and a similar ruling was made, but the latter question was not raised until excitement had grown high and the chair was overruled and the New Jersey vote split.

Just before the balloting began the two-thirds rule was amended. The old rule, adopted by this convention, required two-thirds of the "vote given in the convention"; the amendment required two-thirds of the vote of a full convention. The amendment was carried after several of the Southern States had withdrawn, and was conceded on the threat of Virginia and other states to withdraw also unless it was done. The vote was 141 to 112.

The resolutions committee of one from each state brought in a majority report approved by seventeen members, a minority report by fifteen members was offered as a substitute, and Benjamin F. Butler of Massachusetts brought in an individual report. Butler recommended the readoption of the 1856 or Cincinnati platform, adding only a plank favoring protection of American citizens. His report was promptly rejected, 198 to 105.

Both of the other reports reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, advocated the acquisition of Cuba, aid to the transcontinental railroad and protection to American citizens, native and foreign-born, at home and abroad, and condemned state legislation subversive of the fugitive slave law. The majority report added "and property" and "on the high seas" to the plank dealing with protection to citizens.

The real division was on slavery in the territories.

MAJORITY REPORT

Congress has no power to abolish slavery in the Territories. The Territorial legislature has no power to abolish slavery in any Territory nor to prohibit the introduction of slaves therein, nor any power to exclude slavery therefrom, nor any right to destroy or impair the right of property in slaves by any legislation whatever.

MINORITY REPORT

All questions in regard to the rights of property in States or Territories arising under the Constitution of the United States are judicial in their character, and the Democratic Party is pledged to abide by and faithfully carry out such determination of these questions as has been or may be made by the Supreme Court of the United States.

It may be said that the South demanded that the principles laid down in the Dred Scott decision be declared the principles of the Democratic Party, while the North was willing to endorse those principles only so far as and so long as they were the law of the land, not changed by statute or reversed by courts. As much of the court decision was claimed to be merely *obiter dicta*, abhorrent to two-thirds of the people of the whole country and the sworn object of a most determined attack for its reversal, the South would not accept such a qualified assertion of slave rights as the minority report offered. Besides, had not Douglass said in his Freeport speech, "No matter what the decision of the Supreme Court" the people of a territory could by "unfriendly legislation" keep out slavery, and had announced that he did not care whether slavery was voted up or down in the territories. The South demanded unqualified assertion of unqualified rights in the territories, and a candidate who would "stand hitched."

Senator Henry B. Payne of Ohio led for the minority report in a calm and forceful speech. The South, he said, was giving up a chance of Democratic success for a mere abstraction. Was it not enough for the Northern members of the party to accept the unpopular Dred Scott decision? Should the majority report be adopted, defeat was certain, the fate of the Democratic Party sealed.

Butler made a ferocious speech, asserting that the majority report meant protection of the African slave trade by its mention of "on the high seas," and he was equally severe on the minority for pledging the party in advance to support any decision of the Supreme Court when Black Republicans might control it.

William L. Yancey of Alabama made the main argument for the majority report. He ascribed Democratic defeats in the North to the Democracy there pandering to anti-slavery sentiment, and scored Douglass and his followers for opposing the admission of Kansas as a slave state; Northern aggression required that the deliberate assertion be made that slavery was *right*, not merely *constitutional*. Not one state, he said, voting against the majority report could be relied on with certainty to cast Democratic electoral votes, while every one, with the possible exception of Maryland, supporting it was surely Democratic. In concluding he admitted that the South did ask of the Northern Democracy an advanced step in vindication of its rights.

Senator Pugh of Ohio, regarded as the Douglass spokesman, replied, and traced the defeats of the Democrats in the North to subserviency to Southern views; they could go no further in that direction—"Gentlemen of the South, you mistake us, we will not do it." He denied that the majority report was warranted by the Constitution, and named men present in the convention, former Senators and Representatives, who had suffered defeat in their states and districts because of their support of Southern doctrines.

The reports had been brought in on the third day and it soon became apparent that an "irrepressible conflict" existed between the Northern and Southern wings of the party, which later was to prove the truth of the adage that a house divided against itself cannot stand. The South regarded its very political and economical existence at stake while the North felt sure that certain and permanent defeat would follow the acceptance of Southern demands. It will be noted that the Southern wing of the party admittedly demanded a change in the party's policies—an advance in its position on slavery extension. On the sixth day disruption came.

The minority was substituted for the majority report by a vote of 165 to 138; 12 Southern delegates voted aye, 33 from the North nay. Buchanan was opposed to Douglass, and to his influence the presence of anti-Douglass men from the North was attributed.

Each plank was then taken up and voted on separately; the first plank, reaffirming the 1856 platform, was adopted 237 to 65; a motion to table the rest of the report was rejected 188 to 81, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Florida and Texas thereupon withdrawing from the convention. The slavery plank was now rejected 238 to 21, the Douglass men first voting aye, but on the Southerners refusing to vote, they changed their votes to nay. Some delegates from North Carolina, Georgia, and Delaware now joined those of the bolting states just above named, 45 of the 303 delegates composing the convention withdrawing. A motion was entered to reconsider all of the above votes, which motion was not acted on until tabled at Baltimore in June.

Various substitutes were offered in place of the rejected slave-plank and great efforts made to heal the breach by Richardson of Illinois, the Douglass manager, but the Douglass men and the Southerners were both obdurate. The South's attitude was well expressed by a Mississippian's reply to a plea for harmony for the party's sake—"We are for principles. Damn the party."

On the eighth day, 26 of Georgia's delegation of 34 withdrew, and the delegations from Virginia, Kentucky, North Carolina and Maryland retired for consultation. The motion to require two-thirds of the whole convention to nominate was then made by Howard of Tennessee; Caldwell of Kentucky said he thought its adoption might bring back seceded delegations, and Russell of Virginia announced that its failure meant Virginia's retirement from the convention. The chair decided that the 8 Georgia delegates remaining in the convention could not cast the vote of the state. Howard's motion to amend the two-thirds rule carried 141 to 112, only New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Oregon voting solidly against it, New York voting solidly for it and Pennsylvania splitting.

Douglass, James Guthrie of Kentucky, Dickinson of New York, R. M. T. Hunter of Virginia, Andrew Johnson of Tennessee and Joe Lane of Oregon were placed in nomination.

The vote of New York on the two-thirds rule amendment having rendered Douglass' nomination impossible, that delegation proceeded to vote solidly for him on every ballot. The first ballot was Douglass, 145½, Hunter, 42, Guthrie, 35, Johnson, 12, scattering, 18, including one vote for Jefferson Davis. Thus Douglass received on the first ballot a majority of the vote actually cast. The twenty-third ballot gave Douglass 152½, a majority of one vote of a full convention. He fell back the following ballot to 151½, where his vote stood until the thirty-second ballot when

he again received 152½. On the thirty-ninth ballot Guthrie received 66½ votes, the highest he or any other lesser candidate obtained in the whole fifty-seven ballots taken. The last ballot was Douglass 151½, Guthrie 65½, Dickinson 4, Hunter 16, Lane 14, Davis 1. It is said the Benjamin F. Butler cast his vote on every ballot for Jefferson Davis although instructed for Douglass.

To give time for passions to cool, the convention on its tenth day adjourned to meet in Baltimore June 18th, and it was recommended that the several states make provision for supplying all vacancies in their respective delegations. The motion to adjourn was carried 195 to 55, 61 Southern delegates voting, 59 having withdrawn or bolted.

The seceders from the main convention, a little more than 100 in number, met May 1st and elected James A. Bayard president. There was much disunion talked and Bayard, on the third day, retired from the convention after making a strong Union speech. The convention adopted the name "Constitutional Democrats," and a platform identical with the majority report of the main convention, and called a convention to meet at Richmond June 11th, inviting the Democratic Party of the United States to send delegates. Accordingly that day about 100 delegates from slave states met and adjourned from day to day, until the 26th, when Breckenridge and Lane, just nominated at Baltimore by the bolting convention, were declared the unanimous choice of the convention.

When the Democratic national convention reassembled at Baltimore June 18th, it was recognized that the New York delegation held the balance of power. Dean Richmond was its chairman and leader. Richardson was again manager for Douglass. In the interim between the two sessions of the convention another Senate debate between Douglass and Davis had widened the breach between the two factions of the party, though the Senate had approved the Davis resolutions.

Five days were consumed in organizing and in deciding various contests between old delegations which had withdrawn and new delegations, the latter being Douglass delegations. Fraud and favoritism were charged against the Douglass men on the credentials committee. For a time New York wavered, retiring often and long for consultation, and the Douglass men were divided between rage and alarm, but finally Dean Richmond brought his delegation in line and New York's deciding 35 votes were cast for the Douglass delegations, the votes on the various

contests ranging around 140 to 110, the states with contesting delegations not voting.

In the convention hall a reasonably calm atmosphere prevailed, but each night two great mass meetings were held in close proximity to each other on the streets. At one the Douglass men denounced in unmeasured terms their opponents and at the other the fire-eaters in violent invective returned the fire, while individual partisans exchanged acrimonious personalities.

The motions to reconsider inherited from the Charleston meeting were disposed of on the evening of the fifth day. In the afternoon New York had voted nay with the South and the motion to table was lost, but later with New York's change to aye the motion to table carried 139 to 113.

Final action now was taken on the seating of the contesting delegations, the Douglass men carrying everything with New York's vote, whereupon the Virginia delegation withdrew, followed by other states, and organized another convention. Cushing resigned the chair and joined the bolters, Benjamin F. Butler and many others of the Massachusetts delegation going with him. Governor David Tod of Ohio, a vice-president, took the chair for the rest of the session.

The evening before the balloting great excitement was caused by the report that Douglass had written Dean Richmond a letter authorizing the withdrawal of his name. Richardson emphatically contradicted the rumor and was believed, he being Douglass' manager. But such a message was, in fact, in Richmond's pocket.

The first ballot on nominations was taken on the sixth day and was: Douglass, 173½; Breckenridge, 5; scattering, 13. Church, of New York, moved that Douglass having received two-thirds of the votes given, be declared the nominee; he said the two-thirds rule as adopted at Charleston was "outrageous, undemocratic, despotic and wrong" and submitted to by New York only for the sake of harmony. However, on objection, he withdrew the motion.

The second ballot was: Douglass, 181½; Breckenridge, 7½; Guthrie, 5½. Church renewed his motion and it was carried without division. A resolution embodying the Douglass slavery plank was adopted by acclamation. Benjamin Fitzpatrick, of Alabama, was named for second place, and he later declining, Herschel V. Johnson, of Georgia, was named by the national committee.

Just before adjournment Richardson sent to the clerk's desk

and had read a letter he had received, very similar to the one received by Richmond, in which Douglass, after insisting on the doctrine of non-intervention, said:

"But while I can never sacrifice the principle, even to attain the Presidency, I will cheerfully and joyfully sacrifice myself to maintain the principle. If therefore you and my other friends shall be of the opinion that the principle can be preserved and the unity and ascendancy of the Democratic Party maintained and the country saved from the perils of Northern abolitionism and Southern disunion by withdrawing my name and uniting upon some other non-intervention and Union-loving Democrat, I beseech you to pursue that course. . . . I conjure you to act with a single eye to the safety and welfare of the country and without the slightest regard to my individual interest."

A manly, self-sacrificing letter this and the one to Richmond. Imagination may riot on what might have happened to the party and country had they been used. Richardson stated that the seceders from the convention had placed it out of his power to use the letters, and that the responsibility was on them. His statement was greatly applauded.

The bolting convention met on June 23rd, and Cushing was chosen president amid great enthusiasm. Delegates purporting to represent all states except Maine, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin were present, but many delegations were small and the scrutiny of credentials slight. As listed 230 delegates were in attendance, but less than half this number seems to have voted. The majority report of the resolutions committee at Charleston was adopted as a platform. The rule of voting adopted at Cincinnati and Charleston was followed, but two-thirds of the votes of only the States represented in the convention were required for a nomination. The first and only ballot for Presidential nominee was Breckenridge, 81; Dickinson, of New York, 24, but the delegates changed their votes and Breckenridge was named unanimously. Joseph Lane of Oregon was nominated for Vice-President by acclamation. This ticket, as stated before, was adopted by the Constitutional Democrats.

Buchanan soon publicly announced that there had been no regular nomination by the Democrats and that members of the party could consistently vote for Douglass or Breckenridge. The influence of the administration, however, was thrown to Breckenridge.

The first and only national convention of the Constitutional Union Party was held at Baltimore, May 9th, nearly every state

being represented. The old Whigs and Americans constituted the body of the new party. Edward Everett was a great favorite, but availability called for a Southern man, and the choice was between old Sam Houston, Democrat of Texas, and John Bell, Whig of Tennessee. The Whig element favored Bell, the Americans Houston. Bell was nominated on the second ballot, and Everett named for second place unanimously. Platforms were asserted to be humbugs, and the convention declared for "The Constitution of the Country, the Union of the States, the Enforcement of the laws," adding a few general principles of justice, fraternity and equality.

The Republican National Convention met in the Wigwam at Chicago, May 16, with 465 delegates, but nine states, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina and Tennessee were unrepresented. Old Francis P. Blair and Horace Greeley were the lions of the day, and had much to do with the final result. Greeley was a member of the convention as a delegate for Oregon, the New York delegation being made up of Seward men only.

The platform was adopted with little debate. Joshua Giddings moved an amendment adding the opening clauses of the Declaration of Independence to one of the planks; the convention had no idea of being tied up with the Abolitionists, and Giddings' amendment was voted down; he was withdrawing from the convention when George William Curtis championed his proposition and Jefferson's words were inserted in the platform.

Seward at Chicago, as Douglass had been at Charleston, was for a time the pivot on which everything turned. He had capable managers, Weed, Evarts and Curtis. But he had powerful enemies; "Success rather than Seward" was their slogan. Pennsylvania wanted a high tariff and Seward's tariff views were not liked. It is one of the curiosities of politics that Seward's "irrepressible conflict" speech was held to destroy his availability while Lincoln's "house divided against itself" phrase seems not to have impaired his. The night before the balloting began even Greeley practically conceded a Seward victory, but much was accomplished between midnight and the hour the convention met next morning; Virginia weakened, as did several New England states under Greeley's efforts. Lincoln was nominated on the third ballot. Greeley had worsted his former partners. Wendell Phillips, Abolitionist leader, was much displeased at the nomination of the "slavehound of Illinois"; Lincoln had said a fugitive slave law was proper.

For the second place the convention chose Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, a former Democrat. The Democratic element in the young party was a factor to be considered.

The Democratic and the Constitutional Unionist platforms have already been outlined. The Republican declaration was comparatively long. It endorsed the Declaration of Independence, glorified the Union and denounced disunion, approved states rights, denounced Democratic administration, and also the Dred Scott decision, declared freedom the normal condition of United States territory, denounced the African slave trade, non-intervention and popular sovereignty, declared for immediate admission of Kansas, a tariff encouraging development of industrial interests, and a liberal homestead law, opposed change in naturalization laws, approved river and harbor appropriations, and immediate aid to the Pacific railroad.

The controlling platform issues may be digested as follows:

DOUGLASS DEMOCRATIC	BRECKENRIDGE DEMOCRATIC	LINCOLN REPUBLICAN
Slavery in any Territory is entirely the affair of the citizens of that Territory; neither Congress nor the people of other parts of the Union have the right to interfere.	Citizens of any state have the right to carry their property, including slaves, into any Territory, and Congress is bound to protect them with or without cooperation of Territorial Legislature.	Slavery exists only by municipal law; there is no law for it in the Territories and Congress has no power to legalize it anywhere, but bound to exclude it from Federal Territories.
Progressive Free Trade throughout the world.	Progressive Free Trade throughout the world.	Tariff to encourage development of industries, high wages and prosperity.

Each party charged the others with disunion sentiment or tendencies, and each candidate pledged devotion to the Union—Douglass said: "The Federal Union must be preserved"; Breckenridge declared: "The Constitution and the equality of the states are symbols of everlasting Union"; Lincoln proclaimed: "The inviolability of the Constitution and perpetual Union"; Bell stood for "The maintenance of the Constitution and the Union."

Strange to say, the 1860 campaign was not so furious as that of 1856; Breckenridge had it all his way in the South, and the Republicans were sure of success in New England. In the rest of the country where the battle was between Douglass and Lincoln the recognized fact that the former had no real chance of election disheartened his followers. Buchanan threw the influence of the administration to Breckenridge, and Douglass fought

Breckenridge as fiercely as he did Lincoln. The best the Democrats of either faction could hope for was a deadlock in the Electoral College and an election by the House of Representatives, whereby Breckenridge possibly might win, a consummation little wished by the Douglass men.

The tariff figured heavily in Pennsylvania where the tariff bill lately defeated in Congress was very popular, and in the Keystone state that issue was stressed. Greeley's Tribune declared that the Pennsylvania vote of 1860 was to settle the future tariff policy of the country.

The most effective argument in the North against the Republicans was that the success of their party meant disunion, for many in the South had so proclaimed, and the sectional character of the party and its platform was evident. But many believed, as Seward did, that the secession threats in the South were mere electioneering cries of "wolf," which had been made, at one time and another, for many years. Douglass thought the danger real, and boldly argued against and denounced disunion when on a Southern speaking tour.

Bell, stout Whig as he was, was so convinced that Lincoln's election would be followed by secession that he agreed to withdraw along with Douglass and Breckenridge, if an acceptable candidate could be agreed on. He and Breckenridge authorized Jefferson Davis to negotiate with Douglass, but Douglass declined. He represented others, he said, who stood for great principles; he had been nominated by two Democratic conventions; any sacrifice of self he was willing to make, but none of principle; besides his withdrawal would but strengthen Lincoln as his Western supporters would all go to Lincoln.

Fusion by Democrats of both wings, and with the Constitutional Unionists, was attempted in New York and several other states, but was ineffectual save in New Jersey where Douglass received three, Lincoln four of the electoral votes. As the returns eventually showed, had fusion been perfected in every state the result only in California and Oregon would have been changed. Every electoral vote Lincoln received was by a majority vote except in those two states.

The state elections foreshadowed the November result; all New England, then doubtful Ohio and Indiana and pivotal Pennsylvania showed Republican successes.

Breckenridge carried every slave state except Missouri which went to Douglass by a plurality of less than 500 of a total vote of 165,000, and except also Kentucky, Tennessee and Virginia, which went to Bell. Practically all of Douglass' strength lay

in states where Lincoln was strongest. The complete votes were as follows:

	<i>Lincoln</i>	<i>Douglass</i>	<i>Breckenridge</i>	<i>Bell</i>
Popular Vote	1,866,452	1,376,957	849,781	588,879
Electoral Vote	180	12	72	39

Of the vote in the slave states Breckenridge received 674,000; Bell, 512,000; Douglass, 162,000, and Lincoln, 22,000. Thus a majority of over 20,000 votes were against Breckenridge in those states. In the free states Douglass received 1,115,000 votes to 285,000 for Breckenridge. The two Democratic tickets received a total of 360,000 more votes than the Republican single ticket. All these figures are affected by the fact that they do not embrace South Carolina's vote.

It was in the face of threatened and practically certain secession that Buchanan prepared his final message. Three months later Lincoln faced the fact accomplished; Buchanan's task was the more delicate—to avert secession if possible.

It is not necessary to discuss the right of secession further than to outline the situation confronting the Democratic President—the attitude of the public mind of his day on the question. Secession had been advocated, threatened, denounced and deplored in every section of the country at one time or another ever since the government had been formed. Only Jackson and Webster of the great leaders had ever squarely denied the right, and Webster in 1851 had declared that if the free states did not carry out the constitutional duty of restoring escaped slaves the slave states were not bound to observe the compact of Union. It is not improbable that in 1860 two Americans out of three believed a state had a right to secede either as a constitutional or a revolutionary right, or were in doubt over the question. Republicans such as Charles Francis Adams, Henry Cabot Lodge and others grant a much larger percentage.

A President, unlike a king, governs under a special, not a general, commission. His party platform on which he is elected by the people is his commission—the sanctioned policy and program of the country for his four years of administration. If party government in America does not mean this, it means little or nothing save a struggle for offices. Buchanan's commission had distinctly asserted that adherence to the constitutional guaranty of slavery and a faithful execution of the Compromises of 1850 were necessary to the continuance of the Union. The platforms of the three contending parties had all reprobated interference with the rights of the states. The election of 1856 had shown a two-thirds vote against the cardinal doctrine of the

Republican platform—"the right and duty of Congress to prohibit slavery in the territories." All parties had declared for the continuance of the Union.

The election of 1860, just held, gave little indication of any fundamental change in popular opinion. The Republican candidate, though elected, had received less than forty per cent of the popular vote; the two wings of the Democratic Party, differing materially only on one phase of the question, had polled forty-seven and a half per cent of the total vote. The Republicans lacked 500,000 of a majority; the Democrats, allowing for South Carolina's vote, lacked scarcely 50,000. No certain voice of the people of the United States told Buchanan their will.

Buchanan's final message reviewed the situation and the course of events leading up to it. That the slave states had just cause to secede he strongly combatted. For more than three-fourths of the time the government had been in existence they had been practically in control; there was not one federal law in existence infringing their rights and the federal courts upheld them. The mere election as President of a fellow citizen of an opposing party was no just cause for dissolving the Union; the agitation of the slavery question by the Abolitionists was censured and the state laws inimical to the enforcement of the fugitive slave law, but these evils, he said, could be remedied by courts and Congress.

The right of a state to secede was vigorously denied, but he could find in the Constitution no power given to the President, or to Congress either, to coerce a state. The remedy he proposed was amendments to the Constitution, and he called on Congress to propose to the several states the remedy for the existing evils.

Horace Greeley in his *Tribune*, the leading exponent of public opinion in the North, was saying: "If the cotton states shall decide that they can do better out of the Union than in it, we insist on letting them go in peace." Greeley, who had brought about Lincoln's nomination, surely represented Republican opinion. Indeed, he was called the Republican oracle.

The most illuminating evidence of the state of public opinion with which Buchanan had to deal is "Scott's Views," an official letter from the commanding general of the United States army to the President. Scott was a hero of the War of 1812, our commander-in-chief in the Mexican War, long a leading Whig and in 1852 that party's candidate for President, and, withal, a man of unquestioned loyalty.

General Scott unequivocally conceded the right of secession, and suggested, and outlined geographically, four possible "new Unions" as a smaller evil than the one Confederacy forming. He

maintained that the federal government had a right to establish by force "a continuity of territory" and to guard against the breaking of this continuity he advised the garrisoning of various Southern forts.

In an official note attached to the copy of his "Views" sent by him to the Secretary of War, he says: "The Views only apply to a case of secession which makes a gap in the present Union. The falling off (say) of Texas or of all the Atlantic States from the Potomac South is not within the scope of General Scott's provisional remedies."

Buchanan, who denied the right of a state to secede, has been censured for not adopting Scott's recommendations as to garrisoning the forts. Months later, on March 15, 1861, five of Lincoln's seven cabinet members advised against an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, as provoking premature war. Much greater reason for restraint lay on Buchanan, yet his patience was condemned and his successor's praised.

A great number of leading Democrats, Republicans, Whigs and Americans were as undecided as General Scott. Buchanan was one of the few who were positive; in the midst of tremendous excitement he was one of the few calm ones.

Strenuous efforts were made in Congress to avert disunion. Crittenden, joined by some Northern Democrats and moderate Whigs, advocated a constitutional amendment establishing the Missouri Compromise, but the Republicans held aloof. Lincoln refused to agree to any measure extending slavery one iota, and Southern Democrats and Americans were either indifferent or actively hostile. Southern Democrats indeed were virtually out of all parties and out of national politics sometime before their respective states had actually seceded.

Significant was the organization of the territories of Colorado, Dakota and Nevada with no provision against slavery, and the recommendation by a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress of an amendment to the Constitution forbidding any amendment giving Congress the power to abolish or interfere with slavery in any state. Conservative Republicans joined with Democrats in passing these measures, the amendment carrying in the Senate 24 to 12, in the House 133 to 65, and was approved of by Lincoln in his inaugural address.

Buchanan looked directly to the body of the people—to the half-million Southerners who had voted for him, to the people of the whole United States. He gave to them, so far as he could compass it, the opportunity to bring about a peaceful

settlement of the great dispute. It was purely a question for the people to decide rather than a President going out of office in a few months.

The supreme and sole impulse of Buchanan's last three months in office was to preserve the *status quo* so far as possible until his successor was inaugurated, and to do this every effort was made, and every concession possible. That he should have pursued any other policy now seems impossible. Border states, Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri, to say nothing of North Carolina and Tennessee, were trembling in the balance. To have precipitated action by them in the closing days of his administration would have been criminal, and cruelly wrong to his successor who was charged with the task of government for the coming four years. That he turned the government over to Lincoln uncommitted to any definite policy, unentangled, free from irrevocable pledges or acts, was a notable feat of statesmanship. When Lincoln assumed charge of the government his hands were free; the Democratic administration had given its Republican successor an honest deal. If a peaceful settlement had been possible, it still was possible; not a state had been driven into hostility to the Union, no new or greater opposition to the government engendered.

Nor was the Democratic administration's policy widely different from Lincoln's initial one as announced in his inaugural address. Considering the fact that Buchanan when he wrote his message in December was confronted by a theory and Lincoln when making his address in March was confronted by a condition, and remembering, too, that Lincoln was beginning and Buchanan was ending an administration, the divergence is much lessened. Buchanan held that as there were no federal officers in South Carolina, all having resigned, he *could* not enforce the laws there without further authorization by acts of Congress: Lincoln said that if there was such hostility to the United States that competent resident officers could not be secured, he *would* not attempt to force obnoxious strangers among the people. Compare—

"If the conflict were to end in civil war, it was my determined purpose not to commence it, nor even to furnish an excuse for it by any act of this government."

Buchanan's Special Message, Jan. 8, 1861.

"In *your* hands, my dissatisfied countrymen, and not in mine, is the momentous issue of civil war. The Government will not assail *you*. You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors."

Lincoln's Inaugural Address.

The difference between the positions of the two men was largely between "could" not and "would" not. George W. Julian, surely a Republican of unquestioned authority of that day, says in his *Political Recollections*: "Notwithstanding all the abuse that has been heaped upon Mr. Buchanan by the Republicans . . . the policy of the new administration, up to the attack upon Fort Sumter, was identical with that of its predecessor."

Charles Francis Adams, who during the War between the States most ably represented this country at the British Court, years later writes of the situation between Lincoln's election and inauguration: "On the part of the North it was highly desirable that every possible form of compromise should be discussed, and discussed at great length, if only to gain time. It was unquestionably under such conditions as these the part of the statesman, as well as of the shrewd political manager, no matter with which side of the struggle he sympathized, to keep his eyes fixed on the 4th of March. If he was a secessionist, he would strain every nerve to precipitate a conflict before that day arrived, while if he were a Union man he would exert himself to the utmost to tide peacefully over the intervening time."

In this paragraph Adams outlines exactly the course Buchanan as a Union man followed.

Buchanan has been accused of weakness and vacillation; nothing seems farther from the real character of the man and his course of action during his whole administration and more especially the last three months of it. He stood squarely on the platform on which he was elected and his interpretation of the Constitution. Many leading men of his own and the Republican Party repeatedly changed opinions and positions as new developments occurred, but Buchanan held to his course.

There are points of resemblance between Buchanan and Taft. Large men physically, calm, kindly and of the judicial temperament, both are reported to have preferred the bench of the Supreme Court to the other honors and places assigned them though leading finally to the Presidency. Both are credited with great diplomatic ability in healing difficulties, carrying in their right hands gentle peace. Yet both had to deal with bitter dissensions in their parties which their wonted judicial temperaments and diplomatic skill were powerless to appease, and both are blamed for party defeat and disruption.

From the campaign of 1860 the Democratic Party emerged with tremendous losses. Not only had it lost strength in the North, but its stronghold, the South, was out of the Union!

Scarcely less revolutionary was the effect on the principles and policies of the party. Not that these changed in theory, but in practice. As to its principles, they were imperishable, but in future they had to be applied to, in some respects, an essentially different government. After sixty years of almost unbroken control of the government it was to be a minority party, sometimes strong, sometimes weak, but always a powerful curb on the majority.

CHAPTER XX

THE JEFFERSONIAN JACKSONIAN LINCOLN

Jeffersonian Parties in Conflict—Republicans of 1860 Jeffersonians—Lincoln's Jacksonianism—The Blairs—Democrats in Cabinet—War Democrats—Votes in Congress—Mid-term Elections—Radical Abuse of Lincoln—Political Effect of Emancipation Proclamation—Party Divisions—Tariff Legislation—Lincoln No Tariff Champion—"Woodscrow Simmons"—Republican Candidates—Lincoln Renominated—Republican Gloom—Ninth Democratic National Convention—Platforms—Campaign and Election—Reconstruction—Lincoln's Plan—Radical Opposition—Lincoln's Democracy and his Republicanism.

THE campaign of 1860 had been one really between warring Jeffersonian sects. The Democrats of both factions were technically the legal heirs of Jefferson and Jackson, but on the great question of slavery the Republicans were Jefferson's spiritual successors and were justly entitled to take for their party the old name Jefferson had chosen for his followers.

The Democrats held to Jefferson's theory of strict construction of the Constitution and sovereign rights of states, but Jefferson had favored those theories as means to an end—a free government of, by and for the people—which he believed would be best secured by leaving all power practicable in the state governments. Jefferson's wish was a government which would bring to realization the great fundamental principles he announced in the Declaration of Independence and in other writings; states rights and state sovereignty were agencies to that end.

Jefferson opposed the extension of slavery and drew the Northwest Ordinance, with the clause prohibiting slavery in the territory ceded by Virginia, as a condition of the grant. Both wings of the Democratic Party in 1860 were opposed to Jefferson's attitude on the extension of slavery. The compact theory of the federal government, the states rights theory, was not sacrosanct with Jefferson, but the principles of liberty, justice and self-government were, and the exclusion of slavery from territory where it did not already exist was close to his heart.

The Republican Party in addition to taking Jefferson's party name included his great truths in its platform, and the cardinal

principle of the party in the 1860 campaign was based on his Ordinance of 1784. Its candidate was the straitest Jeffersonian ever occupying the Presidential office, Madison excepted. Abraham Lincoln in his Douglass debates and other speeches had constantly appealed to Jefferson, to Jefferson's Ordinance and his Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was constantly quoted or cited, and Madison, the man who had demanded the word "slave" should not be used in the Constitution.

A further Democratic character was given the Republican Party of 1860 by the large number and great influence of the Free Soil Democrats who were members of it. These Democrats in Massachusetts and other Eastern states, who had generally combined with the Republicans and the Conscience Whigs against the Cotton Whigs, or Woolly-head Whigs as they were called, before 1860, and Western leaders like Blair and Chase, in great numbers became outright Republicans so long as Lincoln lived.

Still another Democratic influence was evinced by Lincoln. As he used Jefferson to support his position on slavery extension, so he cited Jackson's attitude toward the Supreme Court decision on the bank charter to justify his own position toward the Dred Scott decision, and Jackson's stand on the indissolubility of the Union and the power and duty of the President to enforce federal laws in recalcitrant states as establishing those principles. He wrote Nicolay in 1860 after his election—"The right of a state to secede is not an open or debatable question. It was fully discussed in Jackson's time and denied not only by him, but by the vote of Congress." A comparison of Lincoln's first annual message with Jackson's Nullification message and proclamation is interesting to Democrats. Lincoln plucked the line Jackson laid down.

In view of the Republican Party's subsequent adoption of Alexander Hamilton as its ancestor and prophet, it is curious to note that Lincoln in all his speeches and writings mentions Hamilton only twice and each time merely casually. In a speech in Congress on the veto power he recites the fact that Washington consulted Jefferson and Hamilton touching the question, gives the position of each and then, paying no more attention to Hamilton, proceeds to quote at length Jefferson's reason for his opinion. The other reference is equally slight, only naming Hamilton along with some other members of the Constitutional convention as opposed to slavery.

Well might Woodrow Wilson say, in 1912, that Lincoln, being

a founder of the Republican Party, was one of the mysteries of Providence.

How much a coalition Lincoln's party was is shown by the complexion of his first cabinet; Blair, Postmaster General, Cameron, Secretary of War; Chase of the Treasury and Wells of the Navy were former Democrats, while Seward of State, Smith of the Interior and Bates, Attorney General, had been Whigs. Seward indignantly withdrew his acceptance of the State portfolio, but Lincoln persuaded him to desist by reminding that he, Lincoln, was a Whig, which made the balance equal or more. When Cameron resigned, Stanton, a Breckenridge Democrat and member of Buchanan's cabinet, succeeded him; when Chase resigned, his place was offered Tod, a Douglass Democrat, who had presided over the latter days of the Baltimore convention; and when Blair left the cabinet Denison took his place.

In Congress and among the Northern people there were Peace Democrats in large numbers and Peace Whigs in lesser numbers, and Democrats who, like many Federalists in the War of 1812 and many Whigs in the Mexican War, supported the war, but went no further in support of the government, who all together made up the opposition

The War Democrats became in time more loyal to Lincoln than the Radicals of his party. Buchanan, Cass and Douglass rallied to his support the moment hostilities began, the greater number of their followers with them, and it was the Blairs—old Francis P. and his sons Montgomery and Francis P., Jr.—who defeated the movement to deny Lincoln a renomination in 1864. The South bitterly exclaimed against these Democrats.

The Thirty-seventh Congress called in special session in July, 1861, contained 12 Democrats and 4 Unionists from slave states in the Senate, most of whom coöperated heartily with the administration. The House stood 106 Republicans, 42 Democrats and 28 Unionists. On a resolution pledging any amount of money and any number of men to support the war there were only 5 voting nay.

While loyally supporting the government in war measures the Democrats in and out of Congress, except those who went bodily over to the Republican Party, still maintained their party principles and allegiance in state and national politics. Daniel S. Dickenson, Breckenridge Democrat of New York, and David Tod, Douglass Democrat of Ohio, headed the Unionist ticket in their respective states, the former carrying his state by 107,000 majority, the latter his by 55,000, but in the main the regu-

lar Democrats kept up their organizations and put out party tickets.

Politics standing adjourned to a great extent, Congressional voting was not partisan. Conservatives voted conservatively and vice versa. The vote on the legal tender act, 22 to 17 in the Senate, 93 to 59 in the House, was according to the financial ideas of the members of Congress. Men held to their old theories of government and economics, except so far as modified or rendered obsolete by the new condition of affairs, and except also when they were waived for the time being and other policies supported as emergency or war measures.

The conservative Republicans and Democrats stood together while the radical elements of both parties voted together. Thus when Lincoln set aside General Hunter's Port Royal emancipation order, Chase and other radical Democratic Republicans were as violent in opposition as the most extreme Republicans. A more signal instance was that, when the provisioning of Fort Sumter was first considered by the cabinet, only Blair and Chase, Democrats, favored it, while as late as March 28th Seward and Smith, Republicans, advised abandoning the fort. It was Cameron, Democrat, who inserted in his report, which Lincoln recalled and changed, a paragraph authorizing the use of slaves as soldiers.

The anti-slavery legislation followed by the Emancipation Proclamation had excited much opposition in the border slave states and among Northern men who, averse to slavery, still acknowledged the constitutional rights of slave-holders. This was the issue in the Congressional elections of 1862 when the Democrats made considerable gains in the Middle States and New York, their representation increasing from 44 to 75. New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Wisconsin, all of which except New Jersey had gone for Lincoln in 1860, now declared against the party in power. Only the standing firm of New England, Iowa, Michigan, California and some of the border states saved Lincoln from what the New York Times called "a vote of want of confidence." Still the Democrats, in the main, while refusing to endorse the war or the conduct of it, and urging an honorable peace if it could be obtained, supported the government in its war measures.

The arbitrary arrests, under suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, mostly made by Seward and Stanton, hurt the Republicans much, but the confidence of the mass of the people in Lincoln, so much contrary to the opinion of many of the "best minds of

the party," went far to overcome every adverse influence, and brought the administration a majority in Congress. Lincoln's ascendancy had grown enormously since April, 1861, when Seward had, in the most remarkable paper ever presented to a President, offered to formulate a policy for the administration and carry it out, plainly intimating that Lincoln was competent to do neither.

It was not pleasant reading to any American, least of all to Republicans, it would seem,—the harsh abuse, ridicule and unlimited contempt visited on Lincoln by many leading Republican statesmen, politicians, publicists, and newspapers. Nothing more severe or unmitigated came from Northern Democrats. The scorn visited by the Whigs on Tyler did not descend to the scurrilous depths of Radical Republican comment on the greatest and best man their party had ever given to the country. Pride of intellect, says Schouler, made many of them purblind to Lincoln's real greatness. There were others who belittled him with their eyes wide open, and because of his real greatness, his Democracy.

The representatives of the border slave states supported Lincoln in his conservative positions on slavery and opposed him in his progressive acts against the institution. The Emancipation Proclamation was unpopular in many states. Justice Curtis, who had great influence and popularity by reason of his dissenting opinion in the Dred Scott case, declared it unconstitutional. Lincoln justified it as a war measure, inserting in it and insisting upon the retention of the three words "upon military necessity." But it was still disliked by Democrats and Conservative Republicans. Some said that a war for union was being turned into a war for abolition to the destruction of all hope of the Union.

On the other hand Horace Greeley in his "Prayer of Twenty Million" in the Tribune of August 20, 1862, fairly represented the sentiment of millions in demanding that emancipation be carried out so far as possible under the new laws. It was in answer to this "Prayer" that Lincoln wrote Greeley that his paramount object was to save the Union and if he could do it without freeing a single slave he would do it, or if by freeing some and leaving others alone, or by freeing all, he could save the Union he would do that—a position not far removed from Douglass' indifference as to whether slavery was voted up or down in the territories.

The Democratic opposition to the administration is credited by the best historians as being loyal but conservative, with excep-

tions so few and so extreme as to prove the rule. Their creed and slogan was, "The Constitution as it is; the Union as it was."

That the Copperheads, as Northerners who opposed the war came to be called, voted against the administration goes without saying, but so did many Abolitionists who openly desired separation from the South. The peace element, especially when the war situation was gloomiest was larger and comprised many who never were and never would be Democrats. Robert C. Winthrop, Whig Speaker of the House in 1847-48 and Webster's successor in the Senate, gloried in the name of Copperhead. On the other hand, Seymour and Tod and other Democrats were as loyal as the most loyal.

Vallandigham of Ohio was the most extreme Peace Democrat, and his speeches in Congress aped Chatham's in the House of Lords in 1776. He was arrested for making such a speech in Ohio and sentenced to close confinement until the close of the war. Lincoln avoided a delicate situation by a piece of humor at which both North and South laughed; he commuted his punishment to being sent into the Southern lines. Vallandigham was back in 1864 and at the Democratic national convention. If the Republicans connived at his presence in the Union they did a wise thing politically, for Vallandigham succeeded in putting into the Democratic platform a plank which insured defeat.

The Union meetings in the gloomy year of 1863, so popular and numerous, were participated in by Democrats and often addressed by noted Democrats, and aided greatly in the popular financing of the war by bond sales. Even Charles Sumner testified to the fact that the Democrats were loyal to the government and insisting on the most strenuous support of the war.

Lincoln had averted without repudiating Burnside's illegal punishment of Vallandigham, but he promptly stopped that General's attempted suppression of the Chicago Times, an attack on the freedom of the press which aroused furious opposition from men of all parties in the West.

The draft riots in New York in 1863 have been attempted to be shown as evidence of Democratic disloyalty. Politics had little or nothing to do with them. Mechanics and laboring men generally without regard to party resented the enrolment act and the method of its enforcement in New York especially. The exemption to be purchased for \$300 was most unjust, the working men declared, and made the war a "Rich man's war and a Poor man's fight," and the belief that the war was being waged for abolition more than for Union aroused anger against the negroes.

The local objection to the draft was its unfairness, and it was indisputably proven that by error, incompetence or crookedness the enrolment in some strongly Democratic districts in New York City and Brooklyn was grossly excessive and unfair. Governor Seymour appealed to the people of his state and to the President, and when the unjust quotas were corrected the draft was completed.

The Ohio state election of 1863 throws a curious light on that state's politics. Vallandigham was the regular Democratic candidate while the Unionists put up John Brough, a War Democrat of the stalwart type. It was an oratorical campaign and great masses poured out to hear both sides. Brough won by 62,000 majority, increased 39,000 when the soldiers' vote came in. Yet 185,000 civilians and 2,200 soldiers voted for Vallandigham. All the Northern states, except New Jersey, and Delaware, Maryland and Kentucky, voted Unionist tickets, showing that Democratic votes were needed to win support of Lincoln's administration.

Congress promptly passed such war measures as the President asked for, filling the armies and the army chests. The Morrill Tariff bill had been passed amid the excitement of the last hours of Buchanan's administration. As it came from the House it was a decent protective measure, but when the Senate, Republican by the withdrawal of Southern Democrats, got through with it it was so rotten that Morrill was disgusted and determined to drop it when it came back to the House. John Sherman, a more practical politician as well as a high protectionist, had persuaded Morrill to accept it and under Sherman's management it became law, Buchanan signing it in the confused turmoil of the crisis. Thus in haste and confusion and by a disrupted Congress and as a war measure the country had gone back to a tariff policy deliberately rejected twenty years before.

Everybody got everything they wanted, says Ida M. Tarbell of this bill; one notable item in it was that which Senator Simmons of Rhode Island secured, putting a duty on wooden screws, he being part owner of a small factory manufacturing them, the only one in the country. He became famous as "WoodscREW Simmons," coming down in tariff history with Pig Iron Kelly and Tin Plate Leeds.

Lincoln, though a Clay Whig, seems never to have been a tariff advocate. In 1859 he thought the tariff a dead issue at the time and evinced no desire to revive it. He wrote his friends just before the Chicago convention that he did not think the

tariff question should be agitated. His biography by his intimate friends Nicolay and Hay is detailed and complete, consisting of ten volumes with a full index; yet neither the tariff nor the protective theory find place in the index, and to discover Lincoln's views on the tariff the whole ten volumes must be looked through and, when found, they hardly fill one page. His most favorable mention of the subject was a polite compliment paid when passing through Pennsylvania on his way to his inaugural, at the suggestion of a local committee.

At the special session of Congress in 1861 Chase had been forced to advise an increase of duties as a war measure to bring in more revenue, and in 1862 still further increases were made. Thaddeus Stevens of the House, an iron manufacturer of Pennsylvania, engineered the 1862 changes, aided and abetted by Senator Woodscrew Simmons. But Simmons' influence was much crippled right at this juncture by the discovery that he was being paid \$50,000 to get a gun contract adopted, although he stoutly maintained that the employment was "strictly legal." Even other iron men of Pennsylvania admitted that the iron schedule was made to suit Stevens' badly managed foundry rather than the needs of the general industry. Yet this law proved a disappointment as a revenue producer.

William Pitt Fessenden, the Nelson W. Aldrich of that day, was author of the 1864 tariff. He put the bill through the Senate with only two days' debate, and the House made short work of passing it. It increased rates generally from 37 per cent to 47 per cent and over. The effect was tremendous and immediate on the cost of living, and people began to talk of "thousand-dollar breakfasts" if the war kept on. The income tax and increased internal taxes added to the burden.

Lincoln's opposers strongly urged the single term followed in practice by all parties since Jackson's retirement, excepting the renomination of Van Buren in 1840. But the Blairs, old Francis P., young Francis P., Missouri Congressman and General, and Montgomery Blair, Postmaster General, the most politically efficient family this country has ever produced if the Bayards be excepted, were loyal to Lincoln and active; Jacksonian Democrats driven into the Republican Party by dislike of slavery and love for the Union, they were powerful, if not decisive factors in Lincoln's renomination. Lincoln had grown in the confidence and respect of public men since 1861, and even more in the admiration of the people at large.

Chase was the favorite of those who opposed Lincoln. A man

of marked ability with still a strong following among former Democrats, and popular and admired for his administration of the Treasury, for a time his nomination seemed likely. He was receptive, but expressed a well-founded fear of the Blairs. The caucus of the Unionist members of the Ohio Legislature in February, 1864, declared for Lincoln, and Chase withdrew. Ohio's example was followed by other states, and endorsed by mass meetings and conventions everywhere and Lincoln's renomination by his party assured.

To forestall it, radical opponents of the administration held a convention at Cleveland, May 31st. adopted a radical platform and nominated John C. Frémont and General John Cochrane of New York.

The Republican convention, popularly called the Union convention, and its nominees the Union ticket, met at Baltimore June 7. The call, as were many of the calls for state conventions to elect delegates, was addressed to all citizens of whatever political affiliations who would stand by the administration. Lincoln was nominated by a unanimous vote excepting that of Missouri, which by instruction voted for Grant. The nomination of Andrew Johnson recognized the Democratic element in the party, and avoided the charge of sectionalism made against the 1860 ticket; it was also a sop to the border states.

Reverses in the field of war, resentment against profiteering and against the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus begot fear in the Republican camp. The assurance that the Democrats would nominate the popular McClellan added to the alarm. Before the Democrats met in convention the Republican national committee held a caucus to consult; McClellan would attract conservatives, Frémont would draw off radicals from Lincoln; it was proposed that Lincoln and Frémont both withdraw and a new candidate be selected. Lincoln shifted from his July position for Union without slavery to Union alone. Blair personally visited General McClellan in an effort to dissuade him from having anything to do with the Democratic convention.

The Ninth Democratic National Convention, first called to meet on July 4, met at Chicago August 28, 1864. August Belmont of New York, chairman of the National Committee, called it to order, ex-Governor Bigler of Pennsylvania was temporary, Governor Horatio Seymour, permanent chairman. The two-thirds rule was adopted without discussion. Washington Hunt, president of the Constitutional Union convention in 1860, was prominent in the proceedings; Samuel J. Tilden was one of the

New York delegation. The convention was made up of Democrats of all views, and peace party men of which last there were many from the Northwest. General George B. McClellan was nominated on the first ballot, the vote being McClellan 174, Thomas H. Seymour of Connecticut 38, Horatio Seymour 12, but before announcement of the vote, changes were made giving McClellan the nomination unanimously. George Pendleton of Ohio was named unanimously for Vice-President. McClellan represented the element favoring vigorous prosecution of the war to an honorable peace, while Pendleton's nomination was a concession to the peace party. The peace element triumphed in the making of the platform. August Belmont was reëlected chairman of the National Committee, and the convention adjourned, not *sine die*, but subject to a call.

McClellan had no political experience or record. A graduate of West Point he had served with distinction in the Mexican War, and been sent as military commissioner or observer to the Crimean War. He was president of the St. Louis and Cincinnati Railroad Company when the War between the States began, and immediately reëntered the army. His work in organizing the Army of the Potomac was recognized as of tremendous value. As commander-in-chief he won the battle of Antietam, and was exceedingly popular with the soldiers. His removal from chief command had been much criticized by some, highly approved by others.

The Republican platform declared for a vigorous prosecution of the war, unconditional surrender and return to the Union by the seceded states, complete abolition of slavery, voted thanks to the soldiers and sailors, endorsed Lincoln's administration, favored immigration and a Pacific railroad and reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine.

The Democratic platform proclaimed fidelity to the Union under the Constitution, declared the war a failure, called for a cessation of hostilities and a convention of states to restore peace on the basis of the federal Union, denounced violations of the Constitution under pleas of military necessity, and interference by the military in elections, proclaimed the aim of the party to be to preserve the Union and the rights of the states unimpaired, denounced arbitrary arrests and military trials, suppression of freedom of speech and the press and disregard of states rights and private rights, criticized the neglect by the government of Union soldiers held prisoners in the South, and proclaimed devotion to the soldiers and sailors of the Union.

Neither platform dealt with the great impending question, the reconstruction of the Union when peace should come. Both avoided it.

Vallandigham, after a bitter contest in the resolutions committee, had succeeded in getting the war-failure plank adopted, and it spelled defeat. McClellan in his letter accepting the Democratic nomination decisively repudiated this Vallandigham plank. He declared for a vigorous prosecution of the war, the Union first and then peace, the Union the one condition of peace. But Vallandigham continued to stress his position as the party doctrine, and with his Knights of the Golden Circle, or Sons of Liberty, an organization of mystic ceremonies and objects, and fabulous strength in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois, did much to offset McClellan's loyalty.

Lincoln, too, had his troubles in his party. Senators Benjamin Wade and Henry Winter Davis issued a manifesto bitterly denouncing him for his veto of a radical reconstruction bill, probably the most acrimonious criticism ever directed at any President by members of his own party. Issued after he was the party's candidate, its tone and matter, its argument and spirit show how far apart on many vital matters were Lincoln and the men who after his death came into control of the Republican Party.

These platforms, letters, proclamations and manifesto were important documents in the campaign, but the most potent document was issued September 3rd and changed the whole aspect of the situation. It was very short—"Atlanta is ours and fairly won. W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant-General." "The war is a failure" plank in the Democratic platform had always seemed wicked in many eyes; now it appeared foolish to all. A few weeks later Sheridan's victory at Winchester completed the argument Farragut's capture of Mobile Bay had begun. General Grant issued a letter that all that was needed to insure victory was unity of sentiment at the North.

Whatever chance of election the Democrats had, vanished. McClellan's success at Antietam sank into insignificance beside these later and greater victories. The news from the field and the logic of the situation demanded Lincoln's reëlection and even members of the peace party began to think his election meant peace. Swapping horses in the middle of a stream was risky at best; it would be folly indeed to swap off a horse that was going so well as the Lincoln administration was now. The result was

foreshadowed by the early fall elections, Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania going heavily Republican.

Lincoln's popular vote was 2,213,665 against 1,802,237 for McClellan, a majority increased by the soldier vote, 116,887 to 33,748, to a total majority of 494,567. McClellan carried only New Jersey, Delaware and Kentucky, 21 electoral votes to Lincoln's 212. Only in Kansas and Massachusetts were there land-slides, though many states went heavily for Lincoln. New York's vote was, Lincoln, 368,726 to 361,986; Pennsylvania's, 296,389 to 276,308.

The vote shows that the country in 1864 was still normally Democratic. With a split in the party and many Democrats tied to the administration, with its stronghold out of the Union and not voting, with thousands of soldiers who could be relied on to "vote right" sent home for the election, the Democratic candidate in the midst of the war was defeated by the war President by only a little more than ten per cent.

Lincoln was committed to the validity of the reorganized state governments of Louisiana and Tennessee, while the Radicals in Congress were determined that those governments should not be recognized. To prevent such recognition as would be implied by counting their votes, what was known as the "twenty-second joint rule" was hastily put through Congress, which provided that the contested vote of a state should not be counted unless approved by a concurring vote of both houses. This rule is to come up again in 1868 and in 1876. Now and in 1868 the question was largely academic since the result would not be affected either way, but in 1876 its non-observance denied Tilden the Presidency to which he had been elected.

The fight over reconstruction between Lincoln and the Radicals is of great significance as showing how much more in accord with Democratic principles Lincoln's plans were than with those the Radicals advanced and the Republican Party finally adopted.

In his annual message of December, 8, 1863, and a proclamation of the same date Lincoln had proclaimed that whenever in any of the seceded states a number of qualified voters equal to one tenth of the votes cast in the Presidential election of 1860 should take the proper oath and establish a republican state government such government would be recognized. It was the act counteracting this plan which Lincoln vetoed, which veto was the subject of the Wade-Davis manifesto. No other President ever took so strong a position for states rights inside the Union.

The resolution proposing the 13th Amendment to the Constitution was finally adopted, after one defeat, by eight House Democrats declining to vote in order that the necessary two-thirds vote could be attained. Some Democrats thought the amendment illegal; others voted against it, regarding it as an obstacle to peace, though some voted for it as a war measure.

Resolutions introduced by Sunset Cox, Democrat, in 1865, praising Lincoln for his efforts to secure peace, were adopted by the House 105 to 33, 31 Republicans and 2 Democrats making up the **negative vote**.

Prompt and practical readmission of the seceded states after the complete abolition of slavery and return to the Union, with generous treatment of fellow Americans, was Lincoln's policy. The Radicals insisted on confiscation and punishment, placing the freed negroes in control of the seceded states, vengeance, spoils and political subjection.

Lincoln's last cabinet meeting was on April 14th, the afternoon before his death, and reconstruction was the main subject considered. His position then was that subsequently maintained by the Democrats. It was strongly for the rights of states. Secretary Welles' account is received as correct. Stanton's plan for the temporary government of Virginia and North Carolina was considered and Lincoln with some of his cabinet objected to that feature which joined the two states under one government. He directed Stanton to revise his plan and report separate plans for each state. He was unwilling to destroy the individuality of a state.

"I tremble for my countrymen when I remember that God is just and will not withhold his anger forever," wrote Jefferson.

"If God wills that the scourge of war continue until all the wealth piled up by the bondsman's centuries of unrequited toil be sunk and every drop of blood drawn with the lash be paid for by another drawn with the sword, still the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether," wrote Lincoln in his second inaugural address.

His term of office came when the days dreaded by Jefferson came. Stern war for liberty and the preservation of the Union, and then peace instead of hate was Lincoln's problem. The half he least liked he went through, but that part which most would have pleased him, for which he above all other men was best fitted to accomplish, the kindest of our Presidents was denied.

Lincoln's principles and policies were rejected by his party and their very opposites adopted and carried out after his death.

Since then, not the rank and file whose revered prophet he still is, but the Republican Party's leaders, those who, as Woodrow Wilson phrases it, "make its choices," have made it less Lincolnian in its spirit and ideals, in its objects and principles than any political party in American history except the Federalist, whose modern counterpart it is. The Republican Party now is the party of Lincoln only "in that strange spell, a name."

The wise Van Buren foresaw this change. Writing just before his death in 1862, he said: "When that influence"—i.e. the slavery issue—"is spent, the individuals constituting the so-called Republican Party will revert to their original positions." And he recites the old Federalist and modern Republican appeals to special interests, special advantages granted in return for party support, and other similar principles and practices.

One part of Lincoln's first annual message, ostensibly aimed at the Confederate government, seems singularly out of place unless intended for some Hamiltonians in his own party, those fighting for outrageous tariffs and special favors to property and wealth:

"It is not needed or fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions, but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is an effort to place *capital* on an equal footing with, if not above, *labor* in the structure of government. . . .

"Labor is prior to and independent of capital. Capital is only the fruit of labor, and could never have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor is the superior of capital, and deserves much the higher consideration."

Reconstruction became, with the end of war, the great problem. Democratic principles in their application to this question suffered incalculable disaster in Lincoln's death.

CHAPTER XXI

RECONSTRUCTION UNDER JOHNSON AND GRANT

1865-1877

Lincoln's Policy Reversed—Democratic Course—Congress—Grant's Nomination—Tenth Democratic National Convention—Platforms—Seymour and Blair—The Campaign—Encouraging Features of Result—Grant's Course—Policy of Radical Republicans—Carpetbag Government—Voodoo Politics and Government—Ku Klux Klan—Republican Scandals—Finance and Tariff—Liberal Republican Party Nominates Greeley—Grant Renominated—Eleventh Democratic National Convention—Greeley Nominated—Platforms—Campaign—Lamar Eulogizes Sumner—Democratic Tidal Wave—Anti-Third Term Resolution.

"JOHNSON, we have faith in you. By the gods, there will be no trouble now in running the government." So Senator Benjamin Wade, at the head of the joint Congressional committee on the conduct of the war, addressed President Andrew Johnson the day after he was sworn in as Chief Executive after Lincoln's death, as reported by Representative Julian of Indiana, present as a member of the committee. "I hold," said the new President, "treason is a crime and must be punished. Treason must be made infamous and traitors must be impoverished."

This conversation illustrates a fact that seems strange indeed now—that Radical Republicans looked on Lincoln's death as a godsend, that many of the devout ones saw in it a dispensation of Providence removing the great obstacle to punishing their late enemies. It demonstrates, too, how immediately the Republican Party departed from the principles and policies of Lincoln.

The history of the Democratic Party during the reconstruction period is that of a small minority handicapped by the majority party's added strength by reason of having just successfully conducted a war. All the minority could accomplish was sometimes to modify the majority action by siding with the moderates when there were party divisions.

The Radicals soon discovered that they had misunderstood Johnson's views and politics. He hated treason and traitors, as he termed them, but he did not hate states nor the mass of the people of the seceded states. An Andrew Jackson, strict-construction, states rights, anti-tariff Democrat, he had in 1860 stumped his state for Breckenridge. But he loved the Union

and hated those he deemed responsible for secession, who might be described as the official and the higher classes. Lower than Confederate Colonels and men worth say \$20,000 and over, the hate of Andrew Johnson did not descend. He thought he knew in what ranks secession had been bred.

Johnson was a sober-minded, intense sort of man. It is said that the only time he ever evoked so much as a smile in Congress was when in a Senate speech in 1861 he expressed a wish that Massachusetts and South Carolina might be chained together, taken to some remote spot in the ocean and fast anchored there to be washed by the waves and cooled by the winds until the other states recalled them.

Johnson's reconstruction plan was much that of Lincoln's, though not quite so liberal—to get the states back into practical relation with the Union as soon as possible. He required three conditions: the repeal of secession, acceptance of emancipation and repudiation of Confederate debts. Later he added the adoption of the 14th and 15th Amendments.

The Democratic regret over the death of the Whig Party was justified now. It was felt that Northern and Southern Whigs could and would have reunited as thoroughly as the Democrats of the two sections did when peace came. The Republican Party had no old Southern affiliations or ties, though former Whigs and Free-Soil Democrats, now Republicans, were a conciliatory element, but they were outnumbered and outgeneraled by the Radicals.

The first thing the Radical Congress did was to refuse recognition to the new Senators and Representatives from the South, and to appoint a "Reconstruction" committee to report whether those states were entitled to be represented in Congress. One political fact stood out glaringly; the freed negroes, each of whom now counted for a whole man instead of only three-fifths of one in the basis of representation, increased Southern representation about one-fourth in Congress and in the Electoral College. This had its due and undue weight in every reconstruction measure considered. Nor were the state, county and municipal offices in the South left out of consideration.

The Democrats stood on the Constitution and on the Crittenden Resolution, adopted July 2, 1861, in the Senate 30 to 5, in the House with only two dissenting votes. It had been passed after states had seceded and while the other slave states were undecided. It had been adopted to keep those border states in the Union, and on faith of it they had remained and sent soldiers

to the Union armies. The Democrats had strong ground here as a reading of the resolution will show.

"That this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit of oppression, nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the rights and established institutions of those States, but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality and rights of the several States unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

Democratic feeling in the North was well expressed by the resolutions passed at a great Tammany meeting in 1866.

"When we entered the late war, when we put our money, our lives, our reputation in the contest to put down the rebellion, we did it for the sake of preserving the Union and not for keeping the states out of the Union."

John Sharp Williams, in a letter written in 1928 to the author, says that had it not been for the encouragement and support of the Northern Democrats, especially those of Indiana, New Jersey and New York City, the Southern Democrats might have given up the fight and the Cotton States suffered a fate comparable to that of Haiti or Santo Domingo.

Sumner elaborated a theory of "State suicide" which destroyed all rights of seceded states; Stevens without any fine-spun theories declared them conquered provinces, and that Congress, not the President, had the power to deal with them.

The theory of an indissoluble Union could not withstand the practical necessities of the situation. The Democratic logic was good, but the logic of events, the logic of politics and of the election returns prevailed over it. Again was the moral common-sense of the people against the Democrats, and opposed to turning over to the Southern states the civil and political future of the emancipated negroes, as much as the fair-minded people of the North realized the evils of negro suffrage, only six Northern states allowing negroes to vote.

The problem was finally worked out during the succeeding twelve years, in an American way; E. L. Godkin summarized completed reconstruction as—"The work of sentimentalists controlled by knaves." Through it all the Democrats worked with the moderate Republicans for a plan as like Lincoln's as developments permitted. The Liberal Republicans in and out of Congress, Senators like Trumbull, in whose office William Jennings

Bryan studied law later, B. Gratz Brown, Doolittle, Dixon and Cowan, and Governors Andrews of Massachusetts and Morton of Indiana were in accord with Democratic views on reconstruction. From the Democrats no positive action was possible or needed; their whole duty was to restrain immoderate action.

The better opinion now is that had the Lincoln-Johnson Democratic plan been carried out a saner and earlier reconstruction would have resulted. John Sherman, at that time a thorough-going Radical, and at all times a stubborn-minded Republican, in his *Recollections* say: "After this long lapse of time, I am convinced that Mr. Johnson's scheme of reorganization was wise and judicious. It was unfortunate that it had not the sanction of Congress, and that events soon brought the President and Congress into hostilities."

The Democrats opposed the 14th and 15th Amendments, the bill curtailing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and all radical legislation.

With the conservative Republicans the Democrats defeated the impeachment of Andrew Johnson and saved the nation from an act of gross partisan injustice and folly.

The Senate consisted of 40 Republicans, 8 Democrats and 3 Independents; the House of 145 Republicans and 40 Democrats. Congress' first act, the Stevens' reconstruction committee resolution, was adopted 133 to 36 in the House, and barred forthwith Johnson's policy.

The Thirty-ninth Congress had in the Senate 40 Republicans, 8 Democrats and 3 Independents; in the House 145 Republicans and 40 Democrats. The Fortieth Congress was made up of a Senate of 55 Republicans, 8 Democrats and 3 Independents, and a House of 174 Republicans and 49 Democrats and Independents. It was this Congress that put through the 14th and 15th Amendments, curtailed the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and purchased Alaska, this last measure receiving Democratic support and opposition from some leading Radicals. It impeached President Johnson. The tone of the majority of this Congress may be judged from the fact that it applauded the action of Wade, President of the Senate, who would succeed to the Presidency in the event of Johnson's conviction, in voting guilty on every count in the articles of impeachment.

Grave fears were excited in conservative minds when a bank, whose president was H. D. Cooke, a member of Jay Cooke & Co., the financial agents of the government, advertised in 1867 for Confederate bonds. Was there to be another "assumption of state debts?"

The Democrats joined with conservative Republicans in attempting tax reduction, but no tariff bill could be passed, the House being in control of high-tariff advocates who fought for an increase of rates admittedly excessive when made and only justified as a war measure. The Senate favored a lowering of rates. The woolen growers and manufacturers combined and succeeded in putting a high tariff on wool, just as they did forty-five years later when President Taft said in speaking of the famous Schedule K: "It was found that in the Republican Party the interests of the wool growers of the West and the woolen manufacturers of the East are still sufficiently strong to defeat any attempt to change the woolen tariff."

On the question of contraction of the currency, the Democrats rejected the lead of Thurman and Bayard, Democrats, and followed John Sherman, Republican (who afterward changed his views), and voted against contraction.

Grant's nomination by the Republicans in 1868 was a foregone conclusion sometime before the convention, and the contention there was over the selection for second place. Grant had been a Democrat, voting for Buchanan, and favoring Douglass in 1860, though he had cared little for politics.

The Democrats wished much to nominate Grant, but he felt that he owed his eminence to the other party, probably agreed with it on most matters, and his quarrel with Johnson over his giving up the War portfolio to Stanton without warning threw the General still more into Republican and Radical hands, and caused the latter to trust him and his views.

The Republican convention met at Chicago May 20th, and Grant was nominated by acclamation. On the fifth ballot Schuyler Colfax was chosen for second place. This gave adjoining states, Illinois and Indiana, the two places on the ticket.

The Tenth Democratic National Convention met in Tammany Hall, New York, July 4th. "Gentleman" George Pendleton, the Vice-Presidential nominee of 1864, champion of what was called the "Ohio Idea," had long been the leading candidate of those who favored paying the U. S. 5-20 war bonds in greenbacks and not in gold. This Ohio idea developed later into the Greenback Party. General Winfield Scott Hancock was the favorite of the Soldiers and Sailors; he was popular, too, at the South because of his course as military governor of Louisiana. The Southern delegates outwardly were for President Johnson, but with only half a heart. Chief Justice Chase had friends in this convention as well as at the Chicago one; his Democracy clung to him through all vicissitudes of politics. His elimination as a

candidate was attributed to Tilden's skillful opposition,—and Kate Chase Sprague remembered this in 1876.

This convention was the first national convention since 1860 in which all states were represented. August Belmont, chairman of the National Committee, called it to order. Henry L. Palmer was temporary, Horatio Seymour permanent chairman. The two-thirds and unit rules were adopted by adopting the rules of the 1864 convention, the proposal to adopt the rules of the "Radical" House of Representatives being overwhelmingly rejected. The unit rule was twice questioned and upheld. The two-thirds rule came up for interpretation and it was held that a nomination required two-thirds of the number of the Electoral College, that is, of a full convention, not merely of the number voting. General Richardson, Douglass' manager at Charleston and Baltimore in 1860, opposed the rule and announced that he would move that in all future conventions it be abandoned as mischievous and un-Democratic. Kernan of New York defended it as assuring Democratic sentiment; he did not want his own or any others' judgment to prevail unless two-thirds of the convention approved it.

The territories were denied representation. A memorial from the Women's Suffrage Association, signed by Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Mrs. Horace Greeley was received and read, but no action taken on it. The platform was adopted before nominations allowed.

The platform unanimously recommended by the resolutions committee was adopted by the convention without discussion or dissent. The nominating speeches were limited to five minutes. James E. English, W. S. Hancock, George H. Pendleton, Joel Parker, Sanford E. Church, Asa Packer, Andrew Johnson, James R. Doolittle were nominated. Afterward Thomas A. Hendricks, Frank P. Blair, Stephen J. Field and Horatio Seymour were put in nomination at various times between ballots. The number of delegates was 317, necessary to a choice 212.

The first ballot was, Pendleton 105, Johnson 65, Hancock 33, the other votes scattered among favorite sons. Johnson immediately began to fade out of the picture, losing 13 on the second ballot, Hancock gaining them. For many ballots Hancock, Hendricks and Pendleton ran well without making any progress. Pendleton's name was withdrawn and the nineteenth ballot gave Hancock 135, Hendricks 107. It was said that the East wanted neither of these two and kept the vote scattered, but the ballots afford no proof of this.

When Ohio was called on the twenty-second ballot, General

McCook nominated Seymour and before the result was announced enough states changed their votes to nominate him and the unanimous vote of the convention was given him, although he had repeatedly declined to be a candidate and had just addressed the convention, closing with the words "Your candidate I cannot be."

Frank P. Blair, Union general, was nominated, and seconded for second place on the ticket by Generals Preston of Kentucky and Wade Hampton of South Carolina, late of the Confederate army, and was chosen unanimously.

The Democratic candidate had been distinguished in New York politics since 1841, when he was elected as a Democrat to the Assembly. Defeated for Governor in 1850 by a plurality of only 262, he was elected in 1852, defeated again in 1854 by a plurality of only 309; in 1862 he defeated General James Wadsworth by 10,000 votes. As War Governor and Democrat Seymour was conspicuously able and loyal. As Governor he commissioned more than 13,000 officers in the volunteer service of the Union. Blair, his running mate, was an able and famous son of an able and noted father.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM

Favored. Restoration of States and amnesty; payment of public debt in lawful money unless otherwise provided by law or contract; equal tax on all property, including government bonds; one currency for people and for bondholders; abolishment of Freedmen's Bureau and all instrumentalities to secure negro supremacy in the South; tariff for revenue with incidental protection; independence of the executive, legislative and judicial branches; liberal public land policy to settlers, unity and Union; protection of naturalized citizens.

Condemned. Corruption and course of the Radical Congress, especially its reconstruction acts.

Commended. President Johnson.

An expression of sympathy for Labor and a commendation of Chief Justice Chase for impartiality in the impeachment trial were added.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

Approved. Reconstruction policy.

Denounced. All forms of "repudiation," and condemned President Johnson's course.

Favored. Equal suffrage to all loyal men in the South; payment of public debt according to letter and spirit of the law; reduction of taxes and prompt payment of public debt; immigration, and protection of naturalized citizens.

Commended. Rebels who were coöperating with Republicans in restoring peace.

Endorsed. The Declaration of Independence.

Tariff not mentioned.

The financial planks of the Democratic platform were a distinct departure from the old Jeffersonian and more especially Jacksonian "hard money" principles, and a yielding to the Western Democracy which insisted on the Ohio idea. This was a surrender to expediency, a concession to outside elements of the opposition to the majority party, which minority parties usually make.

"The same money for the plough-holder and the bond-holder, One money for the laborer and the idle rich," seemed a catchy argument in 1868.

Seymour and Blair made a spirited campaign, the latter so aggressive as to offend some Conservatives. It was said that neither much liked the financial planks of the platform, but both stood manfully by that document. The Democrats were fearfully handicapped. Three Democratic states were not yet in the Union, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, and the Republicans with their carpet-bag governments had a strangle-hold on several others. The odium of secession, in many minds, still attached to the party. The financial interests rallied to Republican support and the manufacturing interests knew where tariff favors lay, despite the silence of the Republican platform on that subject.

The immense popularity of General Grant made the campaign a one-sided affair from the start, yet the result had some encouraging features. The Democrats polled over forty-four per cent of the entire vote and a majority of something like 300,000 of the white voters of the country, the 650,000 colored vote all going Republican. In not a single state had the defeat been inglorious, and many Liberal Republicans remained permanently in the Democratic ranks.

The count showed Grant 3,012,833, Seymour 2,703,249; the electoral vote was 214 to 80.

In the face of the twenty-second joint rule the vote of Georgia, which was objected to, was counted, under a special concurrent resolution dealing solely with this state's vote at this election. But the joint rule was left in full force.

It was said of Johnson that he was a statesman, but no politician or diplomat, and of Grant that he was none of the three, but a mere soldier, a plain, blunt man that loved his friends not wisely but too well and trusted them entirely too much.

Realizing that they owed their recent victory to the negro vote of the South, in the Forty-first Congress the Radicals set out to perpetuate negro political control in that section. Their only

restraint was the fact that they could not have one federal constitution and suffrage law for the South and another for the North. The Democratic minority was so small that all it could do was to remonstrate.

The Forty-second Congress, the first since 1860 to have every seat filled, saw the 101 Republican House majority cut to 35; the Senate was little changed.

The Radicals, by enforcement acts, federal election acts, Ku Klux Klan bills endeavored to rivet securely negro domination on the Southern States. While the governments thus established endured, such a saturnalia of folly and corruption ensued as has not existed elsewhere since the dawn of civilization.

The negro legislators of the Southern States spat in \$60 imported cuspidors, looked at their own images in \$600 mirrors, trod on the finest Wilton carpets later transferred from legislative halls to their own cabins. Silk garters and chemises, bonnets, suspenders, champagne, mushrooms, gold watches, fine whiskies, and at least one ornate metallic coffin were listed as "Legislative Expenses," and paid for out of the state treasury. Taxes in Mississippi in 1874 were fourteen times the rate in 1859; the fixed indebtedness of the states under Carpet-bag rule was increased \$172,000,000 or nearly 130 per cent. The South was the most heavily taxed people in the history of the civilized world. This was voodoo government.

The Republican Party in the South was made up of three classes: the Scalawags or renegade Southern whites who consorted with the negro, the Carpet-baggers, Northerners, some few of whom were excellent men, but the great body of whom came South with all their worldly goods in a valise to make their fortunes, politically or otherwise, out of disordered conditions; lastly, the great mass of the party—the freed negroes.

The negroes and their white "friends" were organized in Loyal or Union Leagues, the Southern whites into Knights of the White Camelia, or Knights of the Ku Klux Klan. The ignorant negro returning home at midnight from a Loyal League meeting conducted with many weird and mystic ceremonies was likely to be met by a band of hooded horsemen, clad in white, their horses similarly caparisoned, and he was fortunate if he escaped with nothing more serious than witnessing some more ghostly and weird ceremonies. This was voodoo politics.

Like all things possessing a mysterious element, especially with the ignorant and superstitious people involved, the activities of the Ku Klux Klan and its political effect were tremendously

exaggerated. When Congress came to investigate the subject only a few states were investigated, and not more than forty counties in the whole South examined into.

The Carpet-baggers promised every negro voter forty acres and a mule. They gave their colored brother the whiskey and cigars and other "Legislative Expenses," but they themselves took the fat offices, the bond issues, the public contracts. Wisely enough they selected the very best of their colored material to send to Washington for the world to see, but their choice of local officers was not refined by any such considerations.

But the real truth gradually penetrated the North and so soon as it did these fantastic Carpet-bag governments fell. The reconstruction acts, or rather that small portion of them not declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, were gradually all repealed or, like the 15th Amendment, shorn of their radicalism in their practical application. Time and the good sense of the American people have vindicated the position of the Conservative Republicans and the Democrats.

A most striking feature of Democratic history during the Reconstruction period and the "Bloody Shirt" era, until the defeat of the Lodge Force bill ended the phase, was the adherence by Northern, Eastern and Western Democrats to their constitutional and party principles which held them to the unpopular support of Southern political rights, methods and practices.

Many a good Democrat thereby sacrificed his political career when it would have been easy, indeed would have met with applause, to have alleged the highest moral and patriotic grounds for a defection from his party's policy in this particular. There is nothing more honorable in Democratic history than the story of this loyalty.

Carpet-bag corruption in the South was paralleled in New York City by Boss Tweed and in Washington City by Boss Shepherd. It is illustrative of the political morals of the day that Garfield thought it permissible for him to take a \$5,000 fee from contractors having large dealings with the city while as chairman of the house appropriations committee he passed on all their claims.

Grant's administration, despite his own private personal honesty, was honeycombed with corruption. Grant had his Daugherty in his private secretary and intimate friend, Orville E. Babcock; in Bellknap he had his Albert Fall, and there were Charles Forbes and Jess Smiths in abundance.

The whiskey ring, the Sanford frauds in collection of back

taxes, Secretary Bellknap's bribery, every department was smirched. Even the State Department did not escape; holders of certificates awarded by the Mixed Venezuelan Commission asked that the government recall the certificates as they had been compelled to pay one of the American commissioners fifty per cent of their claims to have them allowed. The army bill for 1873-4 contained an item of \$200,000 for preservation of clothing and equipment from moth and mildew. The Freedman's Bureau had its scandal. The government was defrauded of untold millions.

Congress itself was seriously implicated when the Credit Mobilier scandal cropped out, although an investigation exonerated all but a few members. The Credit Mobilier was a corporation organized by and mostly owned by the leading stockholders of the Union Pacific Railroad; it was given huge contracts for construction at high rates, which it sublet at more reasonable prices, the profits going to the Credit Mobilier Company. Stock in the company was placed, by sale or gift, where it "would do the most good." Vice-President Colfax, the Secretary of the Treasury, two Senators, and two ex-Senators, Speaker Blaine, and six other members of the House were implicated in the charges. Only three were found guilty, but grave suspicion, never removed, rested on some of the others.

The legislative branch of the government was still in bad odor when the Forty-second Congress on the last day of its existence passed the "Salary Grab" bill, increasing salaries of high officials, and making the increase retroactive so as to apply to their two years services just ending. But this Congress passed a broad amnesty act and Sumner, although voting against the amnesty bill, moved that the government should not perpetuate the memory of the War between the States, and that the names of battles with fellow citizens should not be continued in the Army Register or placed on the regimental colors.

The practical politicians at the head of the Radical party, the "Old Guard" of that day, would pardon anything, protect anybody, provided only they would go the limit for negro domination politically of the South, which would place in their hands control of nearly one-fourth of the political power of the country. It was a tremendous political asset they strove to keep possession of.

As for the President, the whole world has long come to believe the truth of the statement in his memoirs:

"I have acted in every instance from a conscientious desire to do what was right. Failures have been errors of judgment, not of intent."

Thurman and Bayard Democrats joined Sherman in opposing the inflation bill of 1874, championed by the "Paper Money Trinity," Morton, Logan and Ferry. It passed the Senate 29 to 24, the House 140 to 102, and Grant vetoed it. The act demonetizing silver, the "Crime of 1873" it came later to be called, was passed without attracting any attention at the time.

The Specie Resumption Act was passed, after the elections showed a majority of Democrats in the next House, and fixed January 1, 1879, as the day to begin the redemption of greenbacks in coin. Thurman, Bayard and Schurz fought it because it did not provide against the reissuance of the greenbacks thus retired; but the Paper Money Trinity would not have it otherwise, and Sherman yielded. This was to occasion great trouble in future administrations, notably Cleveland's second term. It passed the Senate 32 to 14, 11 of the nays being Democrats; the House vote was 136 to 98, Dawes, the two Hoars and 20 other Republicans voted no with most of the Democrats. The Tariff bill of 1872 was a moderate measure, a false start toward reform.

In 1870, certain Republicans in Missouri, led by Carl Schurz and Joseph Pulitzer, who favored removal of political disabilities, by combination with the Democrats elected B. Gratz Brown governor. They then assumed the name Liberal Republicans and called a convention to meet in Cincinnati in May, 1872, of all opposed to the administration and in favor of reform. Four principles were advanced, a general amnesty, civil service reform, specie payments and tariff reform. The Springfield Republican, Chicago Tribune, Cincinnati Commercial, Nation, New York Evening Post and World and Courier-Journal gave the movement support, and only the tariff issue kept Greeley's Tribune from endorsing it. Many of the best men of the Conservative Republicans joined the movement.

The "New Departure" policy of the Democrats, which meant full acceptance of the results of the war, and the adoption of new issues with reform as the keynote, made an alliance between the Liberal Republicans and the Democrats possible.

As Grant was impregably fixed in his associations and certain of renomination, it was recognized that the new party must nominate an independent candidate. Charles Francis Adams, Trumbull, Greeley, Sumner and Judge Davis were all under consideration. So promising did the movement appear that many

politicians hastened to join it, especially disappointed applicants for Grant's favor.

The Liberal Republican convention met May 1, 1872, "as honest, intelligent, public spirited a body of men as ever got together for a similar purpose," said one observer. The delegates were unaccredited, but the votes were distributed among the states according to the usual plan of conventions. Schurz was made chairman when he should have been left upon the floor. Adams was the choice of the real leaders, and it is yet believed that had he been nominated the ticket would have won.

The first ballot was Adams, 203, Greeley, 147, Trumbull, 110, Brown, 95, Davis, 62, Curtin, 62. Missouri voted for Adams, and Brown, being persuaded that he was being betrayed, appeared before the convention and urged Greeley's nomination. This had great effect. The sixth ballot was Adams 324, Greeley 332, and a change of votes before announcement gave Greeley the nomination. On the second ballot B. Gratz Brown was unanimously nominated for second place.

The sole interest in the Republican convention was the selection of Grant's running mate. The convention met in Philadelphia in June. Grant was nominated by acclamation, Senator Henry Wilson for second place:

The Labor Reformers held a convention in February and nominated Judge David Davis and Joel Parker. Both candidates declined and Charles O'Connor was named in Judge Davis' place. O'Connor was a Catholic.

The National Prohibition Party held a convention at Columbus, Ohio, in February, and nominated James Black of Pennsylvania and John Russell of Michigan.

Eighteen Democratic state conventions, among them New York, had instructed their delegates to adopt the platform and ticket of the Liberal Republicans, so the action of the Democratic Party was hardly in doubt some time before its convention. Tammany sent its delegation to Baltimore with strong resolutions for general amnesty and protest against keeping Southern states out of their constitutional rights and their place in the Union.

The Eleventh Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore July 9, 1872, 732 delegates. Thomas Jefferson Randolph, grandson of the founder of the party, was temporary chairman, and Senator James R. Doolittle, now a full-fledged Democrat, permanent presiding officer. The rules of the preceding convention, which included the two-thirds and unit rules, were unanimously adopted. A notable feature of this convention was the

conspicuous absence of many of the old Democratic war horses; evidently this was a battle they preferred to sniff from afar rather than participate in. The truth was the convention was a capitulation, not a fight.

It was proposed to adopt the platform and candidates of the Liberal Republicans. Bayard opposed this while Reagan of Texas, late member of the Confederate cabinet, advocated it. The platform was adopted by a vote of 670 to 62; Greeley's name was presented and without further nomination or discussion a ballot was taken—Greeley, 686, Jeremiah Black, 21, James A. Bayard, 15, blank ballots, 8. The nomination was made unanimous. The Democrats were "eating crow" and they evinced as little distaste for the diet as was possible. The only ballot for second place showed B. Gratz Brown, 713, Stevenson of Kentucky, 6, blank ballots, 13.

The territories were given representation on committees but not allowed to vote on the platform or candidates. August Belmont, after twelve years' service as chairman of the national committee, resigned and Augustus Schell, his successor as committeeman from New York, was chosen chairman over Cyrus McCormick of Illinois.

Dissatisfied Democrats held a convention at Louisville in September, censured the action of the regulars and nominated Charles O'Connor and John Quincy Adams, on a conservative Democratic platform.

Both parties declared for resumption of specie payments and for civil service reform and against further grants of public lands to corporations. The opposing reconstruction policies were respectively set out. On the tariff the Republicans declared for duties upon importations so adjusted as to aid remunerative wages to labor and promotion to all industries.

Greeley himself wrote the tariff plank of the Liberal Republicans and Democrats and promised not to veto any tariff measure.

"Recognizing differences of opinion on the tariff question we remit the discussion of the subject to the people of the Congressional districts and the decision of Congress, free from executive interference or discussion."

A similar remission of the prohibition question in 1928 has been suggested.

The regret over the failure of the Liberal Republicans to name Charles Francis Adams deepened. The opinion has always prevailed with many that he would have been elected.

The Republicans were derisively happy over Greeley's nomination. Despite the confidence his honesty inspired, the affection a large number of people had for him and his great ability along certain lines, he was ridiculous as the candidate of the Democratic Party. He was one of the best men, one of the poorest politicians and the most impossible Democratic candidate the country could produce.

Nor did the platform appeal to the great body of the men opposed to Grant or to the Republican policies. There was an earnest and widespread demand for tariff reduction, and the surrender, in the platform and in the candidate, of that policy destroyed at once hope for tariff reform and confidence in the integrity of the party making such a sacrifice of principle for politics's sake. The contest became one between the personalities, the objectionabilities of Grant and Greeley.

Grant, it was argued, was as personally honest as Greeley and Greeley as credulous, as easy a dupe as Grant; he had long been associated in New York with a set of politicians as base as those surrounding Grant in Washington. Greeley had more "first class weaknesses" than any man living, so it was generally agreed, and Grant more objectionable frailties.

The politicians, even those who had maneuvered Greeley's nomination at the convention, soon saw the hopelessness of his cause and made haste to square themselves with the administration. Even some of the strongest original supporters of the liberal movement refused to countenance the folly of supporting Greeley. It was a heart-breaking campaign and really did break Greeley's heart.

General Sherman described the anomalous character of the race in a letter to his brother: "Grant, who never was a Republican, is your candidate, and Greeley, who never was a Democrat but quite the reverse, is the Democratic candidate." Senator Sherman replied: "As you say the Republicans are running a Democrat and the Democrats a Republican. And there is not an essential difference in the platforms. The chief interest I feel in the canvass is the preservation of the Republican Party."

Greeley suffered many mishaps. The Woman's Suffrage Association condemned him, and Boss Tweed came out strongly for him. His oddities of dress and manner, his many isms and whimsicalities lent themselves to ridicule, against which his ability and worth were poor defenses in a political campaign.

The popular vote was Grant, 3,597,132, Greeley, 2,834,125, O'Connor, 29,489 and Black, 5,608. The electoral vote was Grant,

272, Greeley, 66. Greeley carried only six states, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Tennessee and Texas. Though there were large majorities against him in many states, Greeley received a respectable vote in every one. His death occurring before the count, his electoral vote was given 42 to Thomas A. Hendricks, 18 to B. Gratz Brown.

The votes of several states were objected to when the count was made before the two houses, but all were settled in joint session except those of Arkansas and Louisiana. Sitting separately, each house rejected Louisiana's vote; the Senate rejected Arkansas' vote while the House admitted it. The result was that under the twenty-second joint rule the vote of Arkansas was not counted.

A speech which had great political effect, made in the Forty-third Congress, applauded by Republicans and Democrats, by the North and the South, was the eulogy of Charles Sumner by L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, in the House, a few days after Sumner's death. From his entry into the Senate in 1851 until shortly before his end, Sumner had been the most bitter and persistent enemy of slavery—and the South—in either branch of Congress. His extreme bitterness had caused the personal assault on him by Representative Brooks in 1856. Praising with justice and tact Sumner's virtues, learning and shining abilities, and ascribing justly his animosity toward the South to his intense hatred of slavery, Lamar eulogized his recent generous gesture to the Lost Cause and its followers. Sumner, the Radical Republican, scarred by Southern violence, and Lamar, Southern Democrat and lately a proscribed rebel, were the two men in Congress during the whole reconstruction period who struck the truest national note.

The year 1874 saw the Democratic "Tidal Wave." Tilden was elected Governor of New York and the Democrats also carried the Ohio, Indiana, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania state elections. The new House contained 168 Democrats, 14 Liberals and 108 Radicals; the Republicans still controlled the Senate.

The panic of 1873, dissatisfaction with Republican financial legislation, Grant's backsliding on civil service reform, the corruption and inefficiency of the administration, the Credit Mobilier, the salary grab and other Congressional scandals, all combined to bring about the result. Then, too, Lamar's speech brought about an era of "good feeling." In Ohio a temperance movement frowned upon by the Republicans in power threw its votes to the Democratic candidates.

The Forty-fourth Congress, with a Democratic House and a Republican Senate and President, accomplished little actual legislation. It was a busy Congress, however. It impeached Bellknap, Secretary of War, who escaped conviction by resigning. George F. Hoar was one of the managers on the part of the House.

The frauds in the navy were exposed, and appropriations reduced \$30,000,000. The Senate prevented further reduction.

In strong contrast to his two immediate predecessors was Michael C. Kerr of Indiana, the Democratic Speaker. He defeated Blaine, 173 to 106, which fairly indicates the political complexion of the House.

One resolution of ever-recurring interest was passed by the House, 234 to 18, the overwhelming vote in its favor ending the agitation for a third term to General Grant, 70 out of 88 Republicans voting aye. The resolution read:

"In the opinion of this House the precedent established by Washington and other Presidents of the United States in retiring from the Presidential office after their second term, has become by universal concurrence, a part of our Republican system of government, and any departure from this time-honored custom would be unwise, unpatriotic and fraught with peril to our free institutions."

Speaker Kerr dying, Samuel J. Randall was Speaker during the last session of this Congress. Practically its entire attention was devoted to the disputed Tilden-Hayes election.

In the January 16, 1875, number, Appleton's Journal editorially comments on an interesting innovation lately introduced into English politics. Two Liberal candidates agreed to an informal poll of the Liberal electors a week before the real election, and the loser withdrew allowing the favorite to poll the full party vote. The adoption of the practice was recommended to America. This seems to have been the inception of primary elections. Some localities in this country did soon adopt it, but the primary system did not become general until in the Nineties. As both parties adopted it, where it was adopted, its effects were intra-party, and seems to have helped one party no more than the other.

The Presidential year 1876 found the Democratic Party in splendid condition. The Democratic House and Speaker Kerr had made a good impression on the nation. The scandals of the administration were resented by the majority of the Republican rank and file. Hopes for victory and a Democratic President were soundly based.

CHAPTER XXII

TILDEN-HAYES DISPUTED ELECTION

1876-1880

Twelfth Democratic National Convention—Tilden's Acceptance—Republican Convention—Other Conventions—Platforms—Democratic and Republican Indictments of Republican Record—The Candidates and Campaign—A Fatal Inquiry—The Long Contest—The Visiting Statesmen—The Louisiana Case—Florida Case—Twenty-Second Joint Rule—Electoral Commission—Eight to Seven Rulings—Wormley Conference—Tilden's Course—Hayes' Administration—Troops Withdrawn from South—Democratic House—Forty-Sixth Congress Democratic—Impolitic Action—State of Party.

THE Twelfth Democratic National Convention was held at St. Louis, June 27, 1876, two weeks after the nomination of Hayes and Wheeler by the Republicans. The call had been addressed to "Democrats, Conservatives and all other citizens irrespective of past political associations desiring to coöperate with the Democratic Party." The convention chose Henry Watterson for temporary, General John A. McClernand for permanent president. The speeches made in the convention stressed reform, and enthusiasm and applause marked the proceedings from first to last. The popularity of Tilden, Hancock and Hendricks was evinced whenever any opportunity was given. The rules of the preceding convention were adopted, and mention of the two-thirds rule applauded. The delegates from the District of Columbia and the territories were given seats in the hall but no vote.

Two minority reports were submitted with the platform, one by Eastern men wishing to strengthen the hard money plank, and the other by the soft money advocates who desired to weaken it. The soft money amendment was voted down 515 to 219, the Ohio and neighboring states voting aye, the East and South mainly voting nay. The platform as submitted was then adopted, 651 to 83, Ohio and Indiana supplying 50 of the negative votes.

Thomas F. Bayard, Thomas A. Hendricks, Leon Abbett, Joel Parker, Wm. Allen, General Hancock and Samuel J. Tilden were nominated. Senator Kernan of New York nominated Tilden and John Kelly made a speech against the nomination. There was a disposition on the part of many delegates to shout down the

Tammany chief with cheers for Tilden, but on strong insistence from Tilden leaders he was listened to. He made no criticism of Tilden, though there may have been a sinister intimation in his repeated, "I tell you if you nominate Tilden you will regret it. His nomination will be fatal," but based his opposition solely on Tilden's unavailability. He advised a Western, an Ohio or Indiana man. No Eastern man could be elected, he argued, citing the defeats of McClellan, Seymour and Greeley. But Tilden's organization was compact, their plans well matured and well executed.

There being 738 delegates, 492 votes were necessary to a choice. The first ballot was, Tilden, 417 (from East and South); Hendricks, 140 (Mid-western States); Hancock, 75 (Pennsylvania's 58 and scattering); Allen, 56 (Ohio and West Virginia); Bayard, 33 (Delaware and Georgia); Parker, 18 (New Jersey).

The second ballot gave Tilden 535, Hendricks 85 and Hancock his own state's 58, whereupon amid tremendous enthusiasm Tilden's nomination was made unanimous.

Hendricks was unanimously placed in nomination and unanimously nominated for second place on the ticket. He represented Western claims and views, being at least moderately "soft" on resumption and the money question generally. General Ewing and William Allen, both of Ohio, were the veteran soft money advocates in the party. John Kelly made a speech after the nominations, appealing for harmony in the party, pledging his own and his friends' loyalty to the ticket and prophesying success.

Before adjournment, Webber of Michigan offered a resolution recommending abolishing the two-thirds rule as unwise and unnecessary, and requesting the state conventions to instruct their delegates to the next convention whether to continue the rule or not. The convention by a vote of 379 to 359 refused to table this resolution. The resolution was then voted on in sections, and adopted. A motion hereafter to allow the District and the territories one vote each was laid on the table. Abram S. Hewitt of New York was chosen as chairman of the National Committee.

Tilden's letter of acceptance was argumentative and discursive and three times as lengthy as the platform. Some thought it weakened the platform, but he was emphatic on the resumption and money questions.

The Democratic platform of 1876 has been called a masterpiece of political literature; the writing of it was attributed to Manton Marble of the New York World, but a great deal of its

rhetoric is much like that of Henry Watterson's and the authorship of the tariff plank is credited to him. It was an able declaration of principles ably presented and its reading was punctuated with frequent and great applause.

The Republican convention was held on June 14th in Cincinnati. The Congressional anti-third term resolution and Grant's letter on the subject had ended Grant's candidacy.

The first ballot gave Blaine 285 (77 from the South), Morton, 125; Bristow, 113; Conkling, 99; Hayes, 61. The seventh ballot was Hayes, 384; Blaine, 351; Bristow, 21. The nomination was made unanimous, and William A. Wheeler of New York named for second place on first ballot.

During the balloting the chair ruled that each delegate could vote his sentiments regardless of state instructions; this ruling was confirmed at the succeeding convention, and the unit rule has never since been observed at Republican national conventions.

The Prohibitionists nominated Green Clay Smith and G. T. Stewart.

The Independent National, or Greenback Party, at a convention presided over by Ignatius Donnelly nominated Peter Cooper and General S. F. Carey.

The American National Party nominated James B. Walker of Illinois and Donald Kirkpatrick of New York on a platform declaring God the author of civil government, and favoring Sabbath observance, prohibition, forfeiture of all charters granted secret societies, Bible in schools and direct vote for President.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1876

Reform the immediate need of the country recently rescued from secession and now to be saved from a corrupt centralism which had inflicted Carpet-bag government on the South and honeycombed the government with fraud.

Reform necessary to establish a sound currency.

Republican failure to redeem greenbacks, the wasting of vast sums instead of resuming specie payments, and the existing system of taxation denounced.

Reform in public expenditures, in preserving public lands for settlers, in protection of citizens of foreign birth, in Chinese immigration and importation of women for immoral purposes demanded.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1876

Declaration of Independence quoted and mission of party asserted to be to enforce its principles; to pacify South with complete protection of all citizens in their rights the solemn duty of Congress and President. Civil Service perfunctorily endorsed, and dictation of appointments by members of Congress deprecated.

Non-sectarian schools, no further grants of public lands except to settlers; and protection of foreign-born citizens advocated.

Chinese immigration should be investigated.

Woman's demands for additional rights and privileges declared entitled to respectful consideration.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1876

Non-secretarian schools supported by the States approved.

Sectionalism deplored.

Tariff. Present tariff levied upon nearly 4,000 articles yet yielding a dwindling revenue and impoverishing many industries to subsidize a few condemned. All custom house taxation should be for revenue.

Resumption. Resumption Clause of Act of 1875 should be repealed because it is an actual hindrance to speedy return to specie payments.

The Republican Party indicted for corruption, with instances cited.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1876

Polygamy condemned.

Sectionalism deplored.

Tariff. Duties upon importations should be adjusted to promote interests of American labor and advance the prosperity of the whole country.

Resumption. Administration's course of good faith to public creditors and pledge to redeem all notes in coin recited, and continued progress to specie payment promised.

Democratic Party indicted for sympathy for treason and promotion of Confederate over Union soldiers.

The Democratic plank referring to Republican corruption is probably the severest in American or English political literature. How justified it was by facts may be seen by comparing it with the peroration of George F. Hoar's speech in Secretary Bellknap's impeachment trial. Senator Hoar was a Republican of the Republicans. Both describe a corruption unparalleled in our history far worse than the scandals of the Harding administration, though involving smaller monetary values, because of the much larger number of officials convicted or besmirched. The Vice-President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of the Navy, the Attorney General, the Ambassador to England, the President's private secretary, the Speaker of the House and five chairmen of leading committees, and three Senators were involved. Five federal judges resigned rather than face impeachment.

Tilden was par excellence the Democratic candidate on a reform platform. His political record was based on his prosecution and overthrow of the Tweed ring in New York City followed by his election as Governor and his successful exposé of the Canal ring, a powerful combination of men of both parties in the State who were making millions annually out of canal contracts. A gentleman of high private character and a lawyer of eminent ability, his weakest spot was his war record. He had not performed any military service, though giving loyal aid to the government, the two only surviving members of Lincoln's cabinet testifying to this and supporting him. His war record and his wealth were the criticisms most urged against him by the Republicans during the campaign.

Hendricks with his soft money views hurt the ticket in the East; this may have lost the Democrats Connecticut and New Hampshire where Hayes' majorities were small; but he doubtless added strength in the West, and Indiana alone made up for the loss of the two States named. The state of Tilden's health gave the Vice-Presidency unusual consideration in cautious minds.

Hayes' private character was unexceptional and his civil and war records excellent. He defeated Thurman for Governor in 1867, Pendleton in 1869, and William Allen in 1873. Wounded while leading his men in a charge against the Confederates at South Mountain, and breveted Major-General for courage, his war record was worth a million votes.

The Presidential contest in 1872 had been a weighing largely of the relative Presidential demerits of Grant and Greeley; in 1876 both candidates were recognized as fit and capable men and the issue was between the parties and their platforms, the Republican Party being on the defensive, but its candidate not. The Republicans, however, assumed the offensive by waving the Bloody Shirt. "A Bloody Shirt campaign with money and Indiana is safe; a financial campaign with no money and we are beaten"—so wrote an Indiana campaign manager to Hayes. Zack Chandler, Secretary of the Interior, and Republican national chairman, raised the money, partly by heavy assessments against office-holders, and a "Bloody Shirt campaign with money" ensued. As any number of office-holders faced not only loss of position but possible disgrace and prison terms in case of Republican defeat, the money was forthcoming.

The Republicans made a powerful drive against the "Rebel Brigadier" and the "Second Rebellion," and Tammany and the Solid South were linked together as twin iniquities. Abram S. Hewitt, manager of the Democratic campaign, lofty-minded and scholarly, was no match in hard-boiled politics for Chandler.

An examination of the vote indicates that on the whole the electorate voted on the real issues involved, except that section-alism worked on enough voters to carry several Western and Midwestern States for the Republican ticket, Oregon by 1,000, California by less than 2,000, Ohio by less than two per cent.

The morning after the election every newspaper in the country announced Tilden's election, except the New York Times, which claimed that the result was in doubt. The Times gave Tilden 184, Hayes 181, with Florida's four votes doubtful; in an afternoon bulletin it claimed Florida for Hayes.

Tilden's election had been conceded, and Republican head-

quarters closed and deserted, when a telegram from a Democratic leader came to the Times office at two o'clock in the morning asking information as to Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina. This gave the cue to the Times with the result that Chandler was roused from his bed, telegrams sent to the states named and victory claimed in the columns of the paper.

The returns showed a popular vote of 4,300,590 for Tilden, 4,036,298 for Hayes; Tilden 184 uncontested electoral votes, Hayes 165, with doubt as to South Carolina's 7, Louisiana's 8, Florida's 4 and 1 of Oregon's. To win Tilden needed one, Hayes all of the doubtful votes. The popular vote, as finally adjudicated after the action of the returning boards of Louisiana and Florida, was, Tilden 4,285,992, Hayes 4,033,768, a majority of 252,224 for Tilden. Tilden carried New York by 33,000 votes. "Honest" John Kelly seems to have kept his promise to support the nominee.

Ill luck had pursued the Democrats; a few months before they consented to the admission of Colorado as a state; Colorado's territorial delegate had been a Democrat, but her electors were Republicans and turned the scale.

The Democrats had a large popular majority and the small need of but one vote. They held the House, which in case of no election by the electors would elect the President; the Republicans controlled the Senate and the Executive and predominated on the Supreme Court. The twenty-second joint rule, a Republican measure recognized three times and enforced twice in the last three elections, would have enabled the House to shut out any vote it thought unlawful; but the Senate had refused to readopt that rule at its last organization. The Republican Senate not only refused to recognize the rule, but now set up the preposterous claim that the President *pro tem* of the Senate, (Vice-President Wilson was dead) had the sole power to count the electoral votes.

It all happened fifty years ago, yet it causes tears, idle tears to gather in Democratic eyes to read the story of the "Disputed Election."

Public feeling was so intense that serious fears of violence arose. Henry Watterson said in a speech that 100,000 unarmed citizens would assemble in Washington to petition for the right, and this was distorted into a threat of armed resistance. President Grant ordered troops to protect the returning boards of Louisiana and Florida and stationed troops and a war vessel at Washington. He also invited a number of leading Republicans

to go to the contested states and witness the canvass of the returns. Hewitt issued a like invitation to Democrats, and some twenty-five Republicans and a like number of Democrats met on their missions in New Orleans, and all became known as "The Visiting Statesmen."

These gentlemen witnessed the canvass of the Louisiana vote to the extent of being present when the returns were opened. When uncontested, the returns were sent to be tabulated by clerks in a private room where no visitors were present, statesmen or other kind. The visitors were allowed, too, to hear the evidence, such as it was, on the contested returns. The Democratic visiting statesmen suggested that the Republicans join with them in securing a fair hearing and decision, but the latter declined such "unconstitutional interferences with the duties of the canvassers." The board rendered all decisions in secret session. Three days before they had officially completed the count, the United States marshal at New Orleans wired to Washington that he had seen Wells, and that the board would return Hayes electors; "Have no fear" the message concluded.

Wells, chairman of the board of canvassers, had in 1867 been denounced by General Phil Sheridan as "as dishonest and tricky as a snake." Anderson, the other white member, had been convicted of a felony, and Kenner, another member, had been indicted for larceny. The constitution of Louisiana required Democratic representation on the board but the board refused to fill the vacancy occasioned by the Democratic member resigning.

The subsequent history of the members of the Louisiana returning board is interesting. Three members of Wells' family were given positions in the New Orleans custom-house by the administration he assisted in establishing; Anderson, his white colleague, was made deputy collector of the port and three of his family connections given places in the custom-house; Kenner and two of his brothers were given positions; Cassanove, the other member, had a brother given a good place; Abell, the secretary, and Woodward, David, Green and Hill, clerks of the board, were all appointed to various offices under the Hayes administration.

The Louisiana returning board gave the Hayes electors majorities ranging from 4,626 to 4,712, whereas the returns had given Tilden electors majorities ranging from 6,300 to 8,957; 13,250 Democratic and 2,642 Republican votes were thrown out. There was evidence of fraud and intimidation by Democrats, but the fraud on the part of the Republicans was vastly grosser and

so overwhelmingly proven that while an honest tribunal might have vitiated the whole election, only a shamelessly corrupt one could have given the verdict to the Republicans. No wonder the Republicans, when the contest was taken to Washington, fought going behind the canvassed returns. One glimpse would have destroyed their claims. Bigelow in his life of Tilden gives a circumstantial and credible story that the document by virtue of which the Electoral Commission gave Louisiana's vote to Hayes was a forgery, the actual return, having fatal defects, having been abstracted from the file and a false one substituted.

The Florida case was more involved, there being three certificates, one certifying to the election of Hayes electors; and two certifying to the election of Tilden electors. Another question in the Florida case was as to the eligibility of one of the Hayes electors who, it was alleged, had been a federal officeholder when elected and thereby disqualified.

There were two sets of certificates from Oregon. Hayes had the popular vote, but one of the Republican electors was disqualified when elected. He resigned, the other two Republican electors reëlected him, and the three voted for Hayes. The Democratic Governor gave a certificate of election to a Democrat, the elector having the next highest vote to the disqualified Republican.

The objection to the South Carolina vote was that the United States troops stationed at or near the polls had prevented a legal election.

The Senate's refusal to abide by the twenty-second joint rule created a block. The Republicans who in 1865, 1869 and 1873 enforced the rule that no vote should be counted unless approved by both houses of Congress now insisted that the president of the Senate alone could count the vote of a state even over the objection of both houses. Hayes held to this view.

So threatening became the aspect of affairs that the calmest men of both parties worked together for a settlement and the Electoral Commission was the result, a body of five Representatives selected by the House, five Senators selected by the Senate and five members of the Supreme Court, four of the last being named and empowered to select the fifth.

The commission, when the two houses should disagree over the returns from any state, were to proceed to "consider the same with the same powers, if any, now possessed for that purpose by the two houses acting separately or together." It was further provided that the commission "may therein take into view such

petitions, depositions and other papers, if any, as shall by the constitution and now existing law be competent and pertinent in such consideration." The plan and purpose was to make no change in existing law. The decision of the commission was to stand unless reversed by both houses.

In the House 158 Democrats and 33 Republicans voted for, and 68 Republicans and 1 Democrat against the law creating the commission; in the Senate 26 Democrats and 21 Republicans voted aye, 16 Republicans and 1 Democrat nay. An amendment offered in the Senate authorizing the commission to "go behind the returns" and another denying it that power were both defeated heavily, thus leaving the commission itself to decide that all-important question.

The House chose three Democrats and two Republicans, the Senate three Republicans and two Democrats, while four of the Justices selected were equally divided between the two parties. Under a gentlemen's agreement Justice David Davis, Independent, was to have been the fifth member from the Supreme Court, but before the selection he was elected Senator from Illinois and thereby disqualified, and Justice Bradley, Republican, was chosen. Some of the ablest lawyers in the country represented the contending claims.

Hayes writes in his diary, January 31, 1877:

"The commission seems to be a good one. At 2 P. M. Webb wired, 'The Judge, it is Bradley. In Washington the bets are five to one that the next President will be Hayes.'"

Webb was Hayes' son, living in Washington.

The vote of Florida was submitted to the commission. The commission first decided by a vote of 8 to 7, every Republican voting aye, every Democrat nay, that it would receive no evidence not submitted to the joint session of the two houses (that is, the returns), except such as related to the eligibility of the alleged disqualified elector. On this question of hearing evidence as to Humphreys' eligibility Justice Bradley voted with the Democrats for the only time in the whole proceedings. The vote was 8 to 7. By 8 to 7 the elector was declared qualified and by the same vote the four Hayes electors were declared the lawful electors of Florida.

In the Louisiana case evidence was offered to show that two of the Hayes electors were disqualified under the constitution of the state and four under the constitution of the United States; they had resigned their offices, been reinstated as electors by

their colleagues, voted for Hayes, and been immediately reappointed to their offices. The precedent in Humphreys', the Florida elector's, case was not followed; it was held 8 to 7 that no evidence outside the papers turned over by the president of the Senate would be received—no evidence of the ineligibility of electors, no evidence of invalidity of canvassing board with only one party represented on it contrary to law; the Governor's certificate that these electors were the lawful electors was held by a vote of 8 to 7 to be all-sufficient. In the Oregon case the Governor's certificate was held of no effect and the disputed vote to be given to Hayes.

In each case the commission reported its decision, the Democratic House dissented, the Republican Senate assented and the votes were counted for Hayes. The votes in the two houses were party votes, except that Senator Conkling absented himself when the Louisiana case came up, and in the House Selley, Republican, later president of Amherst College, spoke vehemently against receiving Louisiana's vote. Sunset Cox intimates that Conkling would have overridden the commission's decision in the Louisiana case could he have gotten sufficient support. He had been one of the originators of the Electoral Commission and the failure to make him one of the commission was a matter of significant comment when the appointments were made. Colonel A. K. McClure vouches for a romantic story—that Conkling had sufficient backing, but Kate Chase Sprague persuaded him to abandon the project, to avenge her father's defeat for the Democratic nomination in 1868 by Tilden's efforts.

There was great dissatisfaction among the Democrats in Congress and a filibuster was begun, but Southern leaders opposed it and Speaker Randall put it down with a strong hand. The Southerners wanted no more war, and the Democrats, especially the Southerners, had been responsible for the Electoral Commission, as the votes showed. To many citizens of both parties the peaceful inauguration of any President was a blessing.

There was another powerful reason. The "Wormley Conference" between friends of Hayes and certain Southerners had been held and promises made that troops would be withdrawn from the South. That Hayes authorized any such promises has been denied by himself and his friends, but he honorably kept the pledges made by his party leaders at this conference.

Tilden's plan had been to stand firm, make no concession whatever, relying on the power and duty of Congress to examine, ascertain and count the electoral vote. He believed and urged that

with the popular vote and the popular branch of the national legislature behind the Democrats and a just cause, the Republicans would have been forced to give way to public opinion. But the Democrats in Congress overruled him. Blaine is credited with saying years afterwards that had the Democrats held firm the Republicans would have been forced to yield. When Hewitt told Tilden of the plan of the Democrats in Congress, the latter said that it was rather late to consult him; Hewitt replied, "They do not consult you. They are public men and have their own duties and responsibilities. I consult you."

That Louisiana's electoral vote was on the market is testified to by Hewitt, Watterson and others, but Watterson, for one, considered the offer to sell out to the Democrats only a ruse to bring the Republicans to terms. Colonel Pelton, a kinsman of Tilden, an inmate of his home at the time and having some part in the post-election activities, received incriminating dispatches in cipher addressed to him at the Tilden home. Whether Colonel Pelton entered into any negotiation with any one, or, if he did, with any intention other than of securing evidence of venality, was not shown, but the fact that one so closely connected with him was under tenable suspicion hampered so honorable a man as Tilden. His own conduct was beyond suspicion.

No report of the proceedings of the Electoral Commission while in session was made and a certain air of mystery envelops it. Henry B. Payne, the chairman of the House members, kept a diary of the proceedings; James Ford Rhodes says that he tried hard to obtain the use of it when writing his history, but Payne told him he had promised Senator Edmunds never to publish it without the Senator's consent, and Rhodes thinks the diary was destroyed at or before Payne's death.

Much has been made of the fact that the Republican members of the commission voted together on every material question involved; yet the Democratic members were practically as unanimous and invariable, and the members of the Senate and House voted solidly along party lines except as noted. Hayes' biographer, Williams, attributes the conduct of the commissioners to "subconscious compulsion"—a fine, euphemistic phrase to describe ungovernable partisanship. Partisanship, however, is near kin to patriotism, sometimes its bastard brother, and at times they quarrel. There were technical grounds for every decision carried by the 8 to 7 vote. Anyhow, hundreds of thousands of good Republicans could sleep soundly in the belief that the country was safe, tens of thousands of others without dreaming

of loss of office and other thousands without nightmares of penitentiaries.

The truth of the proverb, a bad title makes a good king, was verified in Hayes' administration. One of the first of his acts was to remove the federal troops from the South. He held a conference with Wade Hampton, the Democratic, and Chamberlain, the Republican Governor of South Carolina, and announced that he would recall the federal forces from that State. Chamberlain immediately turned over the records and papers of the office to Hampton and left the state.

Louisiana presented a more difficult problem, for the Packard government there rested on exactly the same election which gave Hayes the electoral vote. "Discredit Packard and you discredit Hayes," wrote Blaine, an opinion widely held. Yet the President did not hesitate and on the removal of the troops from New Orleans the Republican state government fell like a house of cards.

Hayes never doubted the legality of his own title, and believing that a legal and free election would have given him the South, he doubted not his moral title, a feeling shared by but few men. But by all the rules of law and politics he was bound to accept the legal settlement of the question.

With a questioned authority and a Democratic House and later a Democratic Congress, it seemed that little could be accomplished, yet some Republicans well call Hayes' administration the brightest spot in their party history between Lincoln and McKinley. Hayes won the good will of the South and the good opinion of many of the best men all over the country. He intended appointing General Joseph E. Johnson Secretary of War, and had received General W. T. Sherman's assurance of willingness to receive orders from his late foe, but Morton and other Radicals dissuaded him, so he appointed David Key of Tennessee, a former Confederate officer and Tilden Democrat, Postmaster General.

Hayes understood the folly of intolerance in America. The Federalists lost control of the government in John Adams' administration by their intolerance and the same folly in the War of 1812 killed that party completely. The intolerance of the Nullificationists in 1830 alienated even the other Southern states which agreed with them on the injustice and unconstitutionality of the tariff they sought to annul. The intolerance of the Abolitionists revolted the North, and the intolerance of the Slaveocracy brought ruin and destruction to its peculiar institu-

tion. The intolerance of Reconstruction was kept in power for a time by the aid of ignorant, newly freed negroes and the disenfranchisement of Southern whites, but all its acts were soon annulled either by Congress, the courts or public opinion. If any party wishes to court certain defeat by the American people let it be intolerant.

Hard times which had prevailed since the panic of 1873, low prices and railroad and other strikes all over the country featured Hayes' first years. Only in the South and New England did peace and order prevail.

In November, 1877, the Democratic House of the Forty-fifth Congress passed Richard P. Bland's free coinage of silver bill by a vote of 163 to 34, a great many Republicans voting aye and some Democrats nay. In the Senate the bill was amended, the Republicans Stanley Matthews and some others supporting the Bland measure, Lamar and some other Democrats opposing.

The bill, called the Bland-Allison Act, was finally carried 43 to 22 and as amended passed the House 189 to 79. Hayes vetoed it, and Congress passed it over his veto. This Congress passed a civil service law, among other things prohibiting collections of party funds from government employees.

The Democratic House in 1877 repealed the Specie Resumption Act of 1875, but the influence of Hayes and Sherman was strong enough to kill the bill in the Senate. The Ohio idea of inflation of paper money had been modified to a demand for an abundance of money, paper or silver. The Greenback Party showed great strength in the state elections of 1878, and aided by the Grange vote polled nearly 1,000,000 votes.

The Forty-fifth Congress adjourned without passing the appropriations for the army and civil lists owing to disagreements between the two houses over the repeal of the obnoxious laws providing for federal troops at the polls and other interferences at elections.

The Forty-sixth Congress, called in special session, was Democratic in both houses. The Democrats sought repeal of the objectionable legislation, but instead of attempting it by independent measures, some of which Hayes says he would have signed, they tacked repeal on the appropriation bills. This was bad politics for it laid the party open to Garfield's severe attack that in 1860 the Democrats (for in the logic of the Radicals the Democrats were guilty of every act of the Secessionists) tried to shoot the government to death and now were trying to starve it to death. The Democrats retorted that they were not willing to

supply an army to destroy the rights of the people at the polls. Hayes would not be coerced and vetoed the bills, whereupon Congress yielded, losing the battle and weakening the party among the people of the North, who were still suspicious of Southern Democrats. A little bill doing away with United States troops at polling places, but not interfering with their use in states in case of domestic violence, was finally passed and approved.

Grover Cleveland esteemed Hayes highly as an individual and as a Chief Executive, and Woodrow Wilson pronounced him an upright, public-spirited man, inclined to serve his country unselfishly and in the interest of sound policy. He seems to have been much the same sort of man and President as Polk and Coolidge, quiet, unspectacular, determined but not imperious, well endowed with the saving grace of common sense, thoroughly and instinctively partisan but dispassionately so and on principle, knowing what he wished to do and what he could do, and doing it efficiently and conscientiously.

In 1880 the Democratic Party seemed in hopeful condition. The wrong done the party in 1876 operated in its favor; many of the best men in the country who had joined the Republicans in Lincoln's time, returned to the Democratic faith; the electoral vote of the South was assured its candidate. The opposition among Republican leaders to Hayes' reforms offered the hope that much Democratic support might come from the reform element in the Republican Party.

Against these encouraging conditions was the distrust in the North of Democratic handling of the negro question, the fear that the result of the war would be undone under Democratic rule, which fear the Democratic course in Congress had done little to allay, and the business prosperity existing throughout the country which was credited to Republican legislation. Although both parties were divided on the money question, the Republicans were thought by the business element of the country to be the sounder, or at least more susceptible of control. The odium of disloyalty still attached to the Democratic Party in many minds, and conservatives generally tended toward its opponent.

However, the Democrats were united while dissensions existed in the Republican ranks, in which there were three fairly well-defined factions—the Blaine faction, the anti-Blaine or Grant-Conkling faction and the reform element.

CHAPTER XXIII

THE TARIFF OF 1884. GARFIELD-ARTHUR ADMINISTRATION

First Tariff—Hamilton's Report—Clay's Bad Guess—Walker Tariff of 1846—Walker's Report—Morrill's War Tariff—Increases—Post-War Tariff—"Pig Iron" Kelly Bill 1875—Bucolic Folly—Protection Democrats—Carlisle and Randall—Thirteenth Democratic Convention—Other Conventions—Platforms—Campaign—Arthur—Conkling—Tariff Revision By Its Friends—Arthur's Administration—Democratic Party Minority Party.

IN 1880 tariff reform became the fundamental Democratic policy. It has been, or should have been, Democracy's leading issue ever since. Always arrayed against high tariffs, the party's action was consistent with its own record. The history of the tariff is therefore a vital part of Democratic history. It began with the first debate in the first session of Congress. Smarting under the trade restrictions England had imposed upon us, the tendency in 1788 was strongly for free trade. But revenue was necessary, the need of establishing industries here, which England's policy had forbidden, was urgent and the wisdom of encouragement to them recognized, and, moreover, the trade restrictions of other nations had to be counteracted. The Democrats (Republicans) favored as low duties as possible; the Federalists were high tariff men.

Hamilton's famous Report on Manufactures was submitted in January, 1790, and dealt scientifically and ably with every aspect of the subject. Skillfully he led from incidental protection to protection for industries necessary in war, and thence to infant industries, and he stressed the home market for agricultural products a manufacturing population would afford. The first tariff law was a revenue measure, recognizing incidental protection and squinting at protection for protection's sake. Comparatively few articles were taxed and the average rate was only thirteen and a half per cent.

Our first real protective law was the 1816 tariff law, and it was a mild measure. Dumping of goods from Europe fraudulently invoiced, together with the depressed condition of manufacturing, induced the tariff of 1824, an earnest fight for protection having

been defeated in 1820. No strict party lines had formed on the tariff at this time. The economic conditions in each Congressional district seems to have governed votes. The West had been convinced by the home market argument, and then a duty of twenty-five cents a bushel had been placed on grain; the Western farmer swallowed bait, line and sinker.

The "Tariff of Abominations" of 1828 was passed by the same mixed votes as its predecessor, the South against, the Middle and Western States for, New England divided. Some protectionists opposed the measure as bad, and some anti-protectionists supported it for the same reason—hoping to injure protection with the people.

The National Republicans under Clay and Adams now stood definitely for the protective principle, but were moderate, and Clay thought it only a temporary policy. In 1831 he said in the Senate:

"Long after we shall cease to be agitated by the tariff, ages after all our manufactures shall have acquired a stability and perfection which will enable them successfully to cope with the manufactures of any other country, the public lands will remain a subject of deep and enduring interest."

It is this attitude of his which has kept Henry Clay from standing side by side with Alexander Hamilton as a prophet of the modern Republican Party.

The 1832 tariff was not anti-protection, but a compromise of Clay's, diminishing the 1828 rates gradually for a series of years. The opinion was held by many that with the extinction of the national debt and the consequent diminished need of revenue free trade would come. The protective idea, which had steadily grown from 1816 to 1828, steadily declined from 1832 to 1846. The 1840 Democratic platform declared against it, and Tyler vetoed the Whig tariff bill.

The Walker tariff of 1846 marked the zenith of purely revenue tariff in our history. Walker's report to Congress was as much quoted and relied on by the low tariff advocates as Hamilton's was by the opposition. The House of Lords in England had it reprinted for its use. Like Hamilton, Walker considered the rationale of the entire subject, but as Hamilton had played up manufactures, Walker stressed navigation, commerce and agriculture. Yet he granted protection to some industries.

Walker's report reads well to-day. Some sentences seem pertinent to the tariff difficulty with France in 1927:

"By countervailing restrictions we injure our own fellow-citizens much more than the foreign nations at whom we propose to aim their force; and in the conflict of opposing tariffs we sacrifice our own commerce, agriculture and navigation."

Foreign nations, he said, could not forever import more than they export, and if we closed our markets to them, they must buy less or pay a lower price, or both.

The Walker tariff proved an excellent revenue producer and the whole country prospered, even the manufactures grew and expanded.

The so-called "Free Trade" plank in the Democratic platform of 1856, was not the statement of a domestic policy, but was the proposal of a world-wide, international policy, as a reading of it shows.

"There are questions connected with the foreign policy of this country which are inferior to no domestic question whatever. The time has come for the people of the United States to declare themselves in favor of free seas, and progressive free trade throughout the world, and by solemn manifestations to place their moral influence at the side of their successful example."

In 1857 a tariff bill was passed reducing rates a little, favoring manufactures by lowering or removing duties on some raw materials.

In 1860 the tariff policy of the United States was thought to be definitely settled and Lincoln, Seward, Chase and others high in Republican councils advised against its agitation. But the threat of war demanded revenue and Buchanan in 1861 signed the Morrill Tariff law. Instead of bringing the expected \$80,000,000 revenue it produced only \$51,000,000, and duties were raised again, expressly stated to be temporary and a necessity of the war. Again and again during the war the duties were raised until the average rate was forty-seven per cent, Thad Stevens, "Wood Screw" Simmons, Fessenden and "Pig Iron" Kelly, backed by Horace Greeley and his powerful Tribune, all ardent protectionists, having it all their own way under the plea of war needs and compensatory duties to balance direct taxation.

When the tremendous war outlay ceased, the need of revenue to pay the national debt was urged, and all the great business activity in the North was attributed to the beneficial effect of the high tariff. But much opposition arose. The appalling high cost of living affected every household; the West was building railroads and rebelled at paying the enormous price charged for

steel rails; everyone knew that by smuggling, by fraudulent valuation and other evasions the government and people were being defrauded. So a tariff commission was appointed which reported to Congress in January, 1866.

The tariff commission's report showed many evils, and made many converts to tariff reform, especially in the West and Northwest. In 1870 the duties on sugar, tea and coffee were reduced, and pig iron rates lowered as well as on much other raw material. In 1872, a bill making small concessions to great demands was passed. In 1875 under the driving hand of "Pig Iron" Kelly, who had taken Stevens' place as commander of the protectionists in the House, a high tariff bill was carried, though Allison, Sherman, Fenton of New York, Oglesby of Illinois, Jones and Stewart of Nevada and Sprague of Rhode Island, all Republicans, had voted against it. This bill put rates back to the war height, and even Garfield, Fessenden, Allison, Kasson, Sumner and Raymond, as well as Morrill, could smell monopoly, and remonstrated, although voting with their party.

It was at this time there was begun what some of the soundest political economists, of either or no party, think (and all Democrats believe) to be the greatest and longest continued political folly that any great body of the American people have been guilty of—the support of the high-tariff Republican Party by the farmers of the plains of the Middle and trans-Mississippi West.

Many living in sod houses because all lumber had to be bought, they gave power to Senator Philetus Sawyer and other lumber barons owning millions of acres of timber lands, obtained from the government for practically nothing, to write high tariffs on lumber. They paid twice as much for clothes, for farm machinery, for every manufactured article they bought, than Europeans had to pay for these same American manufactured goods. For quinine for their sick they paid \$4.40 import duty and 35 cents for the medicine they received. An English or continental housewife could get an American sewing machine for \$25.00; the Iowa matron had to pay \$65.00, and quadruple prices for household utensils, especially those made of tin. Thus was created a home-market, these American consumers paying the whole cost and receiving back maybe ten per cent in higher wages and readier sales for their farm products, the protected interests paying maybe ten per cent in wage increases and higher prices for farm products and pocketing ninety per cent, less the costs of politics in the shape of lobbies and campaign contributions.

The politicians and the statesmen and the more serious writers were respectful enough in their manner, but the humorous

literature and drama of the day, which so often give the truer picture of the times, made the country man the popular subject of their wit. Then became current the terms "Hayseed" and "Rube," and the American farmers, the successors of those who had "fired the shot heard round the world," were made the sport of politics, the jest of fortune and the target of general ridicule.

From the passage of the "Pig Iron" Kelly bill until 1883 there was little tariff legislation; from 1875 to 1881 the House being Democratic, the Senate, too, in 1879-1881. But much discussion went on. The action of salt manufacturers buying out and closing up salt works; the fact that users of copper and other heavily protected material or articles could purchase them abroad, ship them back home free of duty as a home product, the European price plus the freight both ways still being less than the price charged here, worked on the public mind.

Especially were the people aroused over the tariff history of quinine. The duty on the manufactured article had been increased repeatedly, and in 1878 the wholesale price had risen to \$4.75 an ounce. This was called "blood money." One firm in the business offered Joseph S. Moore, a powerful tariff reform publicist who wrote under the name of the "Parsee Merchant," \$100,000 to desist from his attacks. Ten bills to remove the duty were introduced in Congress and one passed. The price of quinine fell rapidly to \$1.25, finally to 35 cents, and although some of the manufacturers closed their mills, they later resumed and prospered under free trade in quinine.

Yet the high protectionists had learned much, too, especially the value of a combination of interests, a mutual interchange of support and the superior influence of an organized effort exerted by astute men in actual contact with Congress in Washington over disorganized opposition scattered all over the country. The tariff more than all things else bred lobbies, and the use of money in politics.

The Democrats had in 1872 swallowed a straddle on the tariff question along with Greeley's nomination, but in 1876 the platform flatly declared that all customhouse taxation should be for revenue only. But general reform, not the tariff, was made the main issue. Yet the party in Congress was divided and a resolution by Roger Q. Mills of Texas in favor of a revision of the tariff to make it purely and solely for revenue only was defeated.

The tariff reformers in the Democratic Party were led by Mills and William R. Morrison, the protection Democrats by Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania. These were three able men. Randall was a wonderful man, of distinguished and attractive appear-

ance, with a personality which won friends and held them as with hooks of steel. He was a most accomplished parliamentarian, bold, skillful and of unlimited endurance. He was a leader that led, and as Speaker during the contested election showed his strength. Randall was a protectionist on principle, representing a really Republican district in Pennsylvania, and hoped to convert his party to the protective principle. He lost the battle and John G. Carlisle defeated him for Speaker in the Forty-eighth Congress. A powerful element sprang up about 1880 openly espousing high tariff for protection rather than revenue, in other words distinctly subordinating, for the first time in our history, the revenue to the protective feature in tariff legislation.

The Thirteenth Democratic National Convention met in Cincinnati, June 22, 1880, after the other conventions had been held. The call had been addressed to "all Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations and differences" and had requested expression of opinion by state conventions as to the desirability of continuing the two-thirds rule. Called to order by Chairman Barnum, its temporary president was George Hoadley of Ohio, its permanent presiding officer J. W. Stevenson of Kentucky.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted without any mention of any special rule, and no report was made of state action on the two-thirds rule. From other sources it can be learned, however, that the rule was approved by conventions of Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont and Virginia, whose delegates formed a majority of the convention, and it does not appear that any State requested its rejection.

A statement and plea for representation in conventions from the District of Columbia and the territories were heard, and their delegations were given seats but no vote; they were, however, given representation on the national committee.

The contesting delegations from Massachusetts, the Faneuil Hall and the Mechanics' Hall delegations, adjusted their differences and both were given seats. Two delegations, sent by different conventions, appeared from New York. "Honest" John Kelly headed the contesting Tammany delegation. The credentials committee advised admission of the regulars, a minority report urged giving the regulars fifty and the contestants twenty of New York's seventy votes.

Tammany two years previously had bolted the state ticket, and Cornell, Republican, defeated Robinson, Democrat, for Governor. The breach unhealed, Kelly had called a state convention in 1880, nominated Presidential electors, and elected delegates to the national convention, paying no attention to the regular Democratic state convention. Another fact stated and not denied was that Kelly's delegation frankly admitted to the credentials committee that if Tilden was nominated they would not support him. Kelly's frankness certainly vindicated his deserving of his title "Honest John." The Tammany men were denied seats by a vote of 457 to 205, New York not voting.

The precedent established in 1856 of adopting a platform before nomination of candidates was departed from; speeches were limited to ten minutes' duration.

J. E. McElrath proposed Stephen J. Field, a man and judge as upright as Lord Chief Justice Hale, "more able than Lord Chancellor Brougham and as logical as Chief Justice Marshall"; George Gray named Thomas F. Bayard, "a veteran statesman known and admired wherever the English language was spoken, with judgment clear as sunlight and so honest in thought and deed that the people knew him by heart"; Samuel S. Marshall named William R. Morrison, "of patriotism proven in war, of strong common sense, of fixed and unwavering principles and unerring judgment"; Daniel Voorhees named Thomas A. Hendricks, "commended by the work of his life as Congressman, Senator and Governor, faithful, wise, conservative"; John McSweeney named Allen G. Thurman, the "Great Senator, great in genius, correct in judgment, whose name bespoke public integrity and honor and was a platform in itself"; Daniel Dougherty named Winfield S. Hancock, "the Superb Soldier, the wise and constitutional Military Governor of Louisiana and Texas, the soldier statesman of stainless record." Many seconding speeches were made, the Confederate soldiers, Hampton, Daniel and others, championing the cause of the Union General.

When the speeches were over, it was proposed that as the party was united in opinion there was no occasion far awaiting the platform before nominating candidates, balloting be begun; the test came on a motion to adjourn, which was defeated 395 to 317. The total number of delegates being 738, 492 was announced as necessary to a choice.

The first ballot was, Hancock, 171, Bayard, 153, Payne, 81, Thurman, 68, Field, 65, Morrison, 62, Hendricks, 50, Tilden, 38, scattering or not voting, 49. Hancock and Bayard divided the

South and East, the unit rule having been disregarded, nearly every state, including Virginia and Mississippi, splitting its vote; Thurman and Hendricks were supported by the West, Morrison by Illinois, Iowa and Wisconsin; Payne received New York's 70 votes. Before the voting began next morning, Peckham read a letter from Tilden requesting, on the score of health and strength, that his name be not voted on.

The second ballot seemed to show that the contest was between Hancock and Bayard, with Field a good third, until New York threw its vote to Randall. But Pennsylvania changing and giving its full vote to Hancock turned the tide. New York changed, too, followed by other states, and the announced result was Hancock, 705, Hendricks, 30 (Indiana's vote). Randall and others made speeches, including Kelly, who pledged his party's support to the ticket and extended the hand of fellowship to the other Democratic faction in New York, which was cordially accepted by Fellows.

William H. English was named for Vice-President by acclamation. Henry Watterson, chairman of the resolutions committee, presented the platform, which was unanimously and enthusiastically adopted.

William H. Barnum was reëlected national chairman, and J. Sterling Morton was made committeeman from Nebraska.

The Republican convention held in Chicago, June 2, 1880, is famous in Republican annals. The "Immortal 300," led by Roscoe Conkling and reinforced by from 4 to 13 others on various ballots, voted for General Grant on every one of the thirty-six ballots. Blaine was a fairly close second, with John Sherman trailing third. A deadlock lasted thirty-five ballots, when Garfield was nominated as the way out of a dilemma. Chester A. Arthur was named as the choice of the Grant-Conkling element and was nominated for second place on the first ballot. Arthur and Cornell had been dismissed from the New York custom-house by Hayes; one was now Governor of New York, the other soon to be President.

The Greenback Party met in convention at Chicago June 9th and nominated James B. Weaver of Iowa on the first ballot, by change of votes when his strength was demonstrated. Benjamin F. Butler received 95 votes. B. J. Chambers of Texas was named for second place. This party was greatly reinforced by members of the Farmers' Grange, which had been active and powerful in some of the Western and Northwestern States. Its name indicates the main principle of this party.

The Prohibition convention of 1880 attracted little attention from the newspapers and published no report. It met in Cleveland June 17th, and nominated Neal Dow of Maine and A. M. Thompson of Ohio on a platform practically the same as the Prohibition platform of 1876.

The American National Party nominated John W. Phelps of Vermont and Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas on an anti-secret society, anti-Masonic, Christian observance platform. Neither in 1876 nor 1880 did this party amount to anything.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1880

Opposed centralization in government.

No sumptuary laws.

Separation of church and state.

Common schools.

Home rule.

Honest gold and silver money and paper convertible on demand.

Tariff for revenue only.

Civil service reform.

Free ballot, free ships and no discrimination in favor of corporations or monopolies.

Chinese exclusion.

Public money and credit for public purposes only.

Public lands only to actual settlers.

Protection to labor from "cormorant and commune."

Condemned administration for federal interference at elections and veto of laws remedying it.

Execrated the grand fraud of 1876-77 and the reward of perpetration of it by government places.

Praised patriotic submission of Democrats to award, and course of Democrats in Congress, especially in saving \$40,000,000 a year.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1880

Reviewed at length with pride Republican twenty-year record.

Advocated federal aid to education and non-sectarian public schools.

Custom duties levied for revenue should so discriminate as to favor American labor.

No further public grant to corporations.

Polygamy must be abolished.

Development of waterways and harbors but no further subsidies to private enterprises.

Chinese immigration must be restrained and limited.

Hayes and his administration highly praised, and the Democratic Party severely censured.

The Solid South viewed with alarm as a grave danger.

A clause endorsing civil service reform was added after platform had been adopted.

The campaign was hard-fought. The Republicans waved the bloody shirt and gave it a new angle by stressing the danger of the Solid South, which by a combination with a few Northern states would control the government, undo the result of the war, pay Rebel claims and pension Confederate soldiers, and what not. Hancock silenced the latter charges in a letter stating that

not one dollar would be spent for any such purposes. The "Fraud of 1876" was a Democratic slogan.

The tariff was made an issue in manufacturing sections, and in discussing it Hancock used the unfortunate expression "The tariff is a local question." This was ridiculed with Republican might and main all over the country, and it weakened the Democratic cause, although John Sherman right then was saying that the tariff was a conflict of purely selfish and local interests and in 1890 said that tariff legislation was an affair of sections.

Hancock's record was indeed stainless as was his character, and the main credit of the victory at Gettysburg was ascribed to him. The Democrats made much of this and contrasted it with Garfield's connection with the Credit Mobilier, his \$5,000 fee in the De Golyer paving contracts while chairman of the appropriations committee, and his voting for the salary grab bill. The conclusion generally arrived at (and justly) was that he had only been indiscreet, and the Independents gave him earnest support. Combinations between the Democrats and Greenbackers in some states hurt Democracy on the whole. The tariff, the money question and distrust of Southern control were the deciding issues in the campaign.

But the money question in another way figured decisively. Indiana especially and other doubtful states were said to have been "plastered with \$2.00 bills," these bills being jestingly referred to by Vice-President Arthur at a post-election banquet as "political documents." Rhodes says money was used in this campaign as never before; manufacturers, financial interests and officeholders were assessed heavily.

The charge was made that Tammany's non-support of Hancock lost the Democrats New York. This does not seem justified, Hancock receiving 12,000 more votes in that state than Tilden four years before.

The electoral vote was, Garfield, 214, Hancock, 155. New York would have turned the scale. The popular vote was, Garfield 4,454,416, Hancock, 4,444,952, Weaver, 308,578, Dow, 10,305. Thus Garfield was a minority President by over 300,000 votes.

The politics of the Garfield-Arthur administration belong mostly to Republican history, though having in the outcome much to do with Democratic success in 1884. The quarrel between Garfield and Conkling, the death of Garfield before his first Congress met, the unexpected course pursued by Arthur when he became President, the enmity between Blaine and Conkling, are matters of first importance in Republican annals.

Conkling, able, brilliant, masterful, successful in private as well as public life, was vain and arrogant to a degree. He and Blaine had quarreled years before and he was credited with blocking the latter's nomination in 1876 and 1880. He never forgave Blaine's bitter thrust in the Senate, when, stating that Conkling had been likened to Henry Winter Davis, Blaine said: "The resemblance is great. It is striking. Hyperion to a satyr, Thersites to Hercules, mud to marble, dunghill to diamond, a singed cat to a Bengal tiger, a whining puppy to a roaring lion."

More quiet and deadly was Conkling's encounter with Lamar, whom, with other Democrats, he charged with an act of bad faith in some Senate proceeding. Lamar said that he repelled the intimation of bad faith with all the unmitigated contempt he felt for the author of it. Conkling blusteringly stated that if he understood the Senator aright and if the Senator imputed, or if the Senator intended to impute a falsehood to him, only the rules of the Senate prevented him from denouncing the Senator as a blackguard, coward and liar. Lamar's reply was cold and clear—"The Senator from New York heard me distinctly. I beg pardon of the Senate for the unparliamentary language. It was very harsh; it was very severe; it was such as no good man would deserve and no brave man would wear."

The incident created a great sensation all over the country and a duel or violent personal encounter was looked for, as both men were known to be high-spirited and fearless. But it passed off without further action. Conkling soon resigned from the Senate and failed to be reëlected.

Garfield within four months after his inauguration was assassinated. Arthur, to the surprise of many, was from the beginning of his Presidency an able, conservative and independent executive. Conkling, his erstwhile leader, he treated with due and proper honor and respect, and no more; in his cabinet and other appointments he showed that the New York spoilsman whom fate made President could fully rise to his great duties and station. The civil service law, which he had advocated in two messages, was passed during his administration and has been called the Magna Charta of civil service reform. Its author, however, was Senator Pendleton, Democrat of Ohio. It was under this law that Cleveland made his large additions to the classified service.

Tariff revision "by its friends" was undertaken during Arthur's administration. The bill to create a tariff commission passed the House 151 to 83, the Senate 35 to 19, many Democrats op-

posing it. Their opposition was justified when the names of the commissioners were known. The chairman was John L. Hayes, the lobbyist extraordinary, head of the National Association of Wool Manufacturers; among its other members were one iron manufacturer, one wool grower, one sugar producer, and every member was considered a protectionist. Some think the appointments made to this commission the greatest blot on Arthur's record. Yet the commission recommended a substantial reduction all along the line and presented a scheme of reduction averaging twenty or possibly twenty-five per cent.

The Republican Congress, knowing that the newly elected House was Democratic, made hay while the Republican sun was shining and passed a bill making no material reduction, and violative of the principles laid down by the commission and recognized as just by all. This was the "Mongrel Tariff" and so partisan had been the methods pursued in its enactment that Senators Bayard and Beck refused to serve on the conference committee and, eight other Democrats following their example, the Senate conference committee was made up of Republicans and Mahone, Readjuster, with the result that Mahone got the tariff on iron ore raised even higher than the bill placed it. Bad as it was from a tariff reformer's viewpoint, McKinley refused to sign the conference report or vote for the bill because it reduced wool duties, and Randall voted for it.

Sherman, who managed the bill in the Senate, was greatly aided by a new Senator, Nelson W. Aldrich, whose remarkable capacity along certain lines was recognized immediately. Bayard, and Beck of Kentucky, fought the bill ably but vainly. In the House "Pig Iron" Kelly was supported by Thomas B. Reed, Dudley Haskell and William McKinley, while John G. Carlisle, Morrison, Tucker of Virginia and Randall opposed them. Randall intended to be a candidate for Speaker when the Democratic House came in and did not now run counter to the views of a majority of the party. A powerful lobby supported the high protectionists, a high-pressure army.

The Senate of the Forty-seventh Congress was composed of 37 Democrats, and 37 Republicans with David Davis, Independent, and General Mahone, Readjuster. The House stood 135 Democrats, 147 Republicans, 9 Nationals and 2 Readjusters. The Readjuster movement in Virginia, a combination of dissatisfied Democrats with Republicans, gave the Democrats much alarm in 1880, and the Republicans thought the Solid South was broken, but although the Readjusters gained control of Virginia and sent

Mahone and Riddleberger to the Senate, the movement did not, as feared, spread to other States and was of brief duration in Virginia.

The Forty-eighth Congress had a House containing 196 Democrats, 118 Republicans, 6 Readjusters, and 5 unattached, the Senate being Republican by 4 majority. The contest for the Speakership practically settled the Democratic position on the tariff. Randall had long been a powerful leader, but differing with the mass of his party on protection. His leadership was now contested by John G. Carlisle who had entered the House from Kentucky in 1877. With an intellect as clear and capacious as James Madison's, Carlisle was one of the ablest statesmen America has ever produced; free from the arts of the politician and the sophist, he threw the white light of understanding on every subject he discussed. His tariff speeches attracted the country's attention and finally fixed his party's definite position. Despite Randall's powerful personality, reputation and real ability and against the powerful interests in and out of the Democratic Party which were exerted for him, Carlisle was elected Speaker. One of his first acts was to appoint the veteran low-tariff champion, William R. Morrison, chairman of the ways and means committee. The Morrison bill proposed a horizontal reduction of twenty per cent, less than the reduction proposed by the tariff commission, and no duty was lower than the Morrill tariff of 1861 which the Republicans had promised at every increase to restore so soon as the war was over. Randall opposed the bill and defeated it in a House having a Democratic majority of 78, 41 Democrats voting nay—12 from Pennsylvania, 10 from Ohio, 6 from New York, 4 from the South. Iron, steel, wool and sugar were strong in both parties.

This Democratic House passed with cheers the bill restoring General Grant to his rank as General and retiring him with full pay, the signing of his commission being the second act of Cleveland as President.

Arthur's administration was responsible for the suspension for ten years of Chinese immigration, the prosecution of the Star Route mail frauds and the two-cent postage law. He vetoed, but it was passed over the veto, what was called the "worst river and harbor bill" ever passed, which veto cost him Massachusetts' support in the following Republican convention. His course in making appointments did not please the Grant-Conkling-Platt crowd any more than his general course pleased Blaine and his friends. But the people were pleased, the busi-

ness element regarded him favorably while with the Independents he became quite a favorite. The close analogy between the men Fillmore and Arthur, their political characters, careers and fortunes, has been noted.

It seems evident that by 1884, due to the lasting political effects of the war, reinforced by the fairly satisfactory administrations of Hayes and Arthur, the United States had become normally Republican in politics. To win the Democrats had to draw heavily from the liberal and independent elements ordinarily Republican. The Democratic Party was distinctly the minority party despite the Solid South. Yet it was the minority party only because the negro vote of the whole country was practically as solidly Republican as was the South Democratic.

Still it was a powerful organization, strong in nearly every state, with many of the best and ablest men in the country among its leaders, and fully capable of victory. Its opponent was vulnerable, very vulnerable, despite its overweening strength. Both in and out of Congress party lines were wavering, extensive changes of party association were possible; the years 1880-4 was a period of flux, and the times ripe for a great leader in the Democratic Party. Such a man appeared, one of the greatest of Democratic leaders.

CHAPTER XXIV

HONESTY IN POLITICS AND IN GOVERNMENT UNDER CLEVELAND

1885-1889

Fourteenth Democratic National Convention—Tammany Opposition to Cleveland—The Unit Rule—General Bragg's Speech—Other Conventions—Blaine's Nomination—Platforms—A Bitter Campaign—Characters and Records of Cleveland and Blaine—Tell the Truth—The Millionaires' Dinner—The Votes—The Parties in Congress—The Cabinet—Bayard—Whitney and the Navy—Lamar and Recovery of Public Lands—Civil Service Reform—Innocuous Desuetude—The Tariff—Fateful Message of 1887—The Money Question—Pension Vetoes—The Samoan Crisis—Labor Troubles and Commission—Attacks on Cleveland—Attacks on Other Presidents—Cleveland and the Democratic Party.

THE Fourteenth Democratic National Convention met at Chicago July 8, 1884, about one month after the Republicans had nominated Blaine. The call had been addressed to "all Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations." Called to order by Chairman W. H. Barnum, Governor Richard H. Hubbard of Texas was made temporary chairman, William F. Vilas of Wisconsin permanent president.

The New York opposition to Grover Cleveland was aggressive from the first. When the routine motion to adopt the rules of the preceding convention came up, Grady of the Tammany forces, whose reelection to the New York Senate Governor Cleveland had opposed, moved an amendment annulling the unit rule, the New York delegation, roughly estimated at 50, pro, 22, anti-Cleveland, having been put under that rule by the state convention. Grady contended that the State convention could only instruct the delegates from the state at large, the district delegates being free to vote the sentiment of their districts. Bourke Cockran and Kelly supported his arguments while Fellows, supported by Bragg and Doolittle of Wisconsin, opposed. Their position was that by Democratic principles the state was the unit. The amendment was lost by a vote of 463 to 332. The vote seems to have been considerably influenced by the predilections of the delegates for or against Cleveland; Mississippi voted solidly aye, Louisiana nay, and several states tied.

The two-thirds rule came up just before the first ballot on nominations, W. L. Terry of Arkansas moving that the next call for a convention state that the rule would not be observed unless made obligatory by the convention. After a discussion which showed that such a resolution could be only advisory, the roll call of states began, but the vote was so overwhelmingly against the resolution that the call was soon discontinued and the motion indefinitely postponed. A proposal to give the vote to territorial delegates was adopted.

Among those on the committee on resolutions were William R. Morrison, Henry Watterson, J. Sterling Morton, and Henry G. Davis, and also Benjamin F. Butler, who by some devious route had found his way back into the Democratic Party, although recently nominated for President by the Anti-Monopoly and the National or Greenback, Parties. He had been a Republican since the Charleston convention.

It was decided to hear nominating speeches, but not to take a ballot before the adoption of the platform. Grady challenged New York's vote on this question and the chair ruled that under the instructions of the state convention New York voted as a unit.

Cleveland's great majority in his race for Governor and his acts as New York's chief executive had attracted nation-wide attention, and a demand for his nomination by the Democrats permeated the party and the believers in honest government all over the country. Tilden, declining to be considered, was backing Cleveland, and his intimate, Daniel Manning, was a Cleveland manager in New York. He and Kelly fought the issue out in the New York convention, and Manning, content with a majority of the delegation and the unit rule, forbore to press for instructions for Cleveland.

A Tammany delegation 600 strong went to the convention and many of their ablest men were there to defeat Cleveland, if possible. They were aided by the friends of Benjamin F. Butler, and of Blaine, for Blaine's friends hated the idea of his being opposed by a man of the Cleveland sort. Powerful influences made the New York delegation doubtful for a time, but other powerful influences steadied it, for the Independents and many Republicans were openly declaring that if Cleveland were nominated they would support him.

Cleveland was nominated by Daniel Lockwood of New York and Bragg of Wisconsin, the latter emphasizing the inclination of the German vote of the Northwest for Cleveland. Bayard

was nominated by George Gray, Thurman by Breckenridge of California and Cockran and Grady of New York, the latter two devoting their remarks almost entirely to opposing Cleveland. Carlisle of Kentucky, Randall of Pennsylvania, Joseph McDonald of Illinois and George Hoadley of Ohio were also placed in nomination.

Before balloting the platform was adopted, Benjamin F. Butler's minority report being voted down 721 to 96. Grady challenged New York's vote, only 40 delegates voting and 32 declining; the chair ruled that a majority of the delegation could cast the 72 votes of the state.

The speech of General Bragg in seconding Cleveland's nomination is a Democratic classic. The attacks on Cleveland by Cockran and Grady had been bitter and his veto of the five-cent fare bill especially denounced as alienating the labor vote, and Cleveland declared a foe to labor.

"I voice the sentiments," said General Bragg, "of the young men of my State when I speak for Governor Cleveland. His name is on their lips; his name in their hearts. . . . They love him, gentlemen, and they respect him, not only for himself, for his character, for his integrity and judgment and iron will, but they love him most for the enemies that he has made." (Mr. Grady from the floor—"On behalf of his enemies I reciprocate that sentiment and we are proud of the compliment.")

"I do not assume here to speak for labor," continued the speaker—"Labor is not represented in political conventions by the soft hands of the political trickster. The men who follow conventions and talk about the rights of labor are the Swiss contingent. . . . Their labor has been upon the crank of the political machine."

(Voice from the hall—"Give them a little more grape, Captain Bragg.")

The number of delegates being 820, 547 was necessary to a choice. The first ballot was, Cleveland, 392; Bayard, 170, McDonald, 56; Thurman, 88; Randall, 78; Carlisle, 27; scattering, 9. Cleveland received votes from thirty-eight of the forty-seven states and territories, dividing Ohio with Thurman and Pennsylvania with Randall. Bayard received votes from twenty-three states, 112 of his votes coming from the South, Arkansas, Georgia, Maryland and South Carolina voting solidly, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia giving him strong support. Thurman's votes came from sixteen states.

Then, a carefully arranged stampede to Hendricks having

failed, Cleveland was nominated. Thomas A. Hendricks' friends announced that he was not a candidate, but other names being withdrawn, he was unanimously chosen for second place. He had long been extremely popular with one wing of Democracy, and the injustice he had suffered along with Tilden in 1876 operated in his favor. Again, as he had eight years before, he now represented on the ticket the less conservative, the more partisan, and the Western and Southern soft money element of the party.

The convention provided that the chairman of the national committee need not be a member of the committee, but W. H. Barnum was reelected chairman. Among the new members were Arthur Pugh Gorham, Maryland, Don M. Dickinson, New York, and William F. Vilas, Wisconsin.

The Anti-Monopoly Party had held a convention in May, largely attended, and nominated Benjamin F. Butler, leaving the second place on the ticket to be filled by the Greenback Party. The National or Greenback Party held its convention two weeks later, James B. Weaver presiding, and nominated Butler, with Alanson M. West of Mississippi for Vice-President. Both of these parties criticised the existing tariff without making it a prominent issue. The first named emphasized Labor, the second the money question.

The Republican convention was held at Chicago June 3, 1884, ex-Senator Lynch of Mississippi, a colored man, nominated for the place by Roosevelt and Lodge, being temporary chairman. Blaine, strong in New England only in his own state, had ardent friends in every state and section, and only a combination of all other elements could defeat him. No such combination was effected. The first ballot was, Blaine, 334, Arthur, 278, Edmunds, 93, Logan, 63, Sherman, 30, scattering, 19. Two more ballots were taken, the last, Blaine, 541, Arthur, 207, Edmunds, 41; the nomination was made unanimous. On the first ballot General Logan was named for Vice-President, receiving all but 13 votes, 6 of which were cast for Walter Q. Gresham.

It was a Republican editor who said that the most inspirational feature of a Republican convention in those days was the exceeding kindness dealt out to the colored delegates from the South:

"They arrive cold and hungry and are immediately warmed with wine and fed on the fat of the land. Unkempt and even ragged, they are soon clad as Solomon in his glory. Their erstwhile empty pockets jingle with coin or bulge with bills. They

arrive by devious means of transportation; they depart the paid guests of Wagner or Pullman. Cynics may sneer, but verily the milk of human kindness is not dried up."

The American Prohibition Party nominated Samuel P. Pomeroy of Kansas and John A. Conant of Connecticut on a dry platform also demanding the use of the Bible in schools, Sunday observance and the forfeiture of charters of secret societies. It declared for reduction of the tariff. This party seems to have put no electoral ticket out in any state.

The Prohibition Home Protection Party unanimously nominated John P. St. John of Kansas, and William Daniel of Maryland on a very long platform declaring that both the other parties either in their platforms or candidates were competing for the liquor vote and were partners in the liquor crime.

The Woman's Rights convention met at San Francisco and nominated Belva A. Lockwood and Marietta L. Stow. Besides woman suffrage it advocated moderate tariff reform but not free trade, encouragement of foreign trade, pensions to soldiers, education of the masses and civil service reform, and denounced the liquor traffic and monopolies.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1884

Declared perpetuation of one party in power dangerous; lengthily indicted the Republican Party. Surplus declared a danger.

Tariff revision, fair and not to injure but promote healthy growth of industries, regardful of labor and capital affected by changes.

Taxation limited to needs of economical government, but reduction without injury to American labor.

Favored honest money, the gold and silver currency of the Constitution, and a convertible circulating medium.

Sumptuary laws interfering with individual liberty condemned.

Right of labor to organize and be incorporated recognized.

Republicans blamed for disappearance of American ships from the seas. Restoration of forfeited public lands, rebuilding of the navy and improvement of the Mississippi River promised.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1884

Declared allegiance to original principles of Republican Party, eulogized Garfield and Arthur's administration, liberal pension laws advocated.

Tariff should not be for revenue only but to afford security to our diversified industries and to labor. Correction of irregularities in present tariff, but not by vicious horizontal process. Full and adequate protection to wool industry. No degradation of American labor to foreign standard.

Favored best money known to the world and union of commercial nations in international standard fixing relative value of gold and silver.

Bureau of Labor and eight-hour law advocated.

Restoration of navy to old-time efficiency and removal of burdens on American shipping advocated.

The contest between Cleveland and Blaine is much better described as a battle than as a race. The two men were antipodal in character, records, methods and means. Cleveland had no experience in national affairs; Blaine had been distinguished therein for years. Blunt honesty was Cleveland's main characteristic; smartness, adroitness, Blaine's. Cleveland's brusqueness repelled on first acquaintance and he had none of the arts of friendliness, while no American, except Henry Clay, rivaled Blaine in his wonderful personal magnetism, though both Washington and Jackson more than equalled any of the three in the devotion they inspired.

Cleveland began his public career as Assistant District Attorney; hard work and fitness won him the nomination for District Attorney. Horace Boies, a young Republican, was considered by his party as a candidate against Cleveland, but another was given the nomination and was elected. Years later Cleveland and Boies came in contact again as two of the leading Democrats of the nation and contenders for the Presidential nomination in 1892. In 1870 Cleveland served a term as Sheriff of Erie County, taking the office as giving him a much-desired opportunity for reading and study which active practice of the law denied him.

The story of Cleveland's nomination and election as Mayor of Buffalo is typical of the man. Nominated by the politicians in response to an imperative demand for reform which his planned defeat would dishearten, he declined the nomination until the machine nominee for comptroller was replaced by an acceptable man, and when that was done, Cleveland astonished Buffalo by announcing that he knew that those consenting to his nomination were desirous of his defeat, but that he intended to be elected and if elected, bearing in mind Tilden's experience of 1876, he was not going to be counted out. He was elected, although the Republican state ticket carried Buffalo by a thousand majority.

As Mayor he successfully balked corruption and with extraordinary frankness vetoed ordinances he deemed unwise, unconstitutional or savoring of graft, winning the title of the "Veto Mayor." His conduct so appealed to the voters of his state that he defeated for Governor, by 192,000 majority, Charles J. Folger, one of the best men the Republicans could produce, ex-Chief Justice and at the time Arthur's Secretary of the Treasury. This was said to be not a party victory, but New York's better self speaking for reform.

As Governor he had pursued the same steady course of hard work, common sense, perfect honesty and courage. His veto of the five-cent fare bill as unconstitutional was used to make him appear a foe to Labor, but Roosevelt, who had worked to pass the bill, on reading the veto message promptly and frankly admitted Cleveland was right. His removal of a prominent Tammany man from office for malfeasance, and his request that Grady be not returned to the State Senate brought down upon him the wrath of that powerful organization. At a period when laxity and actual corruption in government was rife and riotous his character and record stood out like an oasis in a desert.

Blaine had been Speaker of the House, Senator, Secretary of State, and in 1876 and 1880 as well as 1884 a leading candidate for his party's nomination for President. His admirers likened him to Henry Clay, but there was one great difference: Clay could say, "I would rather be right than be President" and be applauded by friend and foe, while if Blaine had uttered such a sentiment his friends would have blushed and all others roared with laughter.

The accusations against Blaine were most carefully examined, notably by the Boston Committee of 100 under the direction of Moorfield Storey. It seems that he cannot be acquitted of falsehood, suppression of evidence and bad faith, and at least \$64,000 remained unaccounted for which, if he were innocent, he could have accounted without any trouble. There were expressions, too, in his letters which were utterly inconsistent with honor. Yet millions of his countrymen believed him innocent, and many of the most honorable men of his party supported him for President.

It became a villainous campaign. The Republicans could not distract attention from their candidate to the Solid South, the tariff or other issues; their dirty shirt more than counterbalanced the Bloody Shirt. Cleveland's public record being unassailable, they attacked his private life. Cleveland's friends were greatly perturbed and telegraphed him—"What shall we do to meet these charges?" The answer was immediate—"Tell the truth." That sentence became the shibboleth of the campaign. Scandalous stories about Blaine were circulated too.

The Independents were tremendous factors in the contest. It must be admitted that they supported Cleveland rather than the Democratic Party and platform, basing their change of party on the assertion that the paramount issue of the campaign was moral rather than political and that Blaine's defeat meant the

salvation of the Republican Party. At meetings they had called for Cleveland's nomination before it was made, and endorsed him after it was made. The Independents' view was that Cleveland was better than his party, Blaine worse than his.

The cartoonists, Nast in Harper's Weekly, Keppler, Gillam and Oppen in Puck, played a great part in the campaign. Blaine was the "Tattooed Man," Cleveland a lion beset by curs, jackals and a mangy tiger.

The campaign is generally called the "Mugwump" campaign, the term being applied to the Independents supporting Cleveland. Mugwump is an Algonquin word meaning "heap big chief," also being Indian for "high-brow." Butler worked hard to secure Tammany support, but Hendricks came to New York and assisted in getting Tammany in line. Burchard, however, probably helped Cleveland with the rank and file of Tammany as much as their own leaders did. At any rate Tammany loyally supported the ticket.

How narrowly Cleveland won New York and thereby the election is well known. One sentence of Dr. Burchard's speech was the sentence of doom to Blaine's candidacy—"We are Republicans and do not propose to leave our party and identify ourselves with the party whose antecedents had been Rum, Romanism and Rebellion." Its effect on the Catholic vote was incalculable.

Yet Blaine's candidacy might have survived this, but that night he attended a "Millionaires' Dinner" given in his honor at Delmonico's where Jay Gould, Russell Sage, John Roach and other men of great and unpopular wealth were hosts. This "Belshazzar's Feast" was played up by the opposition papers and doubtless cost Blaine many more votes than were needed to give him New York.

History is constantly repeating itself in politics. Hughes' loss of California and thereby the Presidency in 1916 is attributed to his failure to meet Hiram Johnson when they were at the same hotel at Long Beach. That still unexplained episode did cost him many, many thousands of votes, yet he would have still carried California but for a "Millionaires' Luncheon" he attended in San Francisco about the same time. There he was the guest of Big Business at a rich man's club. A waiters' strike was on and this club had non-union waiters. Labor leaders friendly to the Republican candidate sent him a protest urging him not to attend, but if this reached Hughes, he did not regard it. The Labor papers flamed with headlines—"Hughes Attends

Scab Dinner." San Francisco had until a short time previous been politically controlled by union labor, and Labor was still very powerful—and very sore. Probably that luncheon cost Hughes ten times as many votes as would have given him California's electoral vote.

The finish of the 1884 campaign was exciting; without New York Cleveland had 183, Blaine 182 electoral votes, and for days the New York result was in doubt. Another 1876 contest was feared and Cleveland made up his mind to take the Presidency if it was his. Finally New York's vote was determined as Cleveland, 563,154, Blaine, 562,005, Butler, 17,000, St. John, 25,000, Pomeroy, 10,000. Many Republicans voted for the Prohibition nominee as a way out of troubles of conscience; New York's Prohibition vote of 1,500 in 1880 had increased to 35,000. A similar thing happened in Connecticut, the Prohibition vote jumping, by reason of normal Republican votes, from 400 in 1880 to 2,300 in 1884, giving Cleveland the only New England state he obtained.

The total votes were:

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Cleveland	4,874,986	219
Blaine	4,851,981	182
Butler	175,370	
St. John	150,309	

Cleveland had 23,000 more votes than Blaine but he was a minority President by 250,000 votes. The Forty-ninth Congress consisted of 182 Democrats, 140 Republicans and 2 Nationals in the House, the Senate, 41 Republicans against 34 Democrats.

"Cleveland's two terms in the Presidential office have become, for the American people, a priceless possession." Thus writes James Ford Rhodes, who cannot be held a partisan. The Democratic Party served a great purpose when it placed Cleveland in the Presidency to be a light unto the nation and to all succeeding Presidents.

In his campaigns for election and in his administrations of public offices Grover Cleveland better than any other great American exemplified common sense and common honesty in politics and in government. Government was honorable service, neither a patron nor a master, nor yet a dispenser of favors.

Between the Democratic administration and the accomplishment of Democratic purposes the Republican Senate stood the full four years; which rendered the Democratic House under Speaker Carlisle able to get through only non-partisan legisla-

tion. Therefore the Democratic history of the time is confined mostly to the President and the executive departments, especially since the Democratic members of the House were much at odds among themselves and with the President on many questions. There was little use in subordinating differences of opinion and agreeing among themselves and with the President on a measure the Republican Senate was certain to reject.

Thomas F. Bayard of Delaware was the premier of Cleveland's cabinet, a man like his immortal ancestor without fear and without reproach. He was the fifth of his immediate family to hold high office, a high place in public esteem and play a great part in American affairs. His son and namesake now (1928) is Senator from Delaware.

At the last three preceding conventions Senator Bayard had been one of the leading candidates for the Democratic nomination for President, an honor merited by his distinguished abilities and services. Even in jest there was a certain classic dignity given him, and he was called "the Statesman of Solar walks and Lunar ways." He gave distinction to his office and maintained the highest traditions of American diplomacy. No international questions arose during his term affording him occasion to display his great abilities, but in the Samoan trouble he established the precedent that the United States was to be reckoned with in Pacific affairs.

Daniel Manning, the Secretary of the Treasury, was a Tilden leader, a practical politician, a capable business man and statesman. He was succeeded in 1887 by Charles S. Fairchild, distinguished before and after his appointment as an able financier. William F. Vilas of Wisconsin, Postmaster General, represented the young and growing Democracy of the Northwest and rapidly became a figure of national prominence. William C. Endicott, the head of the War Department, had been a distinguished jurist of Massachusetts and the Democratic candidate for Governor, and popular with the Independents of his State. Augustus H. Garland of Arkansas, the Attorney General, formerly Governor and Senator, was a man of distinguished ability and reputation. To these members of the cabinet fate gave no opportunity for more than capable execution of duty.

William Collins Whitney of New York, Secretary of the Navy, had a larger opportunity and embraced it. As a lawyer and business man he had achieved marked success and reputation. Drawn into politics through his connection with Tilden in the overthrow of the Tweed ring, he had been one of the inner circle

that placed Tilden in the Governor's chair and "elected" him President. Long distinguished in New York politics, he was noted for his strength and soundness of views of affairs and men, and was called the "Fool Killer" because of his relentlessness in weeding out folly and radicals from party counsels and political management. Whitney was a notable example of the gentleman in politics in the old English sense. He took office not from that extreme devotion to service which absorbed Madison, nor that ambition which obsessed Clay, nor just for the fame and power attendant, but from what Henry Adams denominated a high spirit for doing great things and an ambition for large service.

It was a far cry from Whitney's administration of the Navy to that of Robeson's, under whom the department had prospered in an inverse ratio to the remarkable growth of his bank account, and from that of Thompson's who, tradition asserts, was astounded to discover that ships were hollow. The nation did not have a war vessel capable of keeping at sea a week when Whitney came in; four years later there were four, with six more in course of construction. Even more valuable was that rules and methods were put in practice which saved millions of dollars and demonstrated that the United States Navy Department could be conducted honestly, frugally and efficiently upon business principles, with the result that both Congress and the people began to be willing to give the navy the support necessary to make it worthy of the country. Reestablishing the navy in the respect and confidence of the country, and reorganizing its whole administration, Whitney can fairly be called the father of our modern navy. Whitney appointed Captain A. T. Mahan president of our Naval War College, an act of incalculable value in its consequences.

Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Interior, was given an equal opportunity for reform. Like Bayard he was a man without fear or reproach. Under him 86,420,720 acres of public land were recovered to the nation, forfeited by railroads, other large corporations and syndicates, as well as from individuals, for non-compliance with the terms of grants, and suits for the recovery of 65,000,000 more instituted, the whole constituting an area almost as large as that embracing the New England and Middle States combined.

The cattle barons who, contrary to law, had leased from the Indians great areas of their lands for a few cents an acre and were totally ignoring Indian rights, were forced to restore the land to its rightful owners. Other reforms demanded by justice were instituted in Indian affairs. The cost of the Indian

service was reduced and at the same time the amount expended for education was trebled and with it the number of pupils, the number enrolled at all schools increasing from about 5,000 to 15,000.

Cleveland during his first term had to deal not only with a Republican Senate, but also with a divided party. Gorman and a few others in the Senate, and some forty Democrats in the House, led by Randall, entertained very different ideas in regard to the tariff from those of their brethren and the party at large. On the money question, too, Democracy was divided, the East generally abhorring, the West and South generally favoring the as yet not fully developed idea of the free coinage of silver.

Moreover, there were a tremendous lot of old-fashioned Andrew Jackson Democrats, some of whom, though not wanting office themselves, believed that the party in power should occupy the offices. They agreed with Henry Watterson that every officeholder was "offensive" who did not vote with the party. Adlai Stevenson, first Assistant Postmaster General, was the "axeman" and decapitated thousands of postmasters, and the postmasters of some large cities and towns made a clean sweep of Republicans in their offices.

The President was able to please neither the reformers nor the spoilsmen. He stuck by his promise to enforce the Pendleton law in regard to non-political offices provided the holders were not offensive partisans, but when vacancies did occur he put in Democrats. He wanted to go back to Jefferson's program and establish an "equalization of offices" between the parties. His common sense convinced him that application of the merit system should be gradual and moderate. Equalization as a policy was approved by fair-minded Republicans such as Charles Francis Adams and James Russell Lowell; the former declaring that Cleveland was as much in advance of both parties on this matter as it was wise for a leader of one party to be. Yet his administration of the Civil Service law estranged many Independents on one hand and alienated Democrats from Cleveland on the other.

The earliest clash between the President and Senate was over removal of officers, the Senate claiming participation in the removal as well as the appointing of officers. Cleveland was firm in withstanding the resurrection of the Tenure of Office acts after twenty years of "innocuous desuetude" and the acts, or rather what was left of them, were repealed.

Cleveland in a special message emphatically reasserted the old Jacksonian principles, that in the exercise of his exclusive Execu-

tive discretion and function the President was solely responsible to the people. The result was materially to strengthen for himself and his successors the independent authority of the President in the executive functions of our government.

The tariff plank in the Democratic platform had been moderate and the tariff had not been the main issue in the 1884 campaign. In his first message Cleveland advised a reduction of duties because the revenues were greater than expenditures, adding: "The question of free trade is not involved, nor is there now any occasion for the general discussion of the wisdom or expediency of a protective system." But he insisted on due regard being paid to labor and the industries and interests involved in any modifications made.

The Morrison Tariff bill of 1886 had as its main feature the placing of lumber, wool, salt and other articles on the free list, and was denominated a free trade measure, the House finally turning it down 157 to 140, Randall and 35 other Democrats opposing it. Randall introduced a bill protective in its features which got no further than the ways and means committee of the House.

In his annual message of 1886 Cleveland dealt much more at length with the subject, but still indefinitely. Reduction to avoid a surplus of revenue and to make living cheaper to the farmer, the workingman and the citizen generally was advised, yet not so as to curtail opportunity for work, reduce the compensation or injuriously affect the condition of American labor. But the House by a vote of 154 to 149 declined to consider revenue bills, the question coming up on a tariff bill prepared by William R. Morrison. The division in the Democratic ranks, coupled with the fact that the Senate was Republican, influenced the Democratic House to this decision. Bryce in his *American Commonwealth* says about this time that neither party, as a party, had any definite, clean-cut principles on tariff reform, civil service reform or change in the currency. But this condition was altered by Cleveland's message of December, 1887.

This was one of the greatest Presidential messages in our history. Written without consultation with party leaders, although submitted to Carlisle after completion, and sent in against the advice of many of them, the message was devoted entirely to tariff reform. The evils of the existing tariff were recited,—the Treasury congested with money needed by the trade of the country, the people unnecessarily taxed, the national energies crippled, financial disturbance threatened and public plunder

invited. The claim that the foreigner paid the duty was riddled; reduction should be so made as not to cause loss of employment or decrease of wages to the workingman. The interests of the farmer and the manufacturer were also discussed. "Our progress toward a wise conclusion will not be improved by dwelling upon the theories of protection and free trade. It is a condition that confronts us, not a theory."

The message was heralded by the Republicans as a free-trade document, and, in spite of Cleveland's protestations, some Independents and Democrats looked at it much in the same light. The party rallied to the support of the President and a tariff bill passed the House lowering duties on the average from forty-seven per cent to around forty, a slight reduction compared to the tone of the message. A graver fault was that local considerations forced inequalities and sectional partialities into the bill.

The large excesses of revenue over expenditures were used in reducing the public debt, and all the United States bonds callable were called in and paid. Then the government went into the market and purchased millions of bonds not yet due, paying a premium for them. The public debt was reduced several hundred millions, yet the surplus still remained large. Deposited in national banks, much of it was accessible to the money needs of the people, but the danger and the temptation remained.

The money question did not figure much in the 1884 campaign, but before he was inaugurated Cleveland, urged by Tilden, had written a public letter advocating the suspension of the purchase and coinage of silver. Two days later the expiring House of the Forty-eighth Congress voted 152 to 118 against such suspension. In his first message Cleveland repeated the recommendation, but Congress took no action during the whole four years of the term. A bill for free coinage of silver was defeated in the House in 1886 by 37 majority, 96 Democrats and 30 Republicans voting aye, 70 Democrats and 93 Republicans nay, but it was currently reported that many silver Republicans voted nay to embarrass the Democrats.

Nothing showed Cleveland's political courage more than his vetoing of hundreds of private pension bills. These were bills granting pensions to persons not entitled to them under the extremely liberal general pension laws and denied to them by a generous pension bureau. So rotten were they that the intelligent public applauded Cleveland's effort to keep the "Pension roll a roll of honor," but the political effect was great. His veto of the Dependent Pension bill, popularly called the "Pauper Pension,"

which had passed the House 180 to 76, the Senate practically unanimously, was an action only a man conscientious and fearless would have taken.

Antagonistic as were the President and Senate, the Interstate Commerce Act, a compromise of the views of Representative John H. Regan of Texas, Democrat, and Senator Shelby M. Cullom, Republican, a most important and far-reaching measure, was passed by the Forty-ninth Congress. The Direct Tax bill, refunding to the states some \$20,000,000 levied and paid at the beginning of the War between the States passed by the Fiftieth Congress was vetoed, as were many log-rolling bills for the erection of public buildings and a bill appropriating \$10,000 to furnish seed to a drought-stricken section of Texas. As much as Cleveland deplored the existence of the surplus he resisted every unwarranted assault on it, every attempt at public plunder of it. The Dawes act, called the Indian Emancipation Act, transformed the Indians from wards of the nation into citizens and was a notable piece of legislation enacted in 1887.

The Samoan crisis kept the nation on edge all the last year of the administration, Germany having broken the tri-partite agreement among the United States, England and Germany that no one of those nations would seek to appropriate the Samoan Islands. Germany now seized part of the islands, deposed one king and set up another of its own. The American Consul protested and formally extended American protection to the deposed ruler and his followers.

Cleveland and Bayard insisted on the old tri-partite control, but Germany sent out a fleet of war vessels and in the name of its instrument, King Tamesese, waged war on the deposed Malietoa. Our Commander, R. P. Leary of the *Adams*, present in Samoan waters, entered a protest to which the German commander returned an insolent reply. Cleveland sent Admiral Kimberly to Samoa, and laid the matter before Congress. A hurricane which wrecked both fleets gave time for a peaceful adjustment finally, but all through the campaign of 1888 the feeling between America and Germany was tensely antagonistic with the result that the great body of German-Americans, so many of whom had supported Cleveland in 1884, were strenuous in their support of Harrison. This was enough to give Harrison New York's vote and the Presidency. In June, 1888, Wilhelm II had become the German Emperor and it was he who aggressively urged on the seizure of Samoa, with the main result of the Democratic defeat. Thirty years almost to a day from that

defeat, in November, this same emperor, owing to an American army sent to Europe by a Democratic administration, lost his office at the head of a nation and the Democratic overthrow of 1888 was avenged.

The period of 1885-1889 witnessed great labor struggles, protests against factory and other labor conditions, including wages, strikes, boycotts, demands for an eight-hour day, the Chicago riot and factory laws in some states. Cleveland in 1886 sent a special message to Congress suggesting a Labor Commission, the commissioners to be regular officers of the government, to consider, and settle when possible, all controversies between labor and capital, and in 1888 Congress constituted such a body, which has since grown into the Department of Labor.

The Electoral Count Act, providing for state determination of contests over election of electors, and the Presidential Succession Act which fixed the succession of the Presidency in the cabinet in case of the death of both President and Vice-President, were good laws passed in 1887.

Although Cleveland possessed the good opinion of the Independents and good men of both parties, his enemies made him the subject of constant despicable attacks. This was in fact paying him honor. Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, Roosevelt and Wilson have been our best-abused Presidents. The strong, the aggressive, the fighting or stubborn men are the ones who attract the fire of their enemies. Of our late Presidents, Cleveland, Harrison, McKinley, Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, Harding and Coolidge, it cannot be gainsaid that Cleveland, Roosevelt and Wilson were each alone the object of more and severer attacks than were all the other lot combined. There was no thrill to be gotten by firing at the icy Harrison, the amiable economist McKinley, the placid Taft, the imperturbable Coolidge; but shooting at Cleveland, Roosevelt or Wilson had in it the excitement of big-game hunting, even though they were really out of range and impervious to small shot—and mud.

The effect on the Democratic Party of Cleveland's administration was complex. His success restored the party to the political respect of the nation and his courage and ability more than held it; he brought into the party many good and influential men who remained in its ranks so long as he was at its head and others who permanently remained in it; he consolidated the conservative element of it, holding the Southern and Western wings by his tariff views, the Eastern and Northern by his stand on the money question. His civil service record, however unpopular with some

of his party, strengthened the party with the independent electorate. His pension vetoes were more of a moral than a political benefit. Cleveland had attracted the moral forces of the nation, but bitterly antagonized the forces of evil in the body politic, a biangular achievement of questionable practical political value.

In making the tariff the main, almost the sole issue in the coming campaign Cleveland has been held to have thrown away the Presidency for himself and party. Yet paltering with that issue could hardly have elected him in 1888. If he could not beat Harrison on the tariff issue, it is difficult to see how he could have defeated any reputable Republican on other issues.

The Democrats faced the 1888 campaign with confidence and with the chances of victory in their favor. They had a leader on whose banner victory was accustomed to perch and principles well worth fighting for, and it was currently reported and believed that the Republicans went through the campaign with the fear of God and Grover Cleveland in their hearts. It was an untried Democracy in 1888.

CHAPTER XXV

BETWEEN TWO DEMOCRATIC ADMINISTRATIONS

1889-1893

Fifteenth Democratic National Convention—Cleveland by Acclamation—Thurman—Other Conventions—Platforms—Campaign—Political Clubs—Murchison Letter—Democrats Called Free Traders—Hill and Tamm—many Support Cleveland—Samoa Crisis—Germans Vote Republican—Billion-Dollar Congress—Harrison—Roosevelt, Clarkson and Tanner—The McKinley Bill—Tin Plate—Lodge Force Bill—Pensions—Fifty-second Congress—Crisp Speaker—Bryan—Republican Apotheosis of Hamilton—Mississippi Suffrage Plan—New York Snap Convention—Whitney's Splendid Management—Outlook for 1892.

THE Fifteenth Democratic National Convention met at St. Louis, June 5, 1888, present 820 delegates. The call again had been to "All Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations." Called to order by Chairman Barnum, Stephen M. White of California was made temporary chairman, General Patrick Collins of Massachusetts, permanent president.

It being a foregone conclusion that Cleveland was to be renominated, a great many of the war-horses of Democracy stayed at home since there was to be no battle, but many familiar names were on the list of delegates.

Thomas M. Patterson presented to the president a gavel of solid silver from the mines of Colorado made by Colorado artisans as the "modest offering of the youngest member of the Federal Union to that party which restored silver to the monetary plane from which it was degraded by the Republicans" in the crime of '73.

This convention, says A. K. McClure, who was present, was devoid of enthusiasm yet fixed in the determination to renominate Cleveland, who appealed to the convictions and judgment of the party rather than to its affections and enthusiasm. Both the temporary and permanent presiding officers spoke of Cleveland's nomination as certain. General Collins quoted from Jefferson's first inaugural address and showed how the Democratic Party under Cleveland had lived up to it.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted with an "anti-stampede" rule that no state could change its vote during roll call, but must wait until every state had cast its vote.

Cleveland was placed in nomination by Dougherty of New York, amid great enthusiasm, McKenzie of Kentucky, Twigg of Georgia, Stout of Michigan, Lightfoot of Texas seconding, and on motion of McKenzie was nominated by a unanimous vote, as Van Buren had been in 1840.

It seems that no objection was raised against the violation of the custom that nominations should not be balloted on until the platform was adopted. The rule was invoked as to the vote on the Vice-Presidential nominations, though Throckmorton of Texas indignantly asserted that if Grover Cleveland could be nominated without a platform so could Allen G. Thurman.

The platform was reported by Henry Watterson. It was unanimously agreed to by the committee on resolutions, except that Cooper of New York dissented from some part of it. It was unanimously adopted without discussion by the convention.

Thurman was easily named for second place on the first ballot, and when his nomination was made unanimous there was a great waving of red bandanas, the oriflamme of the "Noblest Roman of them all," as his admirers were wont to call Thurman, a title not undeserved.

Among the new members of the National Committee were Henry D. Clayton, Alabama, Arthur Sewall, Maine, Herman Oelrichs, New York, and Calvin S. Brice, Ohio. The thanks of the party in convention were given Frederick O. Prince of Massachusetts who for twenty-eight years had served as secretary of the National Committee. Barnum of Connecticut was reelected chairman, and Brice chairman of the campaign committee.

The Republican convention met at Chicago, June 19. Blaine, his friends thought, could have had the nomination, but he eliminated himself months before. John Sherman, whose managers were Mark Hanna and McKinley, was the leading candidate, but he had the opposition of New York. He had 136 of the Southern delegates and deserved them all for his many battles in their behalf in Congress, but Alger had "commercialized" the others, much to Hanna's disgust. Sherman always attributed his defeat to purchased delegates. Judge Walter Q. Gresham, who had supported Cleveland in 1884, or at least had leaned that way, received 111 votes.

In sharp contrast to the rabid enthusiasm for Blaine four years

previous was the cool search for a winning candidate now. "Sherman is too cold," said a Harrison partisan. "Cold!" retorted the Shermanite, "he is a red-hot stove compared to your man. Harrison sweats ice water." Harrison was nominated on the eighth ballot; Levi P. Morton of New York was nominated for Vice-President on the first ballot.

The Union Labor convention nominated Alson J. Streeter of Illinois and Samuel Evans of Texas.

The United Labor Party nominated Robert H. Cawdrey of Illinois and W. H. T. Wakefield of Kansas on a sort of Henry George platform. These two labor conventions were held at Indianapolis, May 15th.

The Prohibition convention of 1888, held at Indianapolis, May 20th, was notable, four thousand partisans being present besides the delegates. There was much enthusiasm and earnestness, and great debate over the tariff and woman suffrage planks in the platform. Clinton B. Fisk of New Jersey and John A. Brooks of Missouri were the nominees, by acclamation.

A new American Party convened at Washington August 14th, of whose 126 delegates 65 were from New York and 15 from California. The other delegates bolted on the second day and the New Yorkers and Californians nominated James Langdon Curtis of New York and James R. Greer of Tennessee on a platform declaring that only citizens should vote, and that the only vital issue was the restriction of immigration. It demanded that immigration be made costly and difficult, that no alien be allowed to own land, that church and state be kept separate, no appropriation made to any institution administered by a church, and church property taxed. This was a precursor of the A. P. A. (American Protective Association) movement.

The tariff being practically the sole issue, only the tariff declarations need be studied. But it should be carefully noted that, to obviate a surplus, the Republicans offered the people untaxed whisky, wine and beer, and tobacco, rather than lower the duties on the outrageously protected manufactured articles. They sought to palliate this by intimating that internal revenue taxes on liquors were desired by their manufacturers. Blaine in the previous campaign had frankly advocated repeal of these taxes to reduce the surplus. This plank in the Republican platform is the lowest stage in morals ever reached in any American party's declaration of principles and policies.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1888

Tariff.—"The Democratic policy is to enforce frugality in public expense and abolish unnecessary taxation. Our established industries should not and need not be endangered by the reduction and correction of the burdens of taxation. On the contrary, a fair and careful revision of our tax laws, with due allowance for the difference between the wages of American and foreign labor, must promote and encourage every branch of such industries and enterprises, by giving them assurance of extended markets and steady and continuous operations in the interests of American labor, which in no event should be neglected. The revision of our tax laws contemplated by the Democratic Party should promote the advantage of such labor, by cheapening the cost of the necessities of life in the home of every workman, and at the same time securing to him steady and remunerative employment.

"This convention endorses and recommends the early passage of the bill for the reduction of the revenue now pending in the House of Representatives."

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1888

Tariff.—"We are uncompromisingly in favor of the American system of protection. We protest against its destruction, as proposed by the President and his party. They serve the interests of Europe; we will support the interests of America. The protective system must be maintained. Its abandonment has always been followed by disaster to all interests except those of the usurer and the sheriff. We denounce the Mills bill as destructive. . . . We condemn the proposition to put wool on the free list, and insist . . . on full and adequate protection to that industry. Needed reduction will be effected in revenue by repealing the taxes upon tobacco, and spirits used in the arts and for mechanical purposes, and by tariff laws checking imports on such articles as are produced by our people, and release from import duties those articles of foreign production, except luxuries, which cannot be produced at home. We favor the entire repeal of internal taxes rather than the surrender of any part of our protective system at the behest of the whiskey trust and the agents of foreign manufacturers."

A reading of the two platforms in full would show that the Democrats based their campaign on the tariff issue with only necessary mention of other matters, while the Republicans set out several little pots to catch flies. Incidentally they condemn "Democratic efforts to demonetize silver," along with "combinations of capital." Cleveland himself is said to have written the Democratic tariff plank, but the endorsement of the Mills bill was inserted by the convention after the report of the platform committee had been adopted.

The campaign of 1888 had none of the vituperation and little of the bitterness of the preceding election. It was a "campaign of education," said Cleveland, and personalities figured but little. Both candidates had the respect of their parties and the country,

and both were supported loyally, but without wild enthusiasm. Cleveland worked at his desk, and Harrison conducted a most effective front-porch campaign from his home, making speeches almost daily to visiting delegations and demonstrating statesmanship and political ability fully justifying the judgment of his friends.

The great-grandson of Benjamin Harrison, Governor of Virginia and signer of the Declaration of Independence, and grandson of President William Henry Harrison, a splendid man himself with an excellent war record and a not undistinguished civil one, Harrison was an ideal candidate for the Republican Party at this juncture.

A great feature of the campaign was the organization of political clubs, the Republicans having 6,500 clubs joined in the Republican League, while the Democrats had about half as many combined in the National Association of Democratic Clubs. These clubs did most effective work not only in arousing enthusiasm but in educating themselves and the people on the tariff issue.

Many Republicans who had revolted at Blaine's nomination returned to the fold; many civil service reformers turned away from Cleveland, though there was no reason in the world to expect better of his opponent. The proposed return of the captured Confederate battle flags; Cleveland's going fishing on Memorial day; the prominence of Southerners in the government giving emphasis to the strictures against the Solid South, were urged against the Democrats. The Republican leaders solemnly decided, after discussion, that the "Bloody Shirt was good for one more campaign" and it was waved conspicuously.

The Murchison letter was a sensation. A wily California Republican wrote a most ingenious letter, under the fictitious name of Murchison, to Sir Sackville-West, the British Minister at Washington, seeking advice as to which candidate an American citizen of English birth and sympathies should vote for. The English Minister answered diplomatically, but favored Cleveland. His letter was published and the Republicans twisted the British lion's tail and proclaimed Cleveland pro-British. Cleveland acted promptly and issued Sir Sackville-West his passport, but much damage was done.

Despite the careful and explicit language of the platform and Cleveland's clear declaration in his letter of acceptance that in the adjustment of the tariff American labor and capital would be carefully guarded—"We have entered into no crusade for free

trade," wrote Cleveland; "The reform we seek to inaugurate is predicated upon the utmost care for established industries and enterprises and a jealous regard for American labor,"—the Republicans persuaded many that the contest was between free trade and protection. Cleveland was never a free trader, nor in 1888 committed to the doctrine of tariff for revenue only, yet the Democrats were branded as free traders and anti-American. The endorsation of the faulty Mills bill was a tactical error for its every item was thus made an object of direct attack while the Republicans were under cover of general principles. Cleveland attributed his defeat to the tariff, comforting himself with the belief that his party and he were right.

While the campaign was pitched on a high plane it must be admitted that it was one of the most corrupt in our history and an enormous amount of money was illegitimately spent. The big beneficiaries of the tariff were put over the fire and the fat fried out of them, to use the language of a Republican manager; Dudley, Treasurer of the Republican committee, wrote the Indiana manager: "Divide the floaters into blocks of five and put a trusted man with the necessary funds in charge of these five and make him responsible that none get away and all vote our ticket." These floaters were collected the night before the election and guarded until they had voted; the average price of votes in Indiana rose from \$2 to \$15; all this came out later in court proceedings involving Dudley.

David Bennett Hill, Democratic candidate for Governor, carried New York by 19,000 while Cleveland lost the state by 13,000, and Hill and Tammany were accused of trading votes against Cleveland and betraying the party. That there were many anti-Cleveland pro-Hill men, and vice versa, cannot be doubted, but there is no evidence of bad faith on Hill's part, and Cleveland's friends afterward exonerated him; Cleveland himself never doubted Hill's or Tammany's good faith.

As to the accusations against Tammany, the election figures absolutely disprove them. Tammany had fought the nominations of Tilden and Cleveland bitterly, but openly and above-board; there had been no stabbing in the back nor knifing under the fifth rib. The Samoan trouble with Germany turned thousands of German-Americans from Cleveland and there was no Rum, Romanism and Rebellion incident to aid him in 1888, yet he polled in New York City 162,735 votes against 133,222 in 1884, a gain of over 29,500, while Harrison's vote of 106,922 was a gain of less than 17,000 over Blaine's vote in the city in 1884.

Moreover, Cleveland received in 1888 48,600 more votes than Hugh J. Grant, the Tammany candidate for Mayor. Practically every up-state county in New York showed increased Republican votes.

Turning to such German centers as St. Louis and Milwaukee one finds that St. Louis gave Cleveland a majority of 577 in 1884 and Harrison a majority of 6,255 in 1888; Milwaukee gave the Republicans a majority of 555 in 1884 and one of 4,092 in 1888. In the face of all these figures Tammany and Hill's friends must be honorably and fully acquitted.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Cleveland	5,540,329	168
Harrison	5,439,853	233
Fisk	249,506	
Streeter	146,935	

Cleveland received 100,476 more votes than his successful opponent; New York would have given him the Presidency. He carried Connecticut, Delaware and New Jersey besides the normal Democratic states. The vote in most states was fairly close, except that Harrison carried Pennsylvania and Kansas by 80,000 in each, while Cleveland's majority in Texas was 146,000.

A Republican House came in with Harrison, the Fifty-first Congress having 173 Republicans against 156 Democrats in the lower House and a majority of ten in the Senate. The ruthless unseating of Democrats and the seating of Republican contestants gave them this majority. Yet the Republicans boasted that they were safe in control for twenty years, "if they behaved themselves," which, it seems, the public did not think they did.

The story, from a Democratic standpoint, of the period covered by this Congress is short and soon told. For the first time since before the Democratic tidal wave of 1874 the Executive and both houses of Congress were under control of one party, with Reed master of the House, he having defeated Carlisle for Speaker, 166 to 154. Flower, Mills, Crisp and other Democrats could do little against a Republican majority with Reed, Speaker, and McKinley, Burrows, Sereno Payne, Dingley and LaFollette on the floor.

Harrison made Theodore Roosevelt Civil Service Commissioner, one of the strongest champions of that reform of his party, who wrote and spoke boldly and ably for the right. But J. S. Clarkson of Iowa was made First Assistant Postmaster General, a more thorough and efficient axeman than Adlai

Stephenson had been. While Roosevelt eulogized civil service, Clarkson did deeds of darkness to its principles. Clarkson resigned in September, 1890, but in his eighteen months' service he had made 32,335 changes among the 55,000 fourth-class postmasters. Yet after getting the occupancy of offices arranged to suit him, Harrison became a fairly good civil service reformer.

Corporal Tanner was made Pension Commissioner and remarked: "God help the surplus." Truly said a Republican leader: "A surplus is much easier handled than a deficit."

Blaine as Secretary of State held the first Pan-American Congress, and hints of free trade or a zollverein with South America were heard. John Sherman said, "I don't know but that I would be for free trade for all America." But such talk did not last long.

McKinley, chairman of Ways and Means in the House, was an ardent, earnest, conscientious high-tariff advocate. He argued that a cheap coat made a cheap man. His famous tariff bill increased too-high rates four per cent. Its chief merit is said to have been its symmetry; it was perfect of its kind. It protected tin plates and also farm products.

The Republicans in their platform had condemned the "Democratic efforts to demonetize silver, one of our precious metals, one of our great products." The Senate of the Fifty-first Congress passed a free coinage of silver bill, 42 to 25, but the House, owing to the stubborn opposition of Reed, defeated it. The Silver Purchase Act, providing for the purchase of 4,500,000 ounces a month at its market price or commodity value, was a compromise, a trade, it was said, between the far West and the East, a tariff and silver combine. No Democrat in the House or Senate voted for it, no Republican against it. Some Republicans voted for it lest otherwise a free coinage bill would be forced on them.

The Sherman Anti-Trust Act was a non-partisan bill, passing the Senate 52 to 1, the House almost unanimously.

The Federal Election Act, generally called the Lodge Force bill, was put through the House by a majority of 1. The negro population of the South was credited with increasing Southern strength in Congress by 38 Representatives and the same number of electoral votes, and the Republicans wanted some or all of them, and proposed to obtain them by federal supervision of federal elections. Quay, Cameron and other Republican Senators refused to vote for it, some to avoid the defeat of the tariff bill by a threatened filibuster, and some because on principle they thought the bill wrong. The Springfield Republican called it

"A Bill to Promote Sectional Strife"; a Republican Senator described it as "a most infamous bill," and the fairminded North and West did not approve of it. Democratic meetings throughout the North denounced it, especially a tremendous Tammany meeting attended by Governor David B. Hill and prominent Democrats from all sections of New York. It was displaced on the calendar and finally postponed with the aid of Republican Senators.

McKinley said the people had declared for tariff revision on protective lines. The way to get rid of the dangerous surplus was to spend it. The Dependent Pension bill was passed and pensions rose from \$87,500,000 to \$107,000,000 in 1890 and to \$159,000,000 in 1892. There were many frauds; a chief justice of the supreme court of one of the states drew a salary of \$7,500 a year and a "total disability" pension of \$100 a month—a "total depravity" pension, the Democrats said. The Republicans would reduce revenue by putting on prohibitive duties so there would be no importation and therefore no duties paid, and the consumer absolutely at the mercy of the manufacturer.

The Tin Plate association had been working for years for a high duty. In 1890 tin plates became the test of simon-pure Republicanism in Congress. If a member rebelled because we had no tin mines, because a high tariff on tin plates would be a blow to a greater industry, canning, and because the burden would fall almost altogether on the poor who used tin buckets and other tin utensils and canned foods, he was no true Republican. The tin tariff was raised from 1 cent to 2.2 cents per pound. Tin plate then held the favored place, close to the Republican heart, that aluminum is said to hold in this day and time.

Although Evarts and Edmunds voted against it, Blaine's reciprocity clause was added to the bill, a useless threat. Ida M. Tarbell says that in 1890 that combination of all the tariff beneficiaries was completed, long striven for by the Industrial League, the Iron and Steel Association, the Wool Association and others. And Nelson W. Aldrich was its *deus ex machina*. Now was consummated the partnership between business and bosses, and Platt of New York, Quay of Pennsylvania and Aldrich displaced Hoar, Edmunds and Evarts and their kind as leaders of the Republican Party. These latter gentlemen were still made much of, still proudly exhibited to the public, but the real power and direction were in the hands of the former.

This was the Billion-Dollar Congress. The Republicans had

been victorious all along the line, but the splendid fight put up by the Democrats presaged a coming victory.

McKinley, when his tariff bill was passed, was jubilant. "It is protective in every paragraph," he said, "and American in every line and word." It became a law October 1, 1890, and in November following the voters elected 235 Democrats and 9 Farmers' Alliance men to the House and only 88 Republicans. McKinley himself was defeated, although his defeat was due to his district having been gerrymandered. The Senate remained Republican by 8, but that was due to the new states lately admitted, Idaho, Wyoming, Montana, North Dakota and Washington. A short time before Harrison had complained of the "free coinage of Senators" when the newcomers sought appointments from him; now they saved his party the upper House.

The Fifty-second Congress showed indeed a bitter reaction against the McKinley tariff and the Billion-Dollar Congress. The Republican majority of 17 was displaced by a Democratic majority in the House of 141, with 9 Farmers' Alliance men or Populists. This gave ample latitude for a fight among Democrats, which was availed of. Carlisle, who had been an ideal Speaker, had been elevated to the Senate. His floor leader, Roger Q. Mills, was opposed for Speaker by William M. Springer of Illinois, William S. Holman of Indiana, both able men and veterans, and Charles F. Crisp of Georgia. Holman had first appeared in Congress in 1859. He became famous as the "Watch-dog of the Treasury." It was at him that Reed quoted Goldsmith when Holman was advocating an appropriation for a public building in his own district:

" 'Tis sweet to hear the watch-dog's honest bark
Bay deep-mouthed welcome as we draw near home."

Crisp had shown fine parliamentary ability in opposing Reed's rulings, and in General T. C. Catchings of Mississippi his campaign had a capable manager. He was chosen Speaker, Springer becoming chairman of Ways and Means, Holman of Appropriations where he could stand guard over the Treasury. Cleveland's influence had been for Mills.

In the 235 Democrats of this Congress there were men of widely variant views and six years later they were to part political company, for a time at least, and be as bitterly opposed as ever Democrats and Republicans were. However, that was in the future, for six years is an epoch sometimes.

William Jennings Bryan won his spurs in this body, making a reputation in his first speech, his time being extended indefinitely. His very first encounter was with John Lind, Republican from Minnesota; Lind in 1896 became and remained an ardent Bryan man, and Bryan, when Secretary of State, chose him for a special mission to Mexico.

Of course, no partisan legislation was affected by this divided Congress. The Baring failure brought great distress here. The Homestead strike occurred in the summer of 1892, the Pinkerton detectives were repulsed by the strikers and the Pennsylvania troops called out. The strike was broken, but the whole affair contributed to Harrison's defeat in 1892, although he carried Pennsylvania.

Harrison made an excellent Chief Executive, but aroused little enthusiasm among the rank and file of his party and none among the politicians. Quay had managed his Presidential campaign. A ludicrous story was told of his meeting with the newly elected President and his consternation at hearing ascribed to Providence the happy result Quay knew to be due elsewhere.

It is time now to note an evolution in the Republican Party coincident with its frank adoption of the protective system as its cardinal principle. More properly it belongs to the history of the Republican Party, but not likely to be found in any such. Beginning about 1880 Alexander Hamilton, displacing all others, was put forward as the founder, fountainhead and father of the Republican Party, making the party a posthumous child by fifty years, and ignoring the fact that it had been really founded by such Jeffersonians and Jacksonians as Lincoln, Blair and others. The Republicans needed a prophet and traditions to give prestige to protection. Their reversal of Lincoln's policies, the manifest contradiction between his ideals and theirs rendered it impossible for them to take Lincoln as their great teacher. Besides, they wished traditions extending further back than the Civil War.

John Adams would not do, nor Webster, because Webster had made one of the ablest of all anti-tariff arguments and later advocated a tariff frankly on sectional grounds. Henry Clay would have served excellently well except that he expressly had regarded a protective tariff only as a temporary policy for infant industries. So Alexander Hamilton was chosen—a wise choice since his tariff record was brief and exhibited no contradictions, and he was the first and foremost protectionist of his day. Moreover, his political principles exactly accorded with those the

Republican Party now fully adopted. Stated by Henry Cabot Lodge, Hamilton's biographer and a Republican of the inner-guard:

"Hamilton's scheme went further, seeking to create a strong and, so far as was possible and judicious, a permanent class all over the country, without regard to existing political affiliations, but bound to the government, as a government, by the strongest of all ties, immediate and personal pecuniary interest."

There began about 1882, if not an organized, at least a combined drive to exalt Hamilton. Before that time Hamilton had ranked as one of the most brilliant and talented of that coterie of statesmen who helped frame, adopt and put in execution our system of government, and who as the first Secretary of the Treasury had rendered great services in organizing and establishing our fiscal department and financial policies. He had, too, a distinguished record as a soldier and as an influential member of the Constitutional convention.

Hamilton's attractive personality, which clung to his memory, his close association with Washington, his rivalry with Jefferson, his tragic end, all lent charm and interest to his history. But it was known that his theories had been discarded by the Constitutional convention and that he had been one of those popularly called "an enemy of the people," frankly advocating giving them as little power in the government as possible, frankly saying the people were not to be trusted, at a time when Liberty and Self-Government were the shibboleths of nine-tenths of the American people.

Thus after his death, Hamilton, in public appeals of all sorts, in speeches, in newspapers, books and letters, did not figure one-tenth so much as did Franklin, the Adamses, Patrick Henry, Monroe, Jay and some others, nor one-hundredth so much as Washington, Jefferson and Madison. Lincoln was but following a universal custom in constantly appealing to Washington, Jefferson and Madison. Paul Leicester Ford, in 1886, published a "*Bibliotheca Hamiltoniana*, a list of books by or relating to Alexander Hamilton." One is astonished to find that with the exceptions of his "Life and Works," by his sons, of the writings relating to Hamilton not a half dozen could be called books, until Lodge's "Life" appeared in 1882. The rest are controversial pamphlets, eulogies, orations and sermons, the latter more on the sin of duelling than on Hamilton's career, and magazine articles. When this meager list is compared with the bibliography dealing

with Washington, Franklin, Jefferson and the Adamsses it seems small.

Daniel Webster's famous eulogy of Hamilton so often quoted was not a critical estimate of the man; it was part of a speech at a public dinner. But even on such an occasion Webster observed due proportions, and in that same speech he gave more lengthy mention and greater praise to Madison, and scarcely less to Chancellor Livingston and John Jay. Webster's address on Adams and Jefferson, delivered in Faneuil Hall in 1826, makes his tribute to Hamilton petty by comparison.

Fair minds resent the methods Hamilton's idolators use to build up his fame at the expense of other men. Hamilton's part in the Constitutional convention was small; he was absent much of the time; his plan was rejected, except one distinctive article, the "chusing" of the President, and its supposed advantage was nullified in practice from the beginning.

His more discriminating admirers base his services in the convention solely on his securing the approval of the Constitution. He made a short and characteristic speech urging the members to sign. He did not approve the plan; on the contrary, he said that no man's ideas were more remote from it than his—yet that it was better than nothing. The people are asked to believe that Washington, Franklin, Madison, Roger Sherman, Abram Baldwin, Daniel Carroll, John Langdon, Rufus King, James Wilson, the proud Morrisses, the haughty Pinckneys, and the other twenty-six grave Fathers of the Constitution, after laboring for months, considering, reconsidering and re-reconsidering that great document, were finally induced at the last moment to sign it by this half-contemptuous, wholly disparaging urging from the young member from New York. They were not such men, and they are not to be pictured in history as such to puff out the image of a partisan leader.

Hamilton himself is guiltless of this dishonest propaganda. He disclaimed all responsibility for that "frail and worthless fabric," the Constitution. He frankly bewailed his ineffectuality in this America in which he was an "exotic." He was honest. He seems never to have made any sacrifice of principle, for personal or political profit. He was a man to be admired for his real greatness and his real service to the nation.

Hamilton's part in securing the adoption of the Constitution by the states is magnified by a similar process. His work in the *Federalist* and in the New York convention has been unfairly aggrandized; Governor Livingston, Chancellor Livingston, John

Jay and others were great factors in that New York contest. Subsequent events showed that the Livingstons had much more power and influence in New York than did Hamilton. It is not fair to award them or their influence no part in the New York victory, and none to Jay, or Gouverneur Morris, Hamilton's dearest friend.

Washington suffers much at the hands of Hamilton's panegyrists. According to them it was not Washington, but Hamilton through Washington, who established the government on a firm foundation; Hamilton was the guiding genius, Washington but his instrument. This is not directly stated, but intimated, insinuated, argued under cover, flavored with praise of Washington. Any American, who thinks the first Washington administration was anything but a Washington administration, knows little of the Father of our Country. No man was ever so wholly and completely President, or administered the government so independently of any one man or any individual or of any party.

Again, all the good of John Adams' administration is claimed for Hamilton, all the evil sought to be saddled on Adams. The verdict of history will not sanction this. The contrary is truer.

Hamilton's unquestioned claim to greatness and to the gratitude of his country, aside from that due to every brave and capable officer and soldier, rests on his administration of the Treasury Department under, not over, George Washington during the first five and a half years of our government's existence. He had a great opportunity and he greatly used it. He was the greatest of our Treasury heads, one of the greatest of our financiers, a great political economist and a great constructive statesman.

He was the first American disciple of what was called the Mercantile School of political economy, really as old as trade and commerce, but refounded in England about 1650 by Sir Joshua Child, chairman of the East India Company and author of Discourses on Trade, and one of the earliest of tariff publicists. The Physiocratic or Agricultural school, to which Jefferson belonged, was organized about the same time.

Able as Hamilton was in many ways, he was a poor politician and unsuccessful in handling men. Thad Stevens, who of all his disciples most resembled him in temper and method, was far his superior in this respect, as were his successors Aldrich and Boies Penrose.

This writing up of Alexander Hamilton and its concomitant writing down of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison is an

interesting and curious phase in our political and literary life. It is significant that it was coincident with Ignatius Donnelly's proving that Bacon wrote Shakespeare.

The Lodge Force bill put the South on guard and stimulated it to adjust the franchise there on a constitutional and legal basis so that if federal supervision should come, the elections would not be at the mercy of partisan enemies. Mississippi solved the problem, a tremendous service to the country and incidentally to the Democratic Party. The credit for the solution belongs almost entirely to General James Z. George. Against discouragement and prophecies of failure from other leaders, he preserved and evolved the "Mississippi Plan."

Briefly stated, the franchise clause of the Mississippi constitution of 1890 required of every voter that he be registered as a voter in due time, that he have paid when due all taxes, including the poll tax which every man was assessed with, and that he have been a resident of his voting precinct for the two years preceding the election at which he sought to vote. These provisions eliminated the shifting, non-tax-paying classes of both races, the vagrant white and the roving negro, and the requirements of previous registration and that the taxes have been paid when due precluded the herding of tax delinquents and the paying of their taxes just before election and the presenting of them and their tax receipts at the polling booth and voting them like sheep.

This left the suffrage in the hands of the bona fide resident, tax-paying citizens. Then there was added an educational qualification to cut out the ignorant vote. It was required that a voter be able to read any section of the Constitution or understand it when read to him, and give a reasonable interpretation thereof. This eliminated the ignorant, and yet left it possible, under the "understanding" clause, for citizens of intelligence yet uneducated, technically illiterate, to qualify. The Mississippi Plan had no "grandfather" clause or other attempted subterfuge in it.

George, who came to the Senate when Lamar entered the cabinet, ably defended his work before the Senate and successfully before the Supreme Court of the United States. Other Southern States adopted the Mississippi Plan and thereafter a force bill had few terrors for them and few charms for the Republicans. George's solution of suffrage in the South was an outstanding achievement in statecraft.

The Democratic landslide of 1890 made the nomination two

years later seem most desirable and during the last years of Harrison's administration many sought it, David Bennett Hill chief among them. The silver question loomed up ominously and Hill declared for free coinage. Cleveland in a public letter to Ellery Anderson in February, 1891, declared that the greatest peril would be invited by the adoption of free and independent coinage of silver. Hill's friends and the friends of other candidates made the most of this and fanned the opposition to Cleveland in the South and West.

While Cleveland on January 8th was speaking at a Jackson Day dinner, the New York Democratic State Committee did the unprecedented thing of calling the state convention for February 22, four months before the national convention. This was the famous "Snap" convention. The state machine was absolutely in the hands of Hill, Croker, Murphy and Sheehan and they set out to beat Cleveland and nominate Hill. St. Clair McKelway, who knew the circumstances and bore no brief for Hill, says that the Snap convention was not Hill's idea, but that he was induced to support the move by Gorman, Senator Palmer of Illinois and Voorhees, each of whom hoped to profit by Cleveland's elimination, each planning to secure the nomination.

Indignant protests were of no avail and Fairchild, Grace, Frederick Coudert, Ellery Anderson and others called a convention to meet in May. Cleveland had brought into activity in New York Democracy an element distinguished in intellect, business and civic circles and only by a machine maneuver could they be defeated.

The Snap convention, however, was absolutely regular, valid and legal, called by the proper authorities on legal notice. A famous cartoon by Nast appeared; Croker, Murphy, Sheehan and their friends had built a great snow man in the likeness of Hill; underneath was the caption "Will it last until June?"

In March Cleveland wrote General Bragg that he would accept the nomination. A few days later came the encouraging news that the Nebraska state convention, in spite of the brilliant efforts of Bryan, had refused to indorse free coinage of silver.

Whitney took charge of the Cleveland campaign and demonstrated large and comprehensive political ability and power. In Chicago at the convention he found that Cleveland had a majority of the delegates; also that every one of the regular New York delegates had signed a pledge not to vote for Cleveland. Doubtless he could have had his delegation seated and the temptation was great for they were eager for the fray. But he was too

wise for such tactics. He wanted New York's vote in November. He undertook to secure Cleveland's nomination without New York and succeeded. Gorman surveyed the situation and joined the Cleveland forces as did Palmer, and only illness prevented Voorhees from seconding Cleveland's nomination.

The New York sequel may be told here. The machine had stood squarely on regularity and Whitney had recognized that regularity to the full and in its name could call upon the regulars to stand by the nominee. They were not given the slightest excuse to bolt. He held them with a hand of steel, but with a velvet glove; he was a pacifist and he did not seek to take from Cleveland's enemies in the party control of the state campaign. Cleveland chafed at Whitney's gentleness, at his campaign being managed by his foes. But Whitney knew what he was doing. He had defended Croker in a trial for murder and he knew his man.

Finally he got Cleveland to meet Murphy, Croker and Sheehan at a dinner. There were high words between Cleveland and Sheehan, the latter demanding promises and pledges to the organization which Cleveland peremptorily refused to give. Croker intervened, supported Cleveland's refusal and promised him New York's vote. The state gave the Democrats 45,000 majority in November.

The year 1892 found the Democratic Party in most excellent condition. There was the silver question, but on that the party had not come to the parting of the ways; the reformers and the politicians and old-fashioned Democrats were widely apart on civil service reform, and there were minor differences. But the party had a leader and a great, paramount issue; Cleveland's tariff message had dictated both. All over the country men were singing "Grover, Grover, four more years in clover."

CHAPTER XXVI

VICTORY AND DISSENSION UNDER CLEVELAND

1893-1897

Sixteenth Democratic National Convention—Convention Strengthens Tariff Plank—Cockran's Speech Against Cleveland—Cleveland Tightens up on Tariff—Other Conventions—Platforms—Campaign—Election Figures—Democratic Party in 1893—Congress—Cabinet—Hawaiian Question—Repeal of the Silver Purchase Law—Bryan—Morgan Bond Sale—Wilson Tariff Bill—Party Perfidy and Dishonor—Pullman Strike—Troops to Chicago—Venezuelan Message—Cuba—Civil Service—Cleveland's Record—The Parties in 1896.

THE Sixteenth Democratic National Convention met at Chicago, June 21, 1892, present 910 delegates. The usual call to "All Democratic conservative citizens regardless of past political associations" had been issued. Called to order by Calvin S. Brice, chairman of the National Committee, William C. Owen of Kentucky was made temporary chairman. He made a plea for harmony, for raising no issues among themselves, arraigned the Republican Party and made tariff reform the keynote.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted, which, as briefly stated, were:

The rules of the national House of Representatives, so far as applicable, were the rules of the convention;

Two-thirds of the whole number of votes given should be necessary for nominations for President and Vice-President;

A vote should be taken whenever called for by any state, and each state entitled to cast its full vote—the number of votes it was entitled to in the next Electoral College—without regard to the number of its delegates attending or voting, and the manner in which said vote should be cast was to be decided by the state delegation;

The unit rule when imposed by the state convention would be enforced if demanded by the state delegation.

Prominent on the committee on resolutions were Bayard of Delaware, Patterson of Colorado, McKenzie of Kentucky, Street of Mississippi, Flower of New York, Daniel of Virginia and Vilas of Wisconsin.

William L. Wilson of West Virginia was chosen permanent

president. His keynote speech was on the force bill, taxation and tariff reform, the McKinley bill and the foolish reciprocity clause.

A gravel of pure zinc mined and made in Missouri was presented by the zinc miners bearing the inscription "We need no protection," accompanied by a protest against a worthless tariff of 30 per cent on zinc which served as an excuse for a tariff of more than 40 per cent on lamps, tools, clothing and blankets.

Vilas presented the majority report on platform, and when he read the sentence "do reaffirm their allegiance to the principles of the party as formulated by Jefferson and exemplified by the long and illustrious line of his successors in Democratic leadership from Madison to Cleveland," pandemonium broke loose and raged for half an hour. Though this has been represented as a cold reluctant body carrying out the will of others, at times there was intense enthusiasm, such as greeted Cleveland's and Hill's names later.

Neal of Ohio presented the minority report though its chief advocate was Watterson, sponsor and devotee of the "Star-eyed Goddess of Tariff Reform." The minority report substituted a stronger tariff plank. The majority plank asserted that any unnecessary tax was an unjust tax; that the difference between the cost of labor here and abroad fully measured any possible tariff benefit to labor; that in making revision it was not proposed to injure any domestic industry but to promote healthy growth, and that changes should be regardful of labor and capital involved—all recognizing at least a scintilla of the protective principle and not committing the party to the principle of "for revenue only."

There is no doubt that this plank represented Cleveland's then views, if he did not actually draft it. It agreed with his utterances on the subject, for he had been wedded to conservatism in making tariff changes giving time and opportunity for readjustment to new conditions. Watterson, however, had come to the conclusion that the nomination of Cleveland, or Hill either, would be folly—to use his own expression, "to march through a slaughterhouse to an open grave." Besides he wanted Carlisle and had no objection to putting a stumbling block in Cleveland's way, and he was and long had been a stalwart "tariff for revenue only" champion.

The Neal-Watterson amendment carried 564 to 342, the West and South mainly voting aye, the North and East mainly nay.

Another amendment was proposed by Patterson of Colorado, the insertion of the word "free" before the word "coinage" in the money plank, but it was rejected without a roll call.

Governor Abbett nominated Cleveland, as the logical candidate demanded by the people, by the Democracy of the Union and by the tariff issue. DeWitt of New York named Hill; his argument was that Hill could carry New York, which Cleveland could not, that Hill was the choice of New York Democracy which Cleveland was not. His logic was faulty in claiming that because the party in New York preferred Hill over Cleveland the party in the nation was bound by that preference. He intimated that his friends would stand for Boies, Palmer, Voorhees, Gorman or Carlisle, but not for Cleveland. John R. Fellows followed, playing on the same string. Green of Illinois named Cleveland as the personification of the tariff issue. English read a letter from Voorhees, too ill to second Cleveland's nomination. Governor Boies was nominated by John F. Duncombe of Iowa, as the first man west of the Mississippi to be presented to a Democratic convention, while the Republicans always chose a Western man. Boies, he said, had always been an anti-tariff advocate and became a Democrat when the Iowa Republicans accepted high-tariff views. The speech making wound up with a notable delivery from Bourke Cockran.

It was long after midnight when the Tammany orator began. He pleaded for adjournment, but the motion was overruled. Deprecating this, he pictured the New York regulars as soldiers whose loyalty was relied on to survive any outrage put upon them; Cleveland's nomination was to please Mugwumps, not Democrats; it was the blackmail demanded of Democrats by the Mugwumps, and if he marched to victory it would be over the prostrate bodies of faithful Democrats; he appealed to the South to remember Hill's and Tammany's activities against the Force bill; Cleveland, he said, was the most popular man in America every day except election day; 25,000 Union soldiers of New York represented in the convention by Generals Sickles and Slocum had said they would not support Cleveland; his nomination would be an outrage on the New York Democracy.

Cockran was one of the greatest convention orators and debaters America has ever seen and he put all the power that was in him in his speech that early morning. But against the rock of Cleveland's strength fortified by Whitney's management the waves of his eloquence broke in vain.

No one dared speak after him. New Mexico knocking for admission as a state seconded both main nominations; Indian Territory when called grimly responded "We pass." It was nearly four o'clock in the morning, but the convention refused to adjourn. Whatever the individual sentiments of a majority of the delegates, the convention itself, in the language of David Crockett, "seen its duty and done it." Cleveland was nominated on the first ballot. Total number of delegates 910, necessary to a choice 607; Cleveland received 617, Hill, 114, Boies, 103, Gorman, 36, Stevenson, 16, Carlisle, 14, scattering, 8. Daniel moved that the nomination be made unanimous and Cockran announced New York's vote aye.

Cleveland received votes from every state and territory except New York, Iowa, Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nevada; Boies' vote came from 16, Hill's from 14 and Gorman's from 12 states. William C. Whitney, managing the Cleveland campaign, as told in the preceding chapter, made no effort to supplant or even hamper the action of the New York delegation, although he had two-thirds of the convention, it was said, under his influence.

Isaac P. Gray of Indiana, Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, Chief Justice Allen B. Morse of Michigan, and John L. Mitchell of Wisconsin were nominated for second place. Iowa had announced that Boies was not to be considered. The ballot was, Stevenson, 402, Gray, 342, Morse, 86, Mitchell, 45, Watterson, Iowa's 26 votes. Before the vote was announced states changed to Stevenson and he was nominated unanimously. There was a great demand for Gray, but Stevenson was popular and it was felt that his wing of the party was entitled to the place.

There had been great disorder in the galleries and among the visitors on the floor. General Collins moved that the National Committee be instructed to provide in the next convention accommodations for the delegates, alternates, members of the press and the national committeemen *and no others*. The motion was referred to the incoming National Committee, which took no action on it.

Calvin S. Brice resigned as chairman of that committee and William F. Harberty of Pennsylvania succeeded him. Robert B. Roosevelt was made treasurer, Don M. Dickinson, chairman of the campaign committee, B. B. Smalley, chairman of the speakers' bureau and Josiah Quincy, chairman of the publicity committee, called then "campaign literature." Branch headquarters were established at Chicago under Don M. Dickinson. Clark Howell,

Jr., of Georgia, began this year a long and useful term of service on the National Committee.

In tracing out Democracy's advance, or return, to the doctrine of tariff for revenue only, Cleveland's speech to the ratification committee and his letter of acceptance are important. In the former he said: "We are not recklessly heedless of American interests," but no tariff legislation would be tolerated which forced contributions from the mass to swell the accumulations of the few, nor would pretended solicitude for labor blind people to the selfish scheme of those who sought, through the tariff, unearned and unreasonable advantages at the expense of their fellows.

In his letter of acceptance, after defining a tariff for revenue, he asserted that any exactions, by way of taxation, from the substance of the people, beyond the necessities of a careful and proper administration of the government, were absolute extortion, quoting Seward in 1857. Farther on he said that the Democrats urged no exterminating war against any American interest; that the principles professed could be carried into execution without "disaster or demolition" and that a fair and careful distribution of necessary tariff burdens was sought rather than the precipitation of free trade. The advantages of freer raw material were stressed. The context makes the latter expression not a recession from the earlier, but only a denial of radical action and free trade. His first annual message states the principle that "only the necessity of revenue justifies the imposition of tariff duties and other federal taxation."

On the money question the letter was explicit against any uncertain, unstable, discredited currency of gold, silver or paper.

The Republican convention met at Minneapolis June 7th, two weeks before their opponents held theirs. Harrison was respected without being loved by his party at large and there was no good reason for refusing him a renomination. After a sharp fight on a money plank, he was named on the first ballot: Harrison, 535, Blaine, 183, McKinley, 182. Whitelaw Reid was nominated for second place by acclamation.

The Prohibition Party nominated John Bidwell of California, and J. B. Cranfill of Texas. The People's Party held its first convention in Omaha July 2, and nominated General James B. Weaver of Iowa and General James G. Field of Virginia, adopting the famous "Omaha Platform." It asserted that wealth belongs to those who create it, and declared for government ownership of railroads, telegraph and telephone lines, a flexible currency issued

by the government, the free coinage of silver at sixteen to one. A Socialist Labor convention held in New York August 28th nominated Silas Wing of Massachusetts and C. H. Matchett of New York.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1892

Condemned force bills.

Denounced protection and the McKinley bill as the culminating atrocities in class legislation with sham reciprocity.

Condemned reckless waste of surplus, and trusts and combinations.

Pointed with pride to recovery of 100,000,000 acres of public land by Democrats during former administration.

Denounced Sherman Silver Purchase Act.

Declared public office a public trust.

Strong navy and foreign policy favored.

Condemned Russian treatment of Lutherans and Jews, and expressed sympathy for Ireland.

Criminal, Chinese and contract labor immigration opposed.

Just and liberal pensions favored.

Improvement of Mississippi and other highways and the Nicaraguan Canal favored.

Admission of states favored and Territorial officers should be residents.

Safety laws for employees of transportation companies favored.

Contract convict labor and employment in factories of children under fifteen opposed.

Sumptuary laws opposed.

Tariff. "We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic Party that the federal government has no constitutional power to impose and collect tariff duties, except for the purposes of revenue only."

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1892

Reaffirmed doctrine of protection and censured Democratic attempts to destroy the system.

Commended international conference on bimetallism.

Demanded free and honest ballot and condemned Southern outrages at elections.

Favored restoration of merchant marine.

Reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine.

Criminal, pauper and contract labor immigration opposed.

Favored safety laws for transportation companies' employees.

Opposed combinations of capital.

Approved Rural Free Delivery.

Commended civil service.

Favored the Nicaraguan Canal.

Favored admission of states.

Favored cession to states and territories, subject to homestead rights, of all arid public lands lying in them.

Expressed sympathy with efforts to lessen evils of intemperance.

Acknowledged claims of veterans.

Tariff. "We believe that all articles which cannot be produced in the United States, except luxuries, should be admitted free of duty, and upon all imports coming into competition with the products of American labor there should be duties levied equal to the difference between wages abroad and at home."

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1892

Money Question. "We hold to the use of both gold and silver as the standard money of the country, and to the coinage of both gold and silver without discrimination against either metal or charge for mintage; but the dollar unit of coinage of both metals must be of equal intrinsic and interchangeable value, or be adjusted through international agreement or by such safeguards of legislation, as shall insure the maintenance of the parity of the two metals, and the equal power of every dollar at all times in the markets and in the payment of debts; and we demand that all paper currency shall be kept at par with and redeemable in such coin."

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1892

Money Question. "The Republican Party demands the use of both gold and silver as standard money, with such restrictions and under such provisions, to be determined by legislation, as will secure the maintenance of the parity of values of the two metals, so that the purchasing and debt-paying power of the dollar, whether of silver, gold or paper, shall be at all times equal."

The 1892 campaign was dignified, though spirited, especially on the part of Weaver, who was a great campaigner. The Homestead strike, caused by a highly protected industry reducing wages in prosperous times, and threatened tariff retaliation by Austria, France, Germany and England, were added arguments against the tariff, which, outside of the silver-producing states, was the only issue of weight. In those states and in Kansas the Democrats fused with the People's Party and put out no electoral ticket, except in Nevada and there, by agreement, voted almost solidly for the Populist electors. For the first time the Australian ballot was used, thirty-three of the forty-eight states having adopted it.

Cleveland had the more popular side of the leading issue and his campaign was skillfully directed by Whitney and well managed by Chairman Harrity, while neither Quay nor Mark Hanna, nor anyone like them, managed Harrison's. Still it was not a cheap campaign; each party had sufficient funds to present its side to the people, but the Australian ballot precluded Dudley's blocks of five and similar practices.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Cleveland	5,556,543	277
Harrison	5,175,582	145
Weaver	1,040,886	22
Bidwell	255,841	
Wing	21,532	

The Republican vote in Pennsylvania fell off 50,000, most of it

going to Cleveland, but elsewhere the Republican defection fell generally to Weaver, as did the Labor vote. The Republican vote was 264,000 less than in 1888 while Cleveland's vote increased only 16,000. The Socialist vote fell from 147,000 in 1888 to 21,000 in 1892, and the Prohibitionists gained 6,000. To fusion must be attributed the small Democratic gain and much of the great Populist vote. Cleveland's vote was no measure of Democratic strength, nor Weaver's a criterion of Populist strength. The New York City returns showed that Tammany kept the Democratic faith as Croker had promised.

The high points in Cleveland's second inaugural address were declarations that a sound and stable currency was vital; that a popular disposition to expect especial and direct individual advantages from the operation of the government was dangerous, "perverting patriotism to pitiful calculation of sordid gain," and the lesson of patriotism should be replaced by the idea that the people support the government not the government the people; public office should not be reward of partisanship, and civil service was now a part of our policy and laws; combinations of great business for limiting production or fixing prices were un-American; tariff revision should be for rectification, not punishment; the necessity for revenue to support the government furnishes the only justification for taxing the people. A feature of the inaugural was the presence in large and enthusiastic numbers of members of Tammany.

The Democratic Party in 1893, in Congress and out, suffered from the disease that attaches always to the minority party; it was badly infested with "antis," like the Whig Party of 1836 as described by Seward. There were many members of the party who dissented from the platform on the money question; there were some in direct opposition to it on the tariff, and there were plenty of old-fashioned Democrats who hated civil service reform.

The Fifty-third and Fifty-fourth Congresses contemporaneous with Cleveland were notable bodies of men. The first was Democratic with Crisp speaker and William L. Wilson floor leader; the second was Republican, and owing to special efforts against him Wilson was defeated for reelection.

There was little congeniality between the Democratic Senate and the President. Hill and Murphy from his own state differed with him in politics; Gorman, Brice and others on the tariff, many others on the silver question, others on civil service reform.

Cleveland had one advantage which many Presidents do not have: there was no man in the party who overshadowed him; he

was the biggest Democrat there was. He chose Walter Q. Gresham as Secretary of State, one of the most distinguished of Republicans, and several times regarded as the possible Presidential nominee of that party. John G. Carlisle, who took the Treasury, was another man of Presidential size. Cleveland wanted George Gray of Delaware as Attorney General, but he declining, Richard Olney, less well known but not less able, was selected. Daniel Lamont, his former valuable and efficient secretary, was given the War Department, William L. Bissell, his old law partner, was made Postmaster General. Coming South, Cleveland chose Hillary A. Herbert of Alabama, long on the House committee on naval affairs and thrice its chairman, as head of the navy, and Hoke Smith of Georgia, a new and young man of notable ability, was made Secretary of the Interior. J. Sterling Morton of Nebraska as Secretary of Agriculture filled out the cabinet.

The Fifty-third Congress, elected with Cleveland, was tabulated as 219 Democrats and 136 Republicans in the House, and 44 Democrats, 36 Republicans and 5 Populists in the Senate. How many of those in the House listed as Democrats were Populists is not known. It has been roughly computed that Cleveland headed a party about sixty per cent Democratic, thirty per cent Populist and ten per cent Independent and "Anti."

The Hawaiian question was the first problem confronting the administration. A revolution had overthrown Queen Liliuokalani and set up a republic which our Minister Stevens had recognized. He had in effect established a protectorate under the American flag pending annexation, a treaty for which was in the hands of the Senate for ratification. Cleveland withdrew the treaty for reëxamination. The document requesting annexation and ceding all rights of sovereignty over Hawaii to the United States was signed by six "Hawaiians"—Foster, Thurston, Castle, Wilder, Carter and Marsden; not a drop of Hawaiian blood in the veins of the lot.

There was no question that Minister Stevens had aided and abetted the revolutionists. Promptly at their request he had landed United States marines "to protect American interests," but according to Admiral Skerret "the American troops were well located if designed to promote the Provisional government, and very improperly located if only intended to protect Americans in persons and property."

Cleveland designed to restore, if possible, or rather permit to be restored, the *status quo ante* the interposition of American troops.

He never contemplated the use of force to restore the deposed queen. To right a great wrong Cleveland was concerned. He sent Blount of Georgia, late chairman of the House foreign affairs committee, to Hawaii to investigate, and Blount reported, among other things, that if the votes of persons claiming allegiance to foreign countries were excluded annexation would be defeated five to one. The facts stated in Blount's report were never successfully contradicted.

Manifest destiny, expansion, the color question, the march of civilization, hauling down the flag and much other reason, folly, patriotism, jingoism and justice figured in a nation-wide discussion. Cleveland tried to apply to our country's action toward a weak neighbor the same principles he had applied to Samoa in 1888 and was to demand that England apply to Venezuela a few years later. Being able to accomplish nothing by diplomacy, he rightly referred the matter to Congress where it rested until under McKinley, the Hawaiian Republic having firmly established itself, annexation took place. On the death of Gresham, Olney had been made Secretary of State, Judson Harmon of Ohio succeeding him as Attorney General.

The repeal of the Silver Purchase Act was the first contest between Cleveland and Bryan, and Bryan's first national appearance as the champion of silver. Wilson of West Virginia introduced the bill for the repeal of the Sherman law; Bland of Missouri offered a substitute looking to the free coinage of silver, and the fight was on. For nearly three hours, his time having been extended time and time again, Bryan argued and pleaded the cause of the white metal. His personality equally as strong and appealing as Clay's or Blaine's, his exquisite voice so fitted to his style of oratory, his powerful eloquence and persuasive logic were all in sharp contrast to the matter-of-fact Cleveland, his ponderous style and rather stolid logic. But Cleveland was the duly elected Democratic President and the Sherman law was repealed by a vote of 239 to 109 in the House, many Republicans, however, voting aye and many Democrats nay. Attached to the repeal was an agreement that the government would endeavor to secure international bimetallism. In the Senate the repeal carried 43 to 32 (counting pairs 48 to 37), 22 Democrats and 26 Republicans voting aye, 22 Democrats, 12 Republicans and 3 Populists nay. The close divisions in the votes show how nearly evenly divided both parties were on the silver issue, a slight preponderance for silver appearing in the Democratic ranks, a slight majority the other way among their opponents. The Seigniorage

bill to coin the silver remaining in the Treasury after minting dollars out of dollars' worth of silver bullion, was passed by both houses a year later and vetoed by the President.

The repeal of the Sherman law was Cleveland's victory, not a party one, and all recognized the fact. Both parties had dallied with the question; McKinley and many other prominent Republican statesmen were still dallying with it. Cleveland brought his party to the parting of the ways. He had either won the Democratic Party to his views or else lost it altogether; which, was not to be known until the 1896 national convention. But the battle weakened the party fearfully in Congress.

Another development of the fight was the bringing to the fore of William Jennings Bryan. It was not at the Chicago convention that he first was leader. Bland of Missouri was the titular head of the movement in 1893, but only of a provisional army; the moment the real fighting began Bryan led the van, displacing him as actual leader. Bryan had been an enthusiastic Cleveland man in 1884 and 1888; in 1892 he was loyal but not enthusiastic and in 1893 anti. After that he thought as unfavorably of Cleveland as Cleveland did of him. In 1892 under its platform and candidate the Democratic Party was the "sound money" party; in 1896 under the leadership of Bryan it was the free silver party. At both times, however, there was a large element in the party adverse to the majority view.

The increase of the demandable notes being stopped by the repeal of the Sherman law, the task of redeeming, reissuing, re-redeeming the hundreds of millions already in circulation had to be performed. There were in circulation \$347,000,000 in greenbacks and about \$150,000,000 of treasury notes which when presented at the Treasury were paid in gold or silver at the option of the holder. This was according to precedent, and Carlisle, when urged to require acceptance of silver, answered that while as an original proposition that might well have been done, to force silver on a public creditor under existing conditions and contrary to a rule established by long custom would in effect put the country on a silver basis.

The greenbacks and treasury notes when paid were not retired but issued again, to be presented again, and thus an endless chain withdrawing gold from the Treasury was in operation. Now was seen the evil so unsuccessfully fought by Bayard and Thurman in 1873 when they insisted on the retirement of the greenbacks when redeemed. The surplus left by the first Cleveland administration had been dissipated, in fact the Harrison adminis-

tration had been preparing for a bond issue when it went out of office; the gold reserve had to be maintained at around \$100,000,000, and gold had to be paid when demanded by the nation's creditors. There was nothing to do but issue bonds. The plates prepared by the Harrison administration were used to print the bonds.

Bonds to the amount of \$50,000,000 were sold in January, 1894, and a like amount in November. It was in February, 1895, that Cleveland, Carlisle and Olney held the conference with J. P. Morgan which resulted in the most discussed financial operation of the government since Andrew Jackson "removed the deposits." Morgan & Company and August Belmont & Company paid \$65,116,244.62 in gold for \$62,400,000 of United States thirty-year bonds bearing five per cent interest. The purchasers offered to take three per cent bonds if made payable in gold instead of coin, but this could not be done without consent of Congress, which had been refused. The transaction was made under a law of 1862 providing for the issuance of bonds to purchase gold. Most important were the inducements to the contract, that at least one-half of the gold should be obtained in Europe and the purchasers bound themselves to exert all financial influence and make all legitimate efforts to protect the Treasury against gold withdrawals.

Congress can hardly be blamed for refusing to single out one set of bonds as payable in gold, thus leaving "up in the air" how the others were to be paid, but the omission cost the government \$16,000,000. The contract was kept by the buyers and gold withdrawals greatly diminished. The government was on the verge of being forced to commit an act of virtual repudiation, when this arrangement restored confidence not only in the Treasury but among financial and business circles generally. On the other hand the bond purchasers made large profits; the bonds were sold immediately and without trouble at a great advance and were oversubscribed seven times. A tremendous onslaught on the administration was made, led by the *New York World*. The general opinion now is that the protection against gold withdrawals together with the increase of the gold supply by that brought from England, and the effect on the business world compensated for what otherwise would have been a hard bargain. Cleveland himself and his friends never questioned the wisdom of the transaction and history has approved it. Nearly a year elapsed before another bond issue was needed and then the people bought \$100,000,000 at 111, but the danger had passed at that

time. In all the Cleveland administration bought \$293,000,000 of gold for \$262,000,000 of bonds.

One of the greatest measures to the credit of the Democratic Party in all its history is the Federal Reserve law. It had its inception in 1894 when Carlisle and his Comptroller of the Currency, James H. Eckels, advised a flexible asset currency to be issued by the banks, under government safeguards. The Democratic Pujo committee of the House during the Taft administration developed the idea further, and the Wilson administration enacted it into law. However, in Cleveland's time Congress refused to consider the plan.

Much smaller, but more effective by being concentrated in the Senate, was Democratic opposition to the party program of tariff reform. Imperatively commissioned by the result of the 1892 election to reduce the tariff, the Democratic House in February, 1894, passed by a vote of 204 to 110 the William L. Wilson tariff bill, 17 Democrats, 8 of them from New York and 4 from Louisiana, voting no. The bill presented an honest and consistent reduction of the tariff, but not radical, the reduction hardly averaging 15 per cent. Its greatest merit was thought to consist in adding raw materials to the free list, iron ore, coal and lumber, and (for the farmers' relief) cotton ties, binding twine and agricultural machinery. It was so moderate that Henry Watterson said it differed from the McKinley bill in degree, not in kind, was only a Sabbath day's journey toward tariff reform.

In the Senate Gorman, Hill, Murphy, Brice, James Smith, Jr. of New Jersey, and the Louisianians, together with the Republicans, amended it in 634 items. Iron ore, sugar and coal were taken off the free list; Murphy got his tariff on collars and cuffs. Cleveland denounced the amended Senate bill as "party perfidy and party dishonor." Gorman replied with a bitter attack on the President. Roger Q. Mills was as severe on the protection Democrats as Cleveland. But the House had to yield and the bill as amended by the Senate was passed 182 to 106, 12 Democrats voting no and many absent. Cleveland refused to sign it, saying in his letter to Congressman Catchings that the livery of Democratic tariff reform had been stolen and worn in the service of Republican protection, and it became a law without his signature.

The income tax incorporated into the measure was later declared unconstitutional. This tariff battle still further weakened the coherency of the Democratic Party.

The financial and business panic, skillfully held back by the

Republicans, which burst upon the country in 1893, added greatly to Cleveland's task. One hundred and fifty-eight banks failed, money on call rose to seventy-four per cent, and clearing-house certificates were used in settlements; the Erie Railroad went into the hands of receivers, and other railroad receiverships impended. Business failures were numerous all over the country. A year later labor troubles arose. The Pullman Palace Car Company reduced wages, its employees struck and the strike spread to other labor organizations; the American Railway Union, with 150,000 members, refused to handle Pullman cars. The Union offered to arbitrate, but the Pullman Company refused. The strike affected the whole country, but centered in Chicago and in spite of the efforts of some of the wiser labor leaders rioting took place.

The interference of the government came from the necessity of protecting and moving the mails and was based on the anti-trust law of 1890. Cleveland was quoted as saying that if it took the entire army to deliver a postal card in Chicago the card would be delivered. Sweeping injunctions against interfering with the movement of the mails were issued, and 2,000 soldiers were sent to Chicago. Order was restored and in ten days the troops were withdrawn. Governor Altgeld of Illinois protested and his protest was applauded by many citizens, but both Houses of Congress approved the President's action by large majorities. The mass of the people approved it too. At Coxey's army they had merely laughed.

The Harrison administration had kept up Whitney's naval program and under Herbert naval construction went on apace. Experimenting ceased and construction concentrated on battle-ships and torpedo boats.

One of the greatest and certainly the most popular act of Cleveland's entire career was his handling of the Venezuelan-English boundary dispute in 1895. Discoveries of gold made the issue acute and in 1876 the United States had offered its good offices, and proposed arbitration, which England refused. During his first administration Cleveland had offered to mediate, but England declined. In 1894 in his message to Congress he recommended arbitration and Congress joined in the recommendation. Olney's dispatch to Ambassador Bayard in July, 1895, brought the United States squarely into the dispute by the assertion that the Monroe Doctrine applied to the case, and made the demand that Great Britain should submit the question to friendly arbitration. Lord Salisbury argued that the Monroe

Doctrine did not apply and that our demand had no foundation in international law. The tone of his reply was "high" and positive. Cleveland took a month to consider, then removed the matter from diplomatic channels by laying it before Congress in his famous Venezuelan Message.

The Monroe Doctrine did apply, he asserted, and since Great Britain refused to arbitrate, it was incumbent on the United States to determine the true boundary. He asked for authority to appoint a commission to make the necessary investigation; when its report should be made and accepted by this country, said the President, "Then it will be in my opinion the duty of the United States to resist by every means in its power, as a wilful aggression upon its rights and interests, the appropriation by Great Britain of any lands or the exercise of governmental jurisdiction over any territory which after investigation we have determined of right belongs to Venezuela. I am fully alive to the responsibility incurred and keenly realize all the consequence that may follow."

There was no misunderstanding the message; it meant arbitration or war, and it stirred the world. It was notice to South America that the United States would stand between it and European aggression of any kind and similar notice to Europe. The people of the country and Congress were with Cleveland, and only from a few speculative business interests was there dissent. He knew he was right and the American and English peoples knew it too.

Congress granted the authority and appointed commissioners. The English government gave them assistance, and later they turned their evidence over the arbitrators. Great Britain, still denying the application of the Monroe Doctrine, admitted such an interest to us in Venezuela as England had in Belgium and Holland, and graciously yielded. A year after Cleveland's message a full treaty of arbitration between the two countries was signed in the State Department at Washington.

Cleveland held hands off the Cuban trouble, warning Americans against unfriendly acts toward Spain and refusing to extend belligerent rights to the insurgents, then disorganized and having no government. Congress in 1896 passed resolutions recognizing a state of war in Cuba and offering the good offices of this country for the establishment of independence there. Cleveland did not act upon this resolution, but in a later message reviewed the Cuban question at length and said that a situation might soon be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain

would be superseded by higher obligations which we could not hesitate to discharge.

Cleveland added some 44,000 places to the classified service. He and Olney negotiated a general arbitration treaty with England. His first administration had to handle a surplus, his second a deficit. Carlisle in his report to Congress in 1894 recommended a plan for a reform of the currency, but the party was hopelessly divided on the money question and nothing was done.

The record of no President is safer in the hands of history than Grover Cleveland's. Bold, blunt and frank, there were no after developments exposing concealments or throwing a shade over any of his acts. He received the full attacks of criticism while he was in office and immediately after; the major part of appreciation and praise came to him later. The more light thrown on him and his administration the greater and wiser both appear. He added, or restored, power and prestige to the President's office. He lived to see nearly all old enmities born of bitter days removed, and when standing on the platform at the St. Louis Exposition in 1904 he received even a warmer welcome from the vast crowd than was given Roosevelt, then President of the United States (who generously felicitated him on the fact), he became, Mrs. Cleveland said, "a different man."

No party could have harbored both Cleveland and Bryan when the latter had gotten his growth. With the national convention of 1896 Cleveland, Whitney, Carlisle and a host of other notable Democrats laid down their batons of command and Bryan assumed the leadership to retain it many years. But Cleveland had stamped an indelible impress on the party, and the Cleveland Democracy remained a leaven in the body politic, which, however frozen out and neutralized at times, worked persistently and powerfully.

It is a question incapable of exact solution whether the Democratic or the Republican Party in 1895 was the most divided over the money question. Certainly, however, the latter turned out the better able to hold its leaders in line with the party decision regardless of their individual views. Perhaps it was because the Democrats were impressed by the moral issue so insisted on, while the Republicans more sapiently regarded only the economic issue involved.

When the 1896 conventions were over it was anybody's battle for the Presidency.

CHAPTER XXVII

THE BRYAN ERA BEGINS

1896-1901

Seventeenth Democratic National Convention—Antecedent Conditions—Line of Cleavage Among Democrats—Tillman—Hill—Bryan's Wonderful Speech—The Balloting—Nominations—Bryan's Speech of Acceptance—Other Conventions—Gold Democrats—Platforms—The Campaign—Cleveland and Bryan—McKinley—Election Returns—McKinley Follows Cleveland Except as to Tariff—Spanish-American War—Political Effects—Retention of Philippines—Gold Standard Established—Conditions of Parties in 1900.

THE Seventeenth Democratic National Convention met at Chicago July 7, 1896, three weeks after the Republicans had nominated McKinley on a gold platform. Next to the Charleston convention in 1860 this was Democracy's most epoch-making convention. It was a contest of principles, not men, and had been long in preparing. During the year each state convention had been a skirmish leading up to the main battle; thirty of them had declared for free silver and fourteen against, Florida's convention alone expressing no views. Neither wing had settled on a candidate, and while Bland, Boies and others had active friends they would not have allowed their candidate's interest to stand in the way of one thought better to represent the principle or more likely to succeed. Principle and desire for success were stronger than either personal or party feeling.

In January, 1896, the Democratic Party was so torn with dissensions that Republicans boasted that they could elect a rag baby that year. But as the silver sentiment crystallized it became a question where the Republican Party would stand, and what in the world would happen. McKinley's own state convention a few weeks before had straddled the question completely. Only the Populist Party was undivided on the subject.

The Democrats of New England and the Middle States, joined by Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin, favored the gold standard, and so uncompromisingly so that for some time before the convention met a bolt from the party had been frankly discussed in the newspapers. New York and some other states had postponed naming electoral tickets in anticipation of a bolt.

The fight started in the January meeting of the National Committee, the Silver Democrats wanting an early, the Gold Democrats a late convention. Thomas of Colorado moved for June 2nd; Cable of Illinois for July 14th. The call as usual was to all Democratic conservative citizens irrespective of past political associations. The committee divided on the temporary chairmanship, the North and East for David B. Hill, the West and South for John W. Daniel, yet Maine was for Daniel, Mississippi and Texas for Hill. Still on this as on most other matters before the convention the fight was the South and West against the North and East, with the Middle West in the balance.

Called to order by Chairman Harrity, the convention promptly overruled the committee and chose Daniel for temporary chairman by a vote of 556 to 349. The battle was good-humored and many compliments exchanged; Daniel four years before had nominated Hill for President, and now with the exception of New York all the Hill men of 1892 were voting against him and all the Cleveland men of that year were for Hill. The credentials committee promptly seated the Bryan delegates from Nebraska, and four Silver contestants from Michigan, giving the Silver men control of the full votes of both these states and two-thirds of the convention.

Before the convention met there had been rumors that the two-thirds rule was to be set aside; the New York Times canvassed the delegates and reported 518 to 412 as in favor of abolishing the rule. However, there was no need of such action and the old rules were adopted. It was reported that the credentials committee were unanimous in seating the Nebraska delegation headed by Bryan. The Michigan contestants were seated by vote of 558 to 368, but not by steam-roller methods.

There were many delegations and lobbies of Silver Republicans, Populists and Silver men generally, including James B. Weaver, around convention hall. They wanted Senator Teller nominated. Weaver's refusal to support Boies practically ended Boies' chances. An interview published on the eve of the convention from Perry Belmont, just returned from Europe, which stated that Europe was indifferent toward international bimetallism, added to the Republican gold plank, cinched the determination to come out absolutely for free silver.

Senator Stephen M. White of California was permanent president, and made a harmony, not a keynote speech. W. A. Clark of Montana presented a solid silver gavel from the miners of his State. A newspaper reporter described Bryan as wearing a black

alpaca coat, string tie and trousers bagging at the knees; that was news in 1896.

When the platform was reported the money plank was demanded, with great cheering, to be read again. Sixteen signed a minority report declaring free coinage dangerous and favoring international bimetalism, demanding the old Democratic policy of "hard money" and criticizing the failure to endorse the existing Democratic administration. Hill, Vilas, Gray and representatives on the committee from Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Vermont, South Dakota, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Alaska signed the minority report.

David Bennett Hill offered individual amendments providing that any change in the money standard should not apply to existing contracts, and that if free coinage failed to effect parity between gold and silver in one year from enactment such coinage should be suspended. Tillman opened the debate in a long and bitter speech; he had his pitchfork with him and used it on the money power, the Republican Party, Cleveland, Carlisle and John Sherman. Jones of Arkansas argued briefly and dispassionately for the majority report. Hill spoke for the minority, cold, logical and able, and respectful toward his opponents; he defended the Cleveland administration, deprecated the attack on the Supreme Court, commented on the presence in a Democratic convention of Republicans and Populists on the platform, organizing, he said, this convention and proscribing Democrats. Vilas and Governor Russell of Massachusetts followed on Hill's side. Bryan of Nebraska, for the majority, closed the debate.

Bryan is justly credited with making two of the most famous, if not the most effective speeches in all American convention history, this one in 1896 and his speech in the Baltimore convention sixteen years later. Conkling's nomination of Grant, Ingersoll's of Blaine, neither won the battle. Both of Bryan's brought about nominations. Bryan's Baltimore speech changed many votes and made Woodrow Wilson President, while it is doubtful if his 1896 and more famous speech changed a single vote on the matter under debate, and did not make him President, although gaining him the nomination and making him the leader and practical dictator of the Democratic Party for sixteen years, with a nation-wide influence all that time second only to that of the actual President.

Addressed to a convention two-thirds of which sympathized with the agricultural element of the country now owing some

billions of dollars in farm mortgages, and the debtor class generally, and thoroughly convinced of the righteousness, wisdom and efficacy of free silver as a remedy for the political ills of the country, Bryan's speech was marvelously adapted to its hearers and its purpose.

"The humblest citizen in all the land, when clad in the armor of a righteous cause, is stronger than the whole hosts of error. I come to speak to you in defense of a cause as holy as the cause of liberty—the cause of humanity. . . . This is a contest of principle. The man who is employed for wages is as much a business man as his employer. The merchant at the crossroads store is as much a business man as the merchant of New York. The farmer who goes forth in the morning and toils all day, begins in the spring and toils all summer, and by the application of brains and muscle to the natural resources of the country creates wealth is as much a business man as the man who goes upon the Board of Trade and bets upon the price of grain. The miners who go a thousand feet into the earth to bring forth the precious metals to be poured forth in the channels of trade are as much business men as the few financial magnates who in a back room corner the money of the world.

"We have petitioned and our petitions have been scorned. We have entreated and our entreaties have been disregarded. We have begged and they have mocked when our calamity came. We beg no longer; we entreat no more; we petition no more. We defy them. . . .

"They say that the government ought to go out of the banking business. I stand with Jefferson rather than with them, and tell them as he did that the issue of money is a function of the government and that the banks should go out of the governing business. . . .

"If protection has slain its thousands, the gold standard has slain its tens of thousands. . . .

"You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard. I tell you that the great cities rest upon these broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms and your cities will spring up again as if by magic. But destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in this country. . . .

"We shall declare that this nation is able to legislate for its own people on every question, without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation on earth. Upon that issue we expect to carry every single state in the Union. . . .

"It is the issue of 1776 over again. Our ancestors when but three million had the courage to declare their political independence of every other nation upon earth. Shall we their

descendants when we have grown to seventy million declare that we are less independent than our forefathers? No, my friends, it will never be the judgment of this people. . . .

"Therefore we care not upon what lines the battle is fought. If they say bimetallism is good but we cannot have it till some nation helps us, we reply that instead of having a gold standard because England has, we shall restore bimetallism and then let England have bimetallism because the United States have.

"If they dare to come out in the open and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we shall fight them to the uttermost, having behind us the producing masses of the Nation and the world. Having behind us the commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, 'You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns; you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.'"

When the wild and long-continued cheering had subsided the minority money amendment was rejected 626 to 303, and the amendment endorsing the Cleveland administration voted down 546 to 357. Hill's two amendments were rejected by viva voce vote. Tillman abandoned his resolution denouncing the administration. The majority report on platform was then adopted 628 to 301, Florida, Minnesota, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming and Alaska supplying 61, the North and East 240, of the nay vote.

It was believed that if the convention had proceeded to nominate immediately Bryan would have won on first ballot; but the nominations were postponed until the morrow.

Richard P. Bland of Missouri, Bryan, Boies of Iowa, Claude Matthews of Indiana, Blackburn of Kentucky, McLean of Ohio, Pattison of Pennsylvania, and Penoyer of Oregon were placed in nomination.

Governor William E. Russell of Massachusetts, for whom his delegation was instructed, declined to allow his name to be presented. New Jersey and New York when called stated sourly that they had no candidate to present to this convention or to run on the platform adopted.

Virginia announced that John W. Daniel, for whom the delegation was instructed, had requested that his name be not presented. Wisconsin through General Bragg announced that that state could not participate in a nomination on the platform adopted.

There was a tremendous amount of oratory in this convention, especially in the nominating speeches, but most of it went with the enthusiasm which was all on the silver side. There were

references not only to Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Jackson and Lincoln, but to Cincinnatus, Tiberius Gracchus, Cato, Cicero, Catiline, Leonidas, Ivanhoe, Henry of Navarre, Peter the Hermit, Cromwell, Danton, Murat, Robespierre, Napoleon, Wellington, Lodi, Austerlitz, Waterloo, Yorktown and Thermopylæ, but, oddly, none to Moses or Joshua and no one seemed to think of Armageddon.

In the balloting many states voting under the unit rule announced the preferences of the minority of the delegations. Connecticut announced 2 delegates not voting, Massachusetts passed, Michigan announced 10 not voting, New York, New Jersey and Wisconsin declined to vote. A Bryan member of the last-named state's delegation demanded the right to vote and the chair ruled that the unit rule did not permit the majority of a delegation to stifle the vote of the minority, so 5 of Wisconsin's votes were cast and counted. Massachusetts announced 18 not voting.

The first ballot showed 930 delegates; of those voting Bryan received 137, Bland, 235, Boies, 67, Matthews, 37, McLean, 54, Pattison, 97, Blackburn, 82, scattering, 43, not voting, 178. Bryan's and Bland's votes came from every section; Pattison, the only Gold candidate, got all his votes from the East except 1 from Florida and 3 from Minnesota and South Dakota. The non-voting delegates were practically all from the East and Wisconsin.

On the second ballot the favorite son vote fell off and Bryan receiving 97, 162 not voting; the fourth ballot was, Bryan, 280, this vote was announced Marston of Louisiana moved that the two-thirds rule was a cowardly subterfuge and should be repealed; Blanchard stated that Marston's motion did not represent the sentiment of the Louisiana delegation. The motion was disposed of on a point of order.

Bryan on the third ballot rose to 219, Bland to 291, Pattison receiving 97, 162 not voting; the fourth ballot was Bryan, 280, Bland, 241, Pattison, 97, not voting, 161. The chair at this point announced a ruling that, following a precedent of 1852, two-thirds of the whole number of votes given was necessary to a choice; this indicated that the number not voting would not figure in the count.

During the roll call on the fifth ballot the names of Bland, Boies, Blackburn and Matthews were withdrawn, all in favor of Bryan, and the ballot was, Bryan, 652, Pattison, 95, scattering, 21, not voting 162. This gave Bryan more than two-

thirds of the full convention; the nomination was made unanimous.

The nominations for Vice-Presidential candidates were made next day. McLean of Ohio, Daniel of Virginia and Fithian of Illinois were named but withdrew. Judge Walter Clark of North Carolina, ex-Governor Pennoyer of Oregon, Joseph C. Sibley of Pennsylvania, George Fred Williams of Massachusetts and Bland of Missouri were placed in nomination. Sixteen men were voted for on first ballot, Sibley leading with 163 votes, McLean next with 111, Sewall, 100, Williams, 76 and Bland, 62, Clark, 50, 260 delegates, among them 55 of Pennsylvania's 64, not voting although a Pennsylvanian was in the race, and Massachusetts not voting although Williams of that state was a candidate. The increase of the number not voting was due to many delegates leaving, and to Nebraska's not voting from motives of delicacy. Massachusetts, sarcastically, or as stated by the chairman "magnanimously left the fortunes of her distinguished son to the convention."

The approved official proceedings give the vote as 682, thus excluding the 260 not voting, and state 455 as necessary to a choice, which indicates the chair holding that two-thirds of a quorum present and voting was sufficient to nominate.

Bland and McLean withdrew and on the fifth ballot Sewall of Maine received 568 votes, against 111 scattering, 251 not voting. Sewall received two-thirds of those voting, but not two-thirds of a full convention. However, the nomination was made unanimous.

The Democratic National Committee contained many new members. Urey Woodson, Kentucky; James Smith, Jr., New Jersey; Josephus Daniels, North Carolina; John R. McLean, Ohio; Ben R. Tillman, South Carolina; Hugh C. Wallace, Washington, and Marcus Smith, Arizona. James K. Jones of Arkansas was made chairman of the executive committee, and Daniel J. Campau of Michigan chairman of the campaign committee.

Bryan was formally notified of his nomination at Madison Square Garden, New York City. The great crowd assembled there were woefully disappointed for instead of a wonderfully eloquent speech they heard Bryan read a carefully prepared argument. Many left the hall thinking Bryan a vastly over-estimated man. They were quickly and thoroughly undeceived so soon as he really began his campaign.

His speech of acceptance was one of the most thoughtful and statesmanlike utterances of his whole career. Quoting Lincoln,

Jefferson and Jackson in support, he endorsed and defended the Democratic platform in all its features. He devoted most of his argument to the money question and maintained that free coinage would restore silver to parity with gold at sixteen to one throughout the world, and that the mint price would control the bullion price, in fact fix the price, and that there was no repudiation involved.

Bryan's letter of acceptance was short, endorsing each plank in the platform seriatim, and plainly saying that tariff legislation should wait upon the settlement of the financial question.

The Prohibition Party split in 1896, the Narrow-Gaugers who controlled the convention devoting the platform solely to prohibition, adding, however, a resolution favoring woman suffrage. Joshua Levering of Maryland and Hale Johnson of Illinois were their candidates.

The Broad-Gaugers bolted and nominated Charles E. Bentley of Nebraska, and James E. Southgate of North Carolina, on a platform condensing the Narrow-Gaugers' declaration of principles into one plank, and adding a woman suffrage plank, and free silver plank and some Populist principles.

The Socialist Labor Party nominated Charles H. Matchett of New York and Matthew Maguire of New Jersey on a Socialist Labor platform. This convention thought that in twenty years its party would control the government.

The People's Party, commonly spoken of as the Populist, and the Silver Party held conventions the same day at St. Louis, July 22. The "Middle-of-the-Road" Populists wished no alliance with either of the old parties. The convention on first ballots nominated Bryan and Thomas E. Watson, but S. F. Norton received 321 votes for first place and Sewall 257 for second.

The platform declared for free silver at sixteen to one, an immediate increase in the volume of money, prohibition of demonetization of lawful money by private contract, and many features of the Omaha platform. It condemned suffrage methods in the South.

The National Silver Party nominated Bryan and Sewall, and confined its platform to the silver issue.

The Republican national convention met at St. Louis June 16. Mark Hanna had made the nomination of McKinley a foregone conclusion, but the position the party was to take on the money question was not so sure. The Silver Republicans could expect nothing better than a straddle and McKinley and Hanna had a

plan for a bimetallism plank. But it was soon evident that the majority of the convention was determined on a gold platform. When the platform was adopted Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado, former cabinet member, left the convention with thirty-three other Silver men, including four Senators. His double standard plank had been voted down 818 to 105, practically all its supporters coming from the West and South.

William McKinley of Ohio and Garrett A. Hobart of New Jersey were nominated on first ballot.

The last convention to be held in 1896 was that of the National Democrats, or Gold Democrats, at Indianapolis September 2nd. Forty-one states and three territories were represented, Idaho, Nevada, Utah and Wyoming sending no delegates. Ex-Governor Flower of New York was permanent presiding officer. General John M. Palmer of Illinois, former Union, and General Simon B. Buckner of Kentucky, former Confederate general, were nominated.

The platform of the Gold Democrats criticized the platform of the regulars for its money views and its abandonment of the tariff issue. It declared for sound money and opposition to paternalism. Arraigning also the Republican and Populist Parties, it declared for tariff for revenue only, liberal policies toward American shipping, liberal pensions, and most of all for a sound money system. It praised the fidelity, patriotism and courage of President Cleveland, commended civil service reform and deprecated attacks on the Supreme Court.

Both the major parties endorsed the Monroe Doctrine and extended sympathy to Cuba, the Republicans hinting at intervention. The Democrats declared for a revenue tariff, but postponing any change until the money question was settled. They denounced federal interference with local affairs and government by injunction and opposed life tenure of office.

The Republicans declared for a protective tariff upholding American standard of wages, and reciprocity.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1896

Money Plank. "We demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one without waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation. We demand that the standard silver dollar shall be full legal tender, equally with gold for all debts."

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1896

Money Plank. Unreservedly for sound money and "opposed to free coinage of silver except by international agreement with the leading commercial nations of the world, which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard must be preserved."

The campaign which ensued had in it the intense enthusiasm for a cause and a leader that marked the Jackson campaign in 1828, the bitterness and animosity (though not so personal) that characterized the Cleveland-Blaine race, and also the solid economic earnestness and seriousness which was such a feature in the 1892 campaign.

Republicans may point with partisan vainglory to their party's fight for sound money in 1896, but the indisputable fact is that the lines of the Battle of the Standards were laid down by two Democrats, Grover Cleveland and William Jennings Bryan. The Republicans after much wabbling simply took up the fight at the point Cleveland was deposed of command and occupied the position he had chosen to make the fight on. Long before the Republican Party had taken its ground, Cleveland had declared and waged war, and seized the position which was the center of the battle.

Republican historians right now are contending as to who put the gold plank in their 1896 platform, while everyone knows that Cleveland really placed it there. After his own, but before Bryan's nomination, McKinley remarked to his friend and subsequent Secretary of State, William R. Day, "I am a Tariff man standing on a Tariff platform. This money question is unduly prominent. In thirty days you won't hear anything about it." Day, less enthusiastic and more sapient, replied, "In my opinion in thirty days you won't hear of anything else." Hanna, too, until the convention met was a chaser of the phantom "International Bimetallism" and came to the convention with a straddling plank in his pocket.

Cleveland and Bryan, the real prophets of the two schools, were both disciples of Calvin and Knox, though neither would ever have written a book praising the beauties of tolerance such as Calvin's *De Clementia*. Wisdom or unwisdom, expediency or in expediency counted for nothing with either when a principle was believed involved; there was no compromise with evil in either's program. They applied to the money question, and to each other, as rigid and stern tests as Calvin applied to the Anabaptists and Knox to the court of Mary Queen of Scots. It was these two Presbyterian Democrats, not McKinley, the "Advance Agent of Prosperity," nor Hanna with his "Full Dinner Pail" appeal, who laid out the plan of battle, forced the fighting and supplied the moral spirit and force which animated the contending squadrons. Hanna furnished the commissariat, drummed

up recruits and organized the camp followers in 1896. It was later that he developed into a statesman.

John Sharp Williams, in his keynote speech as temporary chairman of the 1904 Democratic national convention, was greatly applauded when he said, "This fact of a gold basis was accomplished not by the Republican Party but by the dogged persistency and indomitable will of Grover Cleveland," not so much because the fact he stated was pleasant to all his hearers, but because it was an indisputable fact.

The campaign was a stirring one. Both sides had money although the Republicans had and used much the more. Hanna fairly deluged the country with literature and his forces were organized wherever there was the slightest chance of success. W. H. Harvey's book, *Coin's Financial School*, was the favorite piece of Silver literature and was widely circulated by the Democrats. It was written in readable "popular science style." Coin took up and demolished in the easiest and most completely satisfactory way each main argument of the "plutocrats," and so ingenious and plausible were his arguments that the book gave the Republicans no end of alarm and trouble.

The cartoonists pictured with asses' ears the folly of free coinage, but the most striking and enduring caricature of the campaign was the "Plutocrat," a baboon-like man clad in dollar-mark clothes. The campaign in the main, however, was one of education and at its close there were near a hundred fiscal experts among our population to every one in being at its beginning.

McKinley reluctantly accepting the money question and not the tariff as the great issue, remained at home, speaking each day from his front porch to visiting delegations of citizens, some days to as many as twenty sets of visitors. Impressing his hearers with his honesty, eloquent in a calm way and very convincing, he was an ideal candidate for his party at this crisis. The marked advance in the price of wheat before election helped his candidacy and all the conservatism in the nature of the average American tended toward his cause.

Bryan was a true crusader. Covering eighteen thousand miles in his speech-making tours he addressed thousands and tens of thousands of his fellow citizens every day of the campaign. He bore the mental and physical strain of this as easily as a giant bears an ordinary man's burden. Not Clay nor Blaine so enthralled his followers, for added to those magnetic qualities his great forerunners possessed, Bryan so appealed to religious feel-

ing that to many he was as a prophet and moral leader as well as statesman and advocate of a great cause.

Reading now the Democratic platform of the year and Bryan's speeches, there seems nothing revolutionary, certainly nothing anarchistic in them. Yet he appeared to appeal so to the masses against the classes that he had to defend himself against the charge of anarchy, which Altgeld's alliance with him added force to in the public mind. That the issue involved was an economic rather than a moral one is plain enough now, but Bryan had to defend his party and his cause from charges of dishonesty. To him and to nearly half of the American people exactly the reverse was true.

As Democrats had forced the issue so Democratic votes settled it. The Palmer and Buckner followers enlisted under their own banner, but voted for McKinley. Of the seven million votes he received probably a full third were from Democrats, while Bryan's vote was swelled by Republican and Populist supporters. He carried Western Republican states while Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Delaware went into the McKinley column. It was not a partisan contest. The Tammany Democracy were as loyal in support of the ticket as any other element of the Eastern wing of the party.

The persistent charge that Tammany has not been loyal to Democratic nominees seems not tenable, on careful examination. The accusation that it knifed Cleveland in 1888 is utterly disproved. It bitterly opposed the nominations of Cleveland and Tilden, but was loyal on election days. Tammany's behavior appears to be better at the polls than, at times, in conventions. The organization has been as loyal to Bryan, to Wilson and to other Democrats as other cross-sections of the party have been to candidates whom they did not fancy—as loyal to the Westerner in 1896, 1900 and 1908, as the Westerners were to the Easterners in 1904 and 1924, for instance.

There is another side to the picture—how the national Democracy has treated Tammany. In convention assembled Democracy has treated Southern bourbonism with respectful, if bored, toleration; Western isms with polite, if sarcastic, consideration; and Eastern reaction with deferential, if hostile, attention. But, with Tammany in the minority, it has been the angry look and harsh word, the strong arm and the booted foot. Witness General Bragg in 1884 and the party press generally. There was justice in Bourke Cockran's complaint in 1892 that the New York Democracy was treated as regular soldiers

whose loyalty was relied on to survive any outrage put upon them.

A juster criticism of Tammany is that, with the great metropolis to draw from, it has furnished the Democratic Party, during the long interval between Martin Van Buren and Alfred E. Smith, not a single real Tammany man of unquestioned Presidential size.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
McKinley	7,111,607	271
Bryan	6,509,052	176
Palmer	134,645	
Levering	131,000	
Bentley	14,000	
Matchett	36,000	

The Bryan and Watson ticket received 222,000 votes, included in above figures, and Watson received 27 electoral votes for Vice-President, Sewall receiving 149. McKinley's majority over all other candidates was 286,000; his plurality over Bryan 602,555. The Fifty-fifth Congress elected at the same time was Republican in both branches, but the Silver forces still dominated the Senate.

The Republicans promptly enacted a tariff law, the Nelson Dingley tariff. The McKinley bill rates had been around 49 per cent, the Wilson rates around 41; the Dingley rates ran from 50 to 52. As it left the House, it was more moderate, but in the Senate the representatives of various interests were allowed practically to write their own rates. Hanna had brought the powerful and intelligent big-business men in direct contact with, if not control of, the Republican Party. Now was inaugurated the beginning of "invisible government." Worthington C. Ford, Chief of the Bureau of Statistics, asserted that in many cases the duties of the Dingley bill were prohibitive and the law would lessen the revenue; that the fiscal policy of the government had distinctly become one for protection with incidental revenue.

Pending changes in the Senate which would permit financial reform McKinley continued Cleveland's and Carlisle's policies while he made a fruitless attempt to secure international bimetallicism. He endeavored to have the Senate approve the Olney-Pauncefote arbitration treaty, but failed.

McKinley followed his predecessor's footsteps in Cuban affairs also, until his hand was forced. No amount of statescraft, diplomatic traditions, international courtesy or foreign policy could stay the hands of the American people when they beheld tens of thousands of fellow creatures, our near neighbors, crowded in

concentration camps, starved, mistreated and killed by a European power. The destruction of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor was the match to the powder.

Champ Clark always claimed that the Democrats forced the Republicans to declare war, but the evidence seems to show that there was no partisanship in bringing on the war and that the Republicans were as militant as the Democrats, only more careful and conservative as it behooved the party in power, and therefore responsible, to be, as compared with the opposition.

The war was nonpartisan. Democratic and Republican soldiers and sailors, admirals and generals won victories on sea and land, and suffered from Spanish bullets, but much more from disease, mismanagement and embalmed beef. Twenty years later the country was to become engaged in a war a hundred times greater and more serious, and under a Democratic administration was to suffer incomparably less from corruption, inefficiency, mismanagement—and politics. Time will establish these facts, but they have not yet been separated from the mass of misrepresentation and propaganda and favoritism. One can read the story of the destruction of the Spanish fleet out of Santiago harbor written by one of America's most distinguished historians and find Commodore Schley's name not once mentioned, although his flagship, the *Brooklyn*, is named as participating.

The great purely political result of the Spanish-American War was the eventual making of Theodore Roosevelt President of the United States. No one can doubt that. Its immediate political effect was to strengthen the Republican hold on the government, and the Fifty-sixth Congress was Republican in both Houses by increased majorities.

The Democratic minority, however, had much to do with the settlement of the problems growing out of the war. The retention of the Philippines was the greatest question. George Gray of Delaware was the only Democrat of the five peace commissioners sent to treat with Spain, and he alone of them held to American traditions and the announced spirit and purpose with which the United States entered the war. McKinley in his war message had said that forcible annexation would be, by our code of morality, criminal aggression. Gray maintained the same principle. Admirals Dewey and Chadwick approved Judge Gray's position; to demand the Philippines was to alter the moral position of our country. Dewey declared he knew both races and that the Filipinos were more capable of self-government than the Cubans.

McKinley's position as stated by himself was that we could not turn the islands back to Spain, nor to France or Germany, nor leave them, unfit for self-government as they were, to themselves, so there was nothing left to do but to take them, and educate, uplift, civilize and Christianize the people.

Republicans and Democrats in Congress opposed the treaty with Spain; George F. Hoar, Republican, in the Senate, and John Sharp Williams, Democratic minority leader in the House, made notable speeches against annexation, as did others of both parties. It was thought that the treaty would have failed but that Bryan came to Washington and induced Democrats to yield. His position was that the question could better be dealt with as a domestic than as an international problem, and he made it the paramount issue in the next campaign.

The Democratic policy was well expressed in the resolutions introduced by Senator A. O. Bacon of Georgia, stating that it was not the purpose of the United States to secure or maintain dominion over the Philippine Islands as part of the territory of the United States, or to incorporate the inhabitants as citizens or to hold them as vassals or subject, or to exercise permanent sovereignty or jurisdiction over the islands.

Hanna, with his usual frankness, voiced the sentiment of the controlling influences of the Republican Party.

"We make no hypercritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. While we regard the welfare of those people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first. We see our duty to ourselves as well as to others. We believe in trade expansion. By every legitimate means within the province of government and constitution we mean to stimulate the expansion of our trade and open new markets."

On March 14, 1900, a law was enacted making the gold dollar the standard unit of value for the United States and providing that greenbacks and all treasury notes should be redeemed in gold. This put this country definitely, and finally it seemed, on the gold standard.

The Democrats had taken office in 1893 on the verge of an unavoidable period of hard times. Ably they had carried on for four years and laid the foundation for prosperity which was sure to come once the money question was settled. The election of 1896 settled it and the Republicans came in power under the most fortunate conditions, and not least among these favored

conditions was the vastly increased gold production throughout the world which began in 1896 with the gold discoveries in Alaska. A year later the Klondike rush was on, and soon from Alaska, from South Africa and Australia there poured into the channels of trade a flood of gold, bringing with it an increased supply of money and better prices. The evils for which free silver had been deemed the remedy were largely cured by this influx of gold.

The Democrats in 1900 faced an almost invincible Republican Party. Their opponents were solidified, harmonious and entrenched in power; they had conducted a successful war and the country was prosperous—a powerful aid this last, for the American electorate are strong for letting well enough alone.

Their own party, on the other hand, was neither united nor harmonious. Many old leaders, national and state, had been discarded and new men were in control. There had been a great change throughout the whole party in the personnel both of the leaders and of the rank and file. In the South with the cause of difference removed the lines soon closed up again; in the Silver section the 1896 lines held only in a few states; in all the rest of the country, states like Kansas returned to the Republican fold and Delaware, Maryland and West Virginia became doubtful, while states normally Republican became more so. The Eastern Democracy, which had been such a powerful factor in making the Cleveland era great and successful, had not only been deposed, but many of its members alienated, some for good and all, while their places had been taken by men Democratic only on one issue and that a temporary one. Yet Bryan in 1900 was to receive over six million votes.

CHAPTER XXVIII

DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATION UNDER ROOSEVELT

1901-1909

Twelve Lean Years—The Democratic Minority—Eighteenth Democratic National Convention—Bryan and Stevenson—Other Conventions—The Platforms—McKinley and Roosevelt—Era of Trust Formation—Death of McKinley—The Roosevelt Era—Hanna—Nineteenth Democratic National Convention—Bryan's Influence—Parker and Davis—Parker's Telegram on the Gold Standard—Other Conventions—The Platforms—The Humorists' Campaign—Democracy's Great Influence in Legislation in Roosevelt's Administration—Twentieth Democratic National Convention—Bryan Again—Other Conventions—The Platforms—A Forlorn Hope—Taft Elected.

THE history of the Democratic Party from 1896 to the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912 is mostly internal. Not once in all that period did it have the Executive or Senate and only the last two years did it have a majority in the House. Luke E. Wright of Tennessee, and Jacob McGavock Dickinson, who said that he "had never voted a Republican ticket and never would," were made Secretaries of War in the Roosevelt and Taft cabinets, and were the only Democrats holding high executive positions during the whole period.

Yet there were some noble and able men in the Democratic ranks in both Houses of Congress, men who, if ever a Congressional history of the United States is written, will figure conspicuously. There was Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, made chairman of the canal committee by a Republican Senate, who for twenty years hammered the idea of an isthmian canal into the American mind, and is accounted by many the father of our canal policy. Newlands of Nevada was the pioneer in irrigation and reclamation legislation, and John Sharp Williams was as sound and broad a scholar, as clear-headed and honest-minded a statesman as ever sat in either House, and the most famous of all minority leaders. It would be a long list that contained the names of all deserving distinguished mention.

The Eighteenth Democratic National Convention met at Kansas City, July 4, 1900. The call was addressed to all Democratic conservative reform citizens irrespective of past political

associations who could unite for a pure, economical, constitutional government and who favored a Republic and opposed an Empire.

Called to order by Chairman of the National Committee James K. Jones, Charles S. Thomas of Colorado was named as temporary chairman and James D. Richardson of Tennessee permanent president. As it was well known that the convention would only register the will of Bryan and his followers, who completely dominated the party, the Democratic war horses in great numbers remained at home, allowing to less distinguished party men the honor of being delegates.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted and a committee of conference was appointed to confer with the Silver Republican and Populist conventions then being held in the city. This committee later reported the nomination of Bryan by the Silver Republicans. The platform was adopted without debate, with enthusiasm and by acclamation. Some of the resolutions committee suggested a modification of the money plank, but Bryan insisted that there should be no retreat from the 1896 position. The clause declaring imperialism the burning and paramount issue was popular and its rereading demanded.

William Jennings Bryan was nominated and seconded by delegates from practically every state; the enthusiasm for him seemed less wild than four years previous but deeper.

Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, Charles A. Towne of Minnesota (a Populist), Charles S. Thomas of Colorado, David Bennett Hill of New York, James Hamilton Lewis of Washington, John Walter Smith of Maryland, Julian S. Carr of North Carolina and Abraham W. Patrick of Ohio were placed in nomination for Vice-President. Hill and Lewis withdrew themselves from the contest.

Despite his withdrawal Hill received 207 votes; Towne received 89 and Stevenson, 565; states changed before the vote was announced and Stevenson was named unanimously.

Milton Turner, a colored Democrat, representing the Negro Democratic League, addressed the convention and announced that 300,000 of his race would support Bryan.

Among the new members of the National Committee were James Clarke of Arkansas, Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut, Thomas Taggart of Indiana, Senator Stone of Missouri, Norman E. Mack of New York, J. M. Guffey of Pennsylvania and John T. McGraw of West Virginia. James K. Jones was reëlected chairman, and Willis J. Abbott placed at Chicago headquarters; Clark Howell was head of the press committee.

Bryan in his speech of acceptance dealt almost entirely with the paramount issue—Imperialism. He explained his action in aiding the confirmation of the treaty, by asserting that friends could make laws more easily than aliens could make treaties, a quotation from Lincoln in 1860, and that the Democrats were in a better position to wage a contest against imperialism than had the treaty been rejected; now the clean-cut issue was presented, he said, between government by consent and government by force. He endorsed the Bacon resolution and contrasted the acquisition, under Democratic administration, of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, California, and other territory with the proposed Republican seizure of the Philippines.

Bryan quoted Dewey, and Henry Clay, and reciting Hanna's commercial argument compared it to a not dissimilar argument made by Lord Howe in 1770 concerning Great Britain's attitude toward her American colonies and Franklin's famous reply to him. To offset the cry of manifest destiny Bryan quoted Washington as saying that not only our own, but the destiny of republican government throughout the world was in American hands. If elected, his purpose was, he said, immediately to call Congress in session and recommend a declaration of the nation's purpose to establish a stable government in the Philippines and then let the inhabitants work out their own destiny.

In his letter of acceptance Bryan went over the Democratic platform in detail and approved every plank in it.

The Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, the Silver Republicans, the Anti-Imperialist League and the Fusion wing of the Populists endorsed Bryan's nomination; the latter had nominated Towne for Vice-President, but he withdrew and Stevenson was named. The Social-Democrats nominated Debs and Job Harriman of California on a Socialist platform. The Anti-Fusion or Middle-of-the-Road Populists nominated Wharton Barber of Pennsylvania and Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota, reaffirming the Omaha platform.

The Socialist-Labor Party nominated J. T. Malloney of Massachusetts and Valentino Reinel of Pennsylvania, the platform demanding the restoration to the people of the land, means of production, transportation, etc., and advocating a coöperative republic.

The Prohibition Party nominated John G. Woolley of Illinois and Henry B. Metcalf of Rhode Island. The platform was bitter and personal against McKinley for serving wine at the White

House, permitting army canteens and allowing saloons in the Philippines.

The Gold, or National Democrats held no convention, but its committee adopted resolutions reaffirming the Indianapolis platform and recommending state committees to preserve their organizations.

The Republican Party held its convention at Philadelphia June 19th. The only excitement attending it was the choice of a Vice-Presidential nominee and that was settled before any vote was taken. McKinley and Roosevelt were named unanimously,

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1900

Arraigned Republican breach of faith to Porto Rico and demanded honest fulfillment of our promises to Cuba.

Denounced the Philippine policy as greedy commercialism and "criminal aggression."

Opposed militarism and favored National Guard rather than large standing army.

Demanded enlargement of powers of Interstate Commerce Commission to prevent unjust discrimination in rates.

Favored popular election of Senators.

Charged that Trusts were fostered by Dingley law, and protected by Republicans in return for campaign contributions

Demanded publicity for corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and that products of trusts be placed on tariff free list.

Discrimination in rates by railroads condemned.

Reaffirmed platform of 1896 on money issue.

Denounced the Gold Standard law of 1900 and the power of national banks to issue notes.

Opposed government by injunction.

Recommended Department of Labor, immediate construction of Nicaraguan Canal, and irrigation of arid lands of the West.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1900

Reviewed with pride Republican record, especially of last four years, and endorsed the McKinley administration.

Reaffirmed allegiance to the gold standard.

Condemned trusts and monopolies, but recognized necessity of honest aggregations of capital.

Renewed their faith in protection and reciprocity, restriction of immigration, restoration of the American merchant marine, liberal pensions and liberal homestead laws.

The suffrage laws of the South were condemned.

An isthmian canal, the creation of a Department of Commerce and Industries, good roads, labor insurance, and reclamation of arid lands favored.

Commended Republican handling of foreign affairs and reaffirmed Monroe Doctrine and open door in China.

Good government and peace in the Philippines, liberty and civilization and large measure of self-government to all the rescued peoples, and Cuban self-government promised.

It is to be noted that the Democratic platform modified the advanced tariff position lately assumed by the party. There is no hint of tariff for revenue only; the tariff is opposed on account of its monopolistic, trust-breeding effect.

The campaign was a mild edition of the preceding one. Both the leading candidates had grown in public estimation. By promptly getting Secretary of War Alger out of his cabinet McKinley had rid himself of the onus of the embalmed beef served the army, nor was he blamed for the corruption and mismanagement which had developed. His lovable character stood him in good stead.

Bryan was better understood, better liked and more admired. No one now really believed him revolutionary or anarchistic, but he was still thought radical and the conservatism of the country, the "let well enough alone" feeling, was almost solidly against him again except that many conservative Democrats came back into the party notwithstanding their objections to Bryan's radicalism or progressivism. Anti-imperialism, too, brought him some extreme conservative support.

Manifest destiny, manifest prosperity, Mark Hanna and his own strength enabled McKinley to win a decisive victory. His was the first purely party victory since 1888, for the Independents had elected Cleveland in 1892 and they and bolting Democrats had elected McKinley in 1896. Bryan's vote, however, in practically every state was respectable in size and character.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Republican	7,206,677	292
Democratic	6,374,397	155
Prohibition	209,000	
Social-Democrat	95,000	
Middle-of-Road Populist	50,000	
Social-Labor	40,000	

McKinley's majority over all was near half a million, and his vote exceeded Bryan's by more than 800,000.

The Republicans took the election to be a mandate from the people to the government to do all it could for expansion, territorially and in the interest of business. Morgan proceeded to organize the iron and steel industry as he had the railroads and banks, and he had many large and small imitators. The current literature of the time was filled with stories of the trusts, Ida M. Tarbell's *History of Standard Oil*, Ray Stannard Baker's articles, Upton Sinclair's *Jungle*, Frank Norris' *Octopus*, Lincoln Steffens'

stories of corruption, and similar literature by others, whom Roosevelt later dubbed "Muck Rakers." Stock gambling became the order of the day, the Northern Pacific corner was worked, the "Rich Man's Panic" came on which Morgan diagnosed as caused by "undigested securities." "Expansion," the "White Man's Burden," "America a World Power," distracted American attention from evils at home.

Roosevelt, succeeding to the Presidency on McKinley's death, immediately announced that he would carry out McKinley's policies and that he intended to work with his party. McKinley had promised some reduction of the tariff, but Roosevelt feared to embark on this lest it split the Republicans, Cannon, the Speaker, being a Simon-pure protectionist and Mark Hanna still alive. During Roosevelt's seven years the tariff was untouched.

The Nineteenth Democratic National Convention, 1,000 delegates, met at St. Louis, July 6, 1904, two weeks after the Republican convention. The call had been addressed to all Democratic (omitting the usual "conservative") citizens who could unite in the effort for a pure and economical constitutional government.

Called to order by Chairman of the National Committee James K. Jones, the convention accepted John Sharp Williams of Mississippi for temporary chairman. His keynote speech directed no criticism toward divergent views held by either wing of the Democratic Party.

The rules of the preceding convention were adopted. Two rulings on the unit rule were made at this convention. Williams held that if a delegation was voting under that rule a delegate could not demand a poll simply to show how each delegate voted, but his demand must be based on a charge that the vote was not correctly announced. Champ Clark, permanent chairman, ruled that although Ohio district delegates were chosen by district conventions and not by the state convention, yet the state convention's instruction as to the unit rule would be enforced; the delegates were delegates of the state, he said, not of the districts, no matter how chosen. A reaffirmation of the Democratic rule that the state was the unit.

An attempt to have the committee on rules report against the two-thirds rule was voted down promptly and overwhelmingly. It was argued that it prevented the Republican part of the country from naming the candidate, and that without it, under the unit rule a minority of actual delegates might name him.

Delegates from Porto Rico were admitted and given votes, but

those from the Philippines barred, as according to Democratic principles the latter were not part of the United States.

The personnel of this convention is of interest as showing how strong was Bryan's influence over the party in the various states at this juncture. There had been a great effort to discard obsolete issues and get together on the tariff and other settled Democratic policies and on the new issues so distinctly before the people. This 1904 convention is notable for the number of distinguished members. Especially did the South exert itself in this particular; some of the "Big Fours" from those states were made up of their most distinguished men, though not all followed this policy. Senators, ex-Senators and Senators-to-be, Governors and ex-Governors and Governors-to-be were plentiful. Bryan was a delegate, and John W. Davis.

The speech of Champ Clark of Missouri, the permanent chairman, attacked the tariff and the trusts. He mentioned free silver not at all. Each wing of the party put its best foot forward in selecting the committee on resolutions. Senator Daniel of Virginia was chairman; among its members were Clarke, Arkansas, Thomas, Colorado, Saulsbury, Delaware, Dubois, Idaho, Shively, Indiana, Weaver, Iowa, Beckham, Kentucky, Williams, Mississippi, Bryan, Nebraska, Hill, New York, Pattison, Pennsylvania, and Tillman, South Carolina.

There was quite a fight in the committee over a proposed financial plank, one taken from the Mississippi state convention's resolutions, to the effect that the recent great influx of gold removed the money standard issue from the field of political contention. This was vigorously opposed by Bryan and others and finally it and an income tax plank were both omitted under a compromise, the compromise carrying by a vote of 35 to 15. The platform as reported was adopted without discussion or dissent, and apparently without any wild enthusiasm.

For a year or more there had been diligent Democratic searching for a suitable candidate and many men discussed in the newspapers. Cleveland and Bryan were the most desired and the most talked about, but both were recognized as impossible candidates to reunite the party. William Randolph Hearst and his friends worked up quite a boom for him and several state conventions instructed delegates for him.

It seems to have been conceded that the West having had the nomination the last two times without winning, it should go elsewhere, and that it was inadvisable to take a Southern man. The North after sober deliberation settled on Judge Alton B. Parker

of New York, which selection was accepted by the party all over the country. Tammany's candidate was McClellan but it readily acquiesced in the selection of Parker. Bryan was opposed to Parker, but the opposition could never center on any candidate.

Parker's nomination was seconded by delegates from half of the states. Hearst, Gray of Delaware, General Nelson Miles, Senator Cockrell of Missouri, Richard Olney, Edward C. Wall of Wisconsin and John Sharp Williams were placed in nomination.

It was in his speech seconding Cockrell's nomination that Bryan said: "I come to-night to this convention to return my commission. You may dispute whether I have fought a good fight, you may dispute whether I have finished my course, but you cannot deny that I have kept the faith." Stating that the platform did not altogether suit those of the West, he agreed to stand on it. "Give us," he said, "a pilot who will guide the Democratic ship away from the Scylla of militarism without wrecking her on the Charybdis of commercialism."

There was only one ballot, Parker receiving 679 votes, Hearst, 181, Gray, 12, Miles, 3, Cockrell, 42, Olney, 38, Wall, 27, Williams, 8, scattering 10. The nomination was made unanimous. Henry Gassaway Davis of West Virginia, long a Senator and a veteran Democrat, was named for Vice-President on first ballot.

Immediately upon hearing of his nomination, Judge Parker sent the following telegram to the convention:

"I regard the gold standard as firmly and irrevocably established, and shall act accordingly, if the action of the convention to-day shall be ratified by the people. As the platform is silent on the subject, my view should be known to the convention, and if it is proved to be unsatisfactory to the majority, I request you to decline the nomination for me at once, so that another may be nominated before adjournment.

ALTON B. PARKER."

Williams of Mississippi stated that every one in the convention well knew that Judge Parker had always been a gold standard man and that he had never concealed the fact, though always loyally supporting the Democratic candidates, and offered for adoption an assenting reply to Parker. Bryan opposed this and advocated that the convention consider the insertion of a gold plank in the platform, which, of course, he would resist. After a sharp debate Williams' telegram was ordered sent by a vote of 794 to 141, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri and the silver-producing states voting nay. The telegram read:

"The platform adopted by this convention is silent upon the question of the monetary standard because it is not regarded by

us as a possible issue in this campaign, and only campaign issues are mentioned in the platform. Therefore there is nothing in the views expressed by you in the telegram just received which would preclude a man entertaining them from accepting a nomination on said platform."

Among the new members of the National Committee were Roger Sullivan, Illinois, and Josephus Daniels, North Carolina. Thomas Taggart of Indiana was elected chairman, W. F. Sheehan chairman of the executive committee.

Parker's letter of acceptance stated the issues of the campaign as tariff reform, imperialism, economical administration and honesty in the public service. He placed himself squarely on the platform. In strong contrast to the fervid eloquence of the candidate of 1900 was the almost judicial severity and precision of the utterances of the Democratic candidate of 1904.

The People's Party nominated Thomas E. Watson of Georgia and Thomas H. Tribbles of Nebraska on a platform reaffirming the Omaha platform of 1892 and subsequent party declarations. The Socialist Party named Eugene V. Debs of Illinois on a Socialist platform, a lengthy exposition of the meaning, aims and purposes of Socialism. The Socialist-Labor Party named Charles H. Corregan of New York on a Soviet platform. The United Christian Party, the National Liberal Party and the Continental Party, a new beginner, all held conventions and named candidates.

The Prohibition Party nominated Silas C. Swallow of Pennsylvania and George W. Carroll of Texas. In addition to its liquor planks the platform had only a declaration of general principles on other questions.

The Republican convention of 1904 was largely a cut-and-dried affair. Hanna's death in February, 1904, left Roosevelt's way clear. Roosevelt's kind attitude toward the tariff, his "conservatism" in other vital matters, made him endurable to the stand-patters, while his popularity with the rank and file was already great—a fact the old Hanna crowd in the party acknowledged and bowed to. There had been previous to the convention a desultory contest over the second place on the ticket. Roosevelt was nominated without opposition, receiving every vote in the convention, as was Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana for second place. This convention was described in the papers of the day as without precedent for dullness and tameness.

The Democratic platform called for justice to labor and capital and for observance of constitutional guarantees, no government contracts with trusts, also the enlargement of the powers of

the Interstate Commerce Commission and the reclamation of arid lands in the West (two things they enabled Roosevelt to put through). They declared for direct election of Senators.

The Republicans pointed with pride to many things. They asserted that combinations of capital and of labor when for lawful purposes are entitled to protection of, but must not infringe, the laws.

Imperialism and the tariff were the live issues.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1904

Imperialism. "We insist that we ought to do for the Filipinos what we have done for the Cubans, and it is our duty to make that promise now and upon suitable guarantees of protection to our citizens and others there at the time of withdrawal, set the Filipino people upon their feet, free and independent to work out their own destiny."

The Tariff. We denounce protection as a robbery of the many to enrich the few, and favor a tariff limited to the needs of the government economically administered and so levied as not to discriminate against any industry, class or section.

We favor a revision and a gradual reduction of the tariff by the friends of the masses and not by the friends of its abuses, and for the constitutional purpose of raising a revenue.

The Democratic tariff plank is more conservative than the bare "tariff for revenue only" and harks back to the Democratic position in the 1880's.

Judge Parker proved not a vote-getter, although he had carried his state by 60,000 plurality for Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals. In a time of crisis his conservatism might have carried him through, but 1904 was not an anxious time. Never was being a cartoonist such an easy job. A laughing philosopher kept the nation in a grin; but the suspicion lurks that, like Gil Blas' friend Laura, the American people would not have laughed half so much or rather not half so many would have laughed had they known that Mr. Dooley's tales were tinctured with the base ingredient of veracity.

George B. Cortelyou, Secretary of Commerce and Labor, was manager of the Republican campaign. This was regarded as a

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1904

Imperialism. "In the Philippines we have suppressed insurrection, established order and given to life and property a security never known there before. We have organized effective, strong civil government and conferred upon the people there the largest civil liberty they have ever enjoyed."

The Tariff. Protection which guards and develops our industries is a cardinal policy of the Republican Party. Protection should at least equal the difference in the cost of production at home and abroad. Rates should be readjusted only when conditions have so changed that public interest demands their alteration, which change should be intrusted to Republicans; to intrust it to Democrats is to invite disaster. A Democratic tariff has always been followed by disaster.

sinister fact since in his department was the Bureau of Corporations, the depository of all the facts collected concerning the trusts and big business. Late in the campaign Parker charged that the trusts were contributing to the Republican campaign fund. Roosevelt asserted that the statement was atrociously and unqualifiedly false. Years later, under investigations, the facts partly came out; the directors of the big insurance companies contributed large sums and charged them to their companies. The Morgans gave \$150,000; the Standard Oil \$100,000, Depew and his New York Central associates a like amount and George J. Gould the same, and E. H. Harriman the same or more, while various parties through George W. Perkins contributed \$450,000.

One thing must be said of these contributions so far as the Republican candidate was concerned—there is no evidence that he gave any promises in exchange for them. It seems that they were contributions to the party and were induced more by fear than hope, the transactions partaking more of the nature of blackmail than bribery. A request from the head of the Bureau of Corporations was freighted with all the emphasis of a highway-man's polite demand at the point of a pistol.

Running on the Republican platform, his own war record, the Ten Commandments and the Square Deal and riding a bucking bronco, Roosevelt romped home far in the lead. Parker carried the South, but not Missouri nor Delaware.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Republican	7,621,985	336
Democratic	5,098,225	140
Socialist	386,955	
Prohibition	254,923	
Populist	117,257	

The night of his election Roosevelt gave out the statement—"The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." He supplemented this in December, 1907, with the statement—"I have not changed and shall not change the decision thus announced." H. H. Kohlsaat says Roosevelt, after the Taft-Roosevelt estrangement, told him he would cut his right hand off to recall his renunciation.

To the Democratic minority rather than to the Republican majority in Congress are due the good measures passed during Roosevelt's second administration. Roosevelt's progressive measures were Democratic measures. The reclamation of arid lands

was Senator Newland's bill long advocated by the Democrats. For years the Democratic platforms, 1896, 1900, 1904, had advocated enlarged powers to the Interstate Commerce Commission to prevent excessive rates and unjust discriminations. John Sharp Williams early in the Fifty-seventh Congress introduced a bill to that effect and Roosevelt, after dallying with the subject two years, finally in his December, 1905, message adopted the principle and the Hepburn Rate bill was the result. This law passed the House 346 to 7, the Senate 73 to 3. The point is not so important that the Democrats in Congress supported these measures, as well as the Pure Food law and the Employers' Liability Act, as that if they had not, the laws would never have been passed at all; instead it is doubtful if even a majority of the Republicans actually favored them, a doubt resolved into a certainty by the attitude of the major portion of Republican leaders toward Roosevelt in 1912.

The withdrawal of certain public lands from entry was Roosevelt's own act following a Democratic policy, and his National Conservation Commission was appointed without authority and its members were never granted any compensation, the Republican Congress refusing to publish its report and forbidding executive departments in future to render scientific aid to such unauthorized bodies.

The Aldrich-Vreeland Currency law was the only important legislative accomplishment of the whole administration which was a distinctive Republican measure, and it was a makeshift.

The Twentieth Democratic National Convention, 1,002 delegates, met at Denver July 7, 1908, two weeks after the Republicans had nominated Taft and Sherman. This convention was the first of either of the major parties to have women delegates.

The party after the disastrous 1904 campaign under Eastern auspices turned control, apparently as a matter of course, back to the Western wing. That Bryan would be in control and most probably nominated in 1908 was evident from the day of Parker's defeat. George Gray of Delaware had long been a favorite with many of his party. Others turned their eyes to Governor John A. Johnson of Minnesota who, although Roosevelt carried the state by 160,000 plurality, had been chosen Governor in the same election. But nothing checked the Bryan movement.

It was believed that he had grown more mature and more conservative. This last idea received a rude jolt when it was learned that he was returning from Europe a convert to government ownership and operation of railroads. A delegation of conservative Democrats headed by John Sharp Williams met him at Quarant-

tine to dissuade him from the step, but without avail. Later, seeing that so advanced a step was unpopular, he stated that he did not think it an immediate issue, but that if regulation proved ineffective it might be the ultimate solution. But his budding reputation for conservatism was severely checked and the hope of his obtaining the conservative independent vote much lessened.

The convention chose Theodore Bell of California as temporary, H. D. Clayton of Alabama as permanent chairman. Both keynote speeches dwelt on the evil of organized wealth, the Republican failure to pass the law requiring publicity for campaign contributions, and the iniquities of the tariff.

The platform committee had among its members Clarke of Arkansas, Saulsbury of Delaware, Dubois of Idaho, Beckham of Kentucky, Stone of Missouri, Walsh of Montana, Alton B. Parker, New York, Simmons, North Carolina, W. H. King, Utah, and Daniel, Virginia. Their work was unanimously adopted.

Bryan, Gray and Johnson were placed in nomination; Bryan's nomination was seconded by some one from practically every delegation. There was only one ballot—Bryan, 888, Johnson, 46, Gray, 60. Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania furnished Gray's vote; Minnesota, Connecticut, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island contributed to Johnson's.

John W. Kern of Indiana (nominated by Thomas R. Marshall), Charles A. Towne, Archibald McNeel and Clark Howell of Georgia were placed in nomination for Vice-President. Before the ballot was taken all except Kern withdrew and he was unanimously chosen.

Tomlinson of Alabama, Alva Adams of Colorado, Willard Saulsbury of Delaware, Robert Ewing of Louisiana, Fred B. Lynch of Minnesota, and Bruce Kremer of Montana were among the members of the national committee. Norman E. Mack of New York was elected chairman.

In an address before the committee Bryan advised and the committee adopted a resolution that no contributions from corporations should be received, and no individual contribution greater than \$10,000, and that all contributions over \$100 should be published.

"Shall the people rule" was the keynote of Bryan's speech of acceptance. The powers of organized wealth in politics, the trusts, the direct election of Senators, czarism in the lower House of Congress were the subjects most dealt with; reformation, not revolution, was the purpose of the Democratic Party, he said.

The People's Party nominated Thomas E. Watson of Georgia on a Populist platform. Eugene V. Debs was again named by

the Socialist Party on a Socialist platform. The Socialist-Labor Party nominated Martin H. Preston of Nevada on a Soviet declaration of principles. The Independence Party, an organization formed by W. R. Hearst and his followers to supersede the Democratic Party, nominated Thomas L. Hisgen of Massachusetts and John Temple Graves of Georgia on a platform demanding direct nominations, the initiative, referendum and recall, a central government bank, rights of labor, public ownership, national health bureau, good roads, parcel post, anti-bucket-shop law, and popular election of Senators and Judges.

The Prohibition Party nominated Eugene W. Chafin of Illinois and A. S. Watkins of Ohio. Besides prohibition it declared for direct election of Senators, income tax, regulation of corporations, permanent tariff commission, uniform divorce law, employers' liability act, child labor laws, universal suffrage based on ability to read and write the English language, and conservation.

The Republican convention promptly carried out Roosevelt's mandate and nominated William H. Taft. There had been feeble attempts by Roosevelt's enemies in his party to name Hughes or Fairbanks, or somebody else, but it was Taft or Roosevelt so they accepted Taft with hardly a struggle. What opposition survived was ironed out by Frank Hitchcock's steam roller at the convention. Great pressure had been brought upon Roosevelt to run again. The nomination of James Schoolcraft Sherman of New York for Vice-President was in the nature of a concession to the anti-Roosevelt wing of the party.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1908

Publicity of campaign contributions, states rights, tariff revision, trust regulation including interlocking directorates, railroad regulation, banking reform including guarantee of deposits, income tax, restrictions on injunctions and jury trials for contempt of court, merchant marine, adequate navy, civil service, health bureau, extension of agricultural and mechanical education, popular election of Senators, development of waterways, economy in government and decrease in number of officeholders, conservation and development of natural resources, regulation of telegraph and telephones are all favored.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1908

Republicanism under Roosevelt and general prosperity under Republican administration praised.

Aldrich-Vreeland Currency law approved.

Stronger anti-trust law promised.

Hepburn Railroad Rate law approved, and Employers' Liability Act favored.

Liberal labor laws promised.

Modification of court procedure in injunctions favored.

Reviewed with pride what the Republican Party had done for the farmer.

Equal rights to the negro and the enforcement of the 14th and 15th Amendments demanded.

DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM, 1908

Misuse of patronage, arbitrary power of Speaker of the House and imperialism in the Philippines condemned.

Tariff. "Articles entering into competition with trusts-controlled products should be placed on free list, and material reductions made in the tariff on the necessities of life, especially upon articles competing with American manufactures as are sold abroad more cheaply than at home. Graduated reductions should be made in other schedules to restore the tariff to a revenue basis. We demand an immediate repeal of the tariff on pulp, print paper, lumber, timber and logs."

For the first time profit to the protected industries was specifically avowed in the Republican platform as one of the purposes of the tariff.

Rooseveltism, that is, executive usurpation of power, jingoism, militarism, roughriderism, was one of the issues of the campaign, czardom in the House, extravagance, trusts and the tariff, money in politics, publicity as to campaign funds and popular election of Senators, were others. The Republicans fought Bryanism, alleged Democratic inefficiency and tariff revision by unfriendly hands.

The Democratic candidate never had a real chance of success in 1908, although the Cleveland Democracy and Tammany gave him loyal support. The reactionary wing of the Republican Party knew their party's candidate. As Roosevelt's subordinate he had carried out Roosevelt's policies ably and thoroughly; as the Republican Party's President he would carry out the party's policies equally loyally, and they knew who would dictate those policies. Besides, for them there was no other choice. Thus Taft had the conservatism of his party back of him, while Roosevelt threw to him all the progressive and reform elements in the party, and the great mass of reformers and independents of the country went along with them. Roosevelt took an active personal part in the campaign.

The support of organized labor under Samuel Gompers' active efforts was supposed to be for Bryan, but the election returns in-

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM, 1908

Conservation of natural resources. Efficient army and navy favored. Merchant marine, civil service, public health and liberal pensions declared for.

Democratic incapacity deplored.

Tariff. Promised a special session of Congress to revise the tariff immediately.

"In all tariff legislation the true principle of protection is best maintained by the imposition of such duties as will equal the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad, *together with a reasonable profit to American industries.*" Maximum and minimum rates to be administered by the President to meet foreign discrimination favored.

dicade that Labor's vote split badly for the Democrats. Indiana elected Thomas R. Marshall Governor, but went for Taft; Ohio chose Judson Harmon but voted against Bryan.

Yet the campaign Bryan made was wonderfully effective, and so gallant and clean that when defeated even his opponents felt and expressed sympathy and admiration for him, and the support he had received was almost equal to a victory.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Republican	7,679,000	321
Democratic	6,409,100	162
Socialist	420,800	
Prohibition	253,000	
People's	34,000	
Independent	83,000	

Taft's majority over all was 479,000, over Bryan 1,270,000. But Bryan's vote exceeded by more than that Parker's vote of four years before. He had apparently brought back more than a million into the Democratic fold. In a dignified statement made after the election he announced that he would not again be a candidate.

There was a Presidency in the making all during Taft's administration. A new leader of Democracy was emerging, Woodrow Wilson.

CHAPTER XXIX

TAFT—THE 1912 CONVENTION—WILSON

1909-1913

Republican Coroners—Taft Administration—Ballinger (and Fall) Public Land Policy—Democratic House 1911-12—Underwood-LaFollette Tariff Bills—Democratic Candidates for Nomination—Twenty-First Democratic National Convention—Bryan Opens Fire on Conservatives—Parker vs. Bryan—Bryan's Resolution Against Belmont and Ryan—Democrats All—Wilson and Marshall Nominated—Other Conventions—Platforms—The 1912 Campaign—Battle Royal Between Wilson and Roosevelt—Marshall's Strength—The Democratic Triumph and Trophy.

THE Democratic Party at different times had been pronounced as dead as slavery, as dead as free trade, as dead as free silver. After the 1908 defeat numerous obituaries of the party appeared in Republican publications and were pronounced in Republican speeches. The political coroners were many and positive.

Taft's platform had promised tariff revision to correct some inequalities. The Payne bill, of the Sixty-first Congress, amended by the Senate in 847 items and become the Payne-Aldrich bill, was the most thoroughgoing and highest tariff measure ever enacted by Congress. Taft, after censuring many features of it, characterizing the wool schedule as "indefensible," signed it. Later he called it the "best tariff bill ever passed."

The Democrats controlling the House in the Sixty-second Congress, with the aid of LaFollette and other insurgents in the Senate, passed the Underwood-LaFollette tariff bills, reducing the duties on woolen and cotton goods and establishing the "Farmers' Free List," all of which Taft vetoed. There had been many alliances between Tariff Democrats and Republicans; this was the first combination between Democrats and Tariff-Reform Republicans. The Democratic House passed the wool and steel bills over the veto, but the Senate would not.

Another policy of the Taft administration had a great political effect. This was the handling by Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior, of our public lands. His predecessor under Roosevelt, James A. Garfield, Jr., had withdrawn from entry 1,500,000 acres conserving water power sites; Ballinger restored 1,200,000 of these

acres to private entry, claiming that the 300,000 acres still withheld was ample to retain water power rights. Following that, R. L. Glavis, a very zealous officer of the Land Office, was summarily discharged for resisting the granting of extensive claims to rich coal mines in Alaska to some of Ballinger's former clients, lands containing enormous coal deposits, much timber and important water power sites, the real beneficiaries appearing to be the Guggenheim Smelter Trust. Roosevelt's intimate friend, Gifford Pinchot, head of the Forestry Bureau, took Glavis' part, and he too was driven from the service. Taft stood firmly by his cabinet officer. Thus he not only revoked one of Roosevelt's favorite policies, conservation, but rebuked Roosevelt's friend and fellow in this work. A personal coolness, too, arose about this time between these two men, having a certain political effect later.

There was nothing new in either the public land or tariff policy of the Taft administration. One of the first questions our government had to deal with was our public domain. In 1790 Hamilton made a report on the subject. Characteristically he favored selling the land in large quantities to "the moneyed class" and allowing the benefit to trickle down through them to the common people who would live on it and work it. He was then partisanly accused of wishing to keep labor in the manufacturing districts where it could be exploited by capital. He advised sales of public lands ten miles square—on credit, while requiring cash for small tracts to settlers. Jefferson and Gallatin were supporters of sales to actual settlers. In 1804, under Jefferson, a law was passed allowing sales to settlers of tracts as small as 160 acres. Benton stated the Democratic doctrine—"This is a Republic, not a monarchy; the public lands belong to the People, not to the Federal Government."

The Democratic policy had always been to sell at a low price to actual settlers. No grant of land had been made by Congress to a corporation under a Democratic administration. But the grants to railroads by the Republicans soon amounted to 181,000,000 acres, and through them syndicates and wealthy individuals, some foreign, acquired vast tracts—the Holland Land Company, 4,500,000 acres; Sir Edward Reid and syndicate, 2,000,000; an English syndicate; 1,800,000; Marquis of Tweeddale, 1,750,000; Philips, Marshall & Company of London, 1,300,000; a German syndicate, 1,100,000; Duke of Sutherland, 700,000 acres. Nearly 20,000,000 acres in such large tracts were held by syndicates and speculators in 1871. It was an achievement the Democrats boasted of that under Cleveland's first

administration Lamar recovered 100,000,000 acres of this public land which had been forfeited.

Therefore Ballinger in the Taft administration in facilitating the acquisition of public lands by the Guggenheims and other captains of industry, and Fall and his associates in the Harding administration in transferring Elk Hills and Tea Pot Dome to Doheny's and Sinclair's hands, were all pursuing the policy of Hamilton and of the Republican Party. Corruption, of course, was no part of that policy.

The record of the Democratic House of the Sixty-second Congress was a source of strength to the party; it laid a solid foundation for Democratic success in 1912. Among its achievements was the revision of the House rules ridding it of czarism, the passage of various tariff reduction bills, the adoption of a resolution to amend the Constitution so as to secure the popular election of Senators, the bill for publicity of campaign contributions, the law against the abuse of the writ of injunction, the law for an eight-hour day for workmen in the government employ, support of the navy, economy and other sound service, such as the Pujo House committee investigation of the money trust. This investigation developed facts supporting the Carlisle-Eckels elastic asset currency theory, and was one of the steps in the evolution of the Democratic triumph—the Federal Reserve System.

So it was that in 1912 when the split came in the Republican Party the Democrats were in fine position to take advantage of it.

Another thing that gave life and inspiration to the party was the appearance in the national field of a new leader, one who, many thought, measured up to the standard of the party's best traditions—Woodrow Wilson.

For more than a year before the 1912 convention four leading men were prominently before the party as candidates for the Presidential nomination—Speaker of the House Champ Clark of Missouri, Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey, Oscar Underwood of Alabama, leader in the House, and Governor Judson Harmon of Ohio. The two first were regarded as Progressives, the two last as Conservatives; some classed them as reactionary.

Wilson as Governor had won national fame for progressive legislation and by bold and successful opposition to boss rule in New Jersey.

Clark had long been a popular and distinguished member of Congress; he was famous for political and oratorical ability

rather than executive statesmanship, and was much admired and loved.

Underwood for twenty years had represented the Birmingham, Alabama, district in the House, had borne a leading and distinguished part in tariff and other legislation, and had a reputation for sound and capable statesmanship second to no man of either party in Congress.

Harmon had been twice elected Governor of Ohio, which spoke convincingly for his availability, and his record for executive ability was of the first order. His having been a distinguished member of Cleveland's second cabinet gave him a strong hold on a large element of the party.

Governor Marshall of Indiana, Governor Baldwin of Connecticut, Mayor Gaynor and Congressman Sulzer of New York, and others had been discussed, but long before the convention the contest had narrowed down to those four men—with Bryan, a dark horse of incalculable speed, in the background.

Presidential primaries in various states complicated and confused the issues and the situation. The votes showed that in many of the states holding primaries little attention was given the primary and that in others only the supporters of the favorite candidate participated to any extent. The returns were of little value as showing popular sentiment.

Wilson forged steadily into the lead. For some time he had been most the object of attack as well as commendation and when the convention met to many the coming contest seemed Wilson against the field. Before it met he was the favorite, not of the politicians, but of the rank and file of the party.

The Twenty-first Democratic National Convention met at Baltimore June 25, 1912, and remained in session through July 2nd. The call had been simplified to "The Democrats of the United States." Called to order by Norman E. Mack, the chairman of the National Committee, the convention opened with a mighty clash between antagonistic forces. The Charleston convention of 1860 was the most momentous of Democratic conventions; those nominating Tilden and Cleveland had not been devoid of dramatic features. But the 1912 convention had more dramatic elements than any national convention of either party ever held.

The committee on convention arrangements named Alton B. Parker for temporary chairman. Bryan sent identical telegrams to the four leading candidates to the effect that a progressive Democrat should be temporary chairman to sound the keynote of the campaign, that the subcommittee had selected the one

Democrat in the eyes of the public most conspicuously identified with reaction; he asked that they join in opposing this selection by the full National Committee and the convention. Clark, Underwood and Harmon very properly declined to interfere; Wilson with equal propriety, and consistently with his political principles and methods, replied, "You are quite right." The convention, he continued, was to be a convention of Progressives, and Bryan was entirely within his rights as a delegate in his demand.

When Parker's name was presented to the convention, Bryan, without criticizing Parker or even naming him, proposed Kern for temporary chairman. This convention, he said, in closing a powerful speech, should not be opened by a paralyzing speech from a Wall Street Conservative.

Kern expressing great esteem and regard for Parker, suggested that both Parker and he withdraw and join in selecting O'Gorman, Culberson, Clayton, Luke Lea, Governor Campbell, Folk, Shively or Ollie James. Receiving no sign of acceptance, he said that if there was to be a contest, there was but one man who should lead the Progressives and that man was William Jennings Bryan.

The vote was Parker, 579; Bryan, 508. The Underwood and Harmon delegates voted generally for Parker; the Clark support divided. The Wilson delegations from Pennsylvania, Texas and New Jersey went practically solid for Bryan. The selection was made unanimous. The Wilson leaders were not discouraged at Bryan's defeat; the result was close in the first place, and in the second place it was regarded by some as removing one great danger to Wilson's success—Bryan's possible nomination—leaving Wilson the one unqualifiedly Progressive candidate. However, Wilson's opponents got great comfort out of Bryan's defeat, regarding it as showing definitely that he could not control the convention.

Parker's speech was broad and able, and put no brakes on Progressivism. Bryan was offered the permanent chairmanship but declined and Senator Ollie James was chosen.

The rules of the last convention were adopted. There had been rumors of abolishment of the two-thirds rule, but nothing was attempted. At Bryan's request the rules committee reported in favor of nomination of candidates before adoption of platform and the convention so ordered.

The rules committee reported that all delegations instructed by state conventions or by Presidential primaries should follow instructions so long as a majority of such delegations thought them

applicable. The convention decided that it would enforce the unit rule when enacted by state conventions, except when the state primary law absolved delegates chosen under it from orders of state convention.

It was held during the convention that the convention could not enforce instructions to primary-elected delegates, the matter being between such delegates and their constituents. It was also held that Alabama's instructions to vote as a unit for Underwood and on all questions affecting his nomination did not apply to the vote for temporary chairman. The Philippines, being no part of the United States, were denied representation in the convention.

The Baltimore convention was almost double the usual size, very many states sending double the number of delegates with half a vote each. No extraordinary interest having been taken in the convention until the Republican split, which occurred long after the selecting of delegates, the personnel of the convention was not especially notable.

The newspapers and the air were full of rumors of combinations in which the Indiana, Illinois and New York delegations were mostly involved, and it began to be believed that New York's 90 votes would really name the candidate, and the expression became current that New York's vote was "in Charley Murphy's vest pocket." Local newspapers played up Ryan and Belmont as "Wall Streeters" come to boss the convention. This added to Bryan's anger and on the evening of the third day of the convention he introduced his startling anti-Morgan-Belmont-Ryan resolution.

Bryan's motion was that "the rules be suspended and the following resolution be adopted." The chairman ruled on a point of order that the whole motion must be voted on and the vote could not be confined merely to suspending the rules; to the point of order that the convention could not go behind the election of delegates made by sovereign states Chairman James ruled that the convention was a sovereign body and could do anything it desired. The resolution reads:

"Resolved, That in this crisis in our party's career and in our country's history this convention sends greetings to the people of the United States, and assures them that the party of Jefferson and of Jackson is still the champion of popular government and equality before the law. As proof of our fidelity to the people, we hereby declare ourselves opposed to the nomination of any candidate for President who is the representative of or under

obligation to J. Pierpont Morgan, Thomas F. Ryan, August Belmont, or any other member of the privilege-hunting and favor-seeking class.

"Be it further resolved, That we demand the withdrawal from this convention of any delegate or delegates constituting or representing the above named interests."

Said Bryan in support of his resolution: Courts took judicial notice of established facts, and the American people could be assumed to know certain things; there was not a delegate present who did not know that the effort was being made to sell the Democratic Party into bondage to predatory interests, and the men named in the resolution were three of the men connected with the great money trust, despotic and merciless. He was not willing that they come to the convention with their paid attorneys, and that no sense of politeness or courtesy should prevent him from protecting his party from them. He refused to take the responsibility, he said, of nominating a candidate who represented them. He was willing, he declared, to withdraw the latter section of the resolution if the New York delegation, on a poll of it recorded and printed, did not ask for the withdrawal of Belmont, or Virginia, similarly, ask Ryan's withdrawal. Bryan finally withdrew the second section of the resolution and the first section was adopted 883 to 201, New York voting aye with a magnificent gesture which the convention was too tense to appreciate. The nays came from Georgia and Maine voting solidly, and California, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Tennessee giving appreciable support.

The people of New York, judging by the newspapers, were at first infuriated at Bryan's action and voiced their indignation. Bryan's resolution was charged to be the result of a plot concocted with emissaries of Roosevelt, some of whom were conspicuous around convention hall, and looked to the formation of a Roosevelt-Bryan new party. But as the convention proceeded, sentiment changed greatly. Leading Democrats all over New York came out for Wilson. Bryan's act was extraordinary and its effect extraordinary; it raised a storm of abuse and a storm of applause all over the land. Instead of disrupting the party it seemed to unite the rank and file, not for Bryan, however, but for Woodrow Wilson. Telegrams from every part of the country poured into Baltimore urging delegates to "Vote for Wilson." An irreconcilable dissension in the convention was avoided only by the party fealty of the Conservatives.

Bryan was accused of a selfish object, of seeking to obtain the

nomination for himself. He never denied the charge. Had he done so, had he made his own nomination impossible by declaring that he would not accept the nomination—he would have thrown away a potent weapon. The dread of having to accept Bryan if they refused Wilson operated with incalculable force on some men's minds, and Bryan allowed it so to work.

Underwood, Clark, Governor Simeon Baldwin of Connecticut, Wilson, Marshall and Harmon were placed in nomination. The first ballot showed Clark, 440, Wilson, 324, Harmon, 148, Underwood, 117, Baldwin, 22, Marshall, 31. Clark and Wilson gradually increased until on the ninth ballot the vote stood Clark, 452, Wilson, 352, Harmon, 127, Underwood, 122. On the next ballot New York changed from Harmon to Clark, giving Clark a majority, 556, to Wilson's 352.

When Nebraska was called on the fourteenth ballot Bryan changed his vote from Clark to Wilson on the ground that the condition on which Nebraska had voted for Clark had apparently been broken, evidenced by New York's support of him. He would not, he said, support Clark or any other candidate so supported. Eleven others of his delegation followed him while four adhered to the instructions of the Nebraska primary.

On the 18th ballot Clark fell below a majority while Wilson gained. On the 43rd ballot Wilson received 630 to Clark's 329, Illinois having switched its 58 votes. On the 46th ballot Underwood and Harmon were withdrawn and the delegates instructed for Clark were released, with the result that Wilson received 990 votes, 84 still voting for Clark. Fitzgerald of New York had moved that Wilson be named by acclamation but there had been objection. On motion of Senator Stone, Clark's manager at the convention, Wilson's nomination was made unanimous.

Governor Thomas R. Marshall of Indiana, Governor John Burke of North Dakota, Elmore W. Hurst of Illinois, Senator George E. Chamberlain of Oregon and Mayor James H. Preston of Baltimore were nominated for Vice-President. The first ballot showed Marshall, 389, Burke, 304, Chamberlain, 157, Hurst, 78, Preston, 58. In a general way the West and Middle West, except Illinois and Indiana, were for Burke, the East and South, except Texas, for Marshall. The second ballot gave Marshall 645 to 387 for Burke. The latter withdrawing, Marshall was named unanimously.

The platform was adopted without discussion or dissent. Chief among its framers were Kern, Culberson, Raynor, Dockery,

Walsh of Montana, Pomerene, and particularly O'Gorman and Bryan.

The 1912 convention is too recent, too many participants are still living, too much feeling still keenly alive, to permit historical adjudication now. Whether Bryan did the party great service, or whether a monumental disaster was averted solely by the extraordinary loyalty of the Democrats he attempted to proscribe, must be left to the final decision of an unbiased generation. But it is time that known facts be considered.

Belmont's father had come to this country a young man in 1837 when the anti-Catholic, anti-foreigner riots were at their height. He became an ardent Democrat, and was national chairman from 1860 until 1872, a period when there was neither selfish honor nor profit in being a Democrat. Nobody inherited a more intense Democracy than August Belmont, Jr. He was a man noted for public spirit and twice had been president of the American Civic Association.

Thomas Fortune Ryan had been bred up in a Southern community where Democratic traditions were strong. In New York he and Belmont had been associated in business with William C. Whitney and in politics with the Cleveland Democracy. Ryan was especially an admirer of Cleveland. The two men were Sound Money Democrats; they frankly belonged to that element in the party which wished Bryan could be conveniently, or inconveniently, knocked into a cocked hat. Yet they were credited with unbroken loyalty to the party, including support of Bryan in his campaigns.

Thus by tradition, sentiment, past records of party loyalty and political convictions, in fact by any authoritative test, Ryan and Belmont were as true Democrats as was their accuser. They belonged to the conservative wing and were charged with being reactionary; he was of the progressive wing and accused of being radical. It seems to have been a difference of longitude, not of Democratic orthodoxy—a hang-over of the old Cleveland-Bryan difference. There is nothing in the course of the party or of the individuals involved, during the Wilson administration or since, which impeaches the Democracy of any of them. But Bryan evened up some old personal scores by his action.

However unwarrantable Bryan's course may have been, it struck a popular chord at the moment in a public already excited by Roosevelt's fulminations against "reactionaries," "malefactors of great wealth," "predatory interests" and the like. Some felt that Bryan had done the party great injury, had insulted

and endeavored to read out of the party Democrats as loyal as himself, men more sound and thorough Democrats than he was. Others thought that he made victory possible; that had any of the other candidates been nominated the result would have been Roosevelt's election. One can draw individual conclusions. Roosevelt certainly arrayed himself against the supposed forces Bryan opposed and won more votes than the reactionary Taft. But Wilson received more than Roosevelt who was accused of having stolen Bryan's policies.

The effect in the convention of Bryan's course appears clearer. He seems not only to have defeated a powerful influence in the convention, in the party and in the country, but to have made it resultant to defeat its own ends and accomplish his, to defeat its candidate and nominate his. As a parliamentary coup d'main, for dramatic interest and effectiveness it stands without parallel in convention annals.

William F. McCombs of New York was made chairman of the National Committee, with William G. McAdoo vice-chairman.

The Prohibition Party nominated Eugene W. Chafin of New Mexico, on a Prohibition platform with some progressive general features. The Socialists again named Debs on an advanced Socialist platform.

The Republican convention had met at Chicago June 22nd, and after settling contests from a dozen or more states involving more than 100 delegates by deciding practically every one in favor of the Taft delegations and against those for Roosevelt, nominated William H. Taft on the first ballot—Taft, 561, Roosevelt, 107, La Follette, 41, Cummins, 17, not voting, 349. Warren G. Harding placed Taft in nomination. James S. Sherman of New York was nominated for Vice-President on first ballot, 352 Roosevelt delegates not voting.

The Roosevelt forces met at Chicago August 7th, and formed the Progressive Party, nominating Theodore Roosevelt and Governor Hiram Johnson of California. It should be noted that prior to the regular Republican convention the Anti-Third Term League had been formed among Republicans, of which Calvin Coolidge was a member.

The issues of the 1912 campaign as seen by the voters seem to have been triangular, between Wilson and Democratic progressivism, Roosevelt and Rooseveltian progressivism and Taft and Republican standpattism. All three platforms declared for tariff revision downward—the Republican guarded and limited; the Progressive more thorough, declaring for the protective

theory but basing it primarily on benefit to labor; the Democratic declaring for the principle of tariff for revenue only and immediate and material reduction but not so as to injure or destroy legitimate industry, with trust-controlled products and American-made articles sold abroad more cheaply than at home to be put on the free list. All parties stood for exemption of American ships from canal tolls. The Democrats and Progressives opposed the Aldrich-Vreeland currency bill; the Republicans were silent on it, but promised currency reform. The three platforms condemned monopolies and trusts and paid court to labor, the Progressives going farthest along this line. The Democrats and Progressives demanded law reform, especially in the matter of labor injunctions and contempts of court, the Progressives going so far as to advocate popular review of judicial decisions; the Republicans had a plank on upholding the authority of the courts. There was much progressivism in the Democratic platform, considerable socialism in the Progressive, and pronounced conservatism in the Republican, platforms.

The Democrats advocated Presidential primaries, an income tax, popular election of senators, prohibition of contributions to political funds by corporations, and rural credits; they declared the Mississippi River a national problem, and demanded Philippine independence as soon as a stable government could be established in the islands.

The Progressives declared for Presidential primaries, popular election of Senators and woman suffrage, and advised the states to adopt the initiative, referendum and recall.

Wilson and Roosevelt made the 1912 campaign one of the most spirited in our annals. Taft, being President, took no active part; he relied greatly on his regularity and the prosperity the country was enjoying. The clash of personalities and intellects between the other two candidates was exciting and amusing, often with a classic flavor. Roosevelt had no advantage in scholarship, and though Wilson had not the political training which service in the New York legislature, as police commissioner, as civil service commissioner, ranching and rough-riding had given his opponent, his experience as president of Princeton University and as Governor of New Jersey had given him a practical working idea of human nature in politics. Wilson accused Roosevelt of adopting theories exploded in Aristotle's day, which brought forth the angry retort that Wilson was following the outworn theories of oriental despotism when he said that the history of liberty was a history of limitations of governmental powers. When Roosevelt

termed Wilson a schoolmaster the retort that he was acting the irresponsible schoolboy was obvious. When Roosevelt railed at judicial decisions Wilson said the Democrats wished to "oust bosses, not judges." He called the Progressives the "Irregular Republican Party."

Roosevelt having, as Henry Watterson said, built his platform out of timber stolen from Bryan's backyard, copied some of Bryan's old tactics. "Shall the people rule?" asked Bryan in 1908; "Are the American people fit to govern themselves?" queried Roosevelt in 1912. He accused the Republicans of giving prosperity to the wealthy and letting what they condescended to allow trickle down to the masses; that Taft believed that there was a class in this country wiser than, and above the people, who should govern them—Democratic charges against their opponents since Jefferson's day.

Wilson hammered on the trusts, the tariff and bossism. The Republicans, he said, had turned the government over to the trusts; the Progressives proposed to take the trusts into partnership under guise of regulating them; the Democrats proposed to abolish them. But tariff changes, he insisted, must be slow and careful of legitimate business. He weakened Roosevelt's attack on trusts by reminding the people that Roosevelt had expressly consented to the steel trust absorbing its greatest rival, the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company.

Roosevelt was severe on Taft personally; Wilson praised Taft's character and patriotism, but condemned his policies.

Wilson fought the bosses in New York where he brought about the nomination of a progressive Democrat for Governor, and in New Jersey where William Hughes, a Wilsonite, defeated James Smith, Jr., for the Senate. The Senate investigating committee held sessions during the campaign and the treasurer of the Republican campaign committee of 1904 testified that \$1,535,000, seventy-three per cent of the Republican campaign funds of that year, had been contributed by corporations, thus proving Judge Parker's charges true. Charges and countercharges between George W. Perkins, Roosevelt's manager, and Charles D. Hilles, Taft's manager, concerning corporate contributions did neither of their principles any good.

Roosevelt spent much of his time denouncing the theft of delegates at the Republican convention. The New York Times well described the nature the campaign took on by saying that Roosevelt's campaign became more and more a personal one, Wilson's more and more impersonal. The third-term prejudice was much

used, and many Republicans who had flopped to Roosevelt flopped back into the ranks of the regulars. Charles W. Eliot, and many like him, came over to Wilson; La Follette was not inimical and Labor friendly. But many Populists went to Roosevelt. Roosevelt was shot by a maniac October 15th, and Wilson generously left the stump until he recovered.

The campaign of Debs, ~~the~~ Socialist, is sufficiently indicated by the following excerpt from a speech he made:

"Take all three of these candidates and not one of them has ever had to look for a job. Not one of them has ever been on a strike. Not one has ever been slugged by a capitalist policeman, and not one of them has ever been in jail. Not one of them—not all of them together ever produced enough to feed a gallinipper."

Wilson's final argument was that the government under the Republican Party was not free to serve the people impartially; it was not a party of the people, but the instrument of business interests; the tariff and the consequent privilege and monopoly produced bossism which existed by means of business alliances. The Progressives, he said, proposed to continue protection to trusts under the guise of regulating them. The Democrats proposed to set industry and business free.

The history of the campaign is not complete without special mention of Thomas R. Marshall, the Vice-Presidential nominee. With a splendid record as Governor of Indiana, a man of proven ability and courage with a personality which inspired liking and confidence in a remarkable degree, he brought to the ticket everything the leader lacked. His practical homespun common sense balanced the scholasticism of Wilson; his Western Hoosierism, of which he boasted, offset the high-brow Easternism some minds attached to Wilson; he added his democracy to Wilson's Democracy; his homely wit supplemented his leader's humor. In selecting Marshall the Democrats showed as good judgment as in choosing Wilson.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Wilson	6,286,000	435
Roosevelt	4,126,000	88
Taft	3,484,000	8
Debs	897,000	
Chafin	170,000	

Wilson carried twelve states by majorities, twenty-eight by pluralities. Roosevelt carried South Dakota by a majority and Pennsylvania, California, Michigan, Minnesota and Washington

by pluralities. Taft carried Utah and Vermont. Wilson's plurality was more than 2,000,000 but he lacked about the same number of a majority.

It has been claimed that Wilson owed his victory solely to the Republican split. Had only one of the two Republicans been in the field, Taft to win would have had to obtain 3,500,000 of the votes which went to Roosevelt—six out of seven; Roosevelt would have required 2,800,000 of Taft's votes—four out of five. Wilson needed only 700,000—about one out of every eleven—to give him a majority. Surely from the extremes of the antagonistic elements in the Roosevelt-Taft aggregate he would have secured as many.

The Republican hide was nailed in triumph to the Democratic barn door, but an examination of the trophy showed that other than Democratic hands had dealt the fatal blows. A great gash showed where the well-beloved Brutus stabbed and in every state some Cassius or Casca made great rents in the regular Republican mantle.

CHAPTER XXV

THE WILSON ERA OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

1913-1921

An Unbossed Government—Program of Legislation—Cabinet Members and Changes—Tariff Reform—Federal Reserve System—Mexican Policy—Foreign Policy—Tolls Exemptions Repeal—Adamson Law—Anti-Trust Laws—Other Reforms—Rural Credits and Other Farm Relief—Twenty-Second Democratic National Convention—Wilson and Marshall by Acclamation—Other Nominations—Platforms—Wilson's Acceptance—1916 Campaign—Neutrality—Entrance into World War—Unsuccessful Drive Against Administration—Conduct of War—1918 Congressional Election—Peace—Wilson in Europe—League of Nations—Wilson.

THE Wilson-Marshall administrations are too recent for anything more than a summary. The matters dealt with were of tremendous import and affected every spot and every inhabitant of the globe. Wilson himself is a man whose greatness, though recognized, is not yet fixed. Even his discoverer is still a subject of dispute. The true details and full knowledge of him and his times are still hid in documents, in memoranda, letters, in men's memories, in diaries and memoirs not yet published, some not yet written. Therefore nothing more than a bare outline of the political events of the eight years from 1913 to 1921 is attempted.

One shining fact should be noted which throws a great light on those years—the Democratic administration was not bossed. Mark Hanna was the power behind the throne in McKinley's day; Roosevelt consulted and shared his party's authority with Platt in New York, with Aldrich and his coterie in the Senate and with czarism in the House at Washington, and all know the influences which were potent in the Harding régime. Wilson was independent of bossism, of invisible government, as Cleveland had been. He made compromises and concessions, but he made them with and to the legislative branch of the government after full public discussion, not secret ones with bosses and cliques, not to interests or combinations.

Thomas R. Marshall deserves to go down in history as the man who was greatest and most distinguished as Vice-President. Other Vice-Presidents achieved greater fame in other positions

and Van Buren was more subservient to Jackson than was Marshall to Wilson. But for constant loyal support, for unwavering sympathy and helpfulness to his chief Marshall's eight years are models, and it is only just and fair to speak of it as the "Wilson-Marshall administration."

The Congress elected in 1912 was 290 Democrats and 127 Republicans in the House, 51 Democrats and 45 Republicans in the Senate. Champ Clark was elected Speaker and Oscar W. Underwood was floor leader in the House; James P. Clarke of Arkansas was President pro-tem of the Senate. Underwood later went to the Senate, Claude Kitchin of North Carolina succeeding him as floor leader, and in 1917 Willard Saulsbury of Delaware succeeded Clarke. Wilson revived a custom discontinued by Jefferson of delivering in person his message to joint sessions of Congress.

The day was one of dedication, not of triumph, he said in his inaugural address. Tariff reform, a banking and currency system meeting the needs of the day, an industrial system which would set business free and curb the trusts, scientific and practical aid to agriculture, development of waterways and other natural resources, conservation and wiser labor laws were on the program he announced. "To restore, not to destroy," he said was his party's object.

In forming his cabinet Wilson neglected geography, but paid a due regard to politics without sacrifice of competency or personal feeling.

Bryan was entitled to the premiership and he was given it. Barring a pardonable fondness for "deserving Democrats" he was, until their disagreement, a loyal coadjutor. His successful negotiations with thirty-one nations of the peace treaties, providing for a year of negotiation before a declaration of war, was a notable achievement.

William G. McAdoo had demonstrated ability of the first order as organizer and builder of the Hudson tunnels in New York. It is a question whether in all the United States a fitter man could have been found to head the Treasury when great and far-reaching changes were to be made in our currency system. History will doubtless place McAdoo as one of the great finance ministers of all time. The Liberty Loans are the greatest fiscal operations in history. After we entered the World War he took over also the Director-generalship of Railroads and, although much criticized then and now, he made possible what the British Minister of Transportation termed a "Transport Miracle," in moving soldiers, munitions, food, handling war material in its

raw and in its manufactured state, and in addition caring for the freight and passenger traffic of the nation in ordinary.

Lindley M. Garrison of New Jersey, an able man, served thirty-five months as Secretary of War. He disapproved of the Philippine policy adopted by Congress, and when that body refused to adopt the army program agreed upon by him and the President, and Wilson, instead of trying to force it through, decided to work out some plan harmoniously with Congress, Garrison resigned.

Newton D. Baker succeeded him and was at the head of the War Department all during the World War. His department, like McAdoo's and Daniels', was given a great task to accomplish and he met the task. An army of four million men were raised, trained and equipped, and half of them were landed in Europe and maintained there, given all the support that was humanly possible.

Josephus Daniels of North Carolina, Secretary of the Navy, was given also a great task and a great opportunity. He met the occasion ably. Some of the reforms he instituted were unpopular; they may be so yet, but wisdom and respect for public opinion forbid their being abandoned. It is said that he relied much on the counsels of Admiral Dewey. A civilian Secretary could not have pursued a wiser course. The record of the navy for preparedness when war was declared, its performance of every duty imposed upon it, its superb efficiency speak louder than any words can of Daniels' administration. Admiral Mayo, Commander-in-Chief of our naval forces, said that he did not have to give a single order to pass the fleet from a peace to a war footing, so thoroughly was the navy prepared. Our vessels carried 2,079,880 American soldiers across three thousand miles of ocean without loss of a single life. Franklin D. Roosevelt was his assistant secretary, and a most capable and efficient aide.

J. C. McReynolds of Tennessee was made Attorney General. He had distinguished himself first in the legal ability displayed in the prosecution of the tobacco trust and second in the breadth of view and statesmanship evinced in declining to approve the sham penalty imposed on it. When he was named Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Thomas W. Gregory of Texas succeeded him and served ably and well.

Franklin K. Lane of California, the Secretary of the Interior, was an outstanding man and cabinet officer, as he would have been of any body of which he was a member. The Alaskan railroad bill, the development of Alaska and of the oil and

mineral resources of the public domain were features of his administration.

Albert S. Burleson, a veteran Congressman of proved capacity in government as well as in practical politics, was appointed Postmaster General. David F. Houston was Secretary of Agriculture until later transferred to the Treasury to succeed Carter Glass of Virginia who, late in 1918, had taken over that portfolio on McAdoo's resignation. William C. Redfield of New York, a business man and Representative in Congress, was Secretary of Commerce. The Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, handled the grave problems of his department with distinguished ability.

The tasks of some of the departments were greater and more difficult than those of others, but the World War demanded exceptional ability and service in every department of government, and these men each and all measured up to the needs of the time. They performed extraordinary duties with competence and without scandal, and with only partisan and political criticism.

When the Republicans came into power there were loud announcements of investigations and punishment of graft and corruption. Some fifty probes were begun, millions of dollars were appropriated to hire lawyers to prosecute alleged wrongdoers. Evidence was taken in thirteen states, making thousands of pages of written testimony. Attorney General Sargent reported that for three and a half years the auditing department of the army had been investigating; the Charles E. Hughes aircraft committee had investigated; the Graham Congressional committee had investigated and probed specific as well as general matters. The whole result was a complete vindication of the Wilson administration. When one-third of the indictments fathered by the War Transactions section had been tested, the other two-thirds were dismissed in court on the Republican administration's own motion. Soon the Director of that section, a distinguished lawyer employed at a salary exceeding that of the Vice-President of the United States, resigned, saying that after four years of research under three Attorney Generals it was found that there were so few deliberate attempts to defraud the government that it was unfortunate that so many charges had been given circulation.

Of thirty-seven indictments only four resulted in convictions and two of the accused parties had pleaded guilty. The Attorney General's statement shows that of these four, one man had stolen

an old truck valued at \$2,400; one had accepted what he called a "commission" for approving an order for skid-chains, a third had stolen government property and was fined \$100, while the fourth had sworn falsely in applying for a passport.

It was in expressing his opinion of these Republican Congressional investigations that Charles G. Dawes, subsequently Republican Vice-President of the United States, made famous the expression "Hell and Maria." "It's all right now to say we bought too much vinegar or too many cold chisels," he said, "but we saved the civilization of the world." . . . "Damn it all, the business of an army is to win the war, not to quibble around with a lot of cheap buying." . . . "Hell and Maria, we weren't trying to keep a set of books. We were trying to win the war."

Robert Lansing of New York succeeded Bryan in the State Department and was followed by Bainbridge Colby of New York. Mitchell Palmer, after serving as Custodian of Alien Property, served for the latter part of the administration as Attorney General. Joshua W. Alexander served as Secretary of Commerce for a while, and John Barton Payne held the Interior portfolio, while Edwin T. Meredith took Houston's post in the Agricultural Department when Houston took over the Treasury which Glass resigned when elected Senator from Virginia. These short-term cabinet members were men of recognized ability. The New York Sun, a caustic critic of Wilson and accustomed to rail at the appointment of "too many Southern men," frankly admitted that this Treasury appointment went to Carter Glass "as naturally as water runs down hill."

Not less entitled to distinguished mention than members of the cabinet in the history of the Wilson administration was Joseph P. Tumulty, who for the full eight years served as Secretary to the President. Colonel E. M. House, a Texas Democrat, was long the confidential unofficial adviser of the President.

Wilson thought that Cleveland had erred tactically in not immediately convening Congress in 1893 and passing a tariff bill before taking up the silver question which divided the party in Congress. He therefore called Congress in special session in April, 1913, and on October 3rd signed the Underwood-Simmons Tariff bill, the best tariff measure, Democrats averred, since the Walker Tariff of 1846, and following closely in principle that famous tariff law. The average rate of duties was reduced by 40 to 26 per cent and articles entering into the necessary cost of living were placed on the free list or subjected to very low duties. In the Senate Poindexter and La Follette voted for the bill;

two Democrats opposed it. The lowering of tariff, according to Wilson's philosophy, was setting business free. A graduated income tax was part of this measure.

It was during the consideration of this tariff bill that Wilson charged that there was a numerous and insidious lobby in Washington operating to dictate the duties imposed. The mere consequent publicity was effective to destroy the lobby's power. It faded away.

Wilson's tariff record was completed on the last day of his term when he vetoed a high tariff bill passed by the Republican Congress which came into power in 1919.

The Federal Reserve System, the Glass-Owen Currency bill enacted into law, is considered by many leading authorities of the world as the best and most important fiscal measure in the history of the United States. The Republicans for years had been struggling ineffectually with the currency question. The best they could accomplish was the makeshift Aldrich-Vreeland bill; they seemed unable to get away from the idea of a central bank, a thing abhorrent to the majority of Americans from Washington's day to this, or to legislate free from the control of the money centers. Besides Carter Glass, chairman of the House banking committee, to whose ability and arduous labor too much honor cannot be given, and Robert L. Owen, chairman of the Senate Committee, the authors of the measure, the whole Democratic Congress contributed to perfect and enact the law. To Bryan the credit is given for the provision that the United States government issue and lend government notes to the Reserve banks instead of having the banks issue notes themselves; this centered control of the currency issue where it belonged—in the Treasury of the United States. This Federal Reserve measure, in the Wilson philosophy, set credit free.

Its passage against the strongest adverse influences working in every way possible demonstrated Democracy's freedom from the control of the banks and the moneyed class. A lobby against this bill assembled in Washington was dissipated by a mere demand that its members come out into the open. So thoroughly was the merit of the measure recognized by the whole country that it passed the House by a vote of nearly five to one, and the Senate 43 to 25.

But if its formal passage was non-partisan, the law itself was Democratic in principle and policy, in inception, in construction and in actual enactment. Its adoption was the second step in the Democratic program of constructive and progressive legislation.

The difficult Mexican problem left by Taft was worsened by the murder of President Madero, a few days before Wilson was inaugurated, by Huerta, chosen Provisional President by a military-controlled Congress.

The demand for intervention was strong and insistent, the criticism of the Wilson policy bitter. In the press of the country the Hearst newspapers led the attack; in Congress it was led by Senator Albert B. Fall of New Mexico.

Lincoln and Taft as well as Wilson had declared forbearance and generous sympathy toward the Mexican people. Indeed that had been our traditional policy toward our neighbor, even when negotiating peace with Mexico under Polk in 1848. Wilson said that we could not thrust our good offices upon the Mexicans, and pursued his policy of watchful waiting for Mexico to work out its own salvation, the traditional policy of the United States toward our southern neighbor. His demand for amends for the affronts offered our flag and our sailors was supported in the House 337 to 37. The seizing and holding of Vera Cruz, the sending of the Pershing expedition into Mexico to punish Villa, the fall of Huerta, the A. B. C. (Argentine, Brazil and Chile) conference, the recognition of Carranza (which the Springfield Republican asserted was worth a dozen Pan-American conferences) all had their effect and enhanced Pan-American as well as Mexican respect for, and confidence in, the United States. This bore fruit when later Germany made proposals to Mexico for action against the United States. In his Mexican policy Wilson said he was willing to "play for the verdict of mankind."

The Jones Philippine Act was a fulfillment of the promise in the Democratic platform. It gave a larger measure of freedom, a greater share in their own government to the Filipinos, and the hope of an early independence. The nation's attitude toward Hawaii, Porto Rico and to all the Latin-American islands and governments was, under the Democratic administration, characterized by generosity and a single purpose to help them, not ourselves. It marked the abandonment of Dollar diplomacy, a return to the true beneficent principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

The repeal of the act passed during the Taft administration exempting American coastwise ships from paying canal tolls was only keeping faith with the world. Wilson's position appealed to the nation's sense of honor; it was endorsed by many distinguished Republicans, and the repeal passed the House 247 to 162, the Senate 50 to 35. Yet partisan censure is still active.

The Adamson law, passed in the middle of the 1916 campaign, was another severely condemned act of the Democratic adminis-

tration, yet the Republicans in power for eight years since have neither repealed nor modified it. The extravagant denunciation of the Adamson law by the Republicans seems unjustified since the vote on it in the House, 239 to 56, showed how generally its wisdom or necessity was recognized. Even ex-Speaker Cannon voted for it. In the Senate only La Follette of the Republicans supported it. The law was later declared constitutional by the Supreme Court.

The Clayton Anti-Trust law and the Federal Trade Commission Act were other distinct steps forward in curbing the trusts and for the first time American law recognized that "Labor is not a commodity."

Other notable accomplishments were the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act, the securing of greater safety at sea by an international conference, the Seamen's Act abolishing peonage on ships, the Ship Registry Act and War Risk Insurance.

It was in the midst of an era of getting things done that the 1914 elections came on, the Democrats gaining 3 Senators, but having their House majority reduced from 150 to only 25. The Progressives of 1912 had returned to the Republican flock. Cannon, Longworth and McKinley regained their seats in the House lost in the *mêlée* of 1912.

The defeat, by a filibuster in the Senate, of the Ship Purchase Act was the most conspicuous reverse the Democratic progressive program suffered. Senators La Follette, Kenyon and Norris voted with the Democrats, but 7 Democrats opposed the bill. A similar bill passed the House 217 to 122, all Republicans present and 19 Democrats voting no. Had this bill been passed at the time we would have been in vastly better condition to meet the conditions beginning with the declaration of war. Republican denouncers of the measure in 1914 joined in 1917 in passing such a bill although billions of dollars were then added to the cost. As it was, the United States in 1916, for the first time in history, became the foremost shipbuilding country in the world.

The Agricultural Extension act and the Rural Credits Act were measures of tremendous value to the agricultural interests of the country, supplemented by the creation later of the Federal Land banks. The creation of the tariff commission, the ratification of the constitutional amendment for popular election of United States Senators and the beginning of a great program of road building were important progressive measures. To John H. Bankhead of Alabama and his associates every motorist in America owes gratitude. The law, known as the Federal Child Labor

law, excluding from interstate commerce goods produced by children employed at labor for too long hours, was a wise and just measure.

Wilson called for preparedness. He wanted an adequate army, but was not irrevocably committed to any one plan. As to the navy, he declared that America should have the "greatest navy in the world." The United States had both before he went out of office.

For so complete a performance of an announced program one must go back to Polk's administration. But as the Mexican War was to the World War so was Polk's task compared to Wilson's. The Republicans in the 1916 campaign sought to claim a share in the enactment of the Federal Reserve Act and credit for other Democratic achievements, claims more complimentary than just.

Among appointments to high office made by Wilson may be named that of Louis Brandeis to the Supreme Court, Walter Hines Page to England, Thomas Nelson Page to Italy, William G. Sharp to France, James W. Gerard to Germany, F. C. Penfield to Austria, David R. Francis to Russia, Henry Morgenthau to Turkey, Henry Van Dyke to The Hague, John W. Davis Solicitor General.

The Twenty-second Democratic National Convention met at St. Louis June 14, 1916. The call had urged the selection of delegates by primaries and the same method for the selection of National Committeemen, but with little or no effect. Called to order by Chairman of the National Committee W. F. McCombs, Governor Martin H. Glynn of New York as temporary chairman delivered a notably eloquent keynote speech.

A marked feature of this convention was the number of women delegates from the Western States. Another feature was the change in the personnel of the New York delegation; many familiar names were missing; Charles F. Murphy was a mere district delegate while William Church Osborn, Samuel Untermyer, Senator O'Gorman and Frank L. Polk were delegates at large; Alfred E. Smith and Robert F. Wagner were district delegates. James M. Cox and Atlee Pomerene were Ohio delegates at large.

The committee on resolutions had on it Rainey, Illinois; Stanley, Kentucky; Ransdell, Louisiana; Williams, Mississippi; Doremus, Michigan; Stone, Missouri; Walsh, Montana; Pittman, Nevada; Hollis, New Hampshire; Fitzgerald, New York; Pomerene, Ohio, and Martin, Virginia.

Senator Ollie James of Kentucky was permanent chairman, his speech a masterly review of the Democratic record of the preceding four years. Bryan made a great harmony speech. Judge Wescott again placed Wilson in nomination and Judson Harmon seconded the nomination. The rules were suspended and the nomination made by acclamation.

Senator Kern, in a twenty-five word speech, nominated Marshall and he was named by acclamation.

Cordell Hull of Tennessee, Carter Glass of Virginia, Wilbur F. Marsh of Iowa, W. B. Haldeman of Kentucky, J. M. McBeath of Mississippi, Mitchell Palmer of Pennsylvania, Hugh Wallace of Washington, and Patrick Quinn of Rhode Island were among the new National Committeemen. Vance McCormack was made chairman.

It was now the turn of the Democrats to point with pride, of the Republicans to deplore and view with alarm.

The Democratic platform reviewed in detail the work of the Wilson administration and based their claim to popular support on the laws passed under it. It declared for a broad, nonpartisan Americanism at home condemning hyphenated citizenship, for preparedness in army and navy, for neutrality with honor in international affairs and an association of nations formed to secure the peace of the world and the maintenance of national and individual rights. Pan-American concord, a continuation of the existing Mexican policy, the development of a merchant marine, good roads, a liberal policy toward government employees including an eight-hour day, a child labor law and safety appliances were advocated and the rights of labor recognized. An alteration of the Senate rules was favored which would permit of the prompt transaction of the nation's business, and the granting, by the states, of suffrage to women was recommended. One lengthy plank was devoted to what the administration had done and proposed to do for the farmer.

Wilson in his speech of acceptance assumed the offensive. The Republican Party, he said, had been put out of power because it was a practical and a moral failure; it had served special interests and lost touch with the nation as a whole; it was living in a past age under fixed illusions of greatness; it had framed tariff laws based on fear of foreign trade and a doubt of American skill and enterprise, and a tender regard for privilege; it had enacted anti-trust laws which hampered what it wished to foster, and staggered from one financial crisis to another under its banking laws which made stringency and panics cer-

tain and gave control of the large business operations of the country to small groups of bankers; it had ignored the farmer and catered to the "interests," had fought currency reform, had allowed Big Business to write the tariffs, and had become a party of masterly inactivity unable to meet the conditions of a new age.

The Republican Insurgents, Cummins and La Follette, Elihu Root, and the Organization men, Sherman, Fairbanks, and Burton, were much talked of, but when the Republican convention met Associate Justice Charles E. Hughes, acceptable, more or less, both to the Progressives and to the Regulars, had been agreed on. The Old Guard Republicans swore by all that was holy that they would not accept Roosevelt, and all the ardor and devotion of his followers could not break the phalanx. His friends in the convention reluctantly accepted Hughes. Warren G. Harding was the keynote speaker at the Republican convention. Charles W. Fairbanks was named for Vice-President.

The Progressives met and nominated Roosevelt and John M. Parker, Democrat of Louisiana, but both declined, Roosevelt later campaigning for Hughes and Parker for Wilson. With Parker many Progressives came over to the support of Wilson. The Socialist ticket was Allan J. Benson and G. R. Kirkpatrick, the Prohibitionists nominated Frank Hanly and Ira Landreth, the Socialist-Labor candidates were Arthur Reimer and Caleb Harrison.

Nothing better shows the straits to which the Wilson administration had reduced the Republican Party in 1916 than its platform. Platforms are often vague, but this one exceeds all others for vagueness, indefiniteness and evasiveness. On the tariff and on the Philippine question there was some positiveness. Outside of those questions and its deplorings and denunciations of Democratic courses, its planks might have been incorporated into the Democratic or Prohibition platform. All that it had failed to do in its sixteen years of power along progressive lines which the Democrats had accomplished in their four years of control was claimed or declared for.

In the Progressive and the Old Guard elements in the party and in the pro-Ally and pro-German elements among the voters there lay two Scyllas and two Charybdises to avoid. "We believe in American policies at home and abroad," is the platform's first plank. It declared for the "peace of justice and right," and the maintenance of "honest neutrality," and a "firm, consistent and courageous" foreign policy, and favored "pacific

settlement of international disputes" and a world court. It expressed deep sympathy for the Mexican people and horror and indignation at Mexican outrages; denouncing the policy pursued by the Democrats, it favored "aid in restoring order in Mexico."

The campaign did not drag although the Republican candidate injected little of the life into it that Roosevelt had put into the preceding one. Hughes was powerful at destructive criticism, but weak in constructive stuff. Some came to think his election meant war in two weeks; others, among them the German element, believed it would mean harmony between America and Germany. One could take one's choice for all Hughes' definiteness. He was accused of "making points"—campaigning like a lawyer trying a case.

His announcement of his foreign policy was: "I stand for the firm and unflinching maintenance of all the rights of American citizens on land and sea." Many German-Americans somehow interpreted this to mean that he would enforce American rights against the British blockade, and applauded. Others took it to be a declaration against the German submarines. The pro-Germans listened to Hughes who made no threats; the pro-Allies harkened to Roosevelt who breathed fire and brimstone. Hughes' failure to meet Hiram Johnson when in California, and his attending a "scab" luncheon while there, and their dire effect on his candidacy have been mentioned.

Wilson, according to Presidential traditions, took no very strenuous part in the battle, but made campaign speeches once a week from his residence. Some of his shots told. He referred to Roosevelt, without naming him, as "the vocal part of the Republican forces," and when the Wall Street betting odds were announced as ten to one against him, he remarked "They used to control the finances of the nation; now they only control the betting odds." To the disloyal O'Leary who wrote him an offensive letter Wilson replied, "I would feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them."

As in 1884 many leading Republicans such as Schurtz and Curtis came over to Cleveland, so in 1916 Charles W. Eliot, Francis J. Heney, Bainbridge Colby and many of their like joined the Wilson standard. The Hearst papers supported Hughes.

The opinion that Wilson had "kept us out of war" won him

many votes. But this alone would not have brought Democratic success. A factor in the campaign which has received far too little notice was the work of the Western Democratic headquarters at Chicago under Senator Walsh of Montana, having charge of all the states west of the Mississippi River and Ohio on the east. It was in this territory that the Democratic victory was won. With Senator Hollis of New Hampshire in charge of the Labor Bureau, Congressman Scott Ferris of Oklahoma in charge of organization, Mrs. George Bass head of the Women's bureau and William J. Cochran Director of Publicity, what the Democratic administration had done for Labor, for the Woman's cause and for Agriculture, and for the nation at large by the Federal Reserve Act, was hammered into the public mind by speeches, by literature, through both the daily and weekly newspapers all through the campaign.

For the first time since Blair and Kendall used them so in Jackson's time, the country weeklies were used as systematically as were the dailies. The fact was recognized that for governmental or political publicity, where voters and not purchasers are sought to be reached, where the dwellers on remote farms are as much aimed at as citizens of large cities, the country press as a whole is almost, if not fully, as valuable a medium of publicity as the daily papers.

When it was found that the Republicans had carried all the Eastern and mid-Western States except Ohio, it was taken as a foregone conclusion that Hughes was elected and the United States went to bed believing Wilson was defeated. News from California too late for early morning editions of papers told a different tale.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Wilson	9,129,606	277
Hughes	8,538,221	254
Hanly	220,500	
Benson	585,000	

The South and the West, the ancient alignment which had been so powerful from 1800 to 1860, had won together again. Twelve states had woman suffrage; Wilson carried all but Illinois and Oregon. Two years later he appeared before the Senate and urged concurrence in the Constitutional Amendment for Woman Suffrage, and the amendment was put into the Constitution during his administration. Twenty-five states had state-wide prohibition; Wilson carried all but Oregon, Iowa, West Virginia, Michigan and South Dakota.

It was during the Democratic administration that the Prohibition Amendment to the Constitution was adopted, but it was a nonpartisan achievement and had never been a party issue between the two major parties. Wilson's attitude was neutral toward the amendment, but he vetoed the Volstead Act as unreasonable. He originally favored local option, but did not think local option should be a party issue because he believed "that party programs of the highest consequence to the political life of the state and nation ought not to be thrust to one side and hopelessly embarrassed for long periods together by making a political issue of a great question that is essentially non-political, non-partisan, moral and social in its nature." This was his position when Governor of New Jersey and adhered to while President. But he signed the bill establishing war-time prohibition.

Washington, Adams, Jefferson and Madison all had dealt with a situation analogous to that which Wilson dealt with from August, 1914, until we entered the war three years later. With infinite forbearance Washington had established neutrality in European wars as the American policy and his successors followed him except in Madison's administration when America was forced into the war. The nation had borne more under these early Presidents than Wilson allowed it to suffer.

Wilson's efforts for peace were unsuccessful, but they served to clarify to some extent the situation, and to exhibit to the neutrals and to the world the aims and objects of the warring nations. The conflict of purposes and war aims of the belligerents were exposed or, if not exposed, shown to be hidden.

An added difficulty Wilson had to deal with was the fact that in his time our nation had among its citizens a tremendous number of natives or children of natives of the warring countries whose sympathies were warm for their kindred across the sea. Only extreme justification could unite the country in the war involving their respective fatherlands. At the last there were 50 votes in the House and 6 in the Senate against our declaration of war. Public opinion was slow in crystallizing and Wilson acted promptly when it did.

When America did enter the war so clear was the justice of the step that the conscience of the whole nation was satisfied, and nearly every South American country followed our lead. The United States under Wilson followed the Shakespearean adage; we were slow to enter the war, but in, the nation so bore itself that forever after the world will beware our entrance into a quarrel.

Wilson refused most positively to agree to a Congressional committee for the conduct of the war, profiting by Lincoln's experience. He held that the party placed in power by the people was responsible to them and should control. Yet he made use freely and wholeheartedly of many Republicans, entrusting them with great power—Herbert Hoover, Harry A. Garfield, Charles G. Dawes, Charles Schwab, Charles B. Warren, Frank A. Vanderlip, Benedict Crowell, Howard E. Coffin, E. R. Stettinius, Julius Rosenwald, Edward A. Deeds and many others who well might be named. Samuel Gompers, the head of Labor in the United States, was an able coadjutor. Wilson consulted, too, with Taft, Root, and his late opponent, Charles E. Hughes.

The Republicans named worked along with and in perfect accord with the Democrats, Bernard Baruch, Edward N. Hurley, Vance McCormack, Walker Hines and others. Politics were adjoined *sine die* with all of these.

The Democrats in Congress in the main worked in harmony with the Democratic President. One "little group of wilful men," as Wilson termed them, defeated one of his measures, the Armed Ship bill; others at times took counsel of the views of their constituencies rather than of the nation's good, but they were few in number and of small influence, and were more than compensated for by some Republicans who buried politics during the war period. The list of Democratic leaders in the Sixty-third, Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Congresses is a roll of honor, but some Democratic names will be missing. It was Julius Kahn, a California Republican, who steered the Selective Draft bill through the House of Representatives. Dawes was but stating a fact before the Congressional committee when he said that it had not been a Democratic or a Republican war, but had been an American war.

An extraordinary drive against the Democratic administration was made late in 1917. It was a plan to put powerful Republican leaders into responsible, if not controlling positions for the period of the war, a war body supplanting the constitutional authorities. Senator Chamberlain, Democrat of Oregon, joined forces with the movement and there were other Democrats of high position who were sympathetic at least. There was a concerted attack directed mostly against the War Department. The charges made were utterly refuted in a few months by the presence in France of more than twice the number of American soldiers that the department's critics had declared should be abroad by that date. They were disproved by any number of facts, and by the department's entire record of achievement.

Wilson met the challenge aggressively. He declared Chamberlain's statement and that the "military establishment of America had fallen down" as an astounding and absolutely unjustifiable distortion of the truth, and proved it untrue. Then the Overman act, by Senator Overman of North Carolina, was passed by Congress giving the President broad war administrative powers. The conspiracy was dissolved.

America under Wilson exercised to the full its due influence and authority in the joint affairs of this country and its associates in the war, just as it fully performed its part to the full in waging it. Billions of dollars were quickly raised for our own and our associates' use. Four million men were trained, and half of them sent over-seas in little more than a year's time. Before the next campaign began we would have had all of them at the front. Our man power, our woman power, our money power, our every line of effort, were organized and backed by our organized moral power. The selective draft, the wisest and fairest method of forming an army, was used. The ancient charge that republics were incapable of waging war with unity and undivided effort and council was disproved. America gave an example to the world which will last forever of united effort and aspiration. We "mustered not the forces of the party, but the forces of humanity." And Wilson brought about unity of action and command on the battle front in Europe.

The American President was a war force of incalculable power. His messages stating our war aims were translated into every language, distributed in every land, including the enemies', and read by friends and foes. They won the confidence of neutrals, inspired hope of victory in our associates and hope of bearable and enduring peace in the hearts of the common people of our enemies. America gave the world an ideal. Only to the military masters of European peoples did we give no hope; to them Wilson offered only inexorable defeat.

Wilson's fourteen points, elaborated in his message to Congress in June, 1918, had been called a Magna Charta of liberty to peoples.

Open covenants of peace openly arrived at; freedom of the seas; removal of economic barriers between nations; reduction of armaments; due consideration of the rights of the inhabitants of colonies; fair play to Russia; restoration of Belgium; French territory restored to France, including Alsace-Lorraine; adjustment of Italian frontiers; autonomy to the peoples of Austria-Hungary; territorial adjustments and guarantees to the Balkan

States; freedom to the nationalities under Turkish rule; an independent Poland; a League of Nations.

Within a week after his speech outlining the League of Nations the Germans sought an armistice. Then followed the refusal to make peace with the German military masters, then the flight of the Kaiser, a new German régime, the armistice, acknowledged by Hindenburg and the other German leaders as equivalent to an unconditional surrender, then peace with the German people.

It was in the midst of war without peace in sight that in October, 1918, Wilson appealed to the country to give him a Democratic Congress. The Republicans represented this as a slur on the Republicans and on the country. It was only an urging for unity of command and support; he had two more years to serve as President; give him instrumentalities of his own party. Lincoln had made a similar request in 1862 and in 1898 McKinley had made a like plea, supported by Roosevelt, who had said, "A refusal to sustain the President this year will in European eyes be read as a refusal to sustain the efforts of the Peace Commission"; Benjamin Harrison had said that in a Democratic victory Spain would see a gleam of hope.

Some Democrats criticized the appeal as bad politics, arousing Republicans to action and stimulating partisan loyalty among them. Yet if one will look over the newspapers of the day and other evidences of political activity, it clearly will appear that the Republicans were already intensely active in every district in the United States there was any hope of their carrying. The only effect the President's appeal could have was to arouse Democrats and Independents.

The plea was unsuccessful and the Sixty-sixth Congress was Republican, the seating of Newberry of Michigan—a national scandal—giving the Republicans the Senate by one vote. More than a dozen Republican Senators subsequently lost their own seats by reason of their voting to seat Newberry.

The Democratic President went in person to Paris to participate in the peace negotiations. Never has mortal man gone on so great a mission or weighted with such authority. The rulers of Europe greeted him as the august head of the United States Republic; the people of Europe welcomed him as the apostle of freedom, peace and justice, of right and civilization. The message he delivered comported with the power he represented. Nothing in history equals it in depth and inspiration, in

charity and justice save Lincoln's Gettysburg address. And Lincoln spoke only to one land and one people while Wilson spoke to both hemispheres and to all the nations of the earth.

The people heard him gladly, but the politicians, the statesmen bound by old nationalistic ideas and wedded to old traditions of selfish government, opposed his objects. From them he appealed, in effect, to their peoples and his ideas and ideals prevailed to a great extent. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, including the League of Nations, embodied the ideas and principles of the United States as represented by Woodrow Wilson. When later, with Wilson no longer a power, it was changed and some of his noble principles sacrificed, General Jan Smuts, the South African Commissioner, said that when all who had worked together in Paris on the treaty were met in Valhalla only Wilson could look the dead soldiers in the face.

The defeat of the treaty and the league in the Republican Senate, 57 for, to 37 against, and the rejection, in effect, of the League of Nations in the 1920 election, belong to world history, not party annals. The fact that the people of the United States did not demand its acceptance may be proof that the world is not yet ready for so fundamental an advance in international jurisprudence.

Wilson's political career had some interesting similitudes. Like Cleveland he was first nominated for office by bosses in response to imperative demands for reform and like Cleveland he fought the bosses. Like Jefferson and Lincoln he was elected President by aid of a split in the opposing party. He had the philosophy of Jefferson, the broad humanity of Lincoln, much of the masterfulness and stubbornness of Jackson and Cleveland. A master politician in the larger aspects, like John Quincy Adams he lacked some of the smaller political arts.

Fate gave him the greatest opportunity ever presented any man; he met it fully in every respect but one. Had his health and vigor remained he might not have failed in securing American approval of the League of Nations, and have rounded out completely an unparalleled record of national and international accomplishment.

Cranmer's apostrophe in the closing act of "Henry the Eighth" reads true as to Woodrow Wilson:—

"His honor and the greatness of his name
Shall be, and make new nations."

The map of Europe is a testimony to Wilson destined to endure

far longer than the arbitrary territorial establishments made by Napoleon or other conquerors, or by Old World diplomats in Congresses of Vienna.

With the President in ill health and a Congress Republican in both branches, the last two years of the Democratic administration were negative so far as Democratic legislation was concerned. But the executive departments carried on efficiently. The great army was brought back from Europe and disbanded along with those soldiers who never got overseas. Our share in the work of occupation of enemy territory was performed. The demobilization of the nation was a much more difficult task, yet it was accomplished. The Treasury began to pay off the war debt and before March, 1921, the debt had been reduced \$2,776,701,648.00, and in addition large accretions made to the sinking fund.

On March 4, 1921, an epoch of eight of the greatest years of American history ended.

CHAPTER XXXI

DEMOCRACY SEARCHING FOR A LEADER

Successors to Great Presidents—Democratic Search and Republican Blind Acceptance in 1920—Twenty-Third Democratic National Convention—Republican Convention—Cox-Harding Campaign—Back to Normalcy—Normalcy—The New York Convention of 1924—The 1924 Campaign—The Afro-American Vote—Democratic White Majorities in Losing Campaigns—Democratic Versus Republican Principles—Finale.

JEFFERSON resigned his leadership to his disciple Madison, who turned it over to his logical successor; Jackson made Van Buren his heir just as Roosevelt dictated Taft to his party. There were no particular shoulders upon which Wilson's mantle would naturally fall, and he refrained from indicating any choice. Wilson was an invalid, and thus Democracy was left without a leader in 1920. There was much good timber, but no towering oak.

Since 1920 Democracy has been searching for a leader. Not all Democrats have been searching. Some have been seeking to put this man over, or that man under. But the body of the party, the rank and file have looked the candidates over, earnestly hoping for a leader or for one who would develop into a great leader.

The 1920 convention was such a search, and although the wrangling of factions in New York in 1924 attracted all the publicity given the convention's proceedings, the same search was conscientiously being made there by a large number of delegates. No Senatorial cabal at a secret meeting near dawn in a mephitic hotel room named Cox in 1920 nor Davis in 1924. The Democrats in convention were neither dictated to, stampeded nor led by the nose. However confused and turbulent may have been the methods by which these two conventions arrived at their conclusions, the conclusions arrived at were those of the delegates openly and honestly reached.

The Twenty-third Democratic National Convention, 1094 delegates, met at San Francisco June 8, 1920, and sat nine days. Called to order by Vice-Chairman of the National Committee, Bruce Kremer, Homer S. Cummings of Connecticut was chosen

temporary chairman. His keynote speech was an able and reasoned eulogy of the Democratic administration and of Woodrow Wilson, and an earnest advocacy of the League of Nations.

The rules adopted did not mention the two-thirds rule but Senator Robinson, without objection, announced that a two-thirds vote was requisite to a nomination. The unit rule was adopted, excepting, however, district delegates selected by state laws not subjecting them to the authority of state committees or conventions.

Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas was elected permanent chairman. For a polished, logical and caustic arraignment of the opposition his keynote speech is worth the study of any convention orator. "It was a shame to the Senate," he said, "that it consumed a greater length of time in defeating the Peace Treaty than our Army and Navy took to win the war."

The first real action of the convention was to direct that the National Committee should consist of one man and one woman from each State. Telegrams were sent to various governors commending their favoring Woman's Suffrage or urging them to aid the adoption of the suffrage amendment by their states. The women delegates were very active in all the convention proceedings.

The at-sea-ness of the delegates was evidenced by the number of nominations for President, fourteen candidates being nominated and twenty-three voted for on the first ballot. The silence of the White House and the expectation, vain and utterly unwarranted in the face of his positive declination to interfere, of some word from the President, largely was responsible for the uncertainty prevailing.

William G. McAdoo, late Secretary of the Treasury, Mitchell Palmer, late Attorney General, and James M. Cox, thrice elected Governor of Ohio, had long been and remained the three leading candidates. The candidacy of McAdoo was much handicapped by the fact that he was the son-in-law of the President; the foolish cry of the "Crown Prince" forced his friends practically to run him as a "drafted" candidate, he himself declaring that he was not a candidate and even requesting that he be not placed in nomination. Palmer's activities as Attorney General, especially his campaign against enemy aliens, gave him strength, and Cox's record as Governor and his strength in Ohio greatly recommended him, especially in view of Harding being the Republican nominee.

In the order their names appear the following were placed in nomination for President—Robert L. Owen of Oklahoma; James W. Gerard, New York; Homer S. Cummings, Connecticut; Gilbert M. Hitchcock, Nebraska; Mitchell Palmer, Pennsylvania; Edwin T. Meredith, Iowa; James M. Cox, Ohio; Alfred E. Smith, New York; Edward I. Edwards, New Jersey; Andrew J. Volstead, Minnesota; F. S. Simmons, North Carolina; Carter Glass, Virginia; John W. Davis, West Virginia, and Francis Burton Harrison, New York.

On the first ballot McAdoo received 266 votes, Palmer, 256, Cox, 134, Smith, 109, the remaining 329 votes being for favorite sons and scattering. The South was divided between McAdoo and Cox, with the former a little the favorite; Palmer's whole strength was from the East; Smith received New York's 90 with scattered votes from Illinois and Massachusetts. Cox passed Palmer on the seventh ballot and McAdoo on the twelfth, the vote then being Cox, 404, McAdoo, 375, Palmer, 201. After the thirtieth ballot a motion to drop the candidate receiving the lowest vote was rejected by a four to one vote. McAdoo received his highest vote, 467, on the fortieth ballot, Cox receiving 490. On the forty-second ballot Cox received a majority vote, 540. Before the announcement of the forty-fourth ballot states changed their votes to Cox and the nomination was made unanimous.

General Lawrence D. Tyson of Tennessee, Governor S. V. Stewart of Montana, Senator James Hamilton Lewis of Chicago, David R. Francis of Missouri, Governor Alfred E. Smith of New York, E. L. Doheny of California and Franklin D. Roosevelt of New York were placed in nomination for Vice-President. Doheny's candidacy was the work of a few friends associated with him in the oil business; it had no political significance. All the candidates withdrew in Roosevelt's favor and he was named by acclamation.

Carter Glass was chairman of the platform committee; among his associates were Marshall, Beckham, Albert Ritchie, Walsh of Massachusetts, Walsh of Montana, Pat Harrison, Bryan, Bourke Cockran, and Pomerene.

Bryan made a hard fight in committee and before the convention for the incorporation into the platform of five planks—a dry plank demanding enforcement of the Volstead law and no increase of alcoholic content in beverages allowed to be sold; establishment of a national publication under joint control of the two leading parties with equal division of space in its columns;

prevention and punishment of profiteering; no universal compulsory military training, and an amendment to the Constitution providing for ratification of treaties by a majority vote in the Senate. Bryan's dry plank was rejected 930 to 156. A plank proposed by Bourke Cockran for the sale of cider, light wines and beer, the states to fix the alcoholic content, was rejected 727 to 356. An endorsement of a Soldiers' Bonus law was rejected *viva voce*. There was in this convention's whole proceedings no marked division along old lines between the Cleveland and Bryan elements or along sectional or geographical lines.

Some notable women were placed on the National Committee: Miss Elizabeth Marbury of New York, Judge Florence Allen of Ohio and Miss Charl Williams of Tennessee. Miss Williams, elected by the convention vice-chairman of the National Committee, was the first woman to hold distinguished office in the organization of either of the two great parties.

George White of Ohio was made national chairman, W. D. Jamieson director of finance and W. J. Cochran director of publicity.

The exposure during the Republican convention that tremendous sums of money had been spent in securing support for the two leading candidates for the nomination, Governor Lowden and General Wood, destroyed their chances and left the Republicans in a muddle. The impasse was broken by the nomination of Warren G. Harding, late Governor and at the time United States Senator from Ohio.

Some time before the convention met, Harry M. Daugherty of Ohio had told some friends, if a widely current story is to be believed, how the convention was going to become hopelessly deadlocked, and how in some early morning hour, after the convention had been adjourned for the day, there would be a gathering of some party leaders in some smoke-filled hotel room and Harding would be decided on, and would be nominated when the convention reconvened. From several published reports of participants in such a meeting, it happened exactly that way.

It took only one ballot to nominate Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts for Vice-President; Senator Lenroot of Wisconsin was his chief competitor.

The Republican convention was controlled by the Republican Senatorial cabal, including Boies Penrose, ill in bed at his home in Philadelphia, but in constant telephonic touch with the convention. The keynote speech of Henry Cabot Lodge thoroughly deserves the title bestowed on it at the time—a "Hymn of Hate"

of Wilson. If extreme admiration of friends and extravagant condemnation by enemies are companion criteria of the greatness of a man, Wilson was honored by both conventions in 1920, one exalting him to empyrean heights, the other consigning him to abysmal depths.

Independent Republican journals described the work of the convention as the "perfect flowering of Old Guard politics," as putting the party back twenty years. Yet the party promptly rallied to its candidate. Taft and twenty-nine other Republican leaders, advocates of the League of Nations, swung into line, issuing a signed statement that they believed that the League had a better chance of adoption with a Republican success than with a Democratic one.

The platforms of the two parties were each good, of their kind, but the League of Nations was the issue that appeared to cut the greatest figure in the campaign. Cox made a brilliant and aggressive fight. He soon showed that he was not a "wet" candidate and his able advocacy of the League of Nations won Wilson's endorsement. Cox charged the Republicans with collecting huge sums of money for campaign funds and supported it by evidence of tremendous assessments. Will H. Hayes, Republican campaign manager, admitted to a budget of \$3,000,000, maybe \$500,000 more. The developments since then have destroyed any worth that might have been attached to statements made of Republican receipts and expenditures.

Harding let it be known that he would not be an autocrat in the Presidency, such as Wilson was accused of being. His administration was to be a government by the "best minds" of his party. "Back to Normalcy" was his slogan, and with that lotus-eating cry a tired people, tired with the strain of war and self-denial, weary of the high tension of leading the world, elected Harding by a vote of 16,152,000 to 9,147,000 for Cox—404 electoral votes to 127. The Prohibition Party polled 189,000, Debs, Socialist, 919,000 votes.

Then ensued the régime of the sinister Daugherty, Attorney General, the sordid Fall, Secretary of the Interior, the careless Denby, Secretary of the Navy, with his equally careless assistant, Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. Harding had unlimited and loyal confidence in those he believed his friends. In a few months there were more shameful scandal in our government, more graft and corruption and more ineptitude and carelessness than even the most credulous critic had ever imagined against the whole eight years of the preceding Democratic administration. There was

graft even in the Disabled Veterans' Bureau. The courts of the United States are yet engaged in 1928 in recovering government property and convicting the transgressors, as a result of the work of Senator Walsh of Montana and other Democrats for investigation and recovery.

William G. McAdoo and Alfred E. Smith by their friends had been kept before the public as candidates for the Democratic nomination in 1924 ever since the 1920 convention. A large element of the party looked on Oscar Underwood as a better candidate than either and likely to win the nomination by a deadlock between the other two. John W. Davis and Senator Ralston of Indiana were prominent dark horses. The fact that McAdoo had represented as attorney Edward L. Doheny in some Mexican oil matters, although legal, legitimate and proper, blighted his candidacy fearfully. The openly avowed opposition of Underwood to the Ku Klux Klan lost him many delegates from the section in which should have lain his greatest strength, the South. Smith's religion was objectionable to a considerable element of the party and his alleged attitude on the liquor question was unpopular with a great many Democrats. Each of the three leading aspirants were, therefore, in spite of admirable records and qualities, heavily handicapped in the race for the nomination.

The Twenty-fourth Democratic National Convention, 1098 delegates, met at Madison Square Garden, New York City, June 24, 1924. Called to order by Cordell Hull, chairman of the national committee, Senator Pat Harrison of Mississippi was named temporary, Senator Thomas J. Walsh of Montana permanent chairman. The rules of the last Democratic convention, "including the two-thirds rule for the nomination of candidates for President and Vice-President," were adopted.

There were two sharp contests over the platform. The committee reported a plank favoring the removal of the League of Nations question as a party issue by having it submitted to the people of the United States in a great referendum. A minority report called for the explicit endorsement of the League. After a spirited debate the majority report stood by a vote of 742 to 353.

The other fight was on the Ku Klux Klan resolution. The majority report was a general declaration for freedom of religion, speech and press, the old constitutional guarantees; the minority report condemned all secret political societies and named the Ku Klux Klan. The majority report prevailed by one vote, 542 to 541.

The estimates of the strength of the Klan in the party and in the convention differed widely. There were Democrats who, impressed with the influence attributed to the Klan in various States, greatly overestimated its power. Others regarded the Ku Klux movement as a passing phase in our national life which would endure only a few years just as similar organizations and movements had in the past, the Anti-Masons in the 30's, the Know-Nothings in the 50's and the A. P. A.'s in the 90's.

Many candidates were placed in nomination for President, Underwood, McAdoo, Smith, Robinson of Arkansas, Carter Glass of Virginia, Senator Saulsbury of Delaware, ex-Secretary David Houston, Senator Samuel Ralston of Indiana, Governor Jonathan Davis of Kansas, Governor Ritchie of Maryland, Senator Ferris of Michigan, James M. Cox of Ohio, Governor Charles M. Bryan of Nebraska, Governor Brown of New Hampshire, Governor George Silzer of New Jersey and John W. Davis of West Virginia.

The first ballot was, McAdoo, 431, Smith, 241, Underwood, 42, Davis, 31. McAdoo's support came mainly from the South and West; Smith's from the North and East; Pennsylvania and Illinois were divided. The divisional lines of the subdivisions of the party, Western, Southern and Eastern, were visible but not inflexible at the convention, and showed in the voting. The old lines which had divided the party from 1896 until Wilson's election had practically disappeared. Bryan was influential, but far from a dominant force.

Sixty-four ballots brought gradual but not decisive changes—McAdoo, 438, Smith, 307, Davis, 123. Ralston and Cox then withdrew and on the sixty-ninth ballot McAdoo reached his highest vote, 530. From that point he dropped slowly until on the eighty-eighth ballot Smith received 362, McAdoo, 315.

All candidates offered to release the delegates from pledges and instructions except that McAdoo coupled his consent with the provisions that the unit rule be abrogated, the lowest candidate dropped on each ballot and a majority elect.

The great change began on the one hundredth ballot, Davis, 203, Smith, 351, McAdoo, 190. The following ballot showed an effort by one element to substitute Underwood for Smith, countered by a transfer of McAdoo votes to Davis—Davis, 316, Underwood, 229, Smith, 121, McAdoo, 52. The succeeding ballot disclosed a move to bring forward Senator Thomas J. Walsh—Davis, 415, Underwood, 317, Walsh, 123. The one hundred and

third and last ballot was Davis, 844, Underwood, 102, Walsh, 54. The nomination was made unanimous.

Before any nominations were made for Vice-President, Senator Walsh, whose conduct and presiding office had won him great popularity and confidence, was offered the place and declined it. John C. Greenway of Arizona, Alvin Owsley of Texas, George L. Berry of Tennessee, George Silzer of New Jersey, Mrs. Leroy Springs of South Carolina, Governor Davis of Kansas, Bennett Clark of Missouri, W. A. Gaston of Massachusetts, ex-Secretary Meredith of Iowa, James W. Gerard of New York, William S. Flynn of Rhode Island and Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska were placed in nomination for Vice-President. Bryan was nominated on the first ballot, Berry of Tennessee receiving 208 votes.

Clem L. Shaver of West Virginia was made chairman of the National Committee, Emily Newell Blair of Missouri, Samuel B. Amidon of Kansas and Frank Hague of New Jersey, vice-chairmen.

President Coolidge had easy sailing in securing the Republican nomination, Charles E. Hughes being in the cabinet and only Hiram Johnson and La Follette opposing him. The "executive momentum" carried him over on the first ballot, 1,109 to 34 for La Follette and 10 for Johnson. Governor Lowden was nominated for Vice-President, but declining Charles G. Dawes was named on the third ballot.

The La Follette Progressives held a convention on July 4th, before the Democratic convention had made its choice and nominated Robert M. La Follette and Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana. La Follette announced that he ran as an Independent, not as the leader of a third party.

Before the Democratic convention had met the Democrats were in hopeful mood. Coolidge's vote-getting capacity had not then been demonstrated, and the oil disclosures were believed to have thoroughly discredited the Republican Party. But while the convention was sitting there came the news of the indictment and promised vigorous prosecution of Fall, Doheny and Sinclair. This and the definite announcement of La Follette that he would make the race, combined with their own divided counsels cut Democratic hopes in half. That La Follette would draw votes from both the old parties was admitted, but the discouraging fact was that he would simply lessen Republican majorities or pluralities while he would cost the Democrats electoral votes. His candidacy nullified to a great extent the value of Charles W. Bryan on the Democratic ticket.

There were five other tickets in the field, Prohibition, American, Common Land, Socialist Labor and Workers' Party. Their combined vote was less than 150,000. La Follette's candidacy caught most of the votes antagonistic to the old parties.

Heavily handicapped by the temper the convention had left the party in and by the depression which soon settled on the rank and file of it as well as on the leaders, John W. Davis made as gallant a fight as was possible. The election returns tell the tale.

	<i>Popular Vote</i>	<i>Electoral Vote</i>
Coolidge	15,725,016	382
Davis	8,386,503	136
La Follette	4,822,856	13

Davis carried the solid South and Oklahoma. La Follette carried Wisconsin.

The Democratic minority in Congress, never controlling either House, from 1921 on, has been probably the most effective minority in Congressional history. Unable by itself to block anything, except where a two-thirds vote was required, yet in conjunction with Republican insurgents at times and at other times with the soundest and broadest of the regulars, the Democratic minority has driven three cabinet members from office, blocked the confirmation of one cabinet appointee, and exerted a great influence over legislation for the last eight years. Its exposure of the oil and other scandals, its part in the recovery of the oil lands, and its tremendous power as a corrective force in government entitle the party to the respect and gratitude of the nation.

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One phase of American politics, which cannot be passed over in any political history of the United States, is the Afro-American vote. The white voters divide on national issues, but with the vast majority of the colored voters, whatever section of the country the voter may live in, be he farmer or manufacturer, producer or consumer, merchant or laborer, employer or employee, he votes the Republican ticket. Some of the wiser and broader minded of the race have gotten away from this hide-bound practice; more would do so, it is reliably stated, if loss of caste and influence with their fellows did not follow.

Governor Seymour in 1868 received, there can be no doubt, many more white votes than were given General Grant. Grant's majority in 1872 was less than the colored vote of the nation and but little, if any, in excess of the colored vote in the Southern States. Tilden received 264,000 more votes than Hayes, near a million more white votes. Garfield with hundreds of thousands

of colored votes received only 10,000 plurality over Hancock. Cleveland in each of his three campaigns received hundreds of thousands more white votes than his opponents. Not until the 1920 election did the Republican Party secure an undoubted majority of the white votes of the country, although enough Democrats voted for Roosevelt in 1904 to give him a probable white majority.

These facts, viewed in any aspect, are of vital interest. The solid Democratic South and the certain Republican Northeast fairly balance each other, but the Democrats have nothing to balance against this other sure and certain Republican asset; it is a heavy handicap. This advantage of the Republicans, coupled with their always vastly larger campaign funds, makes every fight an uphill fight for the Democrats.

A political diagnostician has pronounced that the Democratic Party is subject to periodic folly while the Republican Party is afflicted with chronic materialism. Between the two the choice may be difficult at times.

Practice and precedent, the War between the States and all the other great and small developments of one hundred and forty years have settled, or modified in application, one after another, many of the policies over which the Democratic Party and its opponents have disagreed. But the fundamental difference still subsists.

The Republican Party, as did the Federalist, believes in a material, paternal government conferring favors to certain important interests through whose subsidized prosperity the benefits are diffused to the whole people, "trickling down to them," as Roosevelt expressed it in 1912. It is an adaptation of the old English polity—a government directly for the noble, the privileged, the rich, and indirectly for the mass. Fisher Ames described it: Wrap up the influence of the moneyed class in the government; it was Hamilton's policy as stated by Lodge: A strong and permanent class bound to the government by immediate and personal pecuniary interest. It is their honest theory that such a government works out for the best of the whole people; that various industries should be fostered, favored, protected, subsidized by the government.

The Democrats still believe, in principle, in the Constitution as originally framed and emphasized by the first ten amendments, as altered by later amendments and adapted to modern conditions. Their theory in its practical application is well stated in Van Buren's message, defining even better than Jackson the

Jacksonian dogma: This government was established to give security to the people under republican institutions and not to confer special favors on individuals or classes of them; it is not its legitimate object to make men or industries rich or give legislation in favor of particular pursuits. It is Jefferson's equal opportunity, no privilege. It harks, in principle, back toward Madison's position taken in the first debate in the first Congress: Industries and labor left to themselves will be directed to objects most productive more certainly than the wisdom of the most enlightened legislature could direct them.

The Democrats believe that economic legislation and administration, like that of justice, should apply equally and directly to all. The public land policies of the parties illustrate the antagonistic ideas. From Jefferson down the Democrats have favored letting actual settlers obtain, directly from the government, homes out of the public lands, or conserving them for the benefit of the nation. Hamilton and his present-day disciples have consistently favored selling it in great blocks to syndicates, to smelter trusts or oil magnates, and have the nation profit through their development or exploitation of it.

There are differences enough, fundamental and immediate, to sharply define the line between Democracy and Republicanism. Wiseacres may profess to see none, but they are perfectly apparent to the protected interests, those that seek governmental advantages and favors. Hence the enormous sums contributed to Republican campaign funds, even in 1904 when they disliked the candidate; hence the astonishingly large contributions to Smith's campaign in Illinois for the Senatorship and to Vare's in Pennsylvania. Thus is explained Sinclair's \$260,000 to the Republican fund. These particular contributions were not bribes, but support to governmental policies the donors favored.

By its work in framing the government, by its work in establishing it on a sure foundation, by its administration of it for sixty years of its earlier life, by its work as a minority party, coupled with the accomplishments of the Cleveland and Wilson administrations, must the Democratic Party be judged.

Its history demonstrates fully its indestructibility, its ability to "come back" after disastrous defeats. That is due to its basic principles being sound and thoroughly American. It has made some mistakes, in abandoning and in applying those principles. Like other minority parties it sometimes has made concessions of principle to expediency and adopted for a time fads and isms to attract the support of the other elements of the

opposition. Its current policies have at times been unwise or untimely; it has not always been wisely led, not always true to its leaders. But its history contains no such reversal of principle as Federalist, Whig and Republican records exhibit.

The party has established imperishable principles in an imperishable record of government. It has built an indestructible structure upon what Madison wrote into the Constitution. It has placed at its own and the nation's head such lasting living forces as Jefferson, Jackson and Wilson.

POSTSCRIPT

SINCE this story was closed the Twenty-fifth Democratic National Convention has been held. Party conditions, sectional and emotional influences, pre-convention mutterings and threats in 1928 were very similar to the sectionalism and dissension rampant in 1860. But the temper and course of action pursued at Houston were in direct contrast to those of the Charleston meeting.

Probably the most distinguished phenomena of the Houston convention were the demonstration of the silent strength of liberalism in the South and the exhibition of rational political judgment by the whole representative body of Democracy. That the convention correctly represented the real sense of the party is evidenced by the fact that practically every statesman and functioning leader of the party in the South and in the other sections of the country are supporting the convention's decisions.

The platform adopted made no departure from Democratic principles, but did make advances to meet current conditions, progression not dissimilar to such as was made under Jefferson, Madison, Jackson, Polk, Cleveland and Wilson.

Grover Cleveland himself might have written the tariff plank. It is the Cleveland tariff policy of 1888, in effect. That practical-minded statesman dealt with conditions, not mere theories.

The historical aspect of the nominations is particularly interesting. Governor Smith exhibits a remarkable combination of the careers and the qualities of the two New York Governors who have reached the Presidency.

For a long period he has led the New York Democracy, as Van Buren did, holding the up-state and the Tammany elements in harmonious working order, the director and leader of both, the tool or subserver of neither. His political leadership has equalled Van Buren's in effectiveness and continuance.

Yet his manner and method have been in striking contrast to Van Buren's. His most fatuous critic has never accused him of non-committalism; political tact, diplomacy, conciliation, have

not characterized him. Yet he has been notably successful as an adjuster of differences, but like Jackson, more convincing than persuasive, he has used the force of popular will with irresistible effect.

His procedures have exhibited rather the downright directness of Cleveland; his leadership has the Cleveland dominance; his honesty has the Cleveland bluntness. "What shall we do to meet these charges?" Cleveland's managers asked him. "Tell the truth," was the instant reply. "Have you changed your views on prohibition?" was inquired of Smith. "I have not," was the immediate and incisive answer. There are other similarities.

Senator Robinson brings to the ticket much of what Allen G. Thurman brought to the Democratic ticket in 1888—a nationwide reputation for honesty and courage of the highest type coupled with long experience and distinguished ability in Congress, and also a geographic and economic representational balance.

Cleveland and Thurman, although the most corrupt campaign in our history was waged against them, received nearly half a million more votes than their Republican opponents. The Corrupt Practices law and other changed conditions preclude a repetition of such a perversion of popular judgment as occurred in 1888. In that particular, assuredly, history will not repeat itself.

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